JUDGMENT : P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J. These three appeals arise from a common cause of action in relation to the order dated 11.03.2008' passed by the court below (lower Appellate court), whereby the appeals preferred against the verdict of the Trial court-Insolvency Court [declaring the concerned respondents/counter petitioners 1 to 26 as insolvents, causing recovery of the due amount by selling the assets] which were dismissed on 07.03.2008, [referring to the 'settlement' arrived at as per the approved scheme and based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appeals were not pressed] strangely came to be allowed on 11.03.2008, in turn setting aside the judgment passed by the Trial Court, without any application for review or without hearing the affected parties/the present appellants. The effect of the subsequent order dated 11.03.2008is that, the verdict dated 07.03.2008 has been 'suo motu' reviewed by the lower Appellate court, taking a diametrically opposite view/course allowing the appeals and annulling the verdict passed by the Insolvency court referring to the 'settlement' under the scheme to be made in conformity with the provisions of the Insolvency Act ('Act' in short), that too, without issuing notice to anybody and hearing the aggrieved parties. 2. M.F.A.No.99 of 2009 is treated as the lead case and reference is made to the parties and proceedings accordingly, except where it is separately adverted to. Heard both the sides in detail. 3. The appeal was preferred with a petition to condone the delay in filing the same, which was condoned as per the order dated 07.04.2010. The appeals were not formally admitted, presumably based on the submissions made from both the sides to have the issue finally heard and decided. There is a challenge with regard to maintainability of the appeals as well. It is also seen that various interim orders have been passed on different dates and the matters were finally heard by another Bench and taken up for judgment on 04.08.2015. But subsequently, it was re-opened as per the order dated 14.01.2016 for further hearing by appropriate Bench as per the roster and were listed accordingly. After hearing, it was found that substantial questions of law were involved and hence the appeals were formally admitted on 14.03.2016. Following are the substantial questions of law raised by this Court on that day. 1. After hearing, it was found that substantial questions of law were involved and hence the appeals were formally admitted on 14.03.2016. Following are the substantial questions of law raised by this Court on that day. 1. Whether the order dated 11.03.2008 passed by the lower appellate court is an order passed by the District Court in appeal arising from an order under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act passed by the Subordinate court. 2. Whether appeal is maintainable by virtue of second proviso to Section 79 (1) of the Insolvency Act. 3. Whether the order dated 11.03.2008 passed by the lower appellate court comes within the purview of Sections 151,152 or 153 of the CPC, so as to be accepted as an incidental slip/omission/mistake to be corrected under the said provision. 4. Could such an order have been passed by the lower appellate court on 11.03.2008 allowing the appeals, when, as per the earlier order dated 7.03.2008, all the appeals were dismissed as not pressed based on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants before the court below; thus arriving at a diametrically opposite finding. 5. Whether such an exercise could have been done by the lower appellate court without affording an opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. 4. The 4th and the 14th respondents filed I.A.No.1182 of 2016 seeking to consider some additional points projected as substantial questions of law, along with those already framed by the Court. They are the following: i). Whether an insolvency petition can be filed in a representative capacity? ii) Whether the Sub Court/trial court was justified in declaring respondents 11,15 and 16 who were minors as insolvents? iii) Whether the Sub Court/trial court was justified in declaring respondent No.10 who is a mentally retarded person as insolvent? iv) Whether Insolvency Petition from which the appeal arises is/was maintainable? v) Whether appellants who accepted payments based on the composition can maintain an appeal on the ground of non payment of interest or any other ground? vi) Whether this Hon'ble Court was justified in condoning the delay in filing appeal without notice to all persons who were parties in the First Appellate Court? vii) What are the circumstances under which an appeal arising from a judgment/order of the District Court under the Insolvency Act, 1955 is heard by a Division Bench despite section 3(13)(f) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958? vii) What are the circumstances under which an appeal arising from a judgment/order of the District Court under the Insolvency Act, 1955 is heard by a Division Bench despite section 3(13)(f) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958? viii) What is the remuneration which the Official Receiver is entitled to receive/claim in an Insolvency Proceedings? ix). Whether the present appeal can be entertained as an "M.F.A"? x) Whether the present appeal can be admitted before and without deciding whether the appeal is maintainable" 5. Both the sides were heard extensively on the substantial questions of law framed by the Court and those raised by the Addl.4th and 14th respondents, with reference to the factual matrix. 6. The crux of the dispute relates to the deposits collected by the concerned respondent/'Malayil Bankers' (hereinafter referred to as 'Bankers') from the general public, offering substantial interest at the rate of 14% per annum. Many of the general public, mostly persons retired from service obtaining the retirement benefits, had effected fixed deposits in the aforesaid institution, with intent to procure interest at the rate proclaimed / assured and earn their livelihood. By the passage of time, after collecting huge amounts from the creditors as above, it so happened that the show came to a standstill and there was default on the part of the Bankers in honouring the commitment by satisfying due interest or in effecting the repayment. This led to various proceedings and finally, the appellants herein, joining hands with another person (who is no more) had filed I.P.No.2/98 before the I Addl. Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram, for declaring the respondents 1 to 26 as insolvents and for recovery of the due amount by selling their assets. It was specifically contended that, making use of the hard earned money/deposits made by the creditors, the concerned respondents had amassed much wealth and had acquired different items of properties, which were sought to be proceeded against. The income generated by sale of the said properties was sought to be utilised for discharging the liability to the creditors. 7. Pursuant to the above proceedings, a notification was caused to be published under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. Based on the said notification, about 581 creditors joined the party array and they got impleaded as the additional creditors/petitioners 8 to 588. 7. Pursuant to the above proceedings, a notification was caused to be published under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. Based on the said notification, about 581 creditors joined the party array and they got impleaded as the additional creditors/petitioners 8 to 588. In the course of further proceedings, it was revealed that huge amounts were liable to be paid by the 'Bankers' to the Income Tax Department as well and in the said circumstance, the Commissioner of Income Tax was impleaded in the party array as an additional respondent. The official receiver of the Court came to be appointed to deal with the assets and he was directed to proceed against the properties; to liquidate the assets and in turn to discharge the liability to the creditors. Accordingly, possession of the properties was taken over. Based on the pleadings and evidence, the I.P. was allowed as per order dated 20.12.2002, declaring the respondents 1 to 26 as insolvents, with liberty to apply for 'discharge' within three months. The interim order appointing the Official Receiver as the Receiver was made absolute. 8. On being aggrieved of the above verdict, the counter petitioners 10, 11, 15 and 16 moved the lower Appellate court (District Court, Thiruvananthapuram) by way of A.S.No.38 of 2002. The counter petitioners 1, 9 and 19 to 26 preferred similar appeal as A.S. 60 of 2003; whereas the counter petitioners 2 to 8, 12 to 14 and 17 filed A.S.No.65 of 2003. During the pendency of the above appeals, on finding that value of the properties taken over by the Receiver was substantially high and that the entire liability could be cleared by selling a portion of the property, the concerned appellants in A.S. 60 of 2003 filed I.A.1930 of 2006 seeking to consider the 'proposal scheme' formulated by them, to pay off the liability to the creditors. It was stated in para 2' of the affidavit dated 18.07.2006 in support of the said I.A., that a sum of Rs.7.55 lakhs with interest was paid to the creditors, adding in paragraph 5' of the very same affidavit that, if the Receiver was directed to sell the properties mentioned therein, it would generate adequate funds to set off the liability to the creditors and that there could be a 'discharge', thus getting the remaining properties released. It was accordingly that the 'scheme' was approved, enabling the debtors/respondents to satisfy the entire debt/liability to the creditors by causing some of the properties in possession of the Receiver to be sold and thus to discharge the liability. Pursuant to approval of the Scheme for Settlement, the learned counsel for the appellants before the lower Appellate court submitted that the appeals were not pressed. This in turn was recorded and the appeals were dismissed as not pressed, as per order dated 07.03.2008. 9. Just 'three days' after dismissal of the above appeals, another order came to be passed by the lower Appellate court on 11.3.2008 'suo motu', that too, without hearing the respondents in the appeal, who were the petitioners in the insolvency petitions and in favour of whom the verdict under challenge was passed by the Trial court/Insolvency Court. As per the said order, material modification was made, virtually allowing the appeals and nullifying the verdict passed by the Trial court in the insolvency petitions, without even ascertaining whether the entire liability was cleared as per the approved scheme and whether the respondents before the Insolvency court were entitled for a 'discharge'. During the course of the above proceedings, different items of properties (as many as 48 items) were sold by the Receiver and the principal amounts payable to the creditors were satisfied, except for a few (who were in fact living in different parts of the world and not available in station). No interest was paid to anybody and as such, the liability was stated as not fully satisfied. Despite this, based on the order dated 11.03.2008' passed by the lower Appellate court, the concerned counter petitioners/respondents who were the appellants in the lower Appellate court got the other properties released from the possession of the Receiver and some of the properties were sold and funds were appropriated by them, without discharging the liability to the creditors completely. Met with the situation, just after two months of the order dated 11.03.2008, the appellants in MFA.99 of 2009 filed I.A.No.2600 of 2008 dated 21.05.2008 in A.S.No.60 of 2003, seeking for a direction to disburse interest by selling the other properties. But the said I.A. was not posted before the Court, stating that the Court had already become 'functus officio', after allowing the appeals as per order dated 11.03.2008. But the said I.A. was not posted before the Court, stating that the Court had already become 'functus officio', after allowing the appeals as per order dated 11.03.2008. Contending that the I.P. Court could not become 'functus officio', unless the entire liability was cleared, and raising such other grounds, a writ petition was filed before this Court, wherein an interim order of stay was obtained. But later, the said writ petition was closed since it was not maintainable and the remedy was only by way of challenging the order passed by the lower Appellate court. It is accordingly that the appellants have approached this Court by filing the present MFAs, challenging the order passed by the lower Appellate court, particularly, the order dated 11.03.2008. 10. Mr. G.S. Reghunath, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the proceedings pursued by the lower Appellate court are per se wrong and unsustainable in all respects, being contrary to the relevant facts, pleadings, evidence and the relevant provisions of law. The fundamental principle of 'audi alteram partem' is also violated; having denied an opportunity of hearing before any order of review was passed 'suo motu' by the lower Appellate court. Referring to Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, the learned counsel points out that, no 'suo motu' review of a verdict passed by a civil court is possible and that 'review' is open only on an application by the parties, unless it is an instance where some clerical errors or mistakes have occurred. Even in such cases, clerical errors/mistakes can be corrected 'suo motu' by the civil court, invoking the provisions under Section 152 or 153 (as the case may be) of the CPC and not otherwise. In the instant case, the power of review has been wrongly exercised, whereby the appeals which were already dismissed by the lower Appellate court, based on the submission made by the counsel for the said appellants, came to be 'allowed', nullifying the verdict passed by the Trial court in favour of the insolvency petitioners, that too without hearing them, which is stated as quite unheard of 11. Coming to the merits, the learned counsel submits that, as per the observations made by the lower Appellate court in a separate order passed on 07.03.2008 in I.A.No.1930 of 2008 (the day on which the appeals were dismissed as not pressed, based on the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, with reference to the approved settlement scheme), the property at item No.6 having an extent of 55 cents and situated at Ponmudi (which is worth of Rs.2.75 crores, according to the present appellants) was sold for 50.40 lakhs. It is stated in the said order itself that the due amount was expected to be remitted by the bidder within the stipulated time, as reported by the Receiver. In fact, as per the earlier order dated 27.02.2008, the court had directed the Receiver to sell 'item No.6' of the property before 07.03.2008 (i.e. within one week) and to file a statement of the total income and total debt, after verifying the claim of the creditors till date. It is not revealed as to whether any publication of sale was effected and the prescribed procedure to cause sale of the immovable property was pursued by the court, so as to generate maximum income, in so far as such direction given on 27.02.2008 was for the sale to be effected before 07.03.2008. The explanation offered is that, there was a direction by this Court in a writ petition, to have the matter finalised within the stipulated time and that the time was running short. Even then, if the bid amount was not adequate enough, it was obligatory for the court to have complied with the procedure in conducting the sale, attracting more prospective bidders, giving sufficient time and by way of wide publicity, to generate maximum funds so as to clear the entire liability to the creditors. The failure has resulted in the sale of the property of 55 cents for 50.40 lakhs, i.e. Less than Rs. One lakh per cent (correctness of which is not being considered now). 12. The failure has resulted in the sale of the property of 55 cents for 50.40 lakhs, i.e. Less than Rs. One lakh per cent (correctness of which is not being considered now). 12. Going by the order dated 07.03.2008 in I.A.No.1930 of 2008 (the very same date on which, the appeals were dismissed based on the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants before the lower Appellate court that the appeals were not pressed, with reference to the approved scheme of the settlement), the total income already generated by virtue of sale of the properties by the Receiver and the amount remaining in the Banks was only to the tune of Rs.18,96,46,958/-. On getting the sum of Rs.50.40 lakhs expected from the bidder, pursuant to sale of 'item No.6' of the properties by the Receiver, it was to be Rs.19, 46,83,958/- (A). The total claim of the creditors who had turned up, till 27.02.2008, as reported by the Receiver, was referred to as Rs.13,32,59,769/- (B). It is stated that no opportunity was given to the insolvency petitioners (respondents in the appeals preferred before the court below) to verify the correctness of the statement or to file objections, since the appeals were dismissed 'as not pressed' on the same date ie. 07.03.2008, based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants before the lower Appellate Court. It is also pointed out that the total demand made by the Income Tax Department was to the tune of Rs.8,88,31,621/- (C). On adding the figures at (B) and (C) (i.e. the amounts payable to the creditors and the Income Tax Department), this by itself would be more than the amounts at (A), i.e. the income generated by sale of the properties and as such, no discharge could have been ordered by the Court on 11.03.2008, that too without hearing. It is also pointed out that, as per the order dated 07.03.2008 in I.A.No.1930/2008, the Court itself has made it clear that, monthly reports shall be filed by the Receiver as to the course and events and that the parties will be at liberty to file I.As, if any, so as to mould the relief before the Insolvency Court. It is also pointed out that, as per the order dated 07.03.2008 in I.A.No.1930/2008, the Court itself has made it clear that, monthly reports shall be filed by the Receiver as to the course and events and that the parties will be at liberty to file I.As, if any, so as to mould the relief before the Insolvency Court. Still, I.A.No.2600 of 2008 dated 21.05.2008 preferred by the appellants herein, who were respondents in A.S.No.60 of 2003, was not posted before the Court, reportedly, for the reason that the Court had already become 'functus officio', on allowing the appeals and nullifying the verdict passed by the Trial court in the insolvency petitions. Thus, there is no consistency in the course and proceedings pursued by the lower Appellate court , submits the learned counsel. 13. With regard to the procedure which should have been followed and the challenge against the maintainability of the present appeals, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that Sec. 4 of the Insolvency Act deals with the power of the courts, which is quite exhaustive and it is to do complete justice. It is a general power, including the power to sell all items of properties of the defaulters and for distribution of the assets. For convenience of Reference, the said provision-Section 4 of the Insolvency Act is extracted below: "4. Power of Courts to decide all questions arising in insolvency- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them. (3) Where the Court does not deem it expedient or necessary to decide any question of the nature referred to in sub-section (1), but has reason to believe that the debtor has a saleable interest in any property, the Court may without further inquiry sell such interest in such manner and subject to such conditions as it may think fit." 14. By virtue of the scheme of the statute, it is contended that no cut-off date can be fixed for ascertaining the liability towards the creditors and the law contemplates a duty upon the Insolvency Court to entertain all petitions to be preferred by the creditors, pursuant to publication of notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC. There was no proposal or petition to accept any 'Scheme' when the matter was dealt with and finalised by the Insolvency Court, thus leading to the order declaring the concerned respondents as insolvents. The 'proposal/Settlement Scheme' came up for the first time, only in the course of appeal preferred by the concerned respondents. Then, it was obligatory for the lower Appellate court to have pursued all the requisite procedures as envisaged under the Insolvency Act, including to consider, approve and finalise the proceedings based on such 'Scheme', bringing it to the notice of all concerned, including the creditors. Power is always vested with the court even to refuse approval to the Scheme, if it is not reasonable or satisfactory to the court. The scope of Section 4 is to be examined in the said background, which is wide enough, being a 'general power' to bring about complete justice. The course pursued by the lower Appellate court in approving the scheme as per order dated 07.03.2008 was pursuant to the earlier order dated 27.07.2008 directing the Receiver to file statement as to the funds procured/assets available and the liability to be paid to the creditors and the statutory bodies. It was accordingly, that the appeals were dismissed as not pressed, based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the said appellants, thus leaving the matter to be pursued before the Insolvency court in accordance with law, based on the Scheme approved, ensuring that the liability to the creditors in all respects was discharged by selling the properties belonging to the concerned respondents. Things took a different turn, when, all of a sudden, ie. Things took a different turn, when, all of a sudden, ie. within three or four days after passing the order dated 07.03.2008 dismissing the appeals, the matters were taken up 'suo motu' and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants herein or anybody else, the appeals preferred before the lower Appellate court were simply 'allowed' referring to the compromise/scheme which was approved. The verdict passed by the Insolvency court was simply annulled, without following any procedure prescribed under the law and even without referring to the fact as to whether the liability to the creditors and statutory bodies stood cleared. By virtue of the course pursued by the lower Appellate court annulling the verdict passed by the Insolvency Court, everything has come to a standstill and no further proceedings could be pursued by the Receiver, as the order passed by the Insolvency Court was no more in existence. Pursuant to the 'suo motu' order passed on 11.03.2008, the respondents/judgment debtors pressurised the Receiver to restore/release the properties already taken over back to them. The difficulties experienced by the Receiver in this regard have been brought to the notice of this Court by filing different proceedings [statement dated 11.06.2010, additional statement dated 15.06.2010 and an affidavit dated 27.06.2011] by the Receiver. 15. The learned Counsel for the appellants points out that, in I.A.No.1930 of 2006 filed by the respondent/judgment debtors, there was an offer to pay interest as well, to all the creditors and to meet the statutory liabilities. Specific reference is also made to paragraphs 1 and 5 of the affidavit in support of the said I.A. As a matter of fact, the 'invitation to treat' was made by the respondent/judgment debtors attracting persons like the present appellants and others, who were mostly pensioners, to effect Fixed Deposits in the establishment of such respondents (Bankers) offering return/interest at the rate of 14% per annum. It was accordingly, that deposits were made and it was utilizing the said hard-earned money, that various investments were made by the respondents/judgment debtors in financial institutions, generating interests and also by procuring/purchasing movable/immovable properties of different extents. It was accordingly, that deposits were made and it was utilizing the said hard-earned money, that various investments were made by the respondents/judgment debtors in financial institutions, generating interests and also by procuring/purchasing movable/immovable properties of different extents. As many as 40' items of properties were identified by the appellants, as brought to the notice of this Court; whereas the respondents judgment debtors at the time of filing the I.A.1930 of 2006 proposing the Settlement Scheme revealed availability of only 7 items' of properties, referring to the liability towards the original Insolvency petitioners (seven in number). It is stated that no idea was given at any point of time that the appellants herein would be paid only the principal amount and not interest. The affidavit in support of the I.A.No.1930 of 2006 clearly states in 'paragraph 2 and 5' that the "entire liability" would be cleared, which includes interest payable as per the agreed terms. Even otherwise, if there is no stipulation as to the rate of interest, it is liable to be paid at the rate of 6% ' per annum, by virtue of mandate under Section 49 of the Insolvency Act. This was also not considered by the lower Appellate court. That apart, pursuant to the order dated 27.02.2008, the Official Receiver had brought it to the notice of the lower Appellate Court that the total amount available was only Rs.18,96,43,958/- and that the sum of Rs.50.40 lakhs pursuant to the sale of 'item No.6' of the properties was not received, as it was still to be deposited by the bidder. The Receiver had also submitted that the total liability(reckoning the claim of the creditors as on 27.02.2008) was Rs.13,32,59,769/- and that a sum of Rs.8,88,31,621/- was payable to the Income Tax department as demanded by them. This by itself shows that the liabilities were much more than the amounts available and as such, the Scheme could not have been successfully worked out and no discharge could have been given to the respondents/judgment debtors, proper appreciation of which was omitted to be done by the lower Appellate court. 16. Referring to the order passed by the lower Appellate court on 07.03.2008, granting approval to the Scheme, it is pointed out, as contained in the last line of the said order, that it was specifically made clear that all remaining claims were to be settled by the Insolvency Court. 16. Referring to the order passed by the lower Appellate court on 07.03.2008, granting approval to the Scheme, it is pointed out, as contained in the last line of the said order, that it was specifically made clear that all remaining claims were to be settled by the Insolvency Court. On the very same day, after passing the order in I.A., on 07.03.2008, a separate order was passed in the appeals, dismissing them based on the submission made by the learned Counsel for the said appellants that the appeals were not pressed in view of the approved Settlement Scheme. As such, nothing remained to be reviewed, either suo motu or otherwise, to have led to the order dated 11.03.2008. Once the appeals were dismissed, it was for the parties concerned to work out their remedies, based on the consequential orders to be passed by the Insolvency Court with reference to the scheme approved by the lower Appellate court and satisfaction to be recorded after completing all the procedural aspects including by way of notification of the order in the Gazette as prescribed, ultimately leading to 'annulment' of the order and the 'discharge' to be given. A very meticulous and detailed procedure has been provided under the statute to safeguard the interests of all concerned, which has been simply given a 'go-bye', by virtue of the order dated 11.03.2008, which is absolutely without any application of mind, submits the learned Counsel. In so far as an order has been passed contrary to the actual facts and figures and the relevant provisions of law, it is liable to be intercepted by this Court at the earliest opportunity, to safeguard the interest of all the creditors. 17. Mr. Philip Mathews, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 4 and 14 in MFA No.99 of 2009 (on behalf of Mr. T.G. Alexander and Annamma Alexander) submits that the insolvency jurisdiction of the court is not merely to protect the creditors but also to liberate the person of the debtor as well, on full surrender of the properties. The Insolvency petition was filed only by 7 persons and the amount due was shown as about Rs.7.55 lakhs. The said petition was filed even before the maturity date in respect of some of the accounts/deposits and as such, the petition itself was premature. The Insolvency petition was filed only by 7 persons and the amount due was shown as about Rs.7.55 lakhs. The said petition was filed even before the maturity date in respect of some of the accounts/deposits and as such, the petition itself was premature. Though it was agreed to give 14% interest on the deposit, when the petitioners wanted to have 'premature closure', no such interest was payable under any circumstance. Disclosure of 7 items of the properties was made pointing out that the said assets were adequate enough to discharge the liability towards the petitioners and other creditors as pointed out in the compromise scheme which did not give any assurance to pay interest, but for the principal amount. It was accordingly, that I.A.No.1930 of 2006 was filed, finally leading to the proceedings/orders under challenge. The learned counsel submits that once an order of composition is passed, the adjudication order has necessarily to be annulled. All the creditors have been paid their 'principal' amount, as agreed in the compromise proposal and the subsequent attempt claiming 'interest' was only an afterthought, which was never agreed to. Since the compromise was approved, consequential order of annulment ought to have been passed by the lower Appellate Court. Hence the order dated 7.3.2008 came to be 'suo motu' reviewed on finding out the mistake committed by the court and it was accordingly, that the error was rectified, by invoking the power under Section 152 of the CPC; leading to the order dated 11.03.2008. The said order is only a natural consequence of the earlier order and the terms of compromise have been clearly dealt with in the order passed in I.A. 1930 of 2006, by virtue of which there is no violation of any statutory requirements. It is also pointed out that copies of proceedings were served to the lawyers who had entered appearance on behalf of the parties/creditors and as such, the service of notice was proper/complete in all respects. 18. The learned counsel further submits that the insolvency petition itself was bad and not maintainable by virtue of the bar under section 9(c) of the Insolvency Act. To declare anybody as insolvent, he should have committed an act of insolvency within three months immediately prior to the petition. Reference is made to Section 6 and 13 of the Act as well. To declare anybody as insolvent, he should have committed an act of insolvency within three months immediately prior to the petition. Reference is made to Section 6 and 13 of the Act as well. The order of adjudication passed by the Insolvency court was not correct or sustainable on facts as well as in law and hence it was subjected to challenge in the appeals before the District Court. It is pointed out that, since the scheme was approved by the Court, it was applicable to all the creditors and there was no assurance or agreement to pay 'interest' as per the terms of compromise. What was agreed in the I.A. was to satisfy the 'entire debt' and the term 'debt' does not include interest at all. Reliance is placed on the decision rendered by a single Bench of this court in Vishalakshi vs. Bank of India ( 2006 (2)KLT 488 ). It is contended that the appellants before this Court cannot successfully contend that no proper notice was issued as they were the petitioners and were representing all the creditors, even according to them. The proceedings have been filed in a 'representative capacity' under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC. The course and conduct of the official Receiver is also sought to be attacked, stating that much amount has already been siphoned out towards his remuneration, alleged expenses and under such other heads (to an extent of nearly Rs.1 crore), which has been objected to and appropriate action is to be taken against the Receiver as well. 19. It is pointed out that the jurisdiction exercised by the District Court is by way of appeal under Section 79(1) of the 'Act' and the challenge now raised before this Court against the order is by way of Second Appeal, which is not maintainable, as power of this court can only be by way of 'revision, by virtue of 'first proviso' to Section 79(1). It is also stated that appeal to this Court under the second proviso to Section 79(1) is only in respect of an order passed in appeal, challenging an order passed by the sub court under Section 4 and that the order under challenge is not an order of this sort. It is also stated that appeal to this Court under the second proviso to Section 79(1) is only in respect of an order passed in appeal, challenging an order passed by the sub court under Section 4 and that the order under challenge is not an order of this sort. There is a mistake in the nomenclature of the appeal, when it has been numbered as MFA (Miscellaneous First Appeal); which actually ought to have been numbered as 'Miscellaneous Second Appeal' as observed in Ann Koshy vs. Ramachandran Pillai (2014 (3) KLT SN 6 Case No.6). Reference is also made to the verdict passed by another learned Judge of this Court reported in 2011(2)KLT 625(Abdul Majeed vs. State Bank of Travancore), wherein it is stated that the appeal is to be numbered as CMA and not as A.S. 20. Referring to Section 3(13)(f) of the Kerala High Court Act, it is contended by the respondents that, normally appeal arising under Section 79(3) of the Insolvency Act is to be heard by a 'Single Bench' and it was accordingly, that the single Bench has observed in the decision cited supra that it has to be numbered as 'MSA. Reference is also made to the decision rendered in Rajan Mathai vs. State of Kerala ( 2009(4) KLT 822 (DB)) , (wherein it is numbered as MFA). It is stated that there is absolutely no basis for the claim for interest, more so when nothing was agreed or stated in I.A.No1930 of 2006 in this regard and the burden is upon the creditor to have it proved otherwise. Section 34 CPC is stated as not applicable to the proceedings under the Insolvency Act, as it is not a suit for recovery of money and interest cannot be included as part of 'debt' by virtue of the observation of a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 1955 KLT 669 (Subramonia Iyer vs. K.R. Ramabhadra Iyer (paragraph 2) (Trivandrum Bench). It is the further case of the respondents that mere error of law or error of facts is not enough to call for interference and that involvement of 'substantial question of law' is necessary, even in an appeal maintainable by virtue of the 'second proviso' to Section 79(1) of the Insolvency Act (in view of the ruling rendered in 2006 (3) KLT 1003 (cited supra). Appropriation of the amount paid pursuant to the compromise against the principal portion (as against the normal rule of appropriation, firstly against the 'interest' portion and thereafter against the 'principal' portion) itself is cited as a pointer/indication as to the understanding of the creditors that 'interest' was never intended to be paid by the respondents. The decision rendered by the Privy council in Rai Bahadur Seth Nemichand vs. Seth Radha Kishen & others ( AIR 1922 PC 26 )(paragraph 27) is pressed into service to substantiate the normal rule of appropriation. 21. Mr.R.Sanjith, the learned counsel for the respondents 1, 6, 9,10, 16 and 28 in M.F.A.No.99 of 2009, Respondent Nos.1 and 9 in M.F.A. 259 of 2009 and respondents 1, 6, 9, 10 and 16 in M.F.A.258 of 2009 virtually supports the submissions made by Mr. Philip Mathew, the learned lawyer for the other respondents mentioned above. The crux of the the submissions made by the learned counsel is that, the appeals are not maintainable under Section 79 of the Insolvency Act and further that the compromise Scheme was approved, accepted and payment was obtained and having done so, the appellants cannot challenge the same thereafter, referring to the claim for 'interest'. It is pointed out that the term 'debt' does not include 'interest' and that there was no agreement/assurance in the compromise scheme to pay 'interest'. Reliance is sought to be placed on the decision in Bombay Cotton (P) Ltd. vs. Ramachandra Iyer ( 1963 KLT 268 [DB]). (But, this is a case where the matter was being considered in relation to a 'winding up' of a Company and as such, the same is not applicable to the case in hand). It is contended that all the creditors were present through the pleader and as such, there is no defectin relation to service of notice to all the creditors. (But it is seen that all the creditors were not represented, as notice sent to some of the creditors was at the initial stage and some of them had chosen to remain ex parte and once the compromise scheme is proposed, individual notice has to be sent to all the creditors by 'registered post' by virtue of Section 39 (1) of the Act read with Rule X of the Kerala Insolvency Rules, 1959). The learned counsel submits that the amounts already satisfied were not accepted 'under protest' and that the claim for interest by filing an I.A itself was an afterthought. The Income Tax Department had also accepted the compromise and it is stated that some other properties are available to meet the outstanding liability to the said Department, if at all any. 22. Admittedly, there was no application from anybody to have the order dated 07.03.2008 reviewed and such power could have been exercised by the lower Appellate court only in terms of Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC; more so when 'suo motu' power is available only to cure the mistakes/errors or the contingency as dealt with separately under Section 152 or 153 of the CPC. It is relevant to note that, in paragraph 3 of the statement dated 11.06.2010 filed by the Receiver before this Court, it has been categorically stated that no public notice was issued as to the Scheme approved by the lower Appellate court. The said paragraph reads as follows: "The order of stay of the Ist Addl. District Court vacated while the court considered the scheme submitted by the insolvents on 18/7/2006 in I.A.1930/2006 in A.S.No.60/2003 wherein the insolvents furnished seven items of property to be put in public auction by the Official Receiver to clear the debt due to the creditors. In pursuance of the order in I.A.No.1930/2006 the furnished items were put to the auction. The public notice as mandated and contemplated under the Insolvency Act and Kerala Insolvency Rules were not issued by the 1st Addl. District Court, Trivandrum for considering the scheme of composition stated in I.A.1930/06 which resulted in the filing of many claim petitions before the insolvency court in OP(IP)2/98. The list of such induction petitions are produced herewith as Annexure A1. 23. It is evident that several claim petitions came to be filed before the Insolvency Court, particulars of which have been given in Annexure A1 list. In paragraph 4 of the said statement, the Receiver submits that the sale conducted pursuant to the order dated 27.02.2008 could not be confirmed, as the Receiver was incapacitated by virtue of annulment of the order passed by the Insolvency Court, which is stated as a jurisdictional error. In paragraph 4 of the said statement, the Receiver submits that the sale conducted pursuant to the order dated 27.02.2008 could not be confirmed, as the Receiver was incapacitated by virtue of annulment of the order passed by the Insolvency Court, which is stated as a jurisdictional error. From paragraph 5 and 6 of the said statement, it is discernible that the total amount procured was only Rs.20,98,25,482/- and that a sum of Rs.14,74,72,200/- was disbursed to 1386 creditors (i.e. creditors as on 27.02.2008). After satisfying the initial payment of Rs.4,83,24,436 to the Income Tax Department (as against the total demand of more than Rs.8 crores) the balance amount available with the Receiver was Rs.13,28,105/-. The aforesaid statement was followed by an additional statement dated 15.06.2010 and an affidavit of the Receiver dated 27.06.2011. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit dated 27.06.2011 also, the Receiver has explained the difficulties met with by him, because of the course pursued by the lower Appellate court annulling the order of the Insolvency Court. In paragraph 11 of the said affidavit, it is stated that the claim of the subsequent induction petitioners/creditors was found to be of Rs.95,62,747/-. The circumstance under which the sale of one item of property (at Gandhipuram) had to be adjourned in view of the intervention of Court is also mentioned therein. In paragraph 12 of the affidavit, the suppression made by the concerned respondents/judgment debtors as to the whole of their assets is highlighted. This being the position, before arriving at a finding that the entire properties belonging to the respondent judgment debtors had been declared by them, that they were sold and the income generated was used and the liability was cleared in toto (unless the total amount/income generated was less than the total liabilities), the appeals could not have been allowed, annulling the judgment passed by the Insolvency Court, that too by way of 'suo motu' review without hearing anybody/the affected parties. 24. With regard to the contentions raised by the respondents/judgment debtors on maintainability, it is of two fold; firstly that no appeal is maintainable under section 79 of the Insolvency Act, in so far as the order under challenge passed by the lower Appellate court is not an order under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act. 24. With regard to the contentions raised by the respondents/judgment debtors on maintainability, it is of two fold; firstly that no appeal is maintainable under section 79 of the Insolvency Act, in so far as the order under challenge passed by the lower Appellate court is not an order under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act. The other contention is that the additional claimants who came to be inducted as additional petitioners 8 to 588 in the Insolvency petition have not been impleaded in the party array and no notice has been caused to be issued to them in these appeals and hence appeals are not liable to be entertained. The said contentions are sought to be negated by the appellants herein with reference to the scheme of the statute, contending that the proceedings filed by the present appellants are in a representative capacity, for and on behalf of all the creditors. More so, it was after causing publication of notice under Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC before the Insolvency Court inviting the additional petitioners 8 to 588 to join the move. It is also pointed out that, in the course of proceedings before this Court, the said additional claimants were also sought to be brought in, by filing necessary I.A., though no notice is seen issued to them. According to the appellants, their presence is not necessary and no notice does require to be issued, as there is no conflict of interests between the appellants and the said additional claimants, in so far as the endeavour of the appellants is only to see that the entire properties of the respondents/judgment debtors are proceeded against generating maximum amounts, to be utilised for discharging the liability of all the creditors and the statutory bodies and never with intent to have it confined to meet the liability towards the appellants alone. This is more so, since by virtue of the relevant provisions of law, once the proceedings are taken to file, it cannot be allowed to be withdrawn by anybody and the proceedings have to be taken to a logical conclusion. It was accordingly, that the present appellants (joining hands with another person, who is no more) had filed the Insolvency petitions before the Trial court and publication was caused to be made under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC. It was accordingly, that the present appellants (joining hands with another person, who is no more) had filed the Insolvency petitions before the Trial court and publication was caused to be made under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC. It was pursuant to the said notice/publication, that the additional claimants 8 to 588 came to be inducted. 25. Section 27 of the Insolvency Act deals with the course to be followed, if the insolvency petition filed by the parties concerned is not dismissed at the threshold as envisaged under Section 25. It was accordingly, that the order of adjudication was passed under Section 27, based on the actual facts and figures. After passing the said order, the matter does not end there and there is a duty cast upon Insolvency court under Section 28 to meet the requirements therein. Once an order of adjudication is passed, the whole properties belonging to the respondents/judgment debtors will come vested in the court and as such, all the 40 items of the properties identified by the appellants herein should stand vested in the Court. It was suppressing the existence of the above different items of properties, that the respondents/judgment debtors approached the Lower Appellate Court with I.A.No.1930 of 2006 (proposing the Scheme for Settlement) declaring only 7 items of properties, which by itself is cited as an instance of fraud. 26. Vesting of all the properties is given a statutory effect by virtue of sub-section 2 and 4 of the Section 28 and the only exception is in respect of the secured creditor who can proceed independently as envisaged under sub section (6). By virtue of sub-section (7) of Section 28, the order of adjudication pertains back to the date of the insolvency petition. In view of Section 30 of the Insolvency Act, all pending proceedings will come to a standstill or stayed and as per Section 31, the order of adjudication has to be published in the 'Official Gazette' and in such other Forum as prescribed. It has been conceded by the Receiver in the statement filed before this Court, (as mentioned already), that such consequential publication of the 'order of adjudication' as envisaged under Section 31 was not effected because of the interim stay granted by the lower Appellate court and the proceedings had come to a standstill. It has been conceded by the Receiver in the statement filed before this Court, (as mentioned already), that such consequential publication of the 'order of adjudication' as envisaged under Section 31 was not effected because of the interim stay granted by the lower Appellate court and the proceedings had come to a standstill. In view of the scheme approved as per order dated 07.03.2008 and dismissal of the appeals filed before the lower Appellate court (based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the said appellants), the interim stay was no more and matter should have been proceeded from the stage where it came to be stopped; of course in the light of approved scheme, which unfortunately has not taken place. 27. To have clarity of understanding as to the Scheme of the Statute, it is to be noted that, the proceedings consequent to an order of adjudication under Section 27 of the Insolvency Act are dealt with under Section 32 onwards. Section 34 deals with schedule of creditors to be prepared. How the schedule is to be prepared is prescribed under 'Rule IX' of the Kerala Insolvency Rules. In the instant case, no notice by registered post was issued to all the creditors, nor was there any publication of the list in the court. No schedule itself was prepared and the various steps, as envisaged under Sections 32 and 34, have not taken place because of the annulment of the order. Sections 36 to 38 deal with how annulment of an order of adjudication is to be made. By virtue of the clear mandate under Section 36, there has to be satisfaction of the court that the debts have been paid in full. The proceedings on annulment are dealt with under Section 38. But because of annulment ordered by the lower Appellate court by way of 'suo motu' order dated 11.03.2008 issued without hearing anybody, no such proceedings could be pursued and hence nobody including the Receiver could proceed further. 28. Sections 39 to 42 of the Insolvency Act deals with compositions and schemes of arrangement. Section 39 reads as follows: "39. But because of annulment ordered by the lower Appellate court by way of 'suo motu' order dated 11.03.2008 issued without hearing anybody, no such proceedings could be pursued and hence nobody including the Receiver could proceed further. 28. Sections 39 to 42 of the Insolvency Act deals with compositions and schemes of arrangement. Section 39 reads as follows: "39. Compositions and schemes of arrangements.- (1) Where a debtor, after the making of an order of adjudication, submits a proposal for a composition in satisfaction of his debts or a proposal for a scheme of arrangement of his affairs, the Court shall fix a date for the consideration of the proposal, and shall issue a notice to all creditors in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) If, on the consideration of the proposal, a majority in number and three-fourths in value of all the creditors whose debts are proved and who are present in person or by pleader, resolve to accept the proposal, the same shall be deemed to be duly accepted by the creditors. (3) The debtor may at the meeting amend the terms of his proposal if the amendment is, in the opinion of the Court, calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. (4) Where the Court is of opinion, after hearing the report of the receiver, if a receiver has been appointed, and after considering any objections which may be made by or on behalf of any creditor, that the terms of the proposal are not reasonable or are not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, the Court shall refuse to approve the proposal. (5) If any facts are proved on proof of which the Court would be required either to refuse, suspend or attach conditions to the debtor's discharge, the Court shall refuse to approve the proposal unless it provides reasonable security for payment of not less than thirty-seven naye paise in the rupee on all the unsecured debts provable against the debtor's estate. (6) No compensation or scheme shall be approved by the Court which does not provide for the payment in priority to other debts of all debts directed to be so paid in the distribution of the property of an insolvent. (7) In any other case the Court may either approve or refuse to approve the proposal. (6) No compensation or scheme shall be approved by the Court which does not provide for the payment in priority to other debts of all debts directed to be so paid in the distribution of the property of an insolvent. (7) In any other case the Court may either approve or refuse to approve the proposal. On filing a petition proposing compromise/scheme, notice has to be issued to all creditors by the court, as prescribed in the rules. Rule X of the Kerala Insolvency Rules, 1959 reads as follows: "X. Consideration of compositions and schemes of arrangements.-(1) If a debtor submits a proposal under Section 39(1) of the Act the Court shall fix a date for consideration of the proposal, and notice thereof in Form No.7 together with a copy of the terms of the proposal, shall be sent to every creditor who has proved. (2) At the meeting for the consideration of the proposal, the debtor shall be entitled to address the Court in person or by pleader in support of the proposal and every creditor who has proved; shall be entitled in person or by pleader to question the debtor and to address the court." From the above, it is quite clear that a meeting of all the creditors has to be convened, issuing notice in Form No.7, with copy of the proposed Scheme, to all the creditors. No such proceeding has ever taken place after submission of the proposal and acceptance of the same by the court and at any rate, before annulling the order passed by the Trial court suo motu, reviewing the earlier order dated 07.03.2008, by passing a totally contradictory order on 11.03.2008. It is quite relevant to note that, when a meeting is convened as aforesaid, the 'Scheme' has to be accepted by majority of the creditors (3/4th) present in the meeting(sub section 2 of Section 39). The debtors can very well seek to amend the scheme/terms of the proposal as envisaged under Section 39(3). Above all, it is always open for the court to refuse approval as stipulated under Section 39(4). 29. Further course of action is discernible from Section 40 of the Act, where an order granting approval is passed by the Insolvency Court, in turn leading to further steps, ultimately ordering 'discharge' under section 42. Above all, it is always open for the court to refuse approval as stipulated under Section 39(4). 29. Further course of action is discernible from Section 40 of the Act, where an order granting approval is passed by the Insolvency Court, in turn leading to further steps, ultimately ordering 'discharge' under section 42. Rule XX of the Rules deals with 'application for discharge' under Section 42 of the Insolvency Act. Notice has to be given as prescribed under Rule XX1 and it has to be in 'English' language and such other languages as specified and the same has to be published in the Gazette. Clause (2) of the said Rules says that 14 days' notice has to be given before hearing and the notice requires to be sent by 'registered post'. The Rule is also quite categoric, that the application for discharge cannot be heard before a 'schedule of creditors' is framed. All these proceedings have been simply given a 'go-bye', by the lower Appellate court, while (suo motu) reviewing the earlier order dated 7.3.2008' dismissing the appeals as not pressed in view of the settlement (based on the submission made by the counsel for the appellants) and virtually allowing the appeals, annulling the order passed by the Insolvency court, that too, without hearing the affected parties. The order is liable to be intercepted on this score alone. 30. With regard to the challenge on maintainability of the appeals, the primary contention is that the order dated 11.03.2008 is per se wrong and not sustainable either on facts or in law; it being an order without jurisdiction and hence it has necessarily to go. It is pointed out that appeal against an order passed by the Insolvency Court/Trial court lies to the District Court under Section 79(1) of the Insolvency Act. The order passed by the Trial court is revisable by the High Court under the 'first proviso' to Section 79(1)of the Act. But, if it is an order passed under Section 4, appeal is maintainable before the High Court, by virtue of the 'second proviso' to Section 79(1) itself; subject to availability of grounds under Section 100 CPC, i.e. on points involving 'substantial questions of law' . 31. A reference to Schedule 1, in relation to Section 79(2) is also necessary. But, if it is an order passed under Section 4, appeal is maintainable before the High Court, by virtue of the 'second proviso' to Section 79(1) itself; subject to availability of grounds under Section 100 CPC, i.e. on points involving 'substantial questions of law' . 31. A reference to Schedule 1, in relation to Section 79(2) is also necessary. For convenience of reference, Section 79 is extracted below: Section 79: "Appeals.- (1) The debtor, any creditor, the receiver or any other person aggrieved by a decision come to or an order made in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction by a Court subordinate to a District Court may appeal to the District Court, and the order of the District Court upon such appeal shall be final: Provided that the High Court, for the purposes of satisfying itself that an order made in any appeal decided by the District Court was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit: Provided, further, that any such person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court on appeal from a decision of a subordinate Court under Section 4 may appeal to the High Court on any of the grounds mentioned in sub- section (1) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (2) Any such person aggrieved by any such decision or order of a District Court as is specified in Schedule I, come to or made otherwise than in appeal from an order made by a subordinate Court, may appeal to the High Court. (3) Any such person aggrieved by any other order made by a District Court otherwise than in appeal from an order made by a subordinate Court may appeal to the High Court by leave of the District Court or of the High Court. (4) The periods of limitation for appeals to the District Court and to the High Court under this section shall be thirty days and ninety days, respectively." It is pointed out with reference to the scheme of the statute, that there is an ocean of difference between the terms- 'decision' and 'order ' as used in the concerned provisions. It is contended that, if it is against a wrong 'order', only revision will lie. But when the matter is finally adjudicated, it becomes a 'decision' and only appeal will lie. It is contended that, if it is against a wrong 'order', only revision will lie. But when the matter is finally adjudicated, it becomes a 'decision' and only appeal will lie. In the instant case, the matter was finally decided as per the verdict dated 07.03.2008 dismissing the appeals based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the said appellants before the lower Appellate court, referring to the approval of the Settlement scheme (preferred before the said court) and just a few days later, the said decision was virtually reversed, suo motu, without hearing anybody; whereby the appeals were allowed annulling the verdict passed by the Trial court/Insolvency Court. This is a 'final decision' and as such, the present appeals are sought to be held as very much maintainable. 32. There is a contention for the respondents/judgment debtors that the order under challenge is not an order under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act. It is pointed out that Section 4 only deals with the general power of the court, which becomes more clear from the second proviso to Section 79(2). Reliance is sought to be placed on the decision rendered by the Apex Court reported in AIR 1977 SC 2202 (Johrilal Soni vs. Smt. Bhanwari Bai). Paragraph 4 of which is relevant and hence the same is extracted below: "4. We now proceed to interpret the provisions of S. 4 itself, the relevant part of which may be extracted thus: "4.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognisance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case." It would be seen that the section has been couched in the widest possible terms and confers complete and full powers on the Insolvency Court to decide all questions of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, which may arise in any case of insolvency. The only restriction which is contained in S. 4 is that these powers are subject to the other provisions of the Act. The only restriction which is contained in S. 4 is that these powers are subject to the other provisions of the Act. In other words, the position is that where any other section of the Act contains a provision which either runs counter to S. 4 or expressly excludes the application of S. 4. to that extent S. 4 would become inapplicable. Counsel for the respondent strongly relied on the provision of S. 53 which runs thus: "53. Any transfer of property not being transfer made before and in consideration of marriage or made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on a petition presented within two years after the date of the transfer, be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the Court." It was submitted that the effect of Section 53 of the Act clearly is that it bars the jurisdiction of the Insolvency Court to determine the validity of any transfer made beyond two years of the transferor being adjudged insolvent. It is no doubt true that the words "within two years after the date of the transfer" being voidable as against the receiver does fix a time-limit within which the transfer could be annulled by the Court. But a plain construction of Section 53 would manifestly indicate that the words "within two years after the date, be voidable as against the receiver, and shall be annulled by the Court" clearly connote that only those transfers are excepted from the jurisdiction of the Court which are voidable. The section has, therefore, made a clear distinction between void and voidable transfers - a distinction which is well- known to law. A void transfer is no transfer at all and is completely destitute of any legal effect: it is a nullity and does not pass any title at all. For instance, where a transfer is nominal, sham or fictitious, the title remains with the transferor and so does the possession and nothing passes to the transferee. It is manifest therefore, that such a transfer is no transfer in the eye of the law. Such transfers, therefore, clearly fall beyond the purview of Sec. 53 of the Act which refers only to transfers which are voidable. It is manifest therefore, that such a transfer is no transfer in the eye of the law. Such transfers, therefore, clearly fall beyond the purview of Sec. 53 of the Act which refers only to transfers which are voidable. It is well settled that a voidable transfer is otherwise a valid transaction and continues to be good until it is avoided by the party aggrieved. For instance, transfers executed by the transferor to delay or defraud his creditors may be avoided under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. Similarly transfers made under coercion, fraud or undue influence may be avoided by the party defrauded. It is only such transfers which, if they take place beyond two years of the date of transfer cannot be enquired into by the Court by virtue of Section 53 of the Act. This appears to us to be the plain and simple interpretation of the combined reading of Sections 4 and 53 of the Act. Indeed if a different interpretation is given, it will render the entire object of the section nugatory, because the Court would be power less to set at naught transfers which are patently void, merely because they had been made at a particular point of time. From the above, it is clear that, unless expressly barred by any other provision, Section 4 applies. Though the above verdict was rendered with reference to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, 1920, the observations of the Apex Court apply with equal force to the present case as well. 33. There is another contention for the respondents herein that all the creditors (additional petitioners 8 to 588) have not been made parties to the present appeals and hence the appeals are not maintainable. It is noted that, in the course of the proceedings, the said persons have been sought to be made as parties, but notice has not been issued so far. The question is whether notice should be ordered and they should be heard. 34. Order 41, Rule 4 of the CPC stipulates that, if several persons are affected, the court can mould the decree in favour of all persons who are entitled to get the benefit; more so, when it is a continuation of the proceedings pursued under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC effecting necessary notification. 34. Order 41, Rule 4 of the CPC stipulates that, if several persons are affected, the court can mould the decree in favour of all persons who are entitled to get the benefit; more so, when it is a continuation of the proceedings pursued under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC effecting necessary notification. The Insolvency petition itself was filed initially by the appellants in a representative capacity, i.e. for the benefit of all the creditors concerned and it was pursuant to the orders passed by the Trial Court/Insolvency Court, that necessary publication was effected in terms of the Order 1 Rule 8 CPC, attracting other similarly situated persons/creditors who came to be impleaded therein as additional petitioners 8 to 588. The scope of Order 41 Rule 4 CPC has been made clear by the Apex Court as per decision in Ratan Lal Shah vs. Firm Lalman Das Chhadamma Lal and another [ AIR 1970 SC 108 ], which stands in favour of the appellants. A learned Judge of this Court also had occasion to consider whether all such similarly situated persons, who are entitled to get benefits should be made parties. Making a reference also to Order 41 Rule 33, along with Rule 4, it was held by the learned Judge, as per the verdict in 1966 KLT 715 (Gouri Amma vs. Gopalakrishna Panicker) that it is not necessary (Paragraph 8). 35. After hearing both the sides and after going through the relevant provisions of law and nature of challenge raised herein, it is seen that the challenge is against the course pursued by the lower Appellate court, virtually annulling the order passed by the Trial court/Insolvency Court in favour of the creditors. In other words, by virtue of the order under challenge, much prejudice has been caused to the present appellants and also to other creditors. In so far as the attempt of the appellants is to rectify the mistake and restore the benefit to all the creditors and since it is virtually a continuation of the proceedings under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC, all the creditors are likely to get the benefit if the contention of the appellants is upheld. In other words, there is no conflict of interest between the appellants and the other creditors, who came to be impleaded as additional petitioners 8 to 588 before the Insolvency Court. In other words, there is no conflict of interest between the appellants and the other creditors, who came to be impleaded as additional petitioners 8 to 588 before the Insolvency Court. As such, the contention raised by the respondents that the present appeals are not maintainable for want of impleadment of other creditors is devoid of any merit and the same is repelled. 36. In support of the contention raised by the appellants that proper remedy is by way of 'appeal' and not by way of 'revision', reliance is sought to be placed on the verdict passed by a Single Bench of this Court in Supreme Finance Corporation v. George ( 2006(3) KLT 1003 ) (Paragraph 5). It is also pointed out that, the present one is a case where Article 227 could have been invoked, as the order under challenge is an order which is totally without jurisdiction and passed in total violation of the relevant provisions of the Act/Rules with regard to the approval of the scheme, annulment of the order passed by the Insolvency Court and in ordering 'discharge'; that too, without hearing the affected parties. Reference is also made to the verdict passed by the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty vs.Rajendra Shankar Patil [2010 (3) KLT SN.86 (Case No.90)] as to the difference between the proceedings under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is also pointed out that a petition was filed before this Court earlier under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, but the same was subsequently withdrawn to facilitate the statutory remedy. In so far as there is no case for the respondents that the lower Appellate court had complied with all the statutory requirements, at least after the approval of the Scheme, leading to dismissal of the appeals preferred by the respondents herein on 07.03.2008 (based on the submissions of their own counsel with reference to the Scheme), the order passed just after a few days, on 11.03.2008, suo motu reviewing the verdict passed on 07.03.2008 and allowing the appeals, annulling the order passed by the Insolvency Court, that too, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the aggrieved parties requires to be intercepted . 37. Since the compromise has become final, the question is only with regard to further steps as envisaged under Section 40, 42 and 38. 37. Since the compromise has become final, the question is only with regard to further steps as envisaged under Section 40, 42 and 38. It is stated that annulment notice has already been published in the Gazette. But on going through a copy of the notification made available before this court, it is seen that it does not refer to the order dated 11.03.2008 passed by the lower Appellate court, but to the order dated 07.03.2008, which does not say anything with regard to the 'annulment', but for dismissal of the appeals pursuant to the compromise approved. I.A. 1930 of 2006 is dated 18.07.2006 and the compromise scheme was also submitted along with I.A.. No materials are available as to the date fixed by the court for considering the proposal and admittedly, no separate notice was issued to all the creditors by the Court, as prescribed under Rule X of the Rules. No order is seen passed on 18.07.2006 as per the proceedings sheet forming part of the LCR. It is also important to note that all the creditors were not made parties to I.A.1930 OF 2006, wherein only 7 persons (appellants herein and another)were shown as respondents. That apart, such a petition was filed only in AS.60 of 2003 and not in the connected appeals. It is seen that the order passed in I.A.No.1930 of 2006 on 07.03.2008 was clear and exhaustive, whereby the parties were relegated to approach the Insolvency court for further steps based on the compromise Scheme approved by the lower Appellate Court. This naturally would include the right of the debtors to file petition for 'annulment' and 'discharge' and the right of the present appellants/creditors to point out that the entire amount due as per the compromise was still to be satisfied, if it be so. Only on full satisfaction of the terms of the approved compromise, can there be an order of 'annulment' and subsequent 'discharge' in terms of Sections 40 and 42 of the Act. But, if for any reason, the appellate court, after having passed the order dated 7.3.2008 relegating the parties to pursue the matter before the Insolvency Court, wanted to complete the remaining procedural steps by the said court itself including for 'annulment' and 'discharge', the further steps, which were to be pursued by the Insolvency Court, should have been pursued by the lower Appellate court as well. Having not chosen to do so, i.e. without ascertaining whether the terms of compromise had already been satisfied and whether there was any subsisting grievance for the creditors, the order passed by the Insolvency Court could not have been annulled by the lower Appellate court on a fine morning; that too without any notice to the aggrieved parties. 38. It is true that 'accidental slips or omissions' can be rectified by the Court invoking the power and procedure under Section 152 of the CPC. The scope of Section 152 has been explained by the Supreme Court in the Deputy Director, Land Acquisition vs. Malla Atchinaidu and ors [ (2006) 12 SCC 87 = AIR 2007 SC 740 ] . The very same decision is an authority to hold the position the other way round, if it is not an accidental slip/mistake or omission (paragraph 48). Such a course is provided only if no prejudice will be caused to anybody. 'Accidental slip' can be corrected by invoking the power under section 152 as mentioned by the Supreme Court in Samarendra Nath Sinha and another v. Krishna Kumar Nag ( AIR 1967 SC 1440 ) as well. Under some circumstance, invocation of power under Section 151 is also possible, as observed by this Court in Raman Nadar Velayudhan Nadar vs. Janaki Karthi [2011(2) KLT 149]. It is also possible to correct an omission to take note of a provision, by invoking the power under Section 153 CPC as held in Kuruvilla Thomas vs. State Bank of Travancore ( 1988(1) KLT 563 ). But here, the position is something different and the so called 'mistake or omission' is not an accidental slip. But, it in fact is a final order/adjudication which could have been pursued only after completing the procedural formalities, subsequent to the approval of the compromise scheme under Section 39. 39. It is true, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, that no appeal lies against a 'consent decree' by virtue of the mandate under Section 96(3) of the CPC. The verdict of the Apex Court in Katikara Chintamani Dora vs. Guntreddi Annamanaidu ( 1974 1 SCC 567 ) substantiates the point. 39. It is true, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, that no appeal lies against a 'consent decree' by virtue of the mandate under Section 96(3) of the CPC. The verdict of the Apex Court in Katikara Chintamani Dora vs. Guntreddi Annamanaidu ( 1974 1 SCC 567 ) substantiates the point. But here, the challenge is not against the 'consent or compromise decree or order' (dated 07.03.2008), but against the subsequent order dated 11.03.2008 passed by the lower Appellate court, 'suo motu', virtually turning the earlier order dated 07.03.2008 upside down, that too, without hearing the affected parties or anybody else. As it stands so, the submission made in this regard is quite out of context and not relevant. 40. From the above discussion, it is quite evident that there is no dispute for both the sides that a compromise scheme was proposed by filing I.A.No.1930 of 2006 agreeing to satisfy the 'entire debt', when the matter was pending before the lower Appellate court; that the above compromise scheme was approved by the said court passing an order on 07.03.2008; that appropriate directions were given relegating the parties to approach the Insolvency Court for further steps, including the right of the respondent debtors (appellants before the lower Appellate court) to apply for 'discharge' and the directions given to the Receiver to file periodical statements/monthly statements and the liberty given to all/other creditors as well, to pursue the matter before the Insolvency Court. It was accordingly, that the appeals preferred by the concerned respondents herein against the adjudication order passed by the Insolvency Court were dismissed as not pressed, based on the submission made by their learned lawyer. There is also no case, that no such submission was ever made by the lawyer for the debtors (appellants before the lower Appellate court) or that they had filed any petition to review the said order, if at all it was not correct or wrong in any manner. There is also no case, that no such submission was ever made by the lawyer for the debtors (appellants before the lower Appellate court) or that they had filed any petition to review the said order, if at all it was not correct or wrong in any manner. Further, there is no dispute that the order dated 07.03.2008 came to be varied by the lower Appellate court 'suo motu' and without hearing anybody, by passing the impugned order dated 11.03.2008, whereby the order of adjudication passed by the Insolvency Court was simply annulled with reference to the order approving the compromise and thus, allowing the appeals (which were dismissed on 07.03.2008) without ascertaining whether the liability to the creditors was fully satisfied in terms of the approved compromise. Admittedly, no notice was ever issued to the aggrieved parties/present appellants or any other creditors before passing the order dated 11.03.2008, diametrically opposite to the order dated 07.03.2008. As such, the order passed by the lower Appellate court on 11.03.2008 is not eligible to be branded as an order correcting an 'accidental slip/mistake/omission' coming within the purview of Sections 151, 152 or 153 of the CPC. The order passed by the lower Appellate court has substantially and quite adversely affected the rights and interests of the appellants herein/creditors, who could not get a chance to submit the actual facts, figures and provision of law and in particular, the procedure to be pursued before 'annulment' and 'discharge' are ordered pursuant to the compromise, once approved by the court. 41. In so far as there is not much dispute for either side, as to the compromise arrived at and approved by the lower Appellate Court as per the order in I.A.No.1930 of 2006, this Court finds that, it is not at all necessary for this Court to go behind the order/proceedings forming the subject matter of I.A. 1930 of 2006 and the order therein. The only question to be considered is whether the terms of the approved compromise / scheme have been duly honoured by clearing the 'entire debt' to all the creditors and the statutory bodies, as agreed and whether 'annulment' of the order of adjudication can be passed and discharge' can be ordered in terms of Sections 40 and 42 of the Act. It also remains a fact that, full particulars of the entire properties were not disclosed by the judgment debtors when the scheme was proposed/produced along with I.A. and the particulars of only 'seven' items were shown therein. Subsequently, it has been brought on record that several other items of properties (as many as 40) could be identified and proceeded against. So also, the demand made by the Income Tax Department was not fully satisfied and the entire outstanding liability was not cleared. The amount generated by way of sale of 'item No.6' of the properties in the schedule of compromise was not satisfied by the successful bidder and since the total liability was outweighing the amounts available from different sources, no annulment/discharge could have been ordered by the appellate court before recording satisfaction of the entire debt as agreed and approved. This being the position, it was necessary for the court to have proceeded with further steps with the involvement of the Receiver, to cause sale of other properties as well, to liquidate the entire liability in terms of the compromise to the creditors and the statutory authorities like the Income Tax Department, in accordance with law. Without making any attempt to see whether the liability was cleared as above, it was not correct or proper for the lower Appellate court to have simply annulled the adjudication order, virtually creating a stalemate and extending undue favours to the debtors. 42. It is also a matter of concern, whether the court could have sanctioned approval of the Scheme, if the proposal was not to satisfy the 'entire debt' including interest; more so when sufficient properties were available to satisfy the entire liability including interest and when full particulars of all the properties (as many as 40 now brought out) were not disclosed/given by the creditors (who chose to give particulars of only 'seven' items in the compromise schedule). It was also for the court below to consider the merit of the case and see whether the actual eligibility of the creditors to get their due amount with interest could be procured by proceeding against such properties or whether the compromise was a 'just and reasonable' one, safeguarding the interest of all concerned to an appropriate extent, if the intention of the debtors was something else. This Court does not propose to express anything in this regard, as it is for the court below to consider whether full satisfaction has been made in terms of the approved compromise scheme. This is more so, since the compromise scheme is not under challenge from either side and the contention raised by the debtors/respondents is that the entire amount payable as per the compromise scheme has been satisfied ('principal portion' alone, as intended by them); whereas the contention of the appellants/creditors is that the payment effected is not complete, having not satisfied the 'interest portion', which was also agreed to be satisfied when the compromise scheme stipulated that the debtors were ready to satisfy the 'entire debt'. What was the extent of the compromise is also a matter to be considered to ascertain the scope of compromise. In other words, in so far as the compromise does not specifically refer to the payment of interest or rate, the question as to what extent interest is payable, i.e. at what rate, and for what period, are also matters to be considered by the court below. 43. In the above circumstances, the Substantial Questions of law raised by this Court (1 to 5) stand answered in favor of the appellants. Coming to the additional Substantial Questions of law framed by the Respondents 4 & 14 as per 1A 1182 of 2016, Questions at Sl. No.'i to iv' pertain to the position prior to approval of the Compromise Scheme as per order dated 07.03.2008 in 1A 1930/2006 filed by them. Since the Compromise Scheme is not under challenge (but brought about at their instance and sought to be relied on), this Court need not go behind the approved Scheme. So these questions are irrelevant. Question No: 'v' stands already answered and it is for the Court below to arrive at a finding, if the terms of the approved Scheme have been fully honoured. Question No: 'vi' Not relevant at this distance of time; more so since the delay was condoned about 6 years ago, on 07.04.2010 and 1A No.327 of 2016 filed to recall the said order now, is much belated and stands dismissed as per separate order passed in the 1A. Question Nos. vii and viii are rather 'inquisitive' in nature and is having only academic importance, in view of the nature of contentions taken. Question Nos. vii and viii are rather 'inquisitive' in nature and is having only academic importance, in view of the nature of contentions taken. They never form any Substantial Questions of Law. However, the question regarding the remuneration payable to the Receiver in an Insolvency proceedings is left open to be considered by the Court who appointed the Receiver. Question No: ix stands answered, holding that the proper nomenclature of the appeal is as 'MSA' (Miscellaneous Second Appeal) and not as MFA. The mistake on the part of the Registry cannot place any hurdle on the way of the litigant and it will not vitiate the merit of the appeal. It is for the Registry to make necessary corrections, wherever necessary and for future guidance. Question No: 'x' Maintainability of the appeals was heard at length, finding that Substantial Questions of Law were involved and it was accordingly, that the appeals were formally admitted as per order dated 14.03.2016, framing the Substantial Questions of Law (1 to 5) as mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said order. 44. In the light of the above discussion, this Court finds that the order dated 11.03.2008 passed by the lower Appellate court which is under challenge in these appeals, cannot subsist anymore and accordingly, we set aside the same without prejudice to pass further orders, if further steps to record full satisfaction of entire debt, 'annulment' of the adjudication order and 'discharge' in terms of the approved compromise Scheme read with Sections 40 and 42 of the Act are intended to be pursued by the lower Appellate Court itself, instead of relegating the parties to move the Trial Court/Insolvency Court, which shall only be after hearing the parties concerned. The parties shall appear before the I Addl. District Court, Thiruvananthapuram on 20.06.2016 for further steps. 45. The appeals stand allowed. No cost. The Registry is directed to return the Lower Court Records immediately.