JUDGMENT : G.B. Shah, J. 1. Present Criminal Misc. Applications under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, 'the Code') have been preferred by the applicants - original accused - Manufacturer/Distributor/Managing Director/company Secretary/Nominee etc. of Cadbury India Limited for quashing the Criminal Complaints being Nos. 5089 of 1995, 3791 of 1992, 1551 of 1992 and 1610 of 1992 filed against them for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Act'), pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Municipal), Vadodara (for short, 'the trial Court') and the orders of issuance of process. 2. As the issue involved in all these applications and the offence are same, these applications are heard together and being decided by this common judgment and order. 3. Brief common facts of the cases on hand are as under: "3.1 The applicant herein is a public limited company. It is the case of the applicant that the respondent No. 2 herein - Food Inspector visited different stores situated at Vadodara and collected the samples of Cadbury Bournvita (company packs) of 500 gms./200 gms. respectively for analysis. The said samples were sent to the Public Analyst, Vadodara and the Public Analyst by reports in the respective cases, opined that the samples were not conforming to the standards of malted milk food with cocoa powder, laid down in item A. 18. 12 of Appendix B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (for short, 'the Rules'). The papers were sent to the Local Health Authority and Dy. Municipal Commissioner, Corporation Area, Vadodara for grant of consent as to initiate prosecution, which came to be granted and accordingly, complaints came to be filed before the trial Court and process was ordered to be issued in each cases and hence, the applicants are before this Court for quashing the said complaints and the proceedings initiated thereupon." 4. Heard, Mr. Jaideep Verma, learned advocate with Mr. Pathak, learned advocate for the applicant and Mr. Pranav G. Desai, learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. L.R. Pujari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent No. 1 - State of Gujarat. 4.1 Mr. Verma, learned advocate for the applicant, vehemently submitted that in the present case, there appears clear breach of provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act. Pranav G. Desai, learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. L.R. Pujari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent No. 1 - State of Gujarat. 4.1 Mr. Verma, learned advocate for the applicant, vehemently submitted that in the present case, there appears clear breach of provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act. Section 13(2) of the Act, provides for forwarding the result of the analysis to the concerned and informing that if he so desires he can make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of the receipt of the report to get the food article kept by the Local Health Authority analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory while it is in fit condition for analyzing and if there is delay in filing the prosecution and in providing the copy of the report, it would not serve the purpose. He submitted that in the case on hand, no letter was issued to the applicant and as such, the right of the applicant to get the sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory has been denied. Further, he submitted that the consent given by the authority concerned, is not a valid consent and is without jurisdiction for the reason that prosecution is consented qua the manufacturing company through its responsible persons viz. Manufacturer/Director etc. but no consent has been granted for prosecuting the company per se. He submitted that in the complaint also the company is impleaded as such and these persons are not being prosecuted in their individual capacity but as representatives of the company. He submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the consenting authority had granted the consent under Section 20 of the Act for prosecution of the responsible persons in their individual capacity. He further submitted that the consent given by the concerned authority is without application of mind as it reflects from the bare perusal of the consent that the authority has found prima facie case against the vendor and the warranter only and in absence of any specific averment in the complaint that the Manufacturer/Managing Director/Director/Company Secretary/Nominee etc. of the manufacturing company were in-charge of the affairs of the business or the offence was committed in connivance of them or due to their negligence, no offence can be said to be made out against them. of the manufacturing company were in-charge of the affairs of the business or the offence was committed in connivance of them or due to their negligence, no offence can be said to be made out against them. He further submitted that, as per the provisions of Section 17 of the Act it is necessary for the complainant to specify as to how a particular accused is responsible, however, in the case on hand, no specific name of any individual for committing specific offence is mentioned and accordingly, vague complaints have been filed by the complainant. He also submitted that 'Bourvita' at the time when the offence alleged to have been committed, was not a 'Malted Milk Food' as described under item No. A.18.12. of the Appendix B of