D. A. Joyson Sethuraj v. Board of Trustees, Tuticorin Trust, rep. by the Chairman, Tuticorin Trust, Tuticorin
2016-12-08
R.SURESH KUMAR
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Mr. R. Suresh Kumar, J. The prayer in the writ petition is for a mandamus to direct the respondents to pay interest to the petitioner at 12% per annum from 01.03.2003 till 07.09.2009, on the retirement benefits of Rs.7,50,447/- settled belatedly. 2. The petitioner retired from service from the respondent Port on 28.02.2003. While he was in service, disciplinary proceedings were initiated. Pursuant to which, before the date of superannuation, on 28.02.2003, the petitioner was served with charges on 25.02.2003. Though the petitioner, subsequently, was allowed to retire by proceedings dated 27.02.2003, by a subsequent proceeding dated 13.03.2003, the petitioner was informed that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner would continue, even after the retirement of the petitioner as per Rule 9 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. Thereafter, an Enquiry Officer was appointed to proceed against the petitioner departmentally. Challenging the said disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner had filed W.P. No. 34185 of 2003 before the Principal Bench of this Court to quash the said proceedings dated 25.02.2003, whereby the disciplinary proceeding was initiated and also the consequential proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 04.07.2003 appointing an Enquiry Officer. The said petition was admitted and a stay was granted. 3. During the pendency of the writ petition, by proceeding dated 08.07.2009, the petitioner was intimated that disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was dropped. The said developments were brought to the notice of this Court in the said writ proceedings in W.P. No. 34185/2003 and this Court, by order dated 07.08.2009, recorded the same and disposed of the writ petition, however, granted liberty to the petitioner to agitate the issue, if any claim left out for the petitioner. Thereafter, the said retirement benefits, as calculated and reflected in the order of the 2nd respondent dated 08.07.2009, was settled to the petitioner on 07.09.2009. For the said belated payment of the retirement benefits to the petitioner, as the same, according to the petitioner, could have been paid to him, if the said disciplinary proceedings ought not been initiated against him even at the time of superannuation of the petitioner, i.e., on 28.02.2003.
For the said belated payment of the retirement benefits to the petitioner, as the same, according to the petitioner, could have been paid to him, if the said disciplinary proceedings ought not been initiated against him even at the time of superannuation of the petitioner, i.e., on 28.02.2003. Therefore, from the period between 01.03.2003 till the date of payment i.e., 07.09.2009, the petitioner is entitled for interest and in order to claim the interest, the petitioner, even though, had requested the respondents, the same was not paid and aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has come out with the present writ petition with the aforesaid prayer. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that as against the disciplinary proceedings, a writ petition was filed as stated supra and the same was admitted and interim stay was granted. All along during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner had enjoyed the stay. Subsequently during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondents had come out with proceedings dated 08.07.2009, wherein, the respondents themselves dropped the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and also accepted to release the retirement benefits to the petitioner, which includes commutation of pension, gratuity, encashment of earned leave, TTA amount and LTC claim. The same have been taken note of by the writ Court in the said order referred to above and after having taken note of, this Court by order dated 07.08.2009, at Paragraph No.5 had given liberty to the petitioner to agitate any further claim, which has been omitted. 6. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that as per the settled legal proposition, the petitioner is entitled to claim interest, at least, nominal interest from the respondents for the belated payment for nearly about six years and more. On that score, the petitioner was not at fault. 7. The learned counsel would rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court 2008 (3) SCC 44 in the matter of S.K. Dua v. State of Haryana and another and the decision of this Court reported in 2010 (7) MLJ 577 , in the matter of P.Nagarathna Pandian v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board and another.
7. The learned counsel would rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court 2008 (3) SCC 44 in the matter of S.K. Dua v. State of Haryana and another and the decision of this Court reported in 2010 (7) MLJ 577 , in the matter of P.Nagarathna Pandian v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board and another. By heavily relying upon the said decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that even in the absence of any Rule to that effect of the employer/authority concerned, the employee/petitioner shall be entitled to claim interest for the belated payment of retirement dues. In view of the settled legal position, the respondents cannot deny the interest, for which, the petitioner is lawfully entitled to and therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the writ petition has to be allowed. 8. Per contra, the learned standing counsel for the respondents would invite the attention of this Court at Paragraph No.4 of the proceedings of the respondents dated 08.07.2009, which reads thus: "Whereas a Committee has been constituted by the Chairman to examine his grievance and in its meeting held on 7.7.09, scrutinised all relevant documents particularly his two letters dated 20.2.2003 & 30.1.2009 and the committee noted that Sri D.A. Joyson Sethuraj had pleaded for pardon and expressed his regrets which was also reflected in the affidavit which was submitted by him in the Court." 9. The learned standing counsel would further contend that during the pendency of the earlier writ petition as stated supra, only on the repeated requests of the petitioner, especially, two requests dated 20.02.2003 and 30.01.2009, the case of the petitioner was considered sympathetically and the respondents, after having accepted the regrets and pardon expressed by the petitioner for his misdeeds, for which the enquiry proceeding was initiated against him, the respondents had taken a decision purely on sympathetic ground in order to give solace to the petitioner, issued the proceedings dated 08.07.2009, thereby dropping the disciplinary proceedings and allowing the retirement benefits to the petitioner. 10.
