JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. -- Heard Shri M.A. Qadeer, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Shri B.N. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The instant writ petition arises out of a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 filed by the opposite party. 3. This release was sought of two shops on the second and third floor with a stair case in the tenancy of the petitioner. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority on 20.02.2015 and the consequential appeal has been dismissed vide order dated 30.09.2016. Hence this writ petition challenging the aforesaid two orders. 4. The facts of the case briefly stated are that the land lady purchased the building, wherein the shop in dispute is situated on 21.01.2012. It is held that a six months notice was served upon the petitioner and, thereafter, the release application was filed. In paragraph 4 of the release application, it has been specifically averred that the land lady has three sons, namely Riaz Ahmad, Ayaz Ahmad and Irshad Ahmad. The shop in issue is required for the benefit and personal need of Riaz, aged about 45 years, a graduate and having four children. 5. In paragraph 10 and 13 of the release application, the need of Riaz Ahmad was specifically set up. It was also the case of the land lady that the tenant has a house in Shyam Nagar. There is a house in the name of the tenant's wife in Mohalla Tilak Nagar. In both the houses there is space where the tenant can shift his business. He is also possessed of vacant land near Konch Bus Stand, where he can construct a shop for himself. 6. The release application was contested by the petitioner alleging that Riaz Ahmad was not unemployed. He was the owner of Riaz Shoe Store situated on the ground floor of the building from prior to its purchase by his mother in 2012. The TIN number of this business was mentioned in the written statement and it was also stated that he was earning approximately 15,000/- per month from the shoe business. He was also alleged to be possessed of agricultural land. His father had a licence for fire works and crackers which business was being conducted by Riaz Ahmad. The TIN number of this business was mentioned in the written statement and it was also stated that he was earning approximately 15,000/- per month from the shoe business. He was also alleged to be possessed of agricultural land. His father had a licence for fire works and crackers which business was being conducted by Riaz Ahmad. It is also alleged that Riaz Ahmad and Irshad Ahmad had jointly purchased a building wherein they had a shoe business. Besides another release application being PA Case No. 2 of 2007 had been filed setting up the need of Riaz Ahmad and Irshad Ahmad. This release application had been allowed and, therefore, the need of Riaz Ahmad set up in the instant release application was not bonafide. It is also alleged that there is no place for construction of a shop in the house in the name of the petitioner's wife. Besides the entire accommodation is in the occupation of various tenants. 7. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the release application has been allowed on the reasoning that since the petitioner possessed alternative accommodation in Mohalla Shyam Nagar and Tilak Nagar as also land near Konch Bus Stand, he is not entitled to contest the proceedings and the need of the land lady set up in the release application is bonafide. 8. It is further contended that although the need of Riaz Ahmad had been set up, there was a shoe shop in the name and style of Riaz Shoe Store. Moreover, another release application setting up the need of the same Riaz and his brother Irshad had already been allowed and the shop in question in that case, had been released in their favour, and duly vacated by the tenant Mohd. Ayyer. It is also submitted that the Assessment Register extract filed on record showed that Riaz Ahmad was also recorded as a tenant therein. It is therefore stood established on record that Riaz Ahmad was running his shoe business in the building purchased by his mother from prior to its purchase. The above documentary evidence had wrongly and illegally been ignored while passing the order on the release application, on the reasoning that it was not proved by the petitioner that the third son of the land lady was settled in business. 9. The above documentary evidence had wrongly and illegally been ignored while passing the order on the release application, on the reasoning that it was not proved by the petitioner that the third son of the land lady was settled in business. 9. He contents that the specific need of Riaz Ahmad had been set up in the release application. This need alone could have been considered. It was not open for the Prescribed Authority to have considered the need of any other person while allowing the release application. He is referred to the judgment of the Prescribed Authority in PA Case No. 2 of 2007, especially on page 95 of the Paper Book, wherein the need of Irshad and Riaz was found to be bonafide while allowing the release application and directing eviction of another tenant, Mohd. Taiyab. 10. It is next submitted that although these aspects were duly raised before the appellate Court, the appellate Court has dismissed the appeal without any independent application on mind and in a mechanical manner. Referring to page 174 of the Paper Book, he has submitted that the appellate Court has clearly misread the evidence on record when he states that shop in issue in PA Case No. 2 of 2007 was got vacated for a need of Irshad Ahmad and Ayaz Ahmad. It is contended from the perusal of the order of the Prescribed Authority in PA Case No. 2 of 2007, that it was filed, setting up the need of Irshad Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad and the same was allowed, finding their need to be genuine and bonafide. 11. He is lastly submitted that another reason for dismissing the appeal is that the Amin Report showed that in the shoe shop, only Irshad Ahmad was carrying on business and that no evidence had been filed by the petitioner to rebut the Amin's Report. He submits that the Amin Report was a mere report and merely if at the time of spot inspection, Riaz Ahmad was not present in the shop, it does not necessarily follow that he was not a partner in this business. 12. He submits that the Amin Report was a mere report and merely if at the time of spot inspection, Riaz Ahmad was not present in the shop, it does not necessarily follow that he was not a partner in this business. 12. He has additionally submitted that the documentary evidence to show that Riaz Ahmad was engaged in a shoe business and that a shop had already been released, after accepting his bonafide need, has been glossed over by the appellate Court by stating that the petitioner has not been able to prove that all three sons of the land lady were settled in business. He states that this was an illegal approach because the need set up, was that of Riaz Ahmad alone and not of any other son of the land lady. 13. Shri B.N. Agarwal on the contrary supported the impugned order. He submits that the trial Court has recorded that the shop in dispute in PA Case No. 2 of 2007 had been released in view of the need of Irshad Ahmad. It is also submitted that the land lady had stated that although the shoe store was in the name of Riaz Ahmad, the actual business was carried on by his brother Irshad and the business was named after his brother out of respect. He has also referred para 7 of the counter affidavit filed by him, which talks of the various affidavits filed in the case. He has also referred to paragraph 14 and 15 of the counter affidavit, wherein, it has been stated that petitioner is in possession of a shop, purchased vide sale deed dated 27.05.2015, in the name of his wife and that the tenant of this shop has vacated the shop and handed over vacant possession to the petitioner's wife. He however admits that this material, as also the compromise whereby Suresh Singh vacated the shop purchased by the petitioner's wife, was not on record of the proceedings by the Court below. 14. In response to the query of the Court, as to whether this evidence can be looked into, he has submitted that although it had not been filed before the Courts below, yet in the rejoinder affidavit this compromise has not been denied by the petitioner and, therefore, the same can be looked into. 14. In response to the query of the Court, as to whether this evidence can be looked into, he has submitted that although it had not been filed before the Courts below, yet in the rejoinder affidavit this compromise has not been denied by the petitioner and, therefore, the same can be looked into. He, lastly contended that the land lady had three sons and only two shops were available between them and, therefore, the release application has rightly been allowed. The writ petition is concluded by pure findings of fact and the same, calls for no interference. 15. He has placed reliance upon the following judgments: - 1. Bibi Begum (Smt.) Vs. Awadhesh Narain (Dr.) and others, 2009 (1) ARC 730 , especially paragraph 6 thereto. 2. Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (d) by L.Rs and others, 2008 (3) ARC 532, especially paragraph 30 to 32. 3. Sushila Vs. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda and others, AIR 2003, Supreme Court 780, especially paragraph 8. 16. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record as also the judgments cited. 17. From a perusal of the release application, especially paragraph 4, 10 and 13 thereto, it is clear that the land lady had set up the need of only one of her three sons, namely, Riaz Ahmad. The courts below have failed to take into account the Assessment Register extract, which showed that Riaz Ahmad was a tenant of a shop on the ground floor in the building, where the shop in dispute in this writ petition, is situated. It is this building, which was subsequently purchased by his mother and, thereafter the instant release application was filed. It is also clear from a perusal of the judgment in PA Case No. 2 of 2007 that this release application had been filed against the tenant Mohd. Taiyab, setting up the need of Irshad Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad. Their need was found to be genuine and bonafide and, therefore, the release application was, allowed. 18. It is also clear from a perusal of the judgment in PA Case No. 2 of 2007 that this release application had been filed against the tenant Mohd. Taiyab, setting up the need of Irshad Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad. Their need was found to be genuine and bonafide and, therefore, the release application was, allowed. 18. I therefore, find substance in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that since the need of only one son namely, Riaz Ahmad, had been set up, it was not proper for the courts below to have allowed the release application, without recording a specific finding that Riaz Ahmad was unemployed and that his need was genuine and bonafide. The trial Court has glossed over this aspect of the matter on the reasoning that the petitioner/tenant had not been able to establish that all three sons of the land lady were settled in business. This in my considered opinion was an irrelevant consideration. It was not open for the courts below to have gone beyond the pleadings in the release application, especially when the need of only Riaz Ahmad had been set up. If some other son was not settled in business or was unemployed, nothing prevented the land lady from setting up his need or setting up his need, also. 19. The appellate Court has clearly misread the judgment of the Prescribed Authority in PA Case No. 2 of 2007, when it says that this case was filed setting up the need of Irshad Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad. This is a clear misreading because the copy of the judgment filed on record clearly mentions the names of Irshad Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad and not Ayaz. 20. Under the circumstances, therefore, the appellate order, which is vitiated by a clear misreading of the evidence on record, is not liable to be sustained. 21. Before parting with the case, the judgments cited by Shri B.N. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent require to be referred to. 22. In Bibi Begum (supra) in paragraph 6, which had been relied upon by counsel for the respondent, it has been held that in rent matters relating to tenancy of shops, situated in posh areas, the bonafide need of the landlord cannot be ignored giving some special preference to a tenant, especially where suitable alternative accommodation is available to the tanant. In Bibi Begum (supra) in paragraph 6, which had been relied upon by counsel for the respondent, it has been held that in rent matters relating to tenancy of shops, situated in posh areas, the bonafide need of the landlord cannot be ignored giving some special preference to a tenant, especially where suitable alternative accommodation is available to the tanant. This judgment has been cited in view of the documents filed along with counter affidavit referred to above. 23. In my considered opinion, the legality and validity of the orders passed by the courts below cannot be judged on the basis of evidence, which was not available on record before these authorities. For the same reason, the judgment cited, has no application in the instant petition. 24. In the case of Shamshad Ahmad (supra), it has been held that a finding of fact cannot be interfered with or set aside by the writ court. There is no quarrel with the legal proposition, laid down in this judgment. However, it is equally well settled that a finding of fact can be interfered with where it is shown to be, either perverse or is a finding vitiated by a misreading of the evidence on record or the finding of fact returned is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at. 25. In the case at hand, as already held herein above, the appellate Court has clearly misread the evidence available on record and, therefore, the respondent is not entitled to any benefit under the judgment cited. 26. Even the judgment in the case of Sushila (supra) is clearly distinguishable on the facts and it does not help the respondent in any manner. 27. Accordingly and in view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed in part, the appellate order dated 30.09.2016 being vitiated by a clear misreading of the evidence on record is set aside, the matter is remanded back to the appellate Court for passing a fresh order on the appeal after hearing the parties within three months of this order being filed before the appellate Court. 28. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.