the Rules but was a 'Proprietary Food Drink' for which, no standards were prescribed under the Rules and it also deviated from the standards prescribed in item No. A.18.12 for Malted Milk Food. He further submitted that the sample distinctly exhibits 'Tastier Food Drinks' on its label along with the list of ingredients which are required under Rule 37-A of the Rules. He also submitted that Rule 37-A prior to amendment in 1985 required the label of every proprietary food to be approved by the Government of India and the Directorate General of Health Services, New Delhi by letter dated 15/12/1983 had approved the label of Bournvita as was required under the Rules and accordingly, the same was always treated as proprietary food for which, as aforesaid, no standards were prescribed under the Act. Moreover, he submitted that after the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Department of Health, Government of India vide GSR No. 297(E) dated 26/04/2001 introduced new entry being No. A.18.12.01 under Appendix B to the Rules for Malt Based Food, effective from 26/10/2001 and the standards prescribed thereunder being applicable to Bournvita, Bournvita was standardized only after 26/10/2001 within the meaning of the Act and not before that. He submitted that the said proposition was also accepted by the Kerala High Court in its decision dated 25/02/2005 passed in Cr.M.C. No. 9930 of 2002. In the aforesaid facts, he submitted that this is a fit case for exercising the discretionary powers vested in the Court under Section 482 of the Code and requested to quash the impugned complaints and the proceedings initiated thereupon. In the aforesaid facts, he submitted that this is a fit case for exercising the discretionary powers vested in the Court under Section 482 of the Code and requested to quash the impugned complaints and the proceedings initiated thereupon. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the following decisions: "i) Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Food Inspector and Another, reported in 2006 (1) FAC 237 of Hon'ble Apex Court; ii) Santanu s/o. Jagatbandhu Sinha v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 3050 of High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench); iii) A.K. Shirbhate (Food Inspector) v. Ramlal alias Ramnath and another, reported in 1990 (2) FAC 257 of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court; iv) Jaswantbhai Ishwarbhai Patel and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another, reported in 2008 (2) FAC 335 of Gujarat High Court;" 4.2 Mr. L.R. Pujari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent No. 1, submitted that the complaints were filed against the applicants in their representative capacity and therefore, they are required to be prosecuted. He further submitted that all the mandatory procedure as required under the Act have been properly followed by the prosecution agency. Further, a valid consent has been given by the competent authority to prosecute the applicants herein. In view of the above, there is complete application of mind on the part of the competent authority and therefore, as the complaints disclose the prima facie offence alleged against the applicants, they are required to be tried. All these applications therefore require to be dismissed. 4.3 Mr. Pranav G. Desai, learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 submitted that all the ingredients of the offence alleged against the applicants are prima facie established. Therefore, according to him, these are cases where trial is a necessity. 5. I have gone through the complaints in question and the ingredients in the complaints. It is required to be noted that the complaints have been filed against Cadbury India Limited and its owner/vendor/warranter/manufacturer/Director/managing director/Company Secretary/nominee etc. in the representative capacity of the company and not in their individual capacity and no person has been specifically mentioned in the complaints for the commission of alleged offence. It is required to be noted that the complaints have been filed against Cadbury India Limited and its owner/vendor/warranter/manufacturer/Director/managing director/Company Secretary/nominee etc. in the representative capacity of the company and not in their individual capacity and no person has been specifically mentioned in the complaints for the commission of alleged offence. Thus, there is non-application of mind on the part of the competent authority in giving consent to prosecute the applicants inasmuch as the said consent is not a valid consent under section 20 of the Act for prosecution of the responsible persons in their individual capacity. 