JUDGMENT & ORDER : T. Vaiphei, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 8-4-2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, North Tripura District (as known earlier), Dharmanagar in S.T. No. 37(NT/D) of 2012 convicting the four appellants U/s 148/302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentencing them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.5,000/- each and, in default thereof, to suffer another rigorous imprisonment for six months for their conviction U/s 302 read with Section 149 IPC. They were also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year for their conviction U/s 148 IPC. Both the sentences are to run concurrently. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be noticed at the outset. It is the case of the prosecution that one Abdul Salam, s/o late Abdul Jalil (the deceased-victim) of Pekucherra, PS Panisagar, North Tripura lodged an FIR with the Officer-in-Charge, Panisagar Police Station on 23-1-2010 stating that on 22-1-2010 at about 8.30 PM, the deceased, aged about 60 years, along with two others were returning to his house from Jalebassa market, but when they were about to reach the house of Sona Miah, 20/30 persons attacked the deceased with sharp cutting weapons on his head thereby causing bleeding injury and left him on the road in a critically injured conditions. Some local people took him to Panisagar Hospital and thence to Dharmanagar Hospital. He was thereafter taken to Silchar for further treatment where he died the next day. According to the ejahar, on 13-1-2010 at about 6 PM, there was quarrel between his cousin brother named Joinal Uddin and Uttam Paul and with him his brother named Abdul Matin was also there. At the time of this quarrel, (i) Panki Miah, (ii) Kuddus Miah, (iii) Abdul Hasim, (iv) Abdul Kadir, (v) Sanjoy Das, (vi) Bijit Das, (viii) Aptab Ali, (8) Main Uddin, (ix) Joinal Uddin, (x) Abdul Monif and (xi) Salim Miah of their own village armed with dao i.e. sharp cutting weapon, lathis, etc. in their hands were present. Since then, they stopped talking to them. Their behaviour indicated that they would harm his father, which they eventually did. On the basis of the complaint so lodged, the police initially registered a regular FIR being PNS PS Case No. 07/2010 U/s 148/149/326/307 IPC and investigated the case. in their hands were present. Since then, they stopped talking to them. Their behaviour indicated that they would harm his father, which they eventually did. On the basis of the complaint so lodged, the police initially registered a regular FIR being PNS PS Case No. 07/2010 U/s 148/149/326/307 IPC and investigated the case. After the death of the deceased, the offence punishable U/s 302 IPC was added for investigation. On completion of the investigation, the police charge-sheeted against 17 accused, namely, (1) Surman Ali, (2) Bijit Das (A-1), (3) Sanjoy Das (A-2), (4) Fanki Miah @ Pankhi Miah, (5) Abdul Kuddus, (6) Salim Miah @ Salim Uddin (A-4), (7) Karim Uddin, (8) Abdul Sukur (A-3), (9) Aftab Ali, (10) Abdul Hasim, (11) Abdul Jainal, (12) Abdul Kadir, (13) Atabur Rahaman, (14) Abdul Manaf, (15) Taj Uddin, (16) Helal Uddin and (17) Sanjoy @ Sujan Das U/s 148/149/326/307/302 IPC. 3. On commitment, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dharmangar, North Tripura (as it then was) framed the charges against all the said 17 accused U/s 148/149/302 IPC, to which all of them pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial, some 19 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution to substantiate the charges against the accused. On the closure of the prosecution witnesses, the accused were examined U/s 313 CrPC and denied their complicity in the crime. No evidence was, however, adduced on their behalf. It may be noticed at this stage that four accused, namely, Karim Uddin, Aftab Ali, Atabur Rahman and Abdul Manaf were acquitted at the stage of their examination U/s 313 CrPC for lack of evidence. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted (1) Bijit Das (A-1), Sanjay Das @ Sujan (A-2), (3) Abdul Sukkur (A-3) and (4) Mohd. Salim @ Salim Miah (A-4) U/s 148/149/302 IPC, but acquitted (1) Abdul Kuddus, (2) Fankhi Miah, (3) Surman ali, (4) Abdul Hasim, (5) Abdul Jainal, (6) Abdul Kadir, (7) Taj Uddin, (8) Helal Uddin and Sanjay Das s/o Samarendra Das for lack of convincing evidence. Aggrieved by their convictions, A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 prefer this jail appeal. 4. As the trial court relied on the oral testimonies of PW 1, 2, 6, 8, 15 and 6 in convicting the four appellants, we will straightaway proceed to examine their evidence. Aggrieved by their convictions, A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 prefer this jail appeal. 4. As the trial court relied on the oral testimonies of PW 1, 2, 6, 8, 15 and 6 in convicting the four appellants, we will straightaway proceed to examine their evidence. Since PW-15 is the informant and the son of the deceased, let us first examine his evidence. He testified that about 2 and half years ago at 8/8.30 PM, his father was returning from market and when he was about to reach the house of Suna Miah, he was assaulted by some miscreants. He further testified that he got the information from Suruj Ali whereupon he rushed to the spot and found his father in injured condition and that he then shifted him to Panisagar Hospital, thence to Dharmanagar and thereafter to Silchar where he died the next day. According to this witness, about one week before the incident, his father had quarrel with Abdul Hasim on the issue of timber, and a village bichar was held for this, but they did not attend the bichar. It is his evidence that after the bichar, one day A-1, A-2, Sujoy Das (non-appellant), Abdul Kuddus (non-appellant), Surman Ali (non-appellant), Pankhi Miah (non-appellant) and A-4, armed with dao and lathi came to attack them and seeing their mood, they fled away. He testified that he suspected that A-1, A-2 and A-4 and the said accused assaulted his father and died as a result thereof and that he lodged the FIR, which was drafted by the daroga and signed by him after it was read over to him. In cross, he admitted that there was no eye-witness to the incident and that he also did not see the incident. Thus, in the absence of any eye witness, the question is whether there are circumstantial evidence to prove the case of the prosecution. Before proceeding further, we may refer to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 to prove the guilt of an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, which are as follows: "13. Before proceeding further, we may refer to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 to prove the guilt of an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, which are as follows: "13. The prosecution case is based on the circumstantial evidence and it is a well-settled proposition of law that when the case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." 5. In the instant case, the two circumstantial evidences, which can be conceived of for successful prosecution of A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 for the offence charged against them may be described as under: 1. The murder of the deceased took place a week after the quarrel between the deceased and Abdul Hasim and the other accused. 2. A-1 and 2 dropped into to the house of PW-1 on the date of the incident at about 8 PM asking her to switch off the light behind her house on the ground saying that they had some work to do and a short while later the deceased was assaulted which resulted in his death. 6. From the evidence of PW-15, the prosecution would like to link the murder of the deceased with the incident which had taken place a week before his death in which he had a quarrel with one Abdul Hasim on the issue of timber, for which a village bichar was convened, but nobody (including the deceased) attended. 6. From the evidence of PW-15, the prosecution would like to link the murder of the deceased with the incident which had taken place a week before his death in which he had a quarrel with one Abdul Hasim on the issue of timber, for which a village bichar was convened, but nobody (including the deceased) attended. According to PW-15, it was after the bichar, one day, the accused i.e. A-1, A-2, A-4, Sujoy Das, Abdul Kuddus, Surman Ali and Pankhi Miah, armed with dao, lathi went to attack them, but seeing their mood, they fled away. This apparently aroused his suspicion that it was the above-named accused including A-1, A-2 and A-4, who murdered his father. This then takes us to the evidence of PW-16, who is the daughter of the deceased. She deposed that on 23-1-2010 at about 8.30 PM, she got the information about the assault on her father whereupon she rushed to the place of occurrence and found him in an injured condition on his head; the incident occurred near the house of Suna Miah. She also deposed that before the incident, there was quarrel on two occasions between her father and Abdul Kuddus, Surman Ali, Abdul Hasim, Abdul Kadir, Pankhi Miah and some others and that she was, as such, of the opinion that the above-named persons assaulted her father leading to his death. It may be noticed that in the testimony of PW-16, she did not implicate A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 in the murder of her father. The question to be determined now is whether there is any convincing evidence to link the murder of the deceased with the incident of quarrel between the deceased and the said Abdul Hasim (who was acquitted by the trial court) which took place about one week earlier? 7. PW-2 is the sister of the deceased and deposed that before the incident, the son of Abdul Jalil (the deceased) gave them some timbers in connection with the marriage of her daughter, but the timbers were stolen by A-3, A-4 and Surman Ali (non-appellant), for which there was a local bichar, but they did not attend. She further deposed that there was thereafter a quarrel between the accused and the deceased and though the dispute was amicably settled, the accused persons threatened to kill him if they had the opportunity. She further deposed that there was thereafter a quarrel between the accused and the deceased and though the dispute was amicably settled, the accused persons threatened to kill him if they had the opportunity. She further testified that on the day of the incident, A-3 and A-4 assaulted the deceased severely and the latter subsequently died at GB Hospital, Agartala. She also testified that on the same day at about 9 PM, when she was coming from the house of Suraj Ali, she saw A-3 and A-4 running away and when she asked them, they told her nothing and ran away. They then rushed to the house of Suraj Ali and told the wife of Suraj Ali that they caused the victim to be sent to GB Hospital. She further testified that A-3, A-4 and Surman Ali (non-appellant) were her neighbours. It is interesting to note that the wife of Suraj Ali, to whom A-3 and A-4 allegedly told that they caused the victim to be sent to GB Hospital, was not examined by the prosecution. In the absence of corroboration from the wife of Suraj Ali, it is difficult to believe the evidence of PW-2. The only evidence of PW-2 worthy of notice is that at about 9 PM of the day of the incident, she saw A-3 and A-4 running away and when she asked them, they told her nothing and ran away. The remaining statements are in the nature of hearsay evidence, which cannot be acted upon. In cross, PW-2 disclosed that except for A-3, A-4 and Surman Ali (non-appellant), she did not come across any other person entering the house of Suraj Ali. The evidence of PW-4 need not be discussed as he did not implicate any of the appellants in the murder of the deceased. 8. PW-7 does not throw any light on the case and is, therefore, skipped. PW-8 is another hostile witness. On being declared hostile, the prosecution confronted him with his previous statement under Section 161 CrPC in accordance with Section 145, Evidence Act and the entire statement was exhibited as Exhibit-3, which was later on confirmed by the IO of the case when he adduced his evidence. However, on going through the contents of Exhibit-3, it surfaced that his statements are merely based on hearsay evidence, which are not admissible in evidence. However, on going through the contents of Exhibit-3, it surfaced that his statements are merely based on hearsay evidence, which are not admissible in evidence. The cross-examination made by the prosecution also does not elicit anything to prove its case. The depositions of PW-9, PW-10, PW-11, PW-12, PW-13 and PW-14 do not bring out any incriminating evidence to bring home the charge against any of the appellants. 9. We have already referred to the evidence of PW-15 who deposed that he suspected that the quarrel between his deceased father and Abdul Hasim one week before the incident prompted A-1, A-2 and A-4 to assault the deceased which resulted in his death. PW-15 is, however, not corroborated by the evidence of PW-16, who rather testified that before the incident, there was quarrel on two occasions between her deceased father and Abdul Kuddus, Surman Ali, Abdul Hasim, Abdul Kadir, Pankhi Miah; that after one week, the incident took place and that she was of the opinion that the said persons assaulted her father leading to his death. It cannot be overlooked that PW-15 suspected A-1, A-2 and A-4 to be the assailants of his father, but he did not even mention the names of A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 who participated in the quarrel between his father and the said Abdul Hasim. That apart, his statement that after the bichar, one day, A-1, A-2, Sanjay Das, Abdul Kuddus, Surman Ali, Pankhi Miah and A-4 armed with dao, lathi came to attack them and seeing their (accused) mood, they fled away. In the first place, PW-16 did not corroborate the version of PW-15 inasmuch as she did not name A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 as the assailants of her father. These two witnesses also did not even mention where and when the incidents took place. She did not even mention that the appellants and the persons named by PW-15 armed with knife and lathis attacked her brother (PW-15) and others. She deposed that as the incident occurred after the quarrel that she opined that the named accused persons assaulted her father leading to his death. As already noticed, PW-16 is also not an eye witness to both the incidents. Moreover, PW-2 (sister of the deceased) disclosed in her evidence that the accused persons quarrelled with the deceased and the matter was settled amicably. As already noticed, PW-16 is also not an eye witness to both the incidents. Moreover, PW-2 (sister of the deceased) disclosed in her evidence that the accused persons quarrelled with the deceased and the matter was settled amicably. Even though she also said that the accused persons, however, threatened that they would kill him if they got scope (opportunity?), we found this to be unbelievable and after-thought. How could they threaten the deceased when they had already settled the matter amicably? In our opinion, there is no clinching evidence to prove that A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 had anything to do with the quarrel between the deceased and Abdul Hasim. In the light of this finding of ours, we unhesitatingly hold that the circumstance that there was a quarrel between the deceased and Abdul Hasim on 22-1-2010 is not of such a definite tendency which could unerringly point towards the participation of A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 in the murder of the deceased a week after the said incident. In other words, the prosecution is unable to prove cogently and firmly the first circumstance from which an inference of guilt of the appellants is sought to be drawn. 