10. The learned standing counsel would further contend that the entire order dated 08.07.2009 was taken on record by this Court in the said writ petition and ultimately the writ petition was closed by recording the statement made on behalf of the respondents that the entire retirement benefits to the petitioner would be paid within 15 days from the date of order and immediately on 07.09.2009, the entire retirement benefits as reflected in the proceedings of the respondents dated 08.07.2009 was paid to the petitioner. Therefore, beyond that there is no other claim or further claim is available for the petitioner to agitate. Therefore, the said liberty given by this Court at Paragraph 5 of the order dated 07.08.2009 cannot be construed that the petitioner would be entitled to get interest for the payment made, as the same had been paid on the request of the petitioner by expressing regret and also the same having been recorded, the writ petition was closed and therefore, the disbursement of service benefits in the normal parlance cannot be invoked here in the case of the petitioner, as the entire issue is covered by the said proceeding of the respondents dated 08.07.2009 and the orders of this Court dated 07.08.2009. Therefore, the learned standing counsel would contend that the petitioner is not entitled to claim any interest, as he claimed in this writ petition. 11. This Court have considered the said rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the materials placed before this Court for perusal. 12. Certain relevant facts, which cannot be controverted by both parties in this writ petition are that the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, of course, before the date of superannuation. Though the petitioner was permitted to retire, the disciplinary proceedings continued in view of the provisions contained in the Pension Rules and as against which, a writ petition was filed, stay was granted. During the pendency of the said writ petition, admittedly, the petitioner had been requesting the respondents repeatedly to consider the case sympathetically and in this regard at least two letters written by the petitioner dated 20.02.2003 and 30.01.2009 are relevant, whereby the petitioner had expressed regrets for the misdeeds committed by him for which, he has sought for pardon from the respondents.
Having accepted the same, the respondents passed order on 08.07.2009, where the entire retirement benefits under five heads as referred to above had been calculated and was directed to disburse. 13. It is also not in controversy that the said order had been taken note of by this Court and on behalf of the petitioner also, in the earlier writ petition, a plea was made to the effect that in view of the said order of the respondents, dated 08.07.2009, the writ petition may be closed giving liberty to the petitioner to agitate any claim, which has been left out in the order dated 08.07.2009. By recording the same, this Court disposed the said writ petition by closing the same by order dated 07.08.2009 and also recorded the undertaking given by the respondents to disburse the amount within 15 days. 14. Therefore, the only issue before this Court is as to whether the petitioner is still entitled to claim interest by using the liberty given by this Court in the earlier order under the head "any further claim, which has been left" in the order dated 08.07.2009. 15. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the "any further claim, which has been left" in the order dated 08.07.2009 includes the interest for the belated payment. On this context only, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the said two decisions, one by the Hon'ble Apex Court and another by this Court. 16. No doubt, the law is well settled in this regard. For any rival claim of an employee, if it is paid belatedly, for which, the employee is not at fault, then, certainly he would claim at least nominal interest, which may vary from 6 to 12%. In a number of cases that kind of interest was allowed by writ Courts. Considering those decisions, this Court in the judgment cited supra, in 2010 (7) MLJ 577 has held as follows: "7.
In a number of cases that kind of interest was allowed by writ Courts. Considering those decisions, this Court in the judgment cited supra, in 2010 (7) MLJ 577 has held as follows: "7. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is now well settled that an employee is entitled to interest on belated payment of pension and other retrial benefits, even in the absence of statutory rules/administrative instructions or guidelines and he can make his claim for interest, under Part III of the Constitution, relying on Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution." Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said judgment cited supra (vide 2008 (3) SCC 44 ) has expressed the same view. No doubt, the law is well settled in this regard. But whether the principle laid down in those cases can be applied to the facts of the present case is yet another issue. 17. In this case, the charges framed against the petitioner, though was put under challenge before this Court, the same was not decided on merits. The writ proceedings was closed by this Court by recording the proceedings of the respondents dated 08.07.2009, which, the petitioner has fully accepted, as the same is reflected at Paragraph No.3 of the order of this Court, which reads thus: "3. In view of the same, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the writ petition may be closed giving liberty to the petitioner to agitate any claim which has been left in order dated 08.07.2009 by way of separate proceedings in accordance with law." 18. When the writ petitioner has himself made a plea before this Court to close the writ petition by recording the orders of the respondents dated 08.07.2009, insofar as the acceptance of the dues proposed to be settled to the petitioner was concluded subject to any left out claim, the plea now made by the petitioner seeking interest for the belated payment, cannot be said to be a further claim or a left out claim of the said proceedings of the respondents and therefore, liberty given to the petitioner at Paragraph No.5 of the earlier order cannot be misused or misconstrued to make such a claim of interest from the respondents. 19.
19. The said view is only available view for the simple reason that this Court in the earlier order at Paragraph No.4 has also recorded the undertaking given by the respondents through his counsel that payment will be made within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of order as contained in the order dated 07.08.2009. 20. So what was contained in the order dated 07.08.2009 has admittedly been paid to the petitioner. The scope of making any further claim, as if left out, would not at all arise. Therefore, the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner as cited supra would no way applicable to the present facts of the case and in that view of the matter, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner is not entitled to seek any interest, as he claimed in this writ petition. Therefore, in that view of the matter, the writ petition fails and the same is accordingly, dismissed. No costs.