5.1 On the above aspect, reliance has been placed by the learned advocate for the applicants on the decision rendered in the case of "Santano, S/o. Jagatbandhu Sinha v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2007 ALL MR(Cri) 3050. The relevant portion below Head Note (A) reads as under: "In the present case, the accused has been described as follows in the complaint, "All Directors and Managers Hindustan Lever Ltd., Backbay Reclamation, Mumbai". Now by any stretch of imagination it could not be the description of an accused at all. If at all the Directors are to be prosecuted they should be prosecuted by names and even where a Manager is to be prosecuted he should be prosecuted by name. If the complainant wanted to prosecute the Company, the Company should have been made an accused but complainant does not seek to make Company accused in this particular case. He seeks to make all Directors and Managers as accused. This is absolutely vague and for this vagueness itself the complaint should have been thrown away at the threshold. The proper description of the accused is absolutely necessary because in case of his conviction the order of conviction and sentence needs to be executed. With the above description the Court would be at a loss to know as to against whom such order of conviction should be executed. There may be hundreds of Managers and even 10 Directors. All of them cannot be hauled up and sent to jail without they being actually asked to face the charge. For this reason alone the complaint should have been dismissed without issuing process. The complaint must contain pleadings to the effect that those persons who are sought to be prosecuted are either in-charge of the business or responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business. For this reason alone the complaint should have been dismissed without issuing process. The complaint must contain pleadings to the effect that those persons who are sought to be prosecuted are either in-charge of the business or responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business. In the case at hand there is not even a whisper as to who are responsible and why all Directors should be prosecuted. In view of this also complaint was liable to be dismissed without issue of process." 5.2 The above ratio is squarely applicable to the case on hand. Therefore, the said non-application of mind on the part of competent authority absolves the applicants from being prosecuted. 6. For the purpose of quashing of the complaints, what is required to be seen is whether complaints disclose the prima facie ingredients of offence or not and if they do not disclose the ingredients of the offence, complaints can quashed and if they disclose, complaints cannot be quashed. In the present cases, a bare reading of the complaints does not disclose any prima facie ingredients of the offence against any of the present applicants as no applicant has been specifically named in the complaints and therefore, they are not required to be tried for the offence alleged against them. 7. Apart from that, prima facie, it appears to be mandatory on the part of the competent authority to forward a copy of the report of the analysis to such person or persons for making an application to the Court within the stipulated period of ten days to get the second sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory. However, the applicants have not been provided with the copy of the report of the local authority within the prescribed time so as to make such an application to the Court within the stipulated time to make the second sample analyzed through the Central Food Laboratory. Therefore, the mandatory procedure as prescribed under the Act has not been followed by the respondents. As the said mandatory procedure has not been followed, the applicants were seriously prejudiced and their valuable right under section 13(2) of the Act of making an application to analyze the second sample before the Central Food Laboratory has been denied by the respondents making the whole proceedings incapable of being proceeded further. As the said mandatory procedure has not been followed, the applicants were seriously prejudiced and their valuable right under section 13(2) of the Act of making an application to analyze the second sample before the Central Food Laboratory has been denied by the respondents making the whole proceedings incapable of being proceeded further. 7.1 In this connection, reliance is placed on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Swaraj Tractors Division, Punjab v. Raghbir Singh, reported in AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 1234. It is true that the said decision was rendered after full-fledged trial, however, the principle laid down in the said reported case was that it was the statutory requirement to be mandatorily followed by the prosecution agency to forward the report of public analyst to the accused. It was also held mandatory on the part of the prosecution agency to see that the said report was not only dispatched but was in fact received by the accused. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the said decision as under: "3. Finding that the mandate of sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act had not been complied with, the High Court acquitted the respondent holding that a statutory valuable right available to him had been taken away. Despite referring to the evidence of PW-1 and the documents available on record, the High Court reversed the judgment of the Courts below with respect to the compliance of sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act provides; that on receipt of the report of the Public Analyst to the effect that the food article was adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority was obliged to forward its copy to the accused, in such manner as may be prescribed, informing him that if he so desires, he can make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of the receipt of the copy of the report, to get the sample of the article of the food kept by the Local (Health) Authority, analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. 4. 4. It is argued on behalf of the accused that mere despatch of the report is not enough; and that the prosecution is further obliged to prove that the letter so despatched had reached the addressee, i.e., the accused. We agree with this submission, as we believe that forwarding a copy of the report is not only a ritual, but a statutory requirement to be mandatorily observed in all the cases. Despatch of such a report is intended to inform the accused of his valuable right to get the other sample analysed from the Central Food Laboratory. However, in this case, the two Courts on facts had found that the copy of the report, in fact, had been despatched and was received by the accused person, PW-1 (Food Inspector) in his statement recorded by the trial Court, had stated: "On 9-4-90 C.D.M.O. intimated the accused regarding the report of public analyst vide his office letter No. 105 dt. 9-4-90. The same was sent by regd. post with A.D. When the A.D. was not returned, the C.D.M.O. made enquiry from the Post Office. The Superintendent of Post Offices confirmed the C.D.M.C. regarding the receipt of the letter by the accused Ext-17 is the office copy of the intimation sent to the accused. Ext. 18 is the postal receipt. Ext. 19 is the office copy of letter addressed to the Postal Authority. Ext. 20 is the letter of confirmation received from the postal authority. Ext. 21 is the copy of A.D. given by the postal authority. In cross-examination he has stated that the record is being maintained by the S.D.M.O. for obtaining sample and sending the sample to the public analyst. In the food section the receiving the report from the public analyst also maintained in the register so also the copy of the public analyst report sending the report is also maintained by the C.D.M.O. Office in the food section. I maintained that register as no dealing assistant is provided to maintain that register.... I personally despatched the report of the public analyst to the accused after obtaining the signature of the C.D.M.O. on the forwarding letter" The testimony given on oath is presumed to be true unless there is something inherently improbable to disbelieve it. The learned counsel did not point out any infirmity of law which may make this testimony unworthy of belief or credence. The learned counsel did not point out any infirmity of law which may make this testimony unworthy of belief or credence. The forwarding letter showing despatch of copy of public analyst report, postal receipt, confirmation as regards the receipt and acknowledgment indicating that the accused had received were produced and admitted into evidence. The defence has not disputed the genuineness of the documents. On consideration of the above materials I am bound to conclude that the copies of the reports of the public analyst (Exts. 13 and 14) were delivered to the accused for compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section13(2) of the Act read with Rule 9(a) of the Rules." 5. Upon analysing all the evidence, the trial Court held that the prosecution had proved that the report was despatched by the C.D.M.O., Balangir to the accused along with the report of the Public Analyst. Similarly, the first appellate Court, after holding that the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act are mandatory in nature, had concluded that the copy of the report had, in fact, been served upon the accused person. In view of the oral testimony of PW-1 and the documentary evidence in the form of Exhibits P-17 and P-18, the High Court was not justified in disturbing the findings of fact arrived at by two Courts of facts. The impugned order of the High Court is thus not sustainable and is liable to be set aside." 7.2 In the present case also, the statutory requirement of forwarding the report of analyst to the accused was not mandatorily observed by the prosecution and hence, in view of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the complaints cannot be allowed to be proceeded with any further and they require to be quashed. 7.3 Moreover, as referred above, it has been vehemently submitted by learned advocate for the applicants that in the case on hand, when the offence was alleged to have been committed, "Bournvita" was not a "Malted Milk Food" as described under item No. A.18.12. of Appendix B of PFA Rules. In fact, it was proprietary food and its label was approved by the Directorate General of Health Services, New Delhi, vide letter dated 15.12.1983 bearing Reference No. P.15019/327/77 PH, copy of which is annexed at Annexure-F, under the then prevailing Rule 37A of PFA Rules. of Appendix B of PFA Rules. In fact, it was proprietary food and its label was approved by the Directorate General of Health Services, New Delhi, vide letter dated 15.12.1983 bearing Reference No. P.15019/327/77 PH, copy of which is annexed at Annexure-F, under the then prevailing Rule 37A of PFA Rules. Considering the submissions as referred above as well as at length mentioned in the application, it appears that the product "Bournvita" was always treated as proprietary food under Rule 37A for which, no standards were prescribed under the P.F.A. Act at the relevant time. 8. Thus, Criminal Complaints Nos. 5089 of 1995, 3791 of 1992, 1551 of 1992 and 1610 of 1992 pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Municipal), Vadodara, and the proceedings thereunder are quashed qua the applicants herein. These applications stand accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute.