ORDER : Veerender Singh Siradhana, J. 1. Aggrieved of the award dated 10th February, 2011 made by the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer (for short, the 'Tribunal'); the petitioner-University has instituted the present writ application with a prayer to quash and set aside the impugned award and dismiss the statement of claim, filed by the respondent-workman. 2. Briefly, the skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy are that the respondent-workman was engaged as Class-IV employee on 1st October, 1990 by the petitioner-University. However, despite his services discharged to the utmost satisfaction of the authorities concerned, his employment was brought to an end all of a sudden on 1st July, 2004 by a verbal order. It is pleaded case of the respondent-workman that prior to termination of his employment, he was allowed the pay scale of Rs. 2550-2945/- per month. 3. Aggrieved of the action of the petitioner-University in terminating his employment contrary to the mandate of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act of 1947'), the respondent-workman raised an industrial dispute. The State of Rajasthan made a reference vide reference No. F1(1)(677)/ J-fu- /2007 dated 20th July, 2007. The Tribunal, on an analysis of the pleadings of the parties, evidence adduced and materials available on record, answered the reference in negative and in favour of the respondent-workman holding the termination of the employment of the respondent-workman as illegal and invalid. The Tribunal allowed minimum of the pay-scale admissible to the counter-parts (IV Class Employees) w.e.f. 1st July, 2004, along with all the consequential benefits while maintaining the continuity of service. The arrears admissible to the respondent-workman w.e.f. 1st July, 2004, until the date of one month beyond the publication of the impugned award dated 10th February, 2011, were restricted to 50%. However, taking note of the manner and behaviour of the management of the petitioner-University, a cost of Rs. 5,000/- was imposed. The Tribunal further observed that failure to comply with the award, within one month from the date of publication of the award, the arrears would carry an interest @ 9% per annum. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-University, Mr. However, taking note of the manner and behaviour of the management of the petitioner-University, a cost of Rs. 5,000/- was imposed. The Tribunal further observed that failure to comply with the award, within one month from the date of publication of the award, the arrears would carry an interest @ 9% per annum. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-University, Mr. T.S. Choudhary, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, vehemently argued that the respondent-workman, did not complete 240 days in the employment of the petitioner-University preceding the alleged termination of service, and therefore, the finding arrived at by the Tribunal to the contrary, is bad in the eye of law for infringement of mandate of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. 5. According to the learned counsel, since the respondent-workman was engaged through contractor after 1994, therefore, he was not an employee of the petitioner-University. It is further urged that while the respondent-workman brought on record Ex. W1 to W54, whereas the petitioner-University got exhibited as many as 44 documents (Ex. M1 to Ex. M44), but the Tribunal fell in gross error while considering the documentary evidence and arriving at a finding against the petitioner-University, in ignorance to the documentary evidence on record. 6. It is further contended that since the respondent-workman was engaged through contractor, therefore, he was not an employee of the petitioner-University, and thus, the question of violation of any of the provisions of Section 25-F, G and H of the Act of 1947, simply did not arise. Moreover, the Tribunal committed gross error in allowing 50% of back-wages contrary to law declared by the Apex Court of the land in the case of Rajasthan Lalitkala Academy v. Radhey Shyam: [2008 (118) FLR 950]. 7. Per contra; Mr. Dharmendra Jain, while supporting the impugned award, strongly asserted that the Tribunal on a proper analysis of the pleadings of the parties and due appreciation of the evidence adduced, rightly concluded on the issue of violation of the mandate of Section 25-F, G and H of the Act of 1947. 8. Learned counsel would further submit that the respondent-workman was in the employment of the petitioner-University since 1990 to 2004. Therefore, the averments made on behalf of the petitioner-University while referring to the period only from 1992 to 1994, is misconceived and misleading statement of facts. 8. Learned counsel would further submit that the respondent-workman was in the employment of the petitioner-University since 1990 to 2004. Therefore, the averments made on behalf of the petitioner-University while referring to the period only from 1992 to 1994, is misconceived and misleading statement of facts. Moreover, the petitioner-University for obvious reasons, did not produce the relevant record, which could have proved the factum of continuous engagement of the respondent-workman with the petitioner-University right from the year 1992 to 1st July, 2004, therefore, the writ application merits rejection at the very threshold. 