10. Coming now to the second circumstance, namely, the entry of A-1 and A-2 to the house of PW-1 on the date of the incident at about 8 PM telling her to switch off the light and of her hearing a hue and cry of a gathering behind her house and also of her hearing that the deceased was severely injured. When this witness denied of making any statement to the IO that A-1 and A-2 came to her house before the occurrence, she was declared as hostile witness by the prosecution and was confronted by the prosecution with her previous statement U/s 161 CrPC, which was exhibited as Exhibit-1, which was subsequently confirmed by the IO. When this witness denied of making any statement to the IO that A-1 and A-2 came to her house before the occurrence, she was declared as hostile witness by the prosecution and was confronted by the prosecution with her previous statement U/s 161 CrPC, which was exhibited as Exhibit-1, which was subsequently confirmed by the IO. In her statement before the police, she had stated that on 21-1-2010, just after around 8 o'clock Sujan Das (A-2) and A-1 of their village came to her house and called her and she, recognizing them, came out of the house; A-1 was waiting on the yard and A-2, after entering her house, told her to switch off the light behind her hut on the ground stating that they had some work to do and assured her to switch on the light after completion of the work saying that he switched off the outside light and went away. According to her, she then heard the voices of few people from behind her hut; that after a short while, she heard the cries of the people and coming out of the hut, she heard that the deceased (Jalil Miah) had been injured severely by some or someone. In the cross by the defence, she testified that she did not make any statement contained in Exhibit-1, (her statement purportedly recorded by the IO U/s161 CrPC) and that the said statement was falsely created by the daroga. 11. It is well settled that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be rejected in to merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed out of the record altogether. The testimony of such witness can be considered and accepted by the Court to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. In other words, the portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence as recorded by the trial court cannot be held washed off or unavailable to the prosecution. As already noticed, in this case, the IO of the case (PW-19) has confirmed that Exhibit-1 was recorded by him. Even if the statement of PW-1 in Exhibit-1 is thus accepted to be true also, this evidence does not prove anything to bolster the case of the prosecution. As already noticed, in this case, the IO of the case (PW-19) has confirmed that Exhibit-1 was recorded by him. Even if the statement of PW-1 in Exhibit-1 is thus accepted to be true also, this evidence does not prove anything to bolster the case of the prosecution. We may also examine the evidence of PW-6, who is the husband of PW-1. He apparently returned home from the market at or about the time of incident. According to his testimony, he heard some hue and cry and proceeded to the spot and found the deceased severely wounded by some persons and his wife told him that she also heard hue and cry at the time of the incident but did not tell him whether any accused came their house before the occurrence. He was then declared as hostile by the prosecution, who confronted him his statement at Exhibit-2 recorded U/s 161 CrPC, but he denied of having made such a statement. In cross also, he repeated the same statement. He had stated before the IO vide Exhibit A-2 that on 21-1-10 AD last at around 8 o'clock night, he came to the house and entered into the hut; that he then heard the sound of few people's whispering, but his wife told him that A-2 and A-1 coming there had switched off the light and that he then suggested to her that they would probably take woods because at all times, they had stolen woods in that way. In our opinion, the statement of PW-6 did not reveal any incriminating evidence against the appellants; there is absolutely no evidence from testimonies of PW-1 and PW-6 to link the entry of A-1 and A-2 into their house with the assault of the deceased resulting in his death. For example, the possibility of some other person or persons assaulting and murdering the deceased on the fateful night is not ruled out. In other words, the circumstance of A-1 and A-2 dropping into the house of PW-2 before the murder of the deceased cannot, without anything more, be said to be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of A-1 and A-2. After all, the prosecution is unable to establish the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn. After all, the prosecution is unable to establish the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn. It must, therefore, be held that there are no circumstances of definite tendency, taken together cumulatively, forming a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the appellants and none else. It is a settled rule of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however grave, it cannot be substituted for proof and courts shall take utmost precaution in finding the accused guilty only on the basis of circumstantial evidence. In the view that we have taken, it is difficult to sustain the impugned judgment of convictions and sentences. The appellants are, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. 12. The result of the foregoing discussion is that this appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment, therefore, stands set aside. The four appellants are, therefore, set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in connection with some other case. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith.