JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. Heard Shri Govind Krishna, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Kamal Narain Rai for the respondent no.3. 2. The instant writ petition arises out of three suits for arrears of rent, eviction and damages filed by the respondent no.3 against the petitioner for his eviction from three shops let out to him. 3. In these suits, three separate applications in each suit, being application Nos. 136-Ga (2) were filed alleging that the plaintiff had no locus to maintain the suits. These shops are trust property. The suits had been filed in personal capacity. A case, under Section 92 CPC for appointment of a receiver to the property in dispute belonging to a Trust had been allowed vide order dated 11.04.2016. In view of the said order, the plaintiff has no locus to prosecute the suit against the petitioner-tenant. 4. The Trial Court by order dated 26.05.2016 dismissed these identical applications filed in the three suits, being Suit Nos. 9, 10 and 11 of 1999. 5. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred three revisions. These three SCC Revisions have been dismissed by a common order dated 01.09.2016. Hence this writ petition. 6. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the order dated 11.04.2016 passed in proceedings, under Section 92 CPC, whereby a receiver was appointed, the plaintiff opposite party ceased to have locus to prosecute the suit. The orders impugned therefore are liable to be set aside. 7. The second contention raised is that the revisional order dated 01.08.2016 has been passed by Incharge District Judge, Azamgarh. The matter not being an urgent matter, the same could not have been heard and decided by him. In support of this contention, reliance has been place upon the provisions contained in the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court in 1987 as also the General Rules Civil, especially Rule 89-B, thereof. 8. It is submitted that an Incharge District Judge can exercise jurisdiction for disposal of urgent applications and may also deal with routine matters, but the Incharge District Judge did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the revisions finally. 9. Shri K.N. Rai, counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the proceedings, where from the writ petition arises are summary proceedings for arrears of rent, eviction and damages instituted by the landlord against the tenant before the Judge Small Causes Court. 9. Shri K.N. Rai, counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the proceedings, where from the writ petition arises are summary proceedings for arrears of rent, eviction and damages instituted by the landlord against the tenant before the Judge Small Causes Court. These proceedings do not entail any decision on the question of title. 10. Besides, as observed in the impugned orders, in case any question of title is found to be involved the Court concerned has jurisdiction to direct the matter to be presented before the Court of competent jurisdiction. Even otherwise, such a SCC suit can be instituted by a landlord, who by definition is the person to whom rent is payable. There is no requirement that a landlord necessarily has to be the owner of the property in suit. Once the landlord-tenant relationship stands established, the question of title has no significance. 11. On the question that the impugned revisional order has been passed by the Incharge District Judge, it has been submitted that the matter came up for admission before the Incharge District Judge. At this stage, after hearing the parties, the order has been passed, dismissing the revision, finding it to be without substance. He submits that in case, the Incharge District Judge was competent to hear the matter on the question of admission and/ or grant of any interim order, he necessarily had the jurisdiction also to hold that the revision was not fit for admission. This is precisely what has been done in the instant case. 12. Moreover, no such issue of jurisdiction to hear and decide the revision had been raised on behalf of the petitioner before the revisional Court and this issue is now being raised because the revision has been found to be without merits and consequently dismissed. 13. On the merits, he has submitted that the petitioner has no case. The order in the proceedings under Section 92 CPC, appointing a receiver has already been stayed by the High Court in a First Appeal filed against the same. Moreover, the person, who has been appointed as receiver had not been granted the power to collect the rent of the shops in dispute in the SCC suits. The impugned orders are therefore, perfectly justified and deserve to be affirmed. 14. I have considered the submissions made by the parties and have perused the record. 15. Moreover, the person, who has been appointed as receiver had not been granted the power to collect the rent of the shops in dispute in the SCC suits. The impugned orders are therefore, perfectly justified and deserve to be affirmed. 14. I have considered the submissions made by the parties and have perused the record. 15. It would be relevant to note that the suits had been instituted in the year 1999. The Courts below have observed that the suits are ripe for final hearing. It is at this highly belated stage that the question of locus of the plaintiff is being raised, relying upon an order, under Section 92 CPC, which order has admittedly, been stayed by the High Court. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the order, which is the basis of the application filed by the petitioner, the tenant- defendant is not in operation. 16. I also find substance in the submissions made by the counsel for the respondents that the dispute in the SCC suits is between the landlord and the tenant. No issue of title is either inherent in such proceedings nor is to be decided therein. I therefore, agree with the observation made in the impugned orders that the application of the petitioner was filed only with the object of delaying the disposal of the proceedings pending at the stage of final hearing. The impugned orders therefore, have rightly been passed and they call for no interference, in so far as the merit of the orders are concerned. 17. The only other questions which survives for consideration is whether the revisions could have been decided by the Incharge District Judge. 18. The contention of counsel for the petitioner is that an Incharge District Judge can only deal with urgent matters or routine matters and at final decision of the revisions, is not an urgent or a routine matter. 19. On the other hand, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent is that the revisions have been decided at the stage of admission after hearing the parties. This submission is borne out from the perusal of the impugned revisional order. 20. I therefore, find substance in the submission that in case, a District Judge, Incharge, was competent to admit the revision and/ or grant an interim order, he necessarily had the jurisdiction to hold that the revisions were not fit for admission. 21. This submission is borne out from the perusal of the impugned revisional order. 20. I therefore, find substance in the submission that in case, a District Judge, Incharge, was competent to admit the revision and/ or grant an interim order, he necessarily had the jurisdiction to hold that the revisions were not fit for admission. 21. It also does not emerge from a perusal of the impugned revisional order that any objection regarding jurisdiction of the Incharge District Judge to hear the revisions, was ever raised. 22. In view of the above discussion, the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner are without substance. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.