9. It is further pointed out that taking note of the manner and attitude of the petitioner-University while proceedings were conducted before the Tribunal, specific observations have been made deprecating the conduct of the petitioner-University while allowing cost of Rs. 5,000/- in favour of the respondent-workman. 10. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner-University did not produce the relevant record, which could have supported the version of the respondent-workman, as to the number of days, he had put in as an employee, and therefore, the adverse inference drawn, is perfectly legal and valid. 11. It is further urged that the observations made by the Tribunal about the Ex. W/1 to W/54, which were denial on a false pretext, the Tribunal made adverse comments reflecting on the conduct of the petitioner-University, which have not been disputed. The Tribunal has specifically taken note of the evasive reply submitted on behalf of the petitioner-University and concluded that the reply so also the affidavit sworn, were not worthy of any credence and relevance for based on false-hood. 12. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Brijesh Narayan v. Rajasthan State Cooperative Bank Ltd. Jaipur & Ors.: 2006 (1) RLW 210. Reference has also been made on an adjudication in the case of Registrar Meharshi Dayanand Saraswati University, Ajmer v. Judge, Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer, Rajasthan & Anr.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17152/2010, decided on 30th September, 2015, which attained finality as it was not subjected to further challenge and the order has been complied with. Reference has also been made on an adjudication in the case of Registrar Meharshi Dayanand Saraswati University, Ajmer v. Judge, Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer, Rajasthan & Anr.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17152/2010, decided on 30th September, 2015, which attained finality as it was not subjected to further challenge and the order has been complied with. Reliance has also been placed on the opinion of another Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur v. Lala Ram & Anr.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4895/2012, decided on 17th December, 2013, wherein the plea declining relationship of an employee and employer was repelled in the backdrop of definition of "workman". Moreover, persons employed by Contractor were held to be 'workmen' of the Company in the case of M/s. Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Ujagar and Ors., 1963 (7) FLR 253 (SC), in view of the explanation to the definition of 'employer' in view of specific Clause (iv) of Section 2(i) of the Act of 1947. 13. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record and carefully considered the impugned award dated 10th February, 2011, as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submission at Bar. 14. Indisputably, the Tribunal taking note of the false statement and evasive reply submitted before it, recorded a finding to the effect that the reply and the statement made on oath were not worthy of any relevance for the inherent directions and falsehood. 15. 14. Indisputably, the Tribunal taking note of the false statement and evasive reply submitted before it, recorded a finding to the effect that the reply and the statement made on oath were not worthy of any relevance for the inherent directions and falsehood. 15. At this juncture, it will be relevant to consider the findings arrived at by the Tribunal which reads thus: 13- eq>s [ksn gS fd foi{kh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk us izkFkhZ i{k dh vksj ls izLrqr vf/kdka'k nLrkostkr muds i{kdkj }kjk tkjh djuk Lohdkj djus ds ckotwn izkFkhZ dks fnukad 1-10-1990 ls nSfud osruHkksxh prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds :Ik esa fu;qfDr ds rF; ls badkj fd;k gSA izkFkhZ dks foi{kh i{k ds v/khu vDVwcj 90 ls yxkrkj nSfud osruHkkxh prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds in ij dk;Z djus ls lacf/kr dqN nLrkostkr dk mYys[k djuk mfpr le>rk gwa] tks fuEu izdkj gS %& 14- nLrkostkr izn'kZ Mc&2 yxk;r 14 Mc&17 yxk;r 26 lHkh nLrkostkr foi{kh ds i{k ls vyx&vyx vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk vyx&vyx le; ij tkjh fd;s x;s gS vkSj ;g nLrkost o"kZ 1990 ls ysdj 1-9-03 dh frfFk rd ds nLrkost gS ftuls Li"V rkSj ij LFkkfir ,oa izekf.kr gS fd o"kZ 1990 ls o"kZ 2003 rd izkFkhZ us foi{kh ds fofHkUu vf/kdkfj;ksa v/khu nSfud osru Hkksxh prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds :i esa lsok;sa nh gS vkSj foi{kh }kjk lsok;sa yh x;h gSA nLrkost izn'kZ Mc&2 fnukad 23-6-05 dh dk;kZy; fVIi.kh gS ftlesa izkFkhZ ds lkFk&lkFk vU; rhu deZpkfj;kas dks Hkh vizkFkhZ laLFkku esa dk;Zjr nSfud osruHkksxh prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh in dh osru J`a[kyk 2550&2945 ij fu;fer fu;qfDRk nsus ds lac/k esa fopkj djus gsrq fy[kh x;h gSA nLrkostkr izn'kZ Mc-34 yxk;r 54 izkFkhZ dh gktjh ls lacf/kr nLrkostkr gS tks ebZ 1992 ls ebZ 1998 rd ds gS ftuls Hkh LFkkfir gS fd izkFkhZ mDr vof/k esa foi{kh ds v/khu prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds :Ik esa dk;Zjr Fkk vkSj bl vof/k esa mlus vius drZO;ksa dk fuoZgu fd;k gSA 15- mijksDr nLrkosth lk{; ls eq>s ;g fu"d"kZ fudkys tkus esa fdlh izdkj dk lansg@ladksp ugh gS fd foi{kh us izkFkhZ dks fnukad 1-10-90 ls nSfud osruHkksxh prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds :i es fu;qDr dj] mlls o"kZ 2003 ¼1-9-03½ rd dk;Z fy;k gS] ftldk izek.k izn'kZ Mc-26 gSA a 16- ;g lgh gS fd nLrkost Mc-26 fnukad 1-9-03 ds nLrkost mijkar foi{kh }kjk izkFkhZ ls dksbZ dk;Z fy;k x;k vFkok ugh] bl laca/k esa fu%lansg i=koyh ij dksbZ vU; nLrkosth lk{; miyC/k ugha gS ijarq ftl izdkj dk >wBk ,oa vLi"V dFku foi{kh i{k }kjk izkFkhZ ds Dyse ds lac/k esa izLrqr fd;k x;k gS] mls /;ku esa j[krs gq, izkFkhZ dk Lk'kiFk dFku gS fd mlus foi{khx.k ds v/khu 1-10-90 ls 1-7-04 rd dk;Z fd;k gS] ij vfo'okl ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA 17- izkFkhZ us vius l'kiFk c;kuksa esa Li"V :i ls dgk gS fd mlus fnukad 1-10-90 ls fnukad 1-7-04 rd yxkrkj esgur] bZekunkjh] ,oa yxu ls dk;Z fd;k gS ftl dFku ds vLkR; gksus ds laca/k esa foi{kh i{k }kjk mldh ftjg esa dksbZ iz'u ugha iwNk x;k gS u gh dksbZ lq>ko fn;k x;k gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa Hkh eS izkFkh ds mDr dFku fo'okl fd;s tkus ;ksX; le>rk gwaA 18- blds foijhr foi{kh i{k dh vksj ls izLrqr gq, izdj.k izHkkjh ,oa dk;kZy; lgk;d] egf"k n;kuUn ljLorh fo'ofo|ky;] vtesj us izkFkhZ }kjk vius dyse ds leFkZu esa izLrqr nLrkostkr izn'kZ Mc&1 yxk;r 54 dk Kku gksrs gq, Hkh >wB dk lgkjk ysdj 'kiFk i= dh en la[;k&2 esa vafdr fd;k gS fd ^^izkFkh egf"k n;kuan ljLorh fo'ofo|ky; dk HkwriwoZ deZpkjh ugha gSA ^^en la-3 esa vfdar fd;k gS fd ^^vizkFkhZ egf"k n;kuan ljLorh fo'ofo|ky;] vtesj izkFkh ds fu;ksDrk ugh gSA ^^en la-4 esa vafdr fd;k gS fd ^^izkFkhZ dh fu;qfDr fnukad 1-10-1990 dks nSfud osruHkksxh prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh ds in ij ugha gqbZ FkhA izkFkhZ dks dHkh fu;qfDRk ugha nh x;h FkhA ^^en la-5 esa vafdr fd;k gS fd ^^izkFkhZ dks tc dksbZ fu;qfDRk ugha nh x;h rks mls gVk;s tkus dk iz’u ugha gSA ^^izkFkh dks tc dksbZ fu;qfDr ugha nh x;h rks mls gVk;s tkus dk iz'u ugha gSA ^^en la-6 esa vafdr fd;k gS fd ^^izkFkhZ us fnuakd 1-10- 1990 ls 1 -7-2000 rd vizkFkh ds ;gka M;wVh ugha nh gSA^^ xokg i`Fohflag ds mijksDr c;ku izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr fd;s x;s nLrkostkr izn'kZ Mc&1 yxk;r 13] Mc 17 yxk;r Mc-26] 34 yxk;r Mc-54 ls Li"V rkSj ij >wBs izekf.kr gksrs gSA ^^vra% egf"kZ n;kauan ljLorh fo'ofo|ky; vtesj ds bl dk;kZy; lgk;d ds izfr xSj&ftEesnkjkuk vkpj.k dh ?kksj funak dh tkrh gSA bl Lrj ds vf/kdkjh ls brus xSj&ftEesnkjkuk vkpj.k dh vis{kk ugha dh tk ldrh gSA 19- blds vykok Hkh xokg i`Fohflag ds c;kuksa dk v/;;u djus ij eS ikrk gwa fd mlus lHkh egRoiw.kZ iz'uks dk mRkj u nsdj mrj dks ¼voksbM½ fd;k gS ,oa lgh fLFkfr dks U;k;ky; ls nwj j[kk gS vkSj vR;f/kd fojks/kkHkklk ,oa tkucw> dj vlR; mrj fn;s gS] ftl dkj.k ls eS bl xokg ds l'kiFk c;kuksa ij rfud Hkh fo'okl fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha le>rk gwaA^^ 16. Furthermore, on a consideration of the documents W2 to W14, W17 to W26 and W34 to W54, the Tribunal concluded that the respondent-workman, along with others, was in the employment of the petitioner-University. Mere issuance of a communication to a contractor to provide skilled and unskilled workmen would not lead to only conclusion that the respondent-workman was an employee of the contractor. That apart, in view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land in the case of M/s. Basti Sugar Millas Ltd. (supra), the assailment made cannot be sustained for the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court taking note of the explanation of the definition of 'employer' by Sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(i) of the Act of 1947, held thus: "7. It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Pathak, that the definition of the word "workmen" did not contain any words to show that the contract labour was included. That however does not affect the position. The words of the definition of workmen in s. 2(z) to mean "any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied" are by themselves sufficiently wide to bring in persons doing work in an industry whether the employment was by the management or by the contractor of the management. Unless however the definition of the word "employer" included the management of the industry even when the employment was by the contractor the workmen employed by the contractor could not get the benefit of the Act since a dispute between them and the management would not be and industrial dispute between "employer" and workmen. It was with a view to remove this difficulty in the way of workmen employed by contractors that the definition of the employer has been extended by sub-clause (iv) of s. 2(i). The position thus is : (a) that the respondents are workmen within the meaning of s. 2(z), being persons employed in the industry to do manual work for reward, and (b) they were employed by a contractor with whom the appellant company had contracted in the course of conducting the industry for the execution by the said contractor of the work of removal of press-mud which is ordinarily a part of the industry. It follows therefore from s. 2(z) read with sub-clause (iv) of s. 2(i) of the Act that they are workmen of the appellant company and the appellant company is their employer. There is no substance therefore in the first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant." 17. In the case of Lala Ram & Anr. (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, while referring to the definition of "workman", observed thus: "The definition of "workman" as amended by the State amendment is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry (by an employer or by a Contractor in relation to the execution of his contract with such employer) to do any skilled or unskilled, skilled manual, supervisory. Technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dis rule, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dis rule, but does not include any such person........ " The perusal of definition, quoted above, reveals engagement of a person even through contractor to fall within the definition of workman. Even if the respondent was engaged through a contractor, he would still fall in the definition of workman. The plea aforesaid is not acceptable in the hands of the board even being principal employer. The definition of "workman" given in the Central Legislation should not be confused by the State definition, inasmuch as, what will prevail herein would be the State definition." 18. In the case of Registrar, Maharshi Dayanad Saraswati University, Ajmer (supra), while dealing with somewhat similar controversy, this Court had occasion to deal with the issue holding thus: "13. It is an admitted fact that the Rules, Regulations of the State-Government's are applicable to the petitioner-University as pleaded in the counter affidavit. In such circumstances, the services of the respondent-employee ought to have been regularized from the date his immediate junior person has been regularized with all attendant benefits as extended to the immediately junior person. It is an admitted fact that the Rules, Regulations of the State-Government's are applicable to the petitioner-University as pleaded in the counter affidavit. In such circumstances, the services of the respondent-employee ought to have been regularized from the date his immediate junior person has been regularized with all attendant benefits as extended to the immediately junior person. While dealing with somewhat similar controversy a Division Bench of this Court in a batch of Special Appeals (Writ), lead case being Ajit Kumar Jain v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.: DBSAW No. 765/2013, held thus:-- "In the light of para-53 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Umadevi's case (supra), the State Government made and amendment vide its Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 and added a new sub-rule (4) to R.6 of the Rajasthan Class-IV Service (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) Rules, 1999. The extract of the amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 is ad infra:-- Government of Rajasthan Department of Personnel (A-Group-II) No.F.5.(2)DOP/A-II/2008 Jaipur, dated: 27.02.2009 NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Rajasthan hereby marks the following rules further to amend the Rajasthan Class-IV Service (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) Rules, 1999, namely:-- "1. Short title and commencement-(1) These rules may be called the Rajasthan Class-IV Service (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) (Amendment) Rules, 2009. (2) They shall come into force with immediate effect. 2. Amendment of Rule 6- After sub-rule (3) to rule 6 of the Rajasthan Class-IV Service (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) Rules, 1999 hereinafter referred to as the said rules, the following new sub-rule (4) shall be added, namely:-- (4) Notwithstanding anything contained these rules the persons irregularly appointed on any duly sanctioned posts mentioned in column number 2 against serial number 4 of schedule and completed ten years service on 10.4.2006, without intervention of any court or tribunal, and continuously working as such on the date of commencement of these amendment rules, shall be screened by a committee consisting of- (i) Principal Secretary/Secretary to the Government, Department of Personnel; (ii) Principal Secretary/Secretary to the Government, Finance Department or his nominee not below the rank of Deputy Secretary; and (iii) Principal Secretary/Secretary to the Government, of the concerned department. Provided they were eligible for appointment, as per rules on the date of their initial irregular appointment and vacancy is available at the time of screening. The Appointing Authority shall issue appointment order of the person, who is adjudged suitable by the screening committee and appointment shall be effective from the date of issue of such appointment order. (3).Amendment of rule 32-After the existing proviso (5) of rule 32 of the said rules following new proviso (6) shall be added, namely:-- "(6) the inter-se seniority of the persons screened under sub-rule (4) of rule 6 shall be determined according to the length of continuous service after their irregular appointment. These persons shall rank junior to the persons appointed regularly before the commencement of these amendment rules." It can be noticed from the amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-53 of the judgment mandated that those who have completed ten years of service on 10.04.2006, subject to other conditions, be considered for regularization of their services. However, in the present amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009, the State Government in its wisdom put an additional impediment that the employee must have completed ten years of service as on 10.04.2006 without intervention of any Court or Tribunal and continuously working as such on the date of commencement of the amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 and eligible employees are to be screened by the Screening Committee constituted under the amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009. The case of each of the employee came to be considered by the Screening Committee constituted under the amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 and taking note of the salient facts of the employees who are working in the cadre of Class-IV and have completed more than ten years of service as on 10.04.2006 and are still in service on the date of issuance of amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009, rejected the candidature of each of them assigning a general reason that there was no sanctioned post and each of the employee could not be accommodated against the sanctioned post and completion of ten years of service by the employees as on 10.04.2006 is under intervention of the Court/Tribunal. From the statement filed by the department, it has come on record that there were five posts of Jamadar/Daftry, six posts of Class-IV and two posts of Security Guard which remained vacant almost from the date of its inception. From the statement filed by the department, it has come on record that there were five posts of Jamadar/Daftry, six posts of Class-IV and two posts of Security Guard which remained vacant almost from the date of its inception. Thus, 13 posts in all in the cadre of Class-IV were available at least from the date of exercise undertaken by the Screening Committee in its meeting Dt. 02.09.2009 and in these facts & circumstances, the decision of the Committee to reject the respective claims of the employees, as there was no sanctioned posts available in the cadre of Class-IV, appears to be factually incorrect and the other reason assigned that their continuance of ten years of service as on 10.04.2006 is under intervention of the Court/Tribunal is a sheer misinterpretation construed by the department for the reason that it the service of an employee, at one stage is terminated who subsequently approached to the Tribunal or court and the termination order stands set aside and the employee has been reinstated in service that will not be construed as intervention of the Court or Tribunal but if someone is allowed to continue with protection of the interim order of the Court/Tribunal certainly that will be an impediment while considering candidature of the employee while regularization of his service in terms of amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 which is almost in the spirit of para-53 of the judgment in Umadevi's case (supra)." 14. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Jain (supra), further observed thus:-- "Before parting with the order, we would like to observe that at one point of time a detailed order was passed by this Court Dt. 18.04.2014 directing the State Government through the Department of Personnel to file an affidavit as to whether the employees working in the cadre of Class-IV in various departments of the Government have at all being considered for regularization of their services in the light of the amendment Notification Dt. 18.04.2014 directing the State Government through the Department of Personnel to file an affidavit as to whether the employees working in the cadre of Class-IV in various departments of the Government have at all being considered for regularization of their services in the light of the amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 and in compliance thereof a statement of each of the department has been placed on record and we find that most of the employees who have been working for almost 15 to 25 years have not been regularized by the Screening Committee only for the reason that there was no sanctioned post or continuance is on account of interim order passed by the Courts/Tribunals, we find that their candidature has not been considered in right perspective and if some of the employees at one point of time were terminated & subsequently reinstated in service by orders of the Courts/Tribunals, that may not be construed as continuance after intervention by Courts/Tribunals and as regards sanctioned post is concerned, it appears that no department has examined & looked into the strength of Class-IV Employee either on 10.04.2006 or on the date of amendment Notification Dt. 27.02.2009 or on the date of meeting of Screening Committee and if post in the cadre of Class-IV became available at a later point of time, we do not find any impediment in considering the candidature of an employee for regularization, at least from the date sanctioned post in the cadre of Class-IV became available and it is expected from the State Government to give a fresh look to the case of such employees who are working in the cadre of Class-IV for more than two decades for their regularization in service, keeping in view observations made by us (supra)." 15. In the case of U.P. SEB v. Poonam Chandra Pandey and Others; 2007 (11) SCC 92 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court repelling the application of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra), held thus:-- "16. We are constrained to refer to the above decisions and principles contained therein because we find that often Uma Devi's case (supra) is being applied by Courts mechanically as it was a Euclids formula without seeing the facts of a particular case. We are constrained to refer to the above decisions and principles contained therein because we find that often Uma Devi's case (supra) is being applied by Courts mechanically as it was a Euclids formula without seeing the facts of a particular case. As observed by this Court in Bhavnagar University (supra) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra), a little difference in facts or even one additional fact may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. Hence, in our opinion, Uma Devi's case (supra) cannot be applied mechanically without seeing the facts of a particular case, as a little difference in facts can make Uma Devi's case (supra) inapplicable to the facts of that case. 17. In the present case the writ petitioners (respondents herein) only wish that they should not be discriminated against vis-à-vis the original employees of the Electricity Board since they have been taken over by the Electricity Board "in the same manner and position". Thus, the writ petitioners have to be deemed to have been appointed in the service of the Electricity Board from the date of their original appointments in the Society. Since they were all appointed in the Society before 04.05.1990 they cannot be denied the benefit of the decision of the Electricity Board dated 28.11.1996 permitting regularization of the employees of the Electricity Board who were working from before Constitution. We have to read Uma Devi's case (supra) in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution, and we cannot read it in a manner which will make it in conflict with Article 14. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any judgment, not even of the Supreme Court, can violate the Constitution. 18. We may further point out that a seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597 has held that reasonableness and non-arbitrariness is part of Article 14 of the Constitution. It follows that the government must act in a reasonable and non-arbitrary manner otherwise article 14 of the Constitution would be violated. Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) is a decision of a seven-Judge Bench, whereas Uma Devi's case (supra) is a decision of a five-Judge Bench of this Court. It is well settled that a smaller bench decision cannot override a larger bench decision of the Court. Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) is a decision of a seven-Judge Bench, whereas Uma Devi's case (supra) is a decision of a five-Judge Bench of this Court. It is well settled that a smaller bench decision cannot override a larger bench decision of the Court. No doubt, Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) does not specifically deal with the question of regularization of government employees, both, principle of reasonableness in executive action and the law which it has laid down, in our opinion, is of general application." 19. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-University for consideration of this Court. 20. For the reasons and discussions hereinabove, I find no force in the writ application while assailing the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned award dated 10th February, 2011, so as to call for any interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 21. Consequently, the writ application fails and is hereby dismissed. 22. The petitioner-University would ensure compliance of this order within four weeks from the date a certified copy of the order is made available. 23. No costs.