JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—Writ Petition No. 17859 of 2016 has been preferred seeking quashing of an order dated 4 April 2016, passed by the third respondent, the Managing Director of the U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (Corporation) A further direction is sought restraining the respondents from causing any interference in the running of an engineering college established by the petitioner upon Plot No. A-1, Industrial Area Rooma, Kanpur Nagar. The petitioner is stated to be a society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is said to have established an engineering college known as the Kanpur Institute of Technology. The said college has been established on the plot aforementioned. By the order impugned, the allotment of the plot made in favour of the petitioner on 15 July 2003, the lease deed executed in its favour by the Corporation on 1 August 2003 and the building plans sanctioned on 1 October 2003 and 15 February 2011 have come to be cancelled. The writ petition came to be instituted in order to assail the orders passed by the Corporation on various grounds and it was sought to be highlighted that the order impugned would adversely affect the functioning of the college and the large number of students who were admitted therein. On 25 April 2016, a Division Bench of the Court directed this petition to be listed alongwith the records of Public Interest Litigation No. 35628 of 2013. On 9 May 2016, this Court noted that a detailed counter-affidavit had been filed in response to the writ petition by the Corporation. It accordingly directed the matter to be listed on 24 May 2016 to enable the parties to file their responses to the said affidavit. On 5 August 2016 by consent of learned counsel for parties, this writ petition alongwith the connected PIL was posted for final disposal. Parties were directed to file their counter-affidavits/replies/rejoinder-affidavit if any in the meanwhile. Pleadings having been completed, these petitions were thereafter taken up for final hearing. During the course of the hearing itself, both the respondents as well as the Petitioners have filed various supplementary-affidavits which were, in the interest of justice, taken on record and learned counsels granted permission to advance submissions thereon. Pleadings having been completed, these petitions were thereafter taken up for final hearing. During the course of the hearing itself, both the respondents as well as the Petitioners have filed various supplementary-affidavits which were, in the interest of justice, taken on record and learned counsels granted permission to advance submissions thereon. In fact the Petitioners even filed an affidavit during the course of their rejoinder submissions which too was accepted and the learned counsel permitted to refer to and rely upon the material appended thereto. These affidavits and other material shall be referred to in detail during the course of this judgment. 2. Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner has while opening his submissions, contended that on 26 June 2003, the petitioner society made an application for allotment of land pursuant to the policy then prevailing. On the basis of the said application, the Corporation on 15 July 2003 is stated to have been allotted land admeasuring 1,01,175 square meters. The petitioner society was informed of the details with regard to the payment of reservation money as well as premium. One of the conditions which found mention in the letter of allotment was the obligation upon the petitioner society to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Kanpur Development Authority (KDA) for setting up an engineering college in the industrial area. Pursuant to the said allotment, Sri Goyal submits that a lease deed came to be executed by the Corporation in favour of the petitioner on 1 August 2003. Referring to the records, Sri Goyal submits that in terms of the conditions imposed in the allotment letter requiring the petitioner to obtain a NOC from the KDA, the petitioner did apply for the grant of such a certificate. In terms of the request made in its letter dated 19 July 2003, the Corporation forwarded the same to the KDA requesting it to grant the NOC. On 29 July 2003, the KDA addressed a communication to the Regional Manager of the Corporation stating therein that in terms of the provisions of Section 17 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 (1976 Act) read with a notification dated 5 September 2001, it is apparent that in an industrial area there arises no occasion for the KDA to grant a NOC. Upon receipt of the said clarification, the Regional Manager accepted the moneys due from the petitioner in terms of the letter of allotment and proceeded to execute the lease in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter is stated to have submitted its building plans to the Corporation for sanction and approval on 1 October 2003. These plans were approved by the Corporation on 21 January 2009 and 25 March 2011. These sanctions, it becomes relevant to note, were also issued under the signatures of the then Regional Manager. In 2004, the petitioner applied for and obtained the necessary affiliation permissions from the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) as well as the U.P. Technical University and proceeded to commence academic activities in the college concerned. Sri Goyal submits that after more than 12 years of the execution of the lease deed and more particularly on 10 September 2015, the Corporation for the first time issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner calling upon it to explain why the lease deed executed in its favour be not cancelled. The grounds taken in the show-cause notice were the failure on the part of the petitioner to obtain the NOC from the KDA as well as that the plot which was earmarked for industrial use had in fact been utilised to establish an engineering college thus putting the plot to institutional use without the requisite conversion permissions having been obtained. A further show-cause notice was issued on 14 September 2015. This was followed by yet another show-cause notice on 12 October 2015. The subsequent notices while reiterating the earlier grounds also alleged that the petitioner alongwith the then Regional Manager of the Corporation had proceeded to establish the college in violation of the terms and conditions of the allotment as well as the lease deed. Upon a consideration of the responses submitted by the petitioner, the impugned order came to be passed by the Corporation on 4 April 2016. The repeated reference to the then Regional Manager itself has some bearing. It is alleged that the then Regional Manager of the Corporation was none other than the husband and son of two members of the Petitioner society, who had applied for the allotment of land on 26 June 2003. It becomes relevant to note that the composition of the society on 26 June 2003 was as follows: 1. It is alleged that the then Regional Manager of the Corporation was none other than the husband and son of two members of the Petitioner society, who had applied for the allotment of land on 26 June 2003. It becomes relevant to note that the composition of the society on 26 June 2003 was as follows: 1. Anil Kumar Agarwal (Business man age:44 years) 2. Vipul Jain 3. Neena Verma 4. Ashok Kumar Agarwal (Brother of Sh. Anil Kumar Agarwal) 5. P.K. Jain (father of Sh. Vipul Jain) 6. Ruchi Jain (wife of Sh. Vipul Jain) 7. M.K. Bansal (Father in-law of Sh. Vipul Jain) 8. Tej Ram Verma 3. The members of the society whose names find mention at items 3 and 8 are directly related to the then Regional Manager, being his wife and father respectively. The underlying and basic allegation against the Petitioner was that the allotment of the land in its favour, the sanction of plans were all part of a conspiracy and collusion between the members of the society, the then Regional Manager and other officers and employees of the Corporation. The allegation primarily appears to be that the then Regional Manager in collusion with other officers and employees of the Corporation facilitated the allocation of a large chunk of land to the petitioner society by not only abusing their official position but also with a view to confer undue benefit to the society. 4. Sri Manish Goyal has contended that the entire action taken against the petitioner smacks of legal mala fides and is primarily occasioned by the motive of certain interested quarters to exact revenge upon the then Regional Manager. He submits that the affairs of an educational institution which has been in existence from the past more than 12 years are sought to be jeopardized even though there is no allegation that the petitioner breached any condition of the lease. He further submits that the lease itself conferred valuable rights upon the petitioner and could not have been cancelled by the unilateral action of the respondent. Referring to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in ITC Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 7 SCC 493 , Sri Goyal submits that the action of cancellation of the lease deed is legally unsustainable. Referring to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in ITC Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 7 SCC 493 , Sri Goyal submits that the action of cancellation of the lease deed is legally unsustainable. He submits that the lease could have been cancelled only by way of a civil suit brought for cancellation or for a declaration that it is illegal, null and void. In the absence of a decree of a competent Court, Sri Goyal submits, that the lease would continue to be effective and binding. Sri Goyal further submits that no wrongdoing can be fastened upon the petitioner for the absence of a NOC having been granted by the KDA. He submits that as would be evident from the sequence of events referred to above, the petitioner had duly applied for the grant of the NOC but it was the KDA itself which held out that such a certificate was not required to be obtained for buildings and constructions which were to come up in the industrial area falling within the jurisdiction of the Corporation. Elaborating upon the said submission, Sri Goyal also refers to a Government Order dated 5 February 1998 to submit that in any view of the matter, the powers conferred upon the KDA under the provisions of Section 14/15 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (1973 Act) stood delegated and in view thereof it is his submission that the Regional Manager was duly empowered to sanction and accord permission to the layout plans. 5. During the course of his submissions, Sri Goyal further contended that the Corporation even otherwise and independent of the provisions of the 1973 Act was sufficiently empowered to accord sanction and permission to layout plans. He submitted that the mere fact that the Corporation had not been constituted in terms and in accordance of the provisions of the 1976 Act would not detract from the aforesaid legal position. Referring to the composition of an industrial development authority which comes to be constituted under the 1976 Act, Sri Goyal submits that the Corporation although a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 was liable to be construed for all purposes as an authority under the provisions of the 1976 Act. Referring to the composition of an industrial development authority which comes to be constituted under the 1976 Act, Sri Goyal submits that the Corporation although a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 was liable to be construed for all purposes as an authority under the provisions of the 1976 Act. It is his submission that the Corporation is an authority constituted for the purposes of overseeing industrial development in the industrial area of Rooma and therefore, no independent or separate notification under the 1976 Act is liable to be promulgated for the Corporation to be treated as such. In light of the above, Sri Goyal contends that the Corporation had full jurisdiction and authority to exercise all powers and perform all functions as stand enumerated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the 1976 Act as if it were an authority constituted in terms of and under the provisions of the said enactment. 6. Sri Goyal then raises the issue of the petitioner having been discriminated and contended that the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution had been clearly breached. Referring to paragraph 41 of the writ petition Sri Goyal submits that various engineering colleges have been permitted to continue and to function within the industrial area by the Corporation even though these colleges also had not applied for nor obtained any permission for change of land use. He submits that the fact that the allotments of such colleges have not been cancelled is proof of the petitioner having been singled out and discriminated. He in this connection refers to a list of educational institutions alleged to be established in industrial areas falling within the jurisdiction of the Corporation in different districts of the State which has been appended at Annexure-26 to the writ petition. Of the eleven institutions which find mention in the said list, Sri Goyal submits, two such institutions are situate in Industrial Area, Rooma itself. Countering the objection that the allotment of the plot in question came to be effected in favour of the petitioner without any transparent process of advertisement or invitation of offers having been resorted to Sri Goyal submits that various other entities have also been allotted land by the Corporation by directly entertaining applications submitted by them. Countering the objection that the allotment of the plot in question came to be effected in favour of the petitioner without any transparent process of advertisement or invitation of offers having been resorted to Sri Goyal submits that various other entities have also been allotted land by the Corporation by directly entertaining applications submitted by them. He refers to a list of nine such institutions existing on industrial plots falling in and under the management of the Corporation and refers to the details in respect thereof set out in Annexure SRA-2 to the third Supplementary Rejoinder-affidavit filed in these proceedings. This submission of Sri Goyal is without prejudice to his primary contention that the allotment of land in favor of the petitioner society on “first come first served” was in accordance with the policy of the Corporation itself. Sri Goyal then submits that the entire action of the Corporation is tainted by legal mala fides and contends that the entire action has been taken against the petitioner with ulterior motives. He submits that the action of the Corporation is guided by its motive to penalize the then Regional Manager. It is his submission that the action of the Corporation in proceeding to inform the AICTE of the cancellation of the lease deed is also evidence of the legal mala fides underlying the action of the Corporation. 7. Sri Goyal has further submitted that the doctrine of indoor management would have application and would clearly protect the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is his submission that whether the Regional Manager of the Corporation was sufficiently empowered to allot, sanction the layout plan and execute the lease deed were all issues which were beyond the knowledge of the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner had no occasion to doubt the authority of the Regional Manager to proceed in the matter and therefore, submits that the petitioner cannot be penalised even if it be the case of the Corporation that the Regional Manager did not carry the authority to take such decisions. 8. Sri Goyal then lastly submits that the action of the Corporation in cancelling the allotment made as far back as in 2003 is clearly inequitable and unfair. He draws our attention to the fact that the institution has been existing right from 2004 without any complaint from the AICTE or any other statutory body. 8. Sri Goyal then lastly submits that the action of the Corporation in cancelling the allotment made as far back as in 2003 is clearly inequitable and unfair. He draws our attention to the fact that the institution has been existing right from 2004 without any complaint from the AICTE or any other statutory body. He further refers to the fact that more than 2000 students are being imparted education in the institution and therefore, submits that the extreme act of cancellation of lease was clearly unwarranted and illegal. In support of his above noted submissions, Sri Goyal has placed reliance upon the following judgements : ITC Limited v. State of U.P. and others, (2011) 7 SCC 493 , Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 872 , M.D.,H.S.I.D.C. and others v. Hari Om Enterprises and another, AIR 2009 SC 218 , Teri Oat Estate (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2004) 2 SCC 130 , Lakshmi Ratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 Allahabad 311, Iron Traders (Private) Ltd. and others v. Hira Lal Mithal and another, 1962 (XXXII) Company Cases 1022, Lachmi Narain etc. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1976 SC 714 , Brij Sunder Kapoor etc. v. 1st Additional District Judge, AIR 1989 SC 572 , ABL International Ltd. and another v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India, (2004) 3 SCC 553 , Huang V Secretary of State for the Home Department Kashmiri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2007 (4) All ER 15 (HL), Huang and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2005 (3) All ER 435 (CA). 9. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior counsel who has appeared for the Corporation proceeded to advance the following submissions. He at the very outset clarified that the Corporation was not an authority constituted under the 1976 Act. He submitted that the Corporation was merely a company incorporated under the provisions of the 1956 Act and therefore, could not be termed to be an authority under the 1976 Act. He further submitted that the Rooma Industrial Area in which the plot in question was situate had never been notified as an industrial development area under the provisions of the 1976 Act. He further submitted that the Rooma Industrial Area in which the plot in question was situate had never been notified as an industrial development area under the provisions of the 1976 Act. On both scores therefore, Sri Ravi Kant contended, that the provisions of the 1976 Act would have no application. Sri Ravi Kant then submitted that any action of an instrumentality of the State is liable to be tested and viewed upon the constitutional guarantees of equality and fairness. Referring to the facts and the background in which the land came to be allotted in favour of the petitioner, it was his submission that the entire transaction was tainted by the vice of nepotism, favouritism and aimed at conferring undue favour upon the petitioner. It is his contention that the petitioner society and certain officers of the Corporation colluded in order to perpetuate fraud and to ensure the allotment of a large chunk of public property to the petitioner in utter violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. He in this connection refers to the fact that in the entire records of the Corporation, there is absolutely no material to indicate how the petitioner came to know of the existence of a plot in the industrial development area. He further refers to the fact that no advertisement was ever issued by the Corporation inviting applications for the allotment of land. Sri Ravi Kant has highlighted the fact that the petitioner society made an application for allotment of land on 26 June 2003 at a time when it was not even registered. The society undisputedly came to be registered under the Societies Registration Act only on 27 June 2003. In the submission of Sri Ravi Kant, the vice of nepotism and arbitrariness is writ large upon the entire transaction and is evident from the fact that the initial entity which applied for allotment of land on 11 June 2003 did not have Mrs. Neena Verma and Mr. Tej Ram (both of whom were directly related to the then Regional Manager) as its members. He submits that the process of allotment was completed with undue haste only after the induction of the aforementioned two persons as members of the society on 27 June 2003. Neena Verma and Mr. Tej Ram (both of whom were directly related to the then Regional Manager) as its members. He submits that the process of allotment was completed with undue haste only after the induction of the aforementioned two persons as members of the society on 27 June 2003. He further draws the attention of the Court to the Memorandum of Association of the petitioner society to highlight that the relationship of the two members aforementioned with the Regional Manager was deliberately concealed. This he submits is evident from the fact that Mrs. Neena Verma even though married did not identify herself as the wife of the Regional Manager and is in fact described as the daughter of Mr. Tej Ram. Similarly he submits the residential address of Mrs. Neena Verma was also shown as that of her father rather than her husband, the then Regional Manager. More importantly, he submits that the Regional Manager who was directly connected and privy to the process of allotment at no point of time disclosed his connection with the members of the petitioner society. Sri Ravi Kant has further submitted that the plot allotted to the petitioner did not form part of any approved layout plan nor was its location and placement approved by the Corporation. He then drew the attention of the Court to the fact that although the plot is stated to have been allotted to the petitioner on 15 July 2003, the layout plan which was ultimately sanctioned by the Managing Director of the Corporation on 22.9.2003 did not even refer to the allotted plot of the petitioner. He submits that the sanctioned layout plan in fact identified Plot No. A-1, admeasuring 4050 square meters as having been allotted to one Sri Narvesh Mehrotra on 30.4.2005 at the rate of Rs. 825/- per square meter. 10. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Counsel refers to the startling fact that a duplicate layout plan appears to have been prepared by and with the collusion of the Regional Manager and other officers of the Corporation and that it was upon this duplicate map that the land allotted to the petitioner was shown. He drew the attention of the Court to the fact that the signatures of the officers on this duplicate map had been omitted and substituted by the words “SD”. He drew the attention of the Court to the fact that the signatures of the officers on this duplicate map had been omitted and substituted by the words “SD”. All this in the submission of Sri Ravi Kant was clear evidence of a great fraud perpetrated by the then Regional Manager alongwith other officers of the Corporation. He submits that perpetrators of fraud cannot claim any equitable consideration. Referring to the manner in which costing of the plot itself was worked out, Sri Ravi Kant refers to a supplementary counter-affidavit dated 1 August 2016 and submits that although the land was allotted to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 175/- per square meter, within six months similarly placed Plot Nos. D-5 and D-14 were allotted to interested persons at the rate of Rs. 684/- per square meter. This in the submission of Sri Ravi Kant led to an approximate loss of Rs. 5.15 crores to the Corporation. Sri Ravi Kant then submitted that the collusion between the petitioner, the Regional Manager and other officers is evident from the process of allotment and identification of the area as carried out. It was his submission that the manner in which the land was allotted to the petitioner and identified is evidence of the fact that an all out effort was made to confer undue advantage and favour upon the petitioner. This he submits is evident from the fact that while all other allottees were granted access to their plots by a service road adjoining NH-2, the petitioner was given direct access to NH-2 in order to ensure that the value of the land allotted to it increases manifold. Sri Ravi Kant then submits that the petitioner was the only educational society which was allotted land without publication of an advertisement or evaluation of applications/bids that may have been received. This he submits is without prejudice to the other vital objections taken to the allotment of the plot in question and referred to above. Sri Ravi Kant then submits that the petitioner was the only educational society which was allotted land without publication of an advertisement or evaluation of applications/bids that may have been received. This he submits is without prejudice to the other vital objections taken to the allotment of the plot in question and referred to above. He refers to the return of the Corporation and the averments taken in the third supplementary counter-affidavit dated 16 September 2016 to submit that except for two allotments made in favour of entities established for the purpose of implementation of Government of India programs no other allotment in the industrial area was made at any point of time merely on the basis of an application and the principles of first come first served. He, in this connection has drawn the attention of the Court to the advertisements issued on 28 April 2005, 21 February 2006 and 15 February 2007 inviting applications for allotment of land in the Hosiery and Textile Parks. 11. The exceptions which have found mention in the affidavit referred to above are the following. A plot of land admeasuring 13240 square meters was allotted to the International Institute of Saddlery Technology and Export Management on 27 September 2001. It becomes relevant to point out here that this plot of land was allotted at Rs. 370/- per square meter two years prior to the allotment in favour of the petitioner. The institute itself is stated to be co-sponsored by the Government of India and the IIT Kanpur under a UNDP associated program. The second allotment which falls in the category of exceptions was made in favour of Apparel and Leather Techniques Pvt. Ltd. on 19 June 2006 for establishment of an institute of Fashion Design and Textile Training Centre under a scheme of the Ministry of Textiles Government of India. Countering the allegations of certain other allotments having been made on similar basis, the Corporation in the affidavit further asserts that another plot bearing No. CF-2 was allotted to one Vijay Prakash Maheshwari on 13 December 2004 for establishment of a canteen and stationery shop adjacent to the existing institution which was running on his private land. This land was allotted at the rate of Rs. 1140/- per square meter. The plot size admeasures 2056 square meters. This land was allotted at the rate of Rs. 1140/- per square meter. The plot size admeasures 2056 square meters. Similar details have been given in respect of the allotment made in favour of Manoj Agarwal Hospital and Nursing Centre. It is disclosed that this allotment was made on 7 February 2007 after invitation of applications received in response to a public notice. The allotment of this land was at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per square meter. Referring to the above and other facts, Sri Ravi Kant submits that the allotment of the plot in question in favour of the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 175/- per square meter is stark evidence of the ulterior motives underlying all actions of the then Regional Manager acting in concert with the other officers of the Corporation. 12. Sri Ravi Kant then proceeded to advance his submissions with respect to the purported delegation of powers in favour of the authorities of the Corporation including the then Regional Manager insofar as sanction of map and layout plan is concerned. Sri Ravi Kant referring to the provisions of Section 51 of the 1973 Act submits that as would be evident from the plain language employed by the said provision, the State Government is conferred the power of delegation to any officer. Sub-section (2) of Section 51 in the submission of Sri Ravi Kant embodies the power conferred upon an authority constituted under the 1973 Act to delegate any power exercisable by it to such other officer or local authority as may be mentioned in that order. Section 51(3) of the Act in the submission of Sri Ravi Kant confers a power on the Vice Chairperson of the authority to delegate his power to any other officer of the authority. It is his submission that the Government Order dated 5 February 1998 as also 26 December 1992 are therefore, liable to be viewed in light of the above provisions. 13. Sri Ravi Kant submits that the order of the State Government dated 26 December 1992 is not indicative of a delegation of power by the State Government. He submits that the said order is wholly without jurisdiction and ultra vires the provisions of the 1973 Act. 13. Sri Ravi Kant submits that the order of the State Government dated 26 December 1992 is not indicative of a delegation of power by the State Government. He submits that the said order is wholly without jurisdiction and ultra vires the provisions of the 1973 Act. He contends that the Government Order dated 26 December 1992 insofar as it purports to hold or bids the Regional Manager of the Corporation to be treated as ex-officio Deputy Secretaries of the respective development authorities is itself based upon the understanding of the Government that it was empowered to introduce a legal fiction. He submits that firstly such a legal fiction could not have been introduced by virtue of an executive order, the power being vested exclusively in the competent legislature alone. Even otherwise, he submits that under the provisions of Section 51, the State Government could have at best delegated only such powers as were exercisable by it under the 1973 Act. The submission of Sri Ravi Kant assumes significance in light of the fact that the power to sanction a map under the 1973 Act is not vested in the State Government but in fact reposed in the Vice Chairperson of the authority. Sri Ravi Kant then submits that even if the Government Order dated 26 December 1992 be treated to be valid, the same would not clothe the Regional Manager of the Corporation with the power to sanction maps. This submission is advanced in the backdrop of the order itself bidding all to treat the Regional Manager as the ex-officio Deputy Secretary of a Development Authority. Sri Ravi Kant then referring to the provisions of the Government Order dated 5 February 1998 refers to the fact that even this order places a caveat to the effect that at the time of approval of layout plans, the Regional Managers even if delegated such powers, were obliged to ensure adherence to the master plan, Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws of the concerned development authority. This he submits in view of the fact that in the present case, an industrial plot had been put to institutional use without any change in the master plan or permission of the State Government for amendment thereto. Sri Ravi Kant then referring to the order dated 14 February 1996 submits that even this cannot come to the aid of the petitioner. Sri Ravi Kant then referring to the order dated 14 February 1996 submits that even this cannot come to the aid of the petitioner. Referring to the provisions of Section 51(3) of the 1973 Act, Sri Ravi Kant submits that the Vice Chairman is conferred the authority to delegate his powers to any officer of the authority. The Regional Manager of the Corporation, Sri Ravi Kant submits is not an officer of the Authority. He further submits that this order of 14 February 1996 itself related to industrial development areas and submits that industrial development areas must necessarily be understood as being those which are notified under the 1976 Act only. 14. Having noticed the rival submissions, we deem it appropriate to enumerate the following seminal issues, which in our considered opinion, fall for determination: 1. Whether the Corporation or the KDA would be empowered to sanction lay out plans and maps in respect of areas not notified under the 1976 Act as an industrial development area? 2. Whether the Governments Orders referred to above would confer jurisdiction upon the Corporation to sanction plans and maps by exercise of powers under the 1973 Act? 3. Whether allotment of land in favor of the Petitioner was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and tainted by the vice of nepotism, fraud and representative of undue favor having been conferred upon it? 4. Even if the answer to the above be against the Petitioner, whether equitable considerations would warrant saving of the transaction in question? 15. We propose to deal with the reports submitted by the CBI separately and in the latter part of this judgment. Before, however, we embark upon the exercise of considering the rival submissions it would be apposite to notice the relevant statutory provisions. 16. The Preamble to the 1976 Act indicates the legislative intent to be the making of provisions for constitution of an authority which may develop certain areas in the State into industrial and urban townships and for matter connected therewith. The expression “industrial development area” has been defined under Section 2 (d) to mean “an area declared as such by the State Government”. The word “Authority” has been defined under Section 2 (b) to mean “the authority constituted under Section 3 of the Act”. The expression “industrial development area” has been defined under Section 2 (d) to mean “an area declared as such by the State Government”. The word “Authority” has been defined under Section 2 (b) to mean “the authority constituted under Section 3 of the Act”. Section 3 of the 1976 Act is in the following terms : “Section 3—Constitution of the Authority.—(1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute for the purposes of this Act, an Authority to be called “(Name of the area) Industrial Development Authority”, for any industrial development area. (a) The Secretary to the Government, Uttar Pradesh, Industries Department or his nominee not below the rank of Joint Secretary-ex-officio Member-Chairman. Provided that the Chairman of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority. (b) The Secretary to the Government, Uttar Pradesh, Public Works Department or his nominee not below the rank of Joint Secretary—ex-officio. Member. (c) The Secretary to the Government, Uttar Pradesh, Local Self-Government Department or his nominee not below the rank of Joint Secretary-ex-officio. Member. (d) The Secretary to the Government, Uttar Pradesh, Finance Department or his nominee not below the rank of Joint Secretary—ex-officio. Member. (e) The Managing Director, U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation—ex-officio Member. (f) Five members to be nominated by the State Government by notification. Member. (g) Chief Executive Officer Member- Secretary. (4) The headquarters of the Authority shall be at such place as may be notified by the State Government. (5) The procedure for the conduct of the meetings for the Authority shall be such as may be prescribed. (6) No act or proceedings of the Authority shall be invalid by reason of the existence of any vacancy in or defect in the constitution of the KDA.” The functions of the authority stand delineated by Section 6 which reads as follows : “Section 6—Functions of the Authority.—(1) The object of the Authority shall be to secure the planned development of the industrial development areas. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the objects of the Authority the Authority shall perform the following functions— (a) to acquire land in the industrial development area, by agreement or through proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purposes of this Act; (b) to prepare a plan for the development of the industrial development area; (c) to demarcate and develop sites for industrial, commercial and residential purposes according to the plan; (d) to provide infra-structure for industrial, commercial and residential purposes; (e) to provide amenities; (f) to allocate and transfer either by way of sale or lease or otherwise plots of land for industrial, commercial or residential purposes; (g) to regulate the erection of buildings and setting up of industries; and (h) to lay down the purpose for which a particular site or plot of land shall be used, namely, for industrial or commercial or residential purpose or any other specified purpose in such area.” Section 7 confers powers upon the authority to transfer land by way of auction, allotment or otherwise and reads as follows : “Section 7—Power to the Authority in respect of transfer of land. The Authority may sell, lease or otherwise transfer whether by auction, allotment or otherwise any land or building belonging to the Authority in the industrial development area, on such terms and conditions as it may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, think fit to impose.” Section 17 and which in our considered view is of significant import is in the following terms : “Section 17—Overriding effect of the Act.—Upon any area being declared an industrial development area under the provisions of this Act, such area, if included in the master plan or the zonal development plan under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, or any other development plan under any other Uttar Pradesh Act, with effect from the date of such declaration, be deemed to be excluded from any such plan.” Moving then to the provisions of the 1973 Act, it becomes apposite to bear in the mind the definition of some important expressions which are used in the legislation. These are the following : “(b) “building” includes any structure or erection or part of a structure or erection which is intended to be used for residential, industrial, commercial, or other purposes, whether in actual use or not; (e) “development” with its grammatical variations, means the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in any building or land, and includes re development; (f) “Development Area” means any area declared to be development area under Section 3; (g) “the Development KDA” or “the KDA”, in relation to any development area, means the Development KDA constituted under Section 4 for that area;” The expression development area, constitution of the authority and its functions are dealt with in Sections 3 and 4 which read as under: “Section 3—Declaration of Development Areas.—If in the opinion of the State Government any area within the State requires to be developed according to plan it may, by notification in the Gazette, declare the area to be a development area. Section 4—The Development Authority.—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Gazette, constitute for the purposes of this Act, an authority to be called the Development Authority for any development area. (2) The Authority shall be a body corporate, by the name given to it in the said notification, having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable and to contract and shall by the said name sue and be sued.” The Act then makes provisions for the creation of a master plan, zonal development plan in Sections 8 and 9. Section 14 prohibits any development or building activity being undertaken while Section 15 lays down the procedure for obtaining permission. They read as follows: “Section 8—Civil survey of, and master plan for the development area.—(1) The Authority shall, as soon as may be, prepare a master plan for, the development area. Section 14 prohibits any development or building activity being undertaken while Section 15 lays down the procedure for obtaining permission. They read as follows: “Section 8—Civil survey of, and master plan for the development area.—(1) The Authority shall, as soon as may be, prepare a master plan for, the development area. (2) The master plan shall— (a) define the various zones into which the development area may be divided for the purposes of development and indicate the manner in which the land in each zone is proposed to be used (whether by the carrying out thereon of development or otherwise) and the stages by which any such development shall be carried out; and (b) serve as a basic pattern of frame-work within which the zonal development plans of the various zones may be prepared. (3) The master plan may provide for any other matter which may be necessary for the proper development of the development area. Section 9—Zonal Development plans.—(1) Simultaneously with the preparation of the master plan or as soon as may be thereafter, the Authority shall proceed with the preparation of a zonal development plan for each of the zones into which the development area may be divided. Section 9—Zonal Development plans.—(1) Simultaneously with the preparation of the master plan or as soon as may be thereafter, the Authority shall proceed with the preparation of a zonal development plan for each of the zones into which the development area may be divided. (2) A zonal development plan may— (a) contain a site-plan and use-plan for the development of the zone and show the approximate locations and extents of land uses proposed in the zone for such things as public buildings and other public works and utilities, roads, housing, recreation, industry, business, markets, schools, hospitals and public and private open spaces and other categories of public and private uses; (b) specify the standards of population density and building density; (c) show every area in the zone which may, in the opinion of the Authority, be required or declared for development or redevelopment; and (d) in particular, contain provisions regarding all or any of the following matters, namely— (i) the division of any site into plots for the erection of buildings; (ii) the allotment or reservation of land for roads, open spaces, gardens, recreation-grounds, schools, markets and other public purposes: (iii) the development of any area into a township or colony and the restrictions and conditions subject to which such development may be undertaken or carried out; (iv) the erection of buildings on any site and the restrictions and conditions in regard to the open spaces to be maintained in or around buildings and height and character of buildings; Section 14—Development of land in the developed area—(1) After the declaration of any area as development area under Section 3, no development of land shall be undertaken or carried out or continued in that area by any person or body (including a department of Government) unless permission for such development has been obtained in writing from the Vice-Chairman in accordance with the provision of this Act. (2) After the coming into operation of any of the plans in any development area no development shall be undertaken or carried out or continued in that area unless such development is also in accordance with such plans. (2) After the coming into operation of any of the plans in any development area no development shall be undertaken or carried out or continued in that area unless such development is also in accordance with such plans. Section 15—Application for permission—(1) Every person or body (other than any department of Government or any local authority) desiring to obtain the permission referred to in Section 14 shall make an application in writing to the Vice-Chairman in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development to which the application relates as may be prescribed by bye-laws. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed by rules. (2-A) The Authority be entitled to levy development fees, mutation charges, stacking fees and water fees in such manner and at such rates as may be prescribed. Provided that the amount of stacking fees levied in respect of an area which is not being developed or has not been developed, by the Authority shall be transferred to the local authority within whose local limits such area is situated. (3) On the receipt of an application for permission under sub-section (1), the Vice-Chairman after making such inquiry as it considers necessary in relation to any matter specified in clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 9 or in relation, to any other matter, shall by order in writing, either grant the permission, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order or refuse to grant such permission: Provided that before making an order refusing such permission the applicant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to show-cause why the permission should not be refused: Provided further that the Vice-chairman may before passing any order on such application give an opportunity to the applicant to make any correction therein or to supply any further particulars or documents or to make good any deficiency in the requisite fee with a view to bringing it in conformity with the relevant rules or regulations. Provided also that before granting permission, referred to in Section 14 the Vice-Chairman may get the fees and the charges levied under Sub-section (2-A) deposited.” As noted above, learned counsels appearing for the parties advanced elaborate submissions on the scope of the power of delegation as engrafted in the 1973 Act by virtue of Section 51. Provided also that before granting permission, referred to in Section 14 the Vice-Chairman may get the fees and the charges levied under Sub-section (2-A) deposited.” As noted above, learned counsels appearing for the parties advanced elaborate submissions on the scope of the power of delegation as engrafted in the 1973 Act by virtue of Section 51. This provision reads as follows : “Section 51—Power to delegate.—(1) The State Government may by general or special order, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act except the power to make rules, may also be exercised by such officer in such cases and subject to such conditions if any, as may be specified therein. (2) The Authority may by general or special order, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act except the power to make regulations or bye-laws, may also be exercised by such officer or local authority, in such cases and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified therein. (3) The Vice-Chairman of the Authority may by general or special order direct that any power exercisable by him under this Act may also be exercised by such officer of the authority in such cases and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified therein. As is evident from Section 2 (d) of the 1976 Act, an industrial development area comes into being when a particular area is declared as such by notification by the State Government. 17. Now it was not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Rooma Industrial Area had never been declared to be an industrial development area by way of a notification issued under the 1976 Act. The reason for this appears to be obvious and flows from the undisputed statement of fact that the Corporation is not an authority under the 1976 Act and merely a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The submission of Sri Goyal that the Corporation is even otherwise and for all intents and purposes liable to be treated as an authority under the 1976 Act is not only fallacious but wholly untenable. Section 3 enjoins the State Government to constitute an authority (a) for the purposes of the 1976 Act (b) for an industrial development area and (c) by way of a notification. Section 3 enjoins the State Government to constitute an authority (a) for the purposes of the 1976 Act (b) for an industrial development area and (c) by way of a notification. The three components of Section 3 clearly envisage positive and definitive steps to be taken by the State Government in order to create an authority. An authority under the 1976 Act comes into being only when all three components of Section 3 are satisfied. We note in the facts of the present case that there is no notification of Rooma Industrial Area in terms of Section 2 (d) nor is there a notification constituting the Corporation as an authority under Section 3. The mere similarity in the composition of the Board of the Corporation with the composition of an authority constituted under the 1976 Act would not, in our opinion, transpose or metamorphose the Corporation into an authority under the 1976 Act. If that be the factual position it is clear that the Corporation did not have the authority to exercise the powers otherwise reposed in and entrusted to an authority constituted under the 1976 Act. 18. One must bear in mind that the primary function of an authority constituted under the 1976 Act is to secure the planned development of an industrial development area. It is with the above object and purpose that Section 6 confers the power upon the authority to prepare plans for development of the area, demarcate and develop sites for industrial, commercial and residential purposes, to allocate and transfer plots of land for industrial, commercial and residential purposes and to regulate the erection of buildings and setting up of industries. However all these functions enumerated in Section 6 presuppose the existence of an “industrial development area” as envisaged by Section 2 (d) and an “authority” constituted under Section 3. It is to further effectuate the above legislative intendment and policy that Section 17 stands placed in the statute. As is evident from the plain language of Section 17, an area which may otherwise be covered under a master plan or zonal development plan under the 1973 Act stands extracted and exorcised therefrom the moment it becomes part of an industrial development area created and notified under the 1976 Act. As is evident from the plain language of Section 17, an area which may otherwise be covered under a master plan or zonal development plan under the 1973 Act stands extracted and exorcised therefrom the moment it becomes part of an industrial development area created and notified under the 1976 Act. In the absence of Rooma Industrial Area having been declared as an industrial development area, the area continues to be part of the development area falling under the jurisdiction of the KDA and does not stand extracted therefrom. 19. The power of a development authority under the 1973 Act is all encompassing and covers all areas which fall within the development area. This includes its obligation to prepare a master plan, a zonal development plan for the area and to ensure that no development takes place in the development area without its permission. The power to sanction all development and erection of buildings and structures stands vested in the KDA exclusively. The only circumstance in which there is a legislative transfer or divesting of its powers is when the area comes to be included within an “industrial development area” under the 1976 Act. It was not disputed before us that Rooma Industrial Area was in fact comprised in the master plan of the KDA and was earmarked for industrial use. The fact that the establishment of the engineering college would entail a change of land use was what constrained the Corporation to place an obligation upon the Petitioner to obtain a NOC from the KDA. This condition to obtain a certificate from the KDA was never amended or diluted with the approval of the Managing Director of the Corporation. However we shall deal with this aspect a little later. The position which, therefore emerges from the above discussion is that the Corporation was not an authority under the 1976 Act and that the area in question was not liable to be treated as an “industrial development area”. Consequentially, the powers otherwise conferred upon an industrial development authority constituted under the 1976 Act did not inhere in the Corporation. If the area was never notified as an industrial development area under the 1976 Act, it did not stand removed or extracted from the development area constituted under the 1973 Act. The authority, therefore, which was entitled to control, sanction and oversee all development in this area remained with the KDA. If the area was never notified as an industrial development area under the 1976 Act, it did not stand removed or extracted from the development area constituted under the 1973 Act. The authority, therefore, which was entitled to control, sanction and oversee all development in this area remained with the KDA. 20. The second issue which then falls for consideration is whether the Government Orders referred to above empowered the Corporation to exercise the powers of a development authority under the 1973 Act. The Government Orders in the submission of Sri Goyal were liable to be viewed and traced to the provisions of Section 51 of the 1973 Act. Now one must bear in mind that the obligation to prepare a master plan, a zonal development plan and to ensure that no development takes place in a development area without requisite permission stands placed upon the KDA under the 1973 Act. The power to sanction plans and maps relating to erection of buildings stands vested in the Vice Chairperson of the authority in terms of Section 15 of the 1973 Act. This power conferred upon the Vice Chairperson and exercisable by him is made subject to an appeal to the Chairman in case of refusal in terms of Section 15 (5). Under the scheme of Section 15, the State Government does not have the power to sanction plans or grant permission for development. It, in fact, has no role to play whatsoever. The issue which therefore arises for determination would be whether by exercising powers either under Section 41 or Section 51 of the 1973 Act the State Government could have altered the statutory scheme underlying Section 15. 21. In State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 , the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the State Government by exercising its powers conferred by Section 41 of the 1973 Act could command the Vice Chairperson to revoke a permission granted under Section 15. Dealing with the said issue, it was held : “50. This power of the State Government consistent with the scheme of the Act, cannot be construed as a source of power to authorise any authority or functionary under the Act to or carry out something which that authority or functionary is not, otherwise, competent to do or carry out under the Act. This power of the State Government consistent with the scheme of the Act, cannot be construed as a source of power to authorise any authority or functionary under the Act to or carry out something which that authority or functionary is not, otherwise, competent to do or carry out under the Act. Section 41(1) is not a Super Henry VIII clause for the supply or source of additional provisions and powers not already obtaining under the “Act”. 55. It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the dictation of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authority’s discretion that is exercised, but someone else’s. If an authority “hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires”. Such an interference by a person or body extraneous to the power would plainly be contrary to the nature of the power conferred upon the authority.....” 22. Before we proceed to deal with the Government Orders in question, it would be apposite to also refer to Sections 5 and 5-A of the 1973 Act which read as follows : “5. Staff of the Authority :(1) The State Government may appoint two suitable persons respectively as the Secretary and the Chief Accounts Officer of the Authority who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be prescribed by regulations or delegated to them by the Authority or its Vice-Chairman. (2) Subject to such control and restrictions as may be determined by general or special order of the State Government, the Authority may appoint such number of other officer and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its functions and may determine their designations and grades. (2) Subject to such control and restrictions as may be determined by general or special order of the State Government, the Authority may appoint such number of other officer and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its functions and may determine their designations and grades. (3) The Secretary, the Chief Accounts Officer and other Officers and employees of the Authority shall be entitled to receive from the funds of the Authority such salaries and allowances and shall be governed by such salaries and allowances and shall be governed by other conditions of service as may be determined by regulations made in that behalf. 5-A. Creation of Centralised Services : (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Section 5 or in any other law for the time being in force, the State Government may at any time, by notification create one or more ‘Development Authorities Centralised Services for such posts, other than the posts mentioned in Sub-Section (1) of Section 59, as the State Government may deem fit, common to all the Development Authorities, and may prescribe the manner and conditions of recruitment to and the terms and conditions of service of person appointed to such service. (2) Upon creation of a Development Authorities Centralised Service, a person serving on the posts included in such service immediately before such creation, not being a person governed by the U.P. Palika (Centralized) Services Rules, 1966. or serving on deputation, shall, unless he opts otherwise, be absorbed in such service.- (a) finally, if he was already confirmed in his post, and (b) provisionally. if he was holding temporary or officiating appointment. (3) A person referred to in Sub-section (2) may, within three months from the creation of such Development Authorities Centralised Service communicate to the Government in the Housing Department, his option not to be absorbed in such Centralised Service. failing which he shall be, deemed to have opted for final or provisional. as the case may be, absorption in such Centralised Service.” The power to appoint the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary and the Chief Accounts Officer vests in the State Government. Apart from the above posts, the State Government is empowered to create or constitute “Development Authorities Centralized Services” for such categories of posts as it may deem fit. Appointments to all other posts are vested in the authority itself. Apart from the above posts, the State Government is empowered to create or constitute “Development Authorities Centralized Services” for such categories of posts as it may deem fit. Appointments to all other posts are vested in the authority itself. Now what the Government Orders dated 26 December 1992 and 5 February 1998 actually purport to do is to declare that the Regional Managers of the Corporation shall be deemed to be Deputy Secretaries of the authorities constituted under the 1973 Act. On a plain reading of the said Government Orders what follows is that a Regional Manager of the Corporation is deemed also to be a Deputy Secretary of the KDA. The issue, however, would be whether such an order or arrangement made by way of a Government Order would be legally valid. The answer to this query, in our considered opinion, must be in the negative for the following reasons. 23. A Regional Manager of the Corporation is not an employee or staff of the authority constituted under the 1973 Act. No power vested in the State Government under the 1973 Act enables it to include such Regional Managers in the service of the authority. The Government Orders in question cannot be traced to Section 41 of the 1973 Act. As aptly stated in Maharaja Dharmandar Prasad Singh, the said provision “is not a Super Henry VIII clause for the supply or source of additional provisions and powers not already obtaining under the “Act”.” Moving on to Section 51 it is clear that the power conferred under the said provision is essentially one of delegation- the power to delegate functions otherwise performable by the State Government, the Vice Chairperson or any other officer. However what can be delegated is a power vested in or exercisable by the State Government “under the Act”, the Act itself being the 1973 Act. The 1973 Act does not empower the State Government to sanction plans and maps. Additionally, the word “officer” occurring in the said provision must necessarily be confined to an officer or an employee appointed under the 1973 Act. This provision which merely empowers the State Government to delegate its functions and powers under the 1973 Act to an officer of an authority created thereunder cannot be read in aid of or to sustain the Government Order in question. This provision which merely empowers the State Government to delegate its functions and powers under the 1973 Act to an officer of an authority created thereunder cannot be read in aid of or to sustain the Government Order in question. More fundamentally it must be noted that no provision of the 1973 Act confers authority upon the State Government to create a legal fiction of the nature which is sought to be introduced by the Government Order in question. The introduction of a legal fiction, it must be noted, is the exclusive prerogative of the legislature. The legislature has not conferred any power upon the State Government to introduce a legal fiction under the 1973 Act so as to enable it to treat officers and employees of the Corporation as that of KDA. Dealing with the scope of introduction of a legal fiction, the Supreme Court in Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd., (2010) 13 SCC 336 , held as follows : “14. The legislature in its wisdom has not enacted any deeming provision providing that in case the resolution is not considered and finally decided by the Registrar within a period of six months, the resolution shall become effective and operative. It is the exclusive prerogative of the legislature to create a legal fiction meaning thereby to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist. Even if a legal fiction is created by the legislature, the Court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and it must be limited to the purpose indicated by the context and cannot be given a larger effect. More so, what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are merely facts and no legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands. It is a settled legal proposition that in absence of any statutory provision, the provision cannot be construed as to provide for a fiction in such an eventuality. More so, creating a fiction by judicial interpretation may amount to legislation, a field exclusively within the domain of the legislature.” 24. That then takes us to the order of the Vice Chairperson which was sought to be read as empowering the Regional Manager to sanction lay out plans and maps. More so, creating a fiction by judicial interpretation may amount to legislation, a field exclusively within the domain of the legislature.” 24. That then takes us to the order of the Vice Chairperson which was sought to be read as empowering the Regional Manager to sanction lay out plans and maps. While this order again rests upon the Government Order dated 26 December 1992, [which we have already held above would not withstand judicial scrutiny] the Vice Chairperson of KDA actually delegates his powers under Section 15 to the then Regional Manager of the Corporation by name. No provision of the 1973 Act conferred such authority upon the Vice Chairperson. He could not have delegated any powers to an officer or authority who was not covered by the provisions of the 1973 Act. The Regional Manager of the Corporation was not staff or an officer of an authority constituted under the 1973 Act. This order too therefore cannot come to the aid of the petitioner society. 25. This then takes us to the issue as to whether the allotment in favor of the petitioner society was made in accordance with law and if not, its resultant effect. The validity of the allotment of the plot in question primarily would rest upon an answer to the issue of whether the procedure adopted by the Corporation was in accord with the principles flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution. In order to appreciate the background in which the allotment came to be made, it would be apposite to take note of the following sequence of events. S. No. Dates Request for allotment of 50 acres of land is made by Indus Education Foundation. This letter as appears from an endorsement made thereon is stated to have been discussed with the Managing Director on 13 June 2003. There are further endorsements made on this letter dated 16 June 2003, 18 June 2003 and 19 June 2003 when it appears to have been marked to different authorities in the Corporation. 1 11-Jun-03 A second letter is submitted by Indus Education Foundation in which it reduces its requirement to 25 acres of land for opening the engineering college. This letter bears endorsements again of 17 June 2003 , 18 June 2003 and 19 June 2003 . 1 11-Jun-03 A second letter is submitted by Indus Education Foundation in which it reduces its requirement to 25 acres of land for opening the engineering college. This letter bears endorsements again of 17 June 2003 , 18 June 2003 and 19 June 2003 . 2 17-Jun-03 The DGM(PM) addresses a communication to the then Regional Manager seeking his report with respect to the availability of 50 acres of land. 3 18-Jun-03 The second letter of Indus Education Foundation as well as the communication of the DGM(PM) dated 18 June 2003 are recorded in the note-sheet. 4 19-Jun-03 The then Regional Manager addresses a communication to the DGM (PM) apprising him that 50 acres of land is available only at Rooma Industrial Area and therefore, the request of establishment of an engineering college in the area may be duly considered. 5 20-Jun-03 A third communication is received from Indus Education Foundation which refers to a discussion held by them with the Vice Chairperson of the KDA. It notes that they were informed by the KDA that their request would be favorably considered. It further notices the KDA having communicated to them the requirement of the Corporation formally asking for a NOC. The letter submits a formal request for allotment of 25 acres of land and further prays that the Corporation address a letter to the KDA for grant of NOC 6 21-Jun-03 Request for allotment of 50 acres of land is made by Indus Education Foundation. This letter as appears from an endorsement made thereon is stated to have been discussed with the Managing Director on 13 June 2003. There are further endorsements made on this letter dated 16 June 2003, 18 June 2003 and 19 June 2003 when it appears to have been marked to different authorities in the Corporation. 7 23-Jun-03 DGM (PM) acknowledges the receipt of the communication of the then Regional Manager and submits a note that if the proposal finds acceptance, the Senior Manager (ATP) may be directed to make a development plan of the area incorporating the land proposed to be allotted. This note is approved by the Joint Managing Director on the same date. 8 24-Jun-03 The Joint Managing Director directs the DGM(PM) to discuss the matter. This note is approved by the Joint Managing Director on the same date. 8 24-Jun-03 The Joint Managing Director directs the DGM(PM) to discuss the matter. 9 26-Jun-03 The Joint Managing Director makes a note to the effect that the issue had been duly discussed and directs the Senior Manager (ATP) to proceed to draw up a development plan as per the directions of the Managing Director within three days. 10 26-Jun-03 The petitioner society (Indus Technical Education Society) is stated to have made a formal application for allotment of land for establishing the engineering college. [Annexure 3 to the writ petition] Note: (i) No such letter exists on the original record handed over by the CBI. (ii) In the entire note-sheet starting from 21 June 2003 to 15 July 2003, there is no mention of this so called letter dated 26 June 2003. 11 27-Jun-03 A layout plan of the said date is on record. It bears the signature of the Assistant Manager (Arch.), Senior Manager (ATP) and General Manager (DEB). Note: (i) This plan does not bear the signatures of either the Joint Managing Director or the Managing Director. (ii) The plan itself only shows the plot proposed to be allotted and is identified as Plot No. A-1. (iii) There are no other details on this plan. No other sector or plots are detailed. 12 27-Jun-03 A note is made by the Senior Manager (ATP) which refers to a letter placed at “A” and as is apparent from the contents of the note, it is referring to the communication submitted by Indus Education Foundation on 21 June 2003. It accordingly proposes that the allotment to the engineering college be made subject to an obligation being placed upon it to obtain NOC from the Authority. 13 28-Jun-03 The Joint Managing Director approves this condition. 14. 3 July 2003 The note sheet records that four blue prints of the approved drawings are placed on the record for further necessary action. On the same date an endorsement is made requiring the Deputy Manager (IM) to work out costing. 13 28-Jun-03 The Joint Managing Director approves this condition. 14. 3 July 2003 The note sheet records that four blue prints of the approved drawings are placed on the record for further necessary action. On the same date an endorsement is made requiring the Deputy Manager (IM) to work out costing. Note: (i) The note sheet does not indicate or bear and evidence of the lay out plan having been approved by either the Joint Managing Director or the Managing Director (i) An undated costing-sheet is available on the record and it shows that various figures have been amended after the application of an ink whitener. (ii) It works out the total cost of 215.60 acres of land at Rs. 721.92 lakhs. (iii) The land acquisition cost of the land is noted as Rs. 721.92 lakhs. To this is added anticipated enhancement by 20% of the land cost of private land and 12.5% towards overheads. It also notes the interest liability on land compensation to be Rs. 183.35 lakhs. (iv) A further note is made to the effect that in order to “arrest the costing of rest of the land” land wastage and cost of infrastructure may also be factored another. (v) After taking into consideration all of the above, the gross total is worked out to Rs. 1492.69 lakhs and subsequently the cost of the plot itself in terms thereof worked out to Rs. 175/- per square meter. 15. 14 July 2003 The costing sheet is made part of the record and the DGM (PM) draws a note that the allotment of 25 acres undeveloped land at the rate of Rs. 175/- per square meter may be approved with the condition that “party itself will obtain a no objection certificate from the KDA regarding land use change.” Note : (i) The note proceeds on the basis that the lay out plan had been duly approved whereas the prior note dated 3 July 2003 bears no evidence of approval having been accorded to the same by either the Joint Managing Director or the Managing Director 16. 15 July 2003 The above note is approved by the Ma naging Director. 17. 15 July 2003 A communication of the DGM (PM) is addressed to the Regional Manager informing him that the Corporation has approved the allotment of 25 acres undeveloped bulk land at the rate of Rs. 15 July 2003 The above note is approved by the Ma naging Director. 17. 15 July 2003 A communication of the DGM (PM) is addressed to the Regional Manager informing him that the Corporation has approved the allotment of 25 acres undeveloped bulk land at the rate of Rs. 175/- per square meter in favour of M/s Indus Education Foundation for the establishment of an engineering college. The letter further records that the approval is with the condition that the allottee will obtain a no objection certificate from the KDA regarding land use change. Note: (i) Word “Technical” is inserted by hand between the words “Indus” and “Education”. (ii) The word “Foundation” is retained although the name of the petitioner society is stated to be Indus Technical Education Society. (iii) The allotment letter issued to the petitioner society bears the correct name and also attaches the condition in written hand that the allotee would have to obtain a NOC from the KDA for setting up the engineering college. This letter is signed by the then Regional Manager. (iv) The layout plan brought on record of the writ petition as Annexure 2A is a copy of the layout plan dated 27 June 2003 found on the original record. (v) The application form for allotment stated to have been submitted by the petitioner society and brought on record as Annexure-3 dated 26 June 2003 is not on the record. 18 26 July 2003 The then Regional Manager addresses a communication to the Chief Architect of the KDA for grant of NOC. 19. 29 July 2003 The Chief Town Planner of the KDA addresses a communication to the Regional Manager stating with reference to the Government Order dated 5 September 2001 that there is no requirement of the issuance of NOC by the KDA with reference to a plot falling within the “industrial development area”. Note: (i) The original record handed over by the CBI carries no noting after 15 July 2003 up to 8 January 2004. 20. 29 July 2003 The petitioner society is stated to have submitted certain demand drafts with reference to the conditions imposed in the allotment letter. 21. 1 August 2003 A formal lease deed is executed in favour of the petitioner society by the then Regional Manager. Note: (i) The condition of obtaining NOC from the KDA does not find mention or inclusion in this lease deed. 21. 1 August 2003 A formal lease deed is executed in favour of the petitioner society by the then Regional Manager. Note: (i) The condition of obtaining NOC from the KDA does not find mention or inclusion in this lease deed. (ii) The original record and note-sheets do not bear any approval having been accorded by the Joint Managing Director or the Managing Director approving the deletion of this condition. (iii) As indicated above, the note-sheet itself ends on 15 July 2003 and the only other endorsement thereafter is dated 8 January 2004 . 22. 22 September 2003 A layout plan of the Rooma Industrial Area is sanctioned by the Managing Director of the Corporation. Note : (i) The layout plan brought on record by way of a supplementary counter-affidavit does not earmark or identify the land allotted to the petitioner society. (ii) Plot No. A-1 is shown as admeasuring 4050 square meters and as disclosed by the Corporation worth ultimately allotted to one Sri Narvesh Malhotra on 30 April 2005 at the rate of Rs. 825/- per square meter. (iii) The Corporation alleges that a duplicate map of the same date is stated to have been prepared wherein the signatures of the officers is omitted. The reference to the Housing Sector and other details are removed and the land allotted to the petitioner society is shown as the allotted land. 23. 1 October 2003 The then Regional Manager sanctions additional building plans in purported exercise of powers conferred by the Government order dated 5 February 1998 read with the letter dated 14 February 1996 issued by the Vice Chair Person of the KDA. 24. 24 December 2003 The Regional Manager of the Corporation addresses a communication to the DGM (PM) seeking endorsement as to whether the cost of the service road has been obtained and recovered from the allottee. The allottee is described as M/s Indus Technical Education Society. 25. 8 January 2004 The DGM addresses a communication to the Regional Manager informing him that in terms of the allotment letter dated 15 July 2003, 25 acres of undeveloped bulk land at the rte of Rs. 175/- per square meter was allotted to M/s Indus Technical Education Foundation. It further states that since the bulk land was undeveloped it did not include the construction of any service road. 175/- per square meter was allotted to M/s Indus Technical Education Foundation. It further states that since the bulk land was undeveloped it did not include the construction of any service road. Note : (i) This exchange of communication is duly recorded in the note-sheet which ends here. 26. The principles which must be borne in mind when the State proceeds to grant largesse or confer benefit were eloquently spelt out in Akhil Bharti Upbhokta Congress, (2011) 5 SCC 29 , in the following terms: “65. What needs to be emphasized is that the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/or officers of the State. Every action/decision of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or confer benefit must be founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well defined policy, which shall be made known to the public by publication in the Official Gazette and other recognized modes of publicity and such policy must be implemented/executed by adopting a non- discriminatory and non-arbitrary method irrespective of the class or category of persons proposed to be benefited by the policy. The distribution of largesse like allotment of land, grant of quota, permit license etc. by the State and its agencies/instrumentalities should always be done in a fair and equitable manner and the element of favoritism or nepotism shall not influence the exercise of discretion, if any, conferred upon the particular functionary or officer of the State. 66. We may add that there cannot be any policy, much less, a rational policy of allotting land on the basis of applications made by individuals, bodies, organizations or institutions de hors an invitation or advertisement by the State or its agency/instrumentality. By entertaining applications made by individuals, organisations or institutions for allotment of land or for grant of any other type of largesse the State cannot exclude other eligible persons from lodging competing claim. Any allotment of land or grant of other form of largesse by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities by treating the exercise as a private venture is liable to be treated as arbitrary, discriminatory and an act of favoritism and/or nepotism violating the soul of the equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. 67. Any allotment of land or grant of other form of largesse by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities by treating the exercise as a private venture is liable to be treated as arbitrary, discriminatory and an act of favoritism and/or nepotism violating the soul of the equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. 67. This, however, does not mean that the State can never allot land to the institutions/organisations engaged in educational, cultural, social or philanthropic activities or are rendering service to the Society except by way of auction. Nevertheless, it is necessary to observe that once a piece of land is earmarked or identified for allotment to institutions/organisations engaged in any such activity, the actual exercise of allotment must be done in a manner consistent with the doctrine of equality. The competent authority should, as a matter of course, issue an advertisement incorporating therein the conditions of eligibility so as to enable all similarly situated eligible persons, institutions/organisations to participate in the process of allotment, whether by way of auction or otherwise. In a given case the Government may allot land at a fixed price but in that case also allotment must be preceded by a wholesome exercise consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) 27. In Institute of Law, Chandigarh v. Neeraj, (2015) 1 SCC 720 , the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the allotment of land in favour of an educational institute. Dealing with the aspect as to whether the avowed and professed charitable purpose of an institute would be sufficient to sustain an allotment made in violation of the settled principles governing the grant of largess let the Supreme Court to observe as follows: “18. It has also come to our notice that the settlement of the land in question in favour of the appellant-Institute was done within a few days without following the mandatory procedure for the allotment of land. We do not doubt the intention of the appellants to set up the law institute, however, their private interest is pitted against the public interest. The loss to the public exchequer could have been easily avoided had the land in question been settled by way of public auction inviting applications from eligible persons. 25. We have carefully considered and examined the question of the legality of the allotment order of the land made in favour of the appellant- Institute. The loss to the public exchequer could have been easily avoided had the land in question been settled by way of public auction inviting applications from eligible persons. 25. We have carefully considered and examined the question of the legality of the allotment order of the land made in favour of the appellant- Institute. It is submitted on behalf of the first respondent that the allotment of public land at throw away price or at no price to the private educational institutions with an avowed object to serve the public interest is contrary to the theory of “charitable education” that serve the pious cause of literacy. The aforementioned legal issue was visualized by this Court and has lucidly laid down the law in the case of Union of India and another v. Jain Sabha, New Delhiand another, wherein the plea of charitable intentions or philanthropic goal behind the establishment of private educational institution was not accepted by this Court, holding that : “11......we think it appropriate to observe that it is high time the Government reviews the entire policy relating to allotment of land to schools and other charitable institutions. Where the public property is being given to such institutions practically free, stringent conditions have to be attached with respect to the user of the land and the manner in which schools or other institutions established thereon shall function. The conditions imposed should be consistent with public interest and should always stipulate that in case of violation of any of those conditions, the land shall be resumed by the Government. Not only such conditions should be stipulated but constant monitoring should be done to ensure that those conditions are being observed in practice. While we cannot say anything about the particular school run by the respondent, it is common knowledge that some of the schools are being run on totally commercial lines. Huge amounts are being charged by way of donations and fees. The question is whether there is any justification for allotting land at throw-away prices to such institutions. The allotment of land belonging to the people at practically no price is meant for serving the public interest, i.e., spread of education or other charitable purposes; it is not meant to enable the allottees to make money or profiteer with the aid of public property. The allotment of land belonging to the people at practically no price is meant for serving the public interest, i.e., spread of education or other charitable purposes; it is not meant to enable the allottees to make money or profiteer with the aid of public property. We are sure that the Government would take necessary measures in this behalf in the light of the observations contained herein.” 28. In the light of the above mentioned cases, we have to record our finding that the discretionary power conferred upon the public authorities to carry out the necessary Regulations for allotting land for the purpose of constructing a public educational institution should not be misused. 31. We, therefore, disregard the plea of charitable intention or philanthropic goal behind the establishment of the appellant educational institution as the establishment of the same does not serve any public interest and we cannot allow the allottee to make money or profiteer with the aid of the public property. 32. Further, on a careful evaluation of the statutory object behind clause 18 of the “Allotment of Land to Educational Institutions (Schools)Rules Etc. on Lease Hold basis in Chandigarh Scheme, 1996” no systematic exercise has been undertaken by the Administration of Chandigarh to identify the needs of different kinds of professional institutions required to be established in Chandigarh. We thus concur with the reasoning of the High Court in the impugned orders that the Screening Committee comprising of senior and responsible functionaries allotted the institutional sites in favour of the allottee without following any objective criteria and policy. The Screening Committee acted in a manner which is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in the judgments cited above in allotting the land in question in favour of the first appellant. The Screening Committee acted in a manner which is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in the judgments cited above in allotting the land in question in favour of the first appellant. We, therefore, conclude that the High Court has rightly held that the policy followed by the Chandigarh Administration where the allotment of land was done in favour of the appellant-Institute without giving any public notice and in the absence of a transparent policy based upon objective criteria and without even examining the fact that the Union Territory of Chandigarh is already under extreme pressure of over population and even in the case of allotment of school sites by making no attempt to enforce clause 18 of the Scheme, 1996, thereby confining the said provision merely to the statute book, is arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust and is opposed to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” (emphasis supplied) 28. In City Industrial Development Corporation, the Court again emphasized the need of the Government adopting a non-discriminatory and arbitrary method in allotment of plots. In that context, it was observed as follows: 49. State and its agencies and instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person at sweet will and whims of the political entities or officers of the State. However, decisions and action of the State must be founded on a sound, transparent and well defined policy which shall be made known to the public. The disposal of Government land by adopting a discriminatory and arbitrary method shall always be avoided and it should be done in a fair and equitable manner as the allotment on favoritism or nepotism influences the exercises of discretion. Even assuming that if the Rule or Regulation prescribes the mode of allotment by entertaining individual application or by tenders or competitive bidding, the Rule of Law requires publicity to be given before such allotment is made. CIDCO authorities should not adopt pick and choose method while allotting the Government land. 50. Even assuming that if the Rule or Regulation prescribes the mode of allotment by entertaining individual application or by tenders or competitive bidding, the Rule of Law requires publicity to be given before such allotment is made. CIDCO authorities should not adopt pick and choose method while allotting the Government land. 50. Furthermore, this Court has already stated in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2011) 5 SCC 29 , that the State or its agencies or instrumentalities must give largesse founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well-defined policy, which should be made known to the public at large and further held that a rational policy of allotting land on the basis of individual applications cannot de hors an invitation or advertisement by the State or its instrumentality, bringing it to the knowledge of public at large so that the eligible persons should not be excluded from lodging their competitive claims. From the above principles elucidated by the Supreme Court in its various judgements referred to above, it is apparent that the exercise of judicial review of an action of the State granting largess is primarily aimed at testing as to whether a fair, equitable and non discriminatory procedure preceded the grant or not. Favoritism and nepotism are anathema to a fair and non arbitrary method of allotment as mandated by Article 14. The policy to be adopted by the State authority must be one which is transparent and based upon an objective criteria. The action under review must be established to be one which has not been tainted by elements of favoritism or an effort to confer undue favour. 29. Another important aspect which must necessarily be borne in mind is the necessity of an invitation and advertisement being made by the State before the grant of largess. An advertisement or invitation enables all persons falling within the same class to be able to participate and be considered for the grant of largess. In fact an invitation or advertisement prior to the grant or allotment ensures that persons who may be otherwise eligible are not excluded. Absence of adequate advertisement and a public invitation in fact, in our considered view, would be indicative of a discriminatory and arbitrary process adopted by the State in the grant of largess. In fact an invitation or advertisement prior to the grant or allotment ensures that persons who may be otherwise eligible are not excluded. Absence of adequate advertisement and a public invitation in fact, in our considered view, would be indicative of a discriminatory and arbitrary process adopted by the State in the grant of largess. The absence of an invitation of public offers itself casts an impervious shadow upon the entire process and taints it from inception. No policy of the State dealing with allotment of land which envisages the entertainment of applications behind closed doors can possibly be countenanced. Such policies raise the specter of the conferment of benefit to the chosen who frequent the corridors of power. It was a procedure akin to what has been described above, which did not find favor in the Coal Block Allocation matters. The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary, (2014) 9 SCC 516 , observed as follows: “160. The entire exercise of allocation through Screening Committee route thus appears to suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and not following any objective criteria in determining as to who is to be selected or who is not to be selected. There is no evaluation of merit and no inter se comparison of the applicants. No chart of evaluation was prepared. The determination of the Screening Committee is apparently subjective as the minutes of the Screening Committee meetings do not show that selection was made after proper assessment. 163. To sum up, the entire allocation of coal block as per recommendations made by the Screening Committee from 14.7.1993 in 36 meetings and the allocation through the Government dispensation route suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and legal flaws. The Screening Committee has never been consistent, it has not been transparent, there is no proper application of mind, it has acted on no material in many cases, relevant factors have seldom been its guiding factors, there was no transparency and guidelines have seldom guided it. On many occasions, guidelines have been honoured more in their breach. There was no objective criteria, nay, no criteria for evaluation of comparative merits. The approach had been ad-hoc and casual. There was no fair and transparent procedure, all resulting in unfair distribution of the national wealth. Common good and public interest have, thus, suffered heavily. On many occasions, guidelines have been honoured more in their breach. There was no objective criteria, nay, no criteria for evaluation of comparative merits. The approach had been ad-hoc and casual. There was no fair and transparent procedure, all resulting in unfair distribution of the national wealth. Common good and public interest have, thus, suffered heavily. Hence, the allocation of coal blocks based on the recommendations made in all the 36 meetings of the Screening Committee is illegal.” In the facts of our case it is apparent that what was essentially followed was a system of first-come-first served. The fundamental flaws which stand inherently attached to a first-come-first served policy were noticed by the Supreme Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation, (2012) 3 SCC 1 , in the following terms: “94. There is a fundamental flaw in the first-come-first-served policy inasmuch as it involves an element of pure chance or accident. In matters involving award of contracts or grant of licence or permission to use public property, the invocation of first-come-first-served policy has inherently dangerous implications. Any person who has access to the power corridor at the highest or the lowest level may be able to obtain information from the Government files or the files of the agency/instrumentality of the State that a particular public property or asset is likely to be disposed of or a contract is likely to be awarded or a licence or permission is likely to be given, he would immediately make an application and would become entitled to stand first in the queue at the cost of all others who may have a better claim. 95. This Court has repeatedly held that wherever a contract is to be awarded or a licence is to be given, the public authority must adopt a transparent and fair method for making selections so that all eligible persons get a fair opportunity of competition. To put it differently, the State and its agencies/instrumentalities must always adopt a rational method for disposal of public property and no attempt should be made to scuttle the claim of worthy applicants. When it comes to alienation of scarce natural resources like spectrum etc., it is the burden of the State to ensure that a non-discriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation, which would necessarily result in protection of national/public interest. 96. When it comes to alienation of scarce natural resources like spectrum etc., it is the burden of the State to ensure that a non-discriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation, which would necessarily result in protection of national/public interest. 96. In our view, a duly publicised auction conducted fairly and impartially is perhaps the best method for discharging this burden and the methods like first-come-first-served when used for alienation of natural resources/public property are likely to be misused by unscrupulous people who are only interested in garnering maximum financial benefit and have no respect for the constitutional ethos and values. In other words, while transferring or alienating the natural resource, the State is duty bound to adopt the method of auction by giving wide publicity so that all eligible persons can participate in the process.” 30. While the principle of auction being the best and in fact the only method ordinarily to be applied in the grant of State largess as laid down in Centre for Public Interest Litigation did not find acceptance in the Natural Resources Allocation Reference, (2012) 10 SCC 1 , the fallacies of a first-come-first-served policy which were noticed by the Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation were not dissented from. The fundamental flaws which were noticed by the Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation in the first-come-first served policy was described as the inherently dangerous implication from such a policy as a consequence of which a person having access to information at the highest level would be able to obtain a contract even before other applicants may come to know of a decision of the Government to grant largess. It was in that context that the Supreme Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation held that a “first-come-first served” policy may not answer the test of a fair and impartial procedure being adopted for the grant of largess. While saying so, we must also note here that it is not our intention to hold that an advertisement or a public invitation is to be understood as making the adoption of an auction proceeding an imperative. The fact that an auction process is not a constitutional policy or principle in relation to the grant of largess, is one which stands duly noticed and held by the Supreme Court in the Natural Resources Allocation Reference. 31. The fact that an auction process is not a constitutional policy or principle in relation to the grant of largess, is one which stands duly noticed and held by the Supreme Court in the Natural Resources Allocation Reference. 31. This issue was again raised in Manohar Lal Sharma when their Lordships after reviewing the law on the subject held as follows : “101. In Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 [ (2012) 10 SCC 1 ] the Constitution Bench, in the main judgment, thus, concluded that auction despite being a more preferable method of alienation/allotment of natural resources cannot be held to be constitutional requirement or limitation for alienation of all natural resources and, therefore, every method other than auction cannot be struck down as ultra vires the constitutional mandate. The Court also opined that auction as a mode cannot be conferred the status of a constitutional principle. While holding so, the Court held that alienation of natural resources is a policy decision and the means adopted for the same are, thus, executive prerogatives. The Court summarized the legal position as under: “146. To summarise in the context of the present Reference, it needs to be emphasised that this Court cannot conduct a comparative study of the various methods of distribution of natural resources and suggest the most efficacious mode, if there is one universal efficacious method in the first place. It respects the mandate and wisdom of the executive for such matters. The methodology pertaining to disposal of natural resources is clearly an economic policy. It entails intricate economic choices and the Court lacks the necessary expertise to make them. As has been repeatedly said, it cannot, and shall not, be the endeavour of this Court to evaluate the efficacy of auction vis-a-vis other methods of disposal of natural resources. The Court cannot mandate one method to be followed in all facts and circumstances. Therefore, auction, an economic choice of disposal of natural resources, is not a constitutional mandate. We may, however, hasten to add that the Court can test the legality and constitutionality of these methods. When questioned, the Courts are entitled to analyse the legal validity of different means of distribution and give a constitutional answer as to which methods are ultra vires and intra vires the provisions of the Constitution. We may, however, hasten to add that the Court can test the legality and constitutionality of these methods. When questioned, the Courts are entitled to analyse the legal validity of different means of distribution and give a constitutional answer as to which methods are ultra vires and intra vires the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it cannot and will not compare which policy is fairer than the other, but, if a policy or law is patently unfair to the extent that it falls foul of the fairness requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court would not hesitate in striking it down. 147. Finally, market price, in economics, is an index of the value that a market prescribes to a good. However, this valuation is a function of several dynamic variables: it is a science and not a law. Auction is just one of the several price discovery mechanisms. Since multiple variables are involved in such valuations, auction or any other form of competitive bidding, cannot constitute even an economic mandate, much less a constitutional mandate. 148. In our opinion, auction despite being a more preferable method of alienation/allotment of natural resources, cannot be held to be a constitutional requirement or limitation for alienation of all natural resources and therefore, every method other than auction cannot be struck down as ultra vires the constitutional mandate. 149. Regard being had to the aforesaid precepts, we have opined that auction as a mode cannot be conferred the status of a constitutional principle. Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximising private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that are competitive and maximise revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, rather than prescribing or proscribing a method, we believe, a judicial scrutiny of methods of disposal of natural resources should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, in consonance with the principles which we have culled out above. Failing which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with Article 14 of the Constitution. 104. Failing which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with Article 14 of the Constitution. 104. In light of the above legal position, the argument that auction is a best way to select private parties as per Article 39(b) does not merit acceptance. The emphasis on the word “best” in Article 39(b) by the learned senior counsel for the intervener does not deserve further discussion in light of the legal position exposited by the Constitution Bench in Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 ] with reference to Article 39(b). We are fortified in our view by a recent decision of this Court (3-Judge Bench) in Goa Foundation v. Union of India and others (2014) 6 SCC 590 ] wherein following Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 : (2012) 10 SCC 1 ], it is stated, “81......it is for the State Government to decide as a matter of policy in what manner the leases of these mineral resources would be granted, but this decision has to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and in consonance with the constitutional provisions......” 32. As would be evident from the above extract, while the Supreme Court held that auction is not a constitutional mandate, stress was actually laid upon the aspect of the executive action and the procedure adopted being fair, reasonable and non capricious 33. It is on the above settled principles that the allocation in favour of the petitioner now needs to be tested. Undisputedly Indus Education Foundation submitted a request for allotment of land on 11 June 2003. At this time, the prayer for allotment was made for a hundred acres of land. It becomes relevant to note that this application for allotment of land was not preceded by the issuance of any advertisement inviting applications for the allotment of land in the Rooma Industrial area. The petition is eloquently silent on the issue of how Indus Education Foundation came to know about the availability of land for allotment in the Rooma Industrial Area. The petition is eloquently silent on the issue of how Indus Education Foundation came to know about the availability of land for allotment in the Rooma Industrial Area. The requirement of land was thereafter amended vide letters dated 17 June 2003 and 21 June 2003 when it was conveyed that the requirement would be of only 25 acres of land. The formal application for allotment of land, according to the petitioner society, came to be made on 26 June 2003. However as we have noted above, there is no trace of this application on the record. Even in the file noting there is no mention of an application dated 26 June 2003. The original record which was in the custody of the CBI carries no copy of this so called formal application for allotment. More fundamentally, on the date when the petitioner society allegedly made this application, it had not even been registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. However, significantly by this time, the wife and father of the then Regional Manager had already been adopted in and had become members of the petitioner society. The society itself came to be registered on 27 June 2003. Significantly at the time when this alleged application was entertained and taken on record no layout plan of Rooma Industrial Area had been framed or approved. The so called layout plan which stands appended as Annexure- 2 A to the writ petition identifies only the spot proposed to be allotted to the petitioner society. Annexure- 2 A does not answer even the rudimentary requirements of a layout plan inasmuch as it does not bifurcate sectors by location or use, shows no roads or other infrastructure which may have been proposed for the development of the industrial area. The document, whose genuiness has been seriously doubted by the Corporation itself if prepared at all appears to have been drawn up only to facilitate the petitioner society. Further, as noted by us above, this lay out plan does not appear to have been ever approved by either the Joint Managing Director or the Managing Director. At least the copy of this so called lay out plan which is dated 27 June 2003 does not bear their signatures. Further, as noted by us above, this lay out plan does not appear to have been ever approved by either the Joint Managing Director or the Managing Director. At least the copy of this so called lay out plan which is dated 27 June 2003 does not bear their signatures. It also becomes relevant to note that it has been the categorical stand of the Corporation that this layout plan was never approved or sanctioned by the Managing Director. As per the stand of the Corporation a layout plan for the Rooma Industrial Area was prepared only on 22 September 2003. It becomes relevant to emphasize here that not only was an allotment letter issued to the petitioner society prior to sanction of the layout plan but the lease in its favour itself came to be executed prior to this date. Insofar as the approved rate at which the land was to be allotted is concerned, it becomes relevant to note that all that was borne in mind was the cost incurred by the Corporation in obtaining the land as is evident from the counter-affidavit of the Corporation filed in these proceedings. Within six months adjoining plots went at rates far exceeding Rs. 175/- per square meters, the rate at which the land was allotted to the petitioner society. In fact as the record bears out and which is also noticed by the CBI, adjacent plots went for Rs. 760 per sq.m and Rs. 1140 per sq.m. The other salient aspect attendant to the allotment made in favour of the petitioner society relates to the requirement of obtaining a NOC from the KDA. As the original records placed before us by the CBI indicate, the condition to obtain a NOC from the KDA was one which was accepted and approved by the Managing Director himself. We have gone through the entire record and are constrained to note that there is no endorsement, note or order of the Managing Director made prior or subsequent to 15 July 2003 deleting this condition or exempting the petitioner society from complying with the same. The then Regional Manager entered into correspondence with the KDA between 26 July 2003 and 29 July 2003 and based upon a response received from the Chief Town Planner of the KDA appears to have unilaterally deleted this condition from the lease deed and terms of allotment. The then Regional Manager entered into correspondence with the KDA between 26 July 2003 and 29 July 2003 and based upon a response received from the Chief Town Planner of the KDA appears to have unilaterally deleted this condition from the lease deed and terms of allotment. Under what authority this amendment to the term of allotment was carried out was neither established before us nor is it borne out from the original record. It becomes relevant to underline here that the then Regional Manager executed the lease deed in favour of the petitioner society minus the condition of obtaining a NOC from the KDA. Since the land fell within the development area of KDA, no construction could have been undertaken without its permission. Its prior permission was imperative even on account of the fact that the establishment of an engineering college on land earmarked for industrial use would require a land use change. As noted above, the layout plan for the industrial area as per the Corporation was approved on 22 September 2003. Copies of this layout plan were forwarded to the Chief Project Engineer, UPSIDC for the first time by the Senior Manager (ATP) on 24 September 2003. In fact the learned counsel for the Corporation has placed before us copies of as many as three layout plans said to be existing on the record to indicate and assert that a parallel file appears to have been prepared upon which the proceedings for allotment of land to the petitioner society was undertaken. The arbitrary nature of the procedure adopted only to confer undue favour upon the petitioner society is further highlighted from the following facts. The noting of 27 September 2003 shows that the rate of industrial land was proposed to be fixed at Rs. 490/- per square meter. A subsequent noting of 6 December 2003 shows that the rate of general industrial area was proposed at Rs. 725/- per square meter. On 11 December 2003, a noting finally refers to a proposed rate of Rs. 760/- per square meter being finalised. A further noting of 8 December 2003 in respect of general areas shows that the rate of allotment was determined at Rs. 760/- per square meter. The above notings indicate that within just two to three months of the allotment of land in favour of the petitioner at Rs. 760/- per square meter being finalised. A further noting of 8 December 2003 in respect of general areas shows that the rate of allotment was determined at Rs. 760/- per square meter. The above notings indicate that within just two to three months of the allotment of land in favour of the petitioner at Rs. 175/- per square meter, the rate of land as finalised by the Corporation came to be fixed at Rs. 760/- per square meter. In the first advertisement that is stated to have been published by the Corporation inviting applications for allotment of land, the rate is shown as Rs. 760/- per square meter. A letter of the Corporation dated 22 April 2004 shows and establishes that the rate of allotment of land was fixed as Rs. 684/- per square meter for the first 25 acres of land and Rs. 760/- per square meter for the subsequent land. From the above narration of facts, it is apparent that the rate of land as finalised for the petitioner society at Rs. 175/- per square meter was clearly unjustified and was designed only to confer undue favour and advantage upon the petitioner society. Sadly, the Managing Director of the Corporation and other persons at the highest levels approved both the rates of Rs. 175/- per square meter as well as Rs. 760/- per square meter. They, therefore cannot be permitted to jettison the cross of having been party to a wholly arbitrary conferment of largess upon the petitioner society in a clear attempt to confer undue advantage upon it. The expediency with which the path was cleared for allotment of land in favor of the petitioner society is evidence of the connivance between the officials of the Corporation and the then Regional Manager. 34. Two other aspects also bear mention here. Rooma Industrial Area under the Master Plan then prevalent earmarked the land in question for industrial use. The establishment of an engineering college on and over the plot in question resulted in the land being put to institutional use. Admittedly no amendment to the Master Plan 2003 had been carried out and without the requisite permissions and approvals as required under the 1973 Act, the engineering college came to be established upon land earmarked for industrial use. The establishment of an engineering college on and over the plot in question resulted in the land being put to institutional use. Admittedly no amendment to the Master Plan 2003 had been carried out and without the requisite permissions and approvals as required under the 1973 Act, the engineering college came to be established upon land earmarked for industrial use. We further note that on 4 September 2008, the Joint Managing Director of the Corporation brought to the attention of the KDA that Rooma Industrial Area had not been notified as an ‘Industrial Development Area’ under the 1976 Act. He further referred to the fact that the petitioner society was required to obtain a NOC from the KDA in terms of the letter of allotment. He accordingly, reiterated a request of the Corporation that KDA should take up the issue of grant of a NOC so that the issue of regularisation of the existence of an engineering college on the plot in question may be considered. Surprisingly and without awaiting any further clarification from the KDA, the then Regional Manager on 25 March 2011 sanctioned additional constrictions being undertaken by the society. 35. Additionally, it also bears mention here that the then Regional Manager at no stage of the allotment proceedings or even thereafter disclosed the interest of his father and wife in the society to the management of the Corporation. All these factors taken together and cumulatively compel us to record our conclusion that the entire process of allotment was an outcome of nepotism, an effort to confer undue favour upon the petitioner society and clearly an outcome of a concerted conspiracy amongst officers at the highest echelons of the Corporation and the then Regional Manager. 36. All these facts when taken into consideration point only in one direction and that being of an arbitrary and unholy nexus between the officers of the Corporation aimed at allotting valuable land to the petitioner society and confer an undue benefit upon it. The procedure adopted by the Corporation far from being fair and transparent appears to have been tainted by the underlying objective of the officials of the Corporation conspiring together to ensure that a large chunk of land is allotted to the petitioner society in complete violation and disregard of the constitutional mandate and clearly indicative of favouritism and nepotism. The procedure adopted by the Corporation far from being fair and transparent appears to have been tainted by the underlying objective of the officials of the Corporation conspiring together to ensure that a large chunk of land is allotted to the petitioner society in complete violation and disregard of the constitutional mandate and clearly indicative of favouritism and nepotism. It is in this light that the Court now proceeds to consider the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the allotment be saved on principles of equity. As the above background in which the allotment came to be made in favour of the petitioner society would indicate, a great fraud and deception was perpetuated as a result of which land which was held in trust by the Corporation came to be handed over to the petitioner society in clear violation of the constitutional mandate. The allotment in favour of the petitioner was made in clear and utter violation of the constitutional principles which must underline and inform a decision of a Governmental authority seeking to distribute largess. It was clearly an act which was tainted by the vice of favouritism and the clear and startlingly evident motive of conferring undue benefits upon it. The allotment was the fruit of an illegal conspiracy hatched by the higher officials of the Corporation in connivance with the then Regional Manager. It was the outcome of not just an abuse of the discretion vested in the Corporation but also an abuse of the trust that stood reposed in it to deal with public property in accordance with constitutional principles. Dealing with the issue of illegal discretionary allotments of retail outlets, the Supreme Court in V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India, (2001) 10 SCC 305 , observed as follows: 23. So far as the fifth question is concerned, it is no doubt true that the appellants have invested considerable amount in the business and have operated for about eight years but even on equitable considerations, we do not find any equity in favour of the appellants. The conduct of the Minister in making the discretionary allotments has been found to be atrocious, in the very three Judge Bench decision of this Court and in relation to similar allotments made by the said minister in favour of 15 persons, who were respondents in the Common Cause case. The conduct of the Minister in making the discretionary allotments has been found to be atrocious, in the very three Judge Bench decision of this Court and in relation to similar allotments made by the said minister in favour of 15 persons, who were respondents in the Common Cause case. This Court came to hold that the allotments of the public property has been doled out in arbitrary and discriminatory manner and the appellants had been held to be beneficiaries of such arbitrary orders of allotments. The question of granting the allottees relief on an equitable consideration did not arise at all, for the same reasons in a case like this, a sympathetic consideration on the ground of equity would be a case of misplaced sympathy and we refrain from granting any relief on any equitable consideration. In our view, the appellants do not deserve any equitable consideration. 37. In Manohar Lal Sharma II, (2014) 9 SCC 614 , after the Supreme Court had come to the conclusion that natural resources had come to be allocated by adoption of a wholly illegal and arbitrary procedure, it proceeded to consider as to whether such allocations were liable to be saved. In that connection, it observed: “30. In Sheela Barse [Sheela Barse v. Union of India, ( 1988 4 SCC 226 ] it was observed, and we endorse that view, that the relief to be granted in a case always looks to the future. It is generally corrective and in some cases it is compensatory. The present case takes within its fold all three elements mentioned in Sheela Barse. Our judgment highlighted the illegality and arbitrariness in the allotment of coal blocks and these “consequence proceedings” are intended to correct the wrong done by the Union of India; these proceedings look to the future in that by highlighting the wrong, it is expected that the Government will not deal with the natural resources that belong to the country as if they belong to a few individuals who can fritter them away at their sweet will; these proceedings may also compensate the exchequer for the loss caused to it, in the manner suggested by the learned Attorney General, and which we now propose to consider. 32. As far as the first category of coal block allotments is concerned, they must be cancelled (except those mentioned in the judgment). 32. As far as the first category of coal block allotments is concerned, they must be cancelled (except those mentioned in the judgment). There is no reason to “save” them from cancellation. The allocations are illegal and arbitrary; the allottees have not yet entered into any mining lease and they have not yet commenced production. Whether they are 95% ready or 92% ready or 90% ready for production (as argued by some learned Counsel) is wholly irrelevant. Their allocation was illegal and arbitrary, as already held, and therefore we quash all these allotments.” The entire transaction embodying the allotment of land in favor of the petitioner society is tainted by fraud as well as deliberate and concerted action to confer largess upon it throwing the salutary constitutional principles to the wind. Fraud as is well-settled vitiates all acts and unravels all actions which bear its brunt. In Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar, (2005) 7 SCC 605 , the Supreme Court held : 11. “Fraud” as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which includes the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. It is also well-settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319 .” 38. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319 .” 38. Bearing in mind the manner in which arbitrarily and without following a due process, the land came to be allotted to the petitioner society, we find ourselves unable to sustain or save the allotment. This, we do bearing in mind what the Supreme Court observed in Manohar Lal Sharma II that the relief liable to be granted must look to the future, be corrective in character and also as a deterrent against such actions being repeated. Our refusal to save the allotment in question is also based upon our considered view that the petitioner society cannot be permitted to retain the fruits of a transaction which is tainted by fraud, nepotism and arbitrary conduct achieved with the collusion of the officers of the Corporation and members of the petitioner society. This, in our considered view, is imperative in order to underline the rule of law. 39. Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner society has submitted that the lease which was executed by the Corporation in its favour would be governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 exclusively. It was his submission that the said lease could not have been cancelled by the Corporation unilaterally and in the absence of an appropriate declaration in that regard by a competent Court. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Express News Papers, AIR 1986 SC 872 , as well as ITC Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 7 SCC 493 and others In the case of Express News Papers, the Supreme Court observed as follows: 201. The rest of the questions relate truly to the civil rights of the parties flowing from the lease deed. Those questions cannot be effectively disposed of in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions arising out of the lease, such as, whether there has been breach of the covenants under the lease, whether the lease can be forfeited, whether relief against forfeiture can be granted etc. Those questions cannot be effectively disposed of in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions arising out of the lease, such as, whether there has been breach of the covenants under the lease, whether the lease can be forfeited, whether relief against forfeiture can be granted etc. are foreign to the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. They cannot be decided just on affidavits. These are matters which should be tried in a regular civil proceeding. One should remember that the property belongs to the Union of India and the rights in it cannot be bartered away in accordance with the sweet will of an Officer or a Minister or a Lt. Governor but they should be dealt with in accordance with law. At the same time a person who has acquired rights in such property cannot also be deprived of them except in accordance with law. The stakes in this case are very high for both the parties and neither of them can take law into his own hands. 202. I, therefore, quash the impugned notices and direct the respondents not to take any further action against the petitioners pursuant to them. 1 express no opinion on the rights of the parties under the lease and all other questions argued in this case. They are left open to be decided in an appropriate proceeding. It is, however, open to both the parties if they are so advised to take such fresh action as may be open to them in law on the basis of all the relevant facts including those which existed before the impugned notice dated March 10, 1980 was issued by the Engineer Officer of the Land and Development Office to vindicate their respective rights in accordance with law. This order is made without prejudice to the right of the Union Government to compound the breaches, if any, committed by the lessee and the regularise the lease by receiving adequate premium therefore from the lessee, if it is permissible to do so.” 40. In ITC Ltd. the Supreme Court dealing with the issue of whether a lease granted to an entity without any misrepresentation or fraud on its part can be cancelled by the Authority. Dealing with the said issue it was observed as follows: “30. In ITC Ltd. the Supreme Court dealing with the issue of whether a lease granted to an entity without any misrepresentation or fraud on its part can be cancelled by the Authority. Dealing with the said issue it was observed as follows: “30. A lease governed exclusively by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (‘TP Act’ for short) could be cancelled only by filing a civil suit for its cancellation or for a declaration that it is illegal, null and void and for the consequential relief of delivery back of possession. Unless and until a Court of competent jurisdiction grants such a decree, the lease will continue to be effective and binding. Unilateral cancellation of a registered lease deed by the lessor will neither terminate the lease nor entitle a lessor to seek possession. This is the position under private law. But where the grant of lease is governed by a statute or statutory regulations, and if such statute expressly reserves the power of cancellation or revocation to the lessor, it will be permissible for an Authority, as the lessor, to cancel a duly executed and registered lease deed, even if possession has been delivered, on the specific grounds of cancellation provided in the statute. 103. Before the High Court, the Respondents clearly admitted that they were not attributing any misrepresentation or fraud or other objectionable conduct, to the Appellants. The stand of the Respondents was that the allotments at the rate of Rs. 7400/- per sq.m. was due to a mistake on the part of NOIDA officials. The High Court has also ruled out any underhand dealing or mala fides in regard to fixation of rate of premium at the rate of Rs. 7400/- per sq.m. The said findings of High Court remain unchallenged. In fact the finding is sound and is not open to challenge. 104. Further, when this Court directed the State Government to pass fresh reasoned revisional order, uninfluenced by the reasoning or findings of the High Court, the State Government has passed detailed orders dated 8.9.2008 for cancellation of plots. Even in these orders dated 8.9.2008, the state Government has not imputed any mala fides, misrepresentation, fraud or suppression of fact, collusion, undue influence or any other illegal act or improper conduct to any of the Appellants. Even in these orders dated 8.9.2008, the state Government has not imputed any mala fides, misrepresentation, fraud or suppression of fact, collusion, undue influence or any other illegal act or improper conduct to any of the Appellants. The state Government has passed the order of cancellation dated 8.9.2008 on the ground that NOIDA had itself violated the regulations and policies of NOIDA leading to loss to public exchequer. 107.1. If the transferee had acted bona fide and was blameless, it may be possible to save the transfer but that again would depend upon the answer to the further question as to whether public interest has suffered or will suffer as a consequence of the violation of the regulations: (i) If public interest has neither suffered, nor likely to suffer, on account of the violation, then the transfer may be allowed to stand as then the violation will be a mere technical procedural irregularity without adverse effects. (ii) On the other hand, if the violation of the regulations leaves or likely to leave an everlasting adverse effect or impact on public interest (as for example when it results in environmental degradation or results in a loss which is not reimbursable), public interest should prevail and the transfer should be rescinded or cancelled. (iii) But where the consequence of the violation is merely a short-recovery of the consideration, the transfer may be saved by giving the transferee an opportunity to make good the short-fall in consideration. 107.2. The aforesaid exercise may seem to be cumbersome, but is absolutely necessary to protect the sanctity of contracts and transfers. If the Government or its instrumentalities are seen to be frequently resiling from duly concluded solemn transfers, the confidence of the public and international community in the functioning of the Government will be shaken. To save the credibility of the Government and its instrumentalities, an effort should always be made to save the concluded transactions/transfers wherever possible, provided (i) that it will not prejudice the public interest, or cause loss to public exchequer or lead to public mischief, and (ii) that the transferee is blameless and had no part to play in the violation of the regulation. 110. In these cases the allotment of commercial plots to Appellants is valid and legal. 110. In these cases the allotment of commercial plots to Appellants is valid and legal. The violation is in making such allotment on fixed allotment rate which is less than the rate the plots would have fetched by calling for tenders or by holding auctions. Therefore the equitable solution in these cases is to give an opportunity to the lessees to pay the difference thereby in consideration which arose on account of wrong interpretation instead of cancelling the leases. 41. It becomes pertinent to note that neither in Express News Paper nor in ITC Ltd. was the Court concerned with a lease obtained by the entity practicing misrepresentation, suppression of fact, collusion or undue influence. In fact in ITC Ltd, the Supreme Court specifically noted the aspect that the State Government had not imputed any such acts to the lessees therein. 42. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that the Supreme Court ultimately saved the leases and required the lessees therein to pay additional premium. Express Newspapers was a case where the allegation was of a breach of a covenant of the lease. The aforementioned two judgments are therefore, clearly distinguishable. In contrast, we note that in the instant case, the facts as noted by us above establish clearly that the lease came to be made in favour of the petitioner society riding on the bedrock of misrepresentation, collusion, undue influence, illegal and improper conduct. We are therefore, unable to accept the submission of Sri Goyal advanced in this behalf. Since the entire allotment procedure and allocation of land in favour of the petitioner society is redundant and tainted by arbitrariness, collusion and a clear subversion of the public interest and the rule of law, we find ourselves unable to sustain the allotment or the lease granted in favour of the petitioner society. We accordingly in exercise of our powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution declare them to be illegal, null and void. Lastly we consider the contention of discrimination as advanced by Sri Goyal. As is evident from the returns filed by the Corporation in these proceedings, it has specifically explained the circumstances in which certain exceptional allotments came to be made. They, in our considered view, do not fall in the same class or category as the petitioner. Even otherwise, it is settled law, that Article 14 is not a negative concept. As is evident from the returns filed by the Corporation in these proceedings, it has specifically explained the circumstances in which certain exceptional allotments came to be made. They, in our considered view, do not fall in the same class or category as the petitioner. Even otherwise, it is settled law, that Article 14 is not a negative concept. Even if certain irregularities were committed in the past or the Corporation has allegedly failed to act against similar allottees, this cannot be a relevant consideration for upholding or even attempting to uphold a submission of discrimination. PIL 35628 OF 2013 Krishna Kumar Kaushik v. State of U.P. and others 43. This petition in public interest had been instituted seeking a direction commanding the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an investigation against the sixth, seventh and eighth respondents for having acquired disproportionate properties and having misused their powers thus causing loss to the Corporation. 44. On 4 July 2013, a Division Bench of the Court after considering the material placed on the record passed the following order : “Considering the background litigation referred above, the dimensions of the matter and also the fact that delay in investigation can often be fatal to collection of evidence, we are of the opinion that pending notice to the private respondents a preliminary investigation be conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation represented by Sri N.I. Jafri, Advocate into the allegations. The status report as a result of the preliminary investigation be submitted to this Court by the C.B.I. within three months. We also direct that the Managing Director, UPSIDC will ensure that the relevant records are made available to the CBI and the investigation is not hampered because of the circumstances as mentioned in the above referred letter dated 22.3.2013. It has been argued from the petitioner’s side that despite such serious allegations and despite earlier transfers of the respondent No. 6 made on recommendations/complaints, not only the respondent No. 6 has been brought back shortly after the transfer but has been permitted not only to continue on that post but also to hold a dual charge. If this contention is factually correct, to say the least, it a little disturbing. Issue notice of this petition to the respondents No. 6 to 8 by registered post. Steps to be taken by registered post within a week. If this contention is factually correct, to say the least, it a little disturbing. Issue notice of this petition to the respondents No. 6 to 8 by registered post. Steps to be taken by registered post within a week. The other respondents who are represented today may also file their counter-affidavits within one month.” 45. The record further reveals that the sixth respondent (the then Regional Manager, UPSIDC), filed a Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 22426 of 2013 challenging the aforesaid order. On 26 July 2013, the SLP was disposed of as withdrawn with the following observations : “Taken on board. Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, on instructions, seeks permission of this Court to withdraw this Special Leave Petition with a liberty to file an appropriate Review Petition/recall application to recall the impugned interim order passed by the High Court. Permission sought for is granted and the Special Leave Petition is disposed of as withdrawn. However, we clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the statement so made by Shri Rohtagi, learned senior counsel. Ordered accordingly.” Pursuant to the liberty sought and granted, the then Regional Manager as well as the seventh respondent filed applications for recall of the order dated 4 July 2013. These recall applicators were dismissed on 5 October 2013 in the following terms : “For the reasons stated above, we find no justification to allow the two applications for recalling the order dated 4.7.2013 and accordingly reject both the applications. The C.B.I. has filed a separate application seeking for time to complete the investigation. Part of the report on the basis of investigations so far made has been filed in a sealed cover. Also from a perusal of the materials collected so far, we are of the view that the C.B.I. should be allowed to complete the investigation. We accordingly, grant three months time from today to the C.B.I. for completing the investigations. It goes without saying that Corporation shall extend all co-operation to the C.B.I. for completing the investigation within the aforesaid extended time.” On 3 November 2014, the CBI submitted a report before this Court seeking permission to convert the preliminary enquiry into a regular case and take it to its logical conclusion. This application was made with reference to PE-7(A)/2013, CBI, AC-III. This application was made with reference to PE-7(A)/2013, CBI, AC-III. At this stage again the then Regional Manager and the seventh respondent appear to have submitted before the Court that the instant PIL was liable to be dismissed and that the orders passed by the Division Bench on the earlier occasions vacated. The prayer, so made by the Regional Manager and the seventh respondent, was turned down and negatived by the Court. Directions were issued consequently to the CBI to proceed in the matter in light of the permission sought and to place the status report in sealed cover upon conclusion of its enquiry. The CBI then moved an application seeking permission of the Court to drop all proceedings pertaining to PE-5(A)/2013/CBI/AC-III/New Delhi. The ground taken was the pendency of a writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 45057 of 2005 and that the allegations which formed the subject-matter of the enquiry, were being already looked into by the Vigilance Department of the State Government. The Division Bench proceeded to reject the said application and directed the CBI to take the preliminary enquiry to its logical conclusion. By this order, copies of the preliminary enquiry report drawn up by the CBI in respect of PE-6 (A) and PE-8 (A) were directed to be furnished to the learned counsels appearing for the parties so as to enable them to advance submissions thereon. By an order of the Division Bench dated 25 April 2016, this instant PIL was directed to be tagged alongwith Writ-C No. 17859 of 2016. We have heard the learned counsel parties on the instant PIL alongwith the aforementioned writ petition restricted to the report of the CBI in PE 8 (A)/2013/CBI/AC-III/New Delhi since it pertained to the allotment made in favour of M/s. Indus Technical Educational Society, the petitioner in Writ-C No. 17859 of 2016. As is evident from the preliminary enquiry report, the CBI has primarily recorded and arrived at the following conclusions. “Result of Inquiry: 51. That inquiry has revealed that the Suspect Officer Shri Anil Kumar Verma did not have the power to allot the type of land involved in the instant case. This power is vested with M.D., UPSIDC. As is evident from the preliminary enquiry report, the CBI has primarily recorded and arrived at the following conclusions. “Result of Inquiry: 51. That inquiry has revealed that the Suspect Officer Shri Anil Kumar Verma did not have the power to allot the type of land involved in the instant case. This power is vested with M.D., UPSIDC. The second aspect inquired upon was whether Shri Anil Verma, handled the instant allotment matter at any stage, so that it can be said that he had any opportunity to misuse and abuse his official position. Inquiry on this aspect revealed that this allotment needed the following three approvals. a. Approval of layout, earmarking of plot for Engg. College and allocation of plot No. i.e. A-1 etc was done on 2.7.2003 under the signatures of Mrs. Kanchan Hanspal (Asstt. Manager, ARCH), Mr. Aizaz Hussain (Dy. Manager ARCH), Mr. Bhupesh Singh (Sr. Manager, ATP), Mr. Y.P. Singh (GM-Dev), Mr. MKS Sundaram, IAS, (Jt. MD) and Mr. PD Shudhakar, IAS, (MD). b. Approval of rate for allotment of undeveloped land. The approval of rates was done by Mr. P.D. Shudhakar, IAS, M.D. on the recommendation of Shri Anup Kumar Srivastava, Dy. Manager, Mr. RK Pandey (Dy. GM-PM) Mr. YP Singh (GM-Dev) and Mr. MKS Sundaram, IAS, (Jt. MD). c. Approval of allotment in favour of M/s. Indus Technical Education Society. The approval of allotment was done by Mr. P.D. Shudhakar, IAS, M.D on the recommendation of Shri Anup Kumar Srivastava, Dy. Manager, Mr. RK Pandey (Dy. GM-PM), Mr. YP Singh (GM-Dev) and Mr. MKS Sundaram IAS (Jt. MD). 52. That as is evident from the aforementioned details, all these three approvals were executed at Head Office level and the Regional Manager had no role to play in all these three approvals. Even recommendations at any stage were not sought from Regional Office, except for the initial comments on the availability of land. After all approvals were given by all concerned, final execution of lease deed was done by suspect Shri Anil Kumar Verma. xxx xxx xxx 61. That thus in this way Sh. Anoop Kumar Srivastava worked out the cost of Rs. 175 of undeveloped bulk land and thereafter put the file before Sh. R.K. Pandey, Dy. After all approvals were given by all concerned, final execution of lease deed was done by suspect Shri Anil Kumar Verma. xxx xxx xxx 61. That thus in this way Sh. Anoop Kumar Srivastava worked out the cost of Rs. 175 of undeveloped bulk land and thereafter put the file before Sh. R.K. Pandey, Dy. GM (PM) and he checked the calculation made by him and thereafter the file was put up before M.K.S. Sundaram, Joint Managing Director on 23.6.2003 and finally approved by Managing Director Sh. P.D. Shudhakar on 24.6.2003. 62. That efforts were also made during inquiry to ascertain details of the land which are adjacent to the land allotted to Indus Technical Education Society but were allotted @ Rs. 1140/- sq.m and the inquiry made in this regard revealed the following such plots: S. No. Plot No. Date of Allotment Rate at which allotted 01. CF-2 22.1.2004 1140/SQM (Commercial Rate) 02. G-15-16 22.1.2004 1140/SQM (Commercial Rate) 03. C-124 1.7.2004 760/SQM (Industrial Rate) 04. B-16 1.7.2004 760/SQM (Industrial Rate) 05. C-118 17.7.2004 760/SQM (Industrial Rate) 06. B-17 9.7.2004 760/SQM (Industrial Rate) 63. That Sh. R K.K. Yadav the then R.M., UPSIDC Kanpur now in-charge Industrial Area on being examined on the basis of rate fixed for the above mentioned plots has clarified that the land under reference is commercial in nature, whose rates were (1 ½) 1.5 times more than the Industrial rates. At that time the industrial rate of this area was Rs. 760/- Per Sq.m, whereas, the rate of 25 acres allotted to M/s.Indus Technical Education Society was Rs. 175/- per sq.m considering it as undeveloped bulk land. xxx xxx xxx 65. That enquiry has also revealed that the first name of M/s. Industrial Technical Education Society was M/s. Indus Education Foundation and M/s. Indus Education Foundation it first applied for 50 acres of land on 11.6.2003 to the M.D for setting up educational institution. The application was processed and during the processing of the application Shri M.K.S. Sundaram, IAS. Joint M.D. held discussion with the representative of the society and consequent to the discussion M/s Indus Education Foundation submitted its 2nd application amending the requirement of the land as 25 acres on 17.6.2003. The application was processed and during the processing of the application Shri M.K.S. Sundaram, IAS. Joint M.D. held discussion with the representative of the society and consequent to the discussion M/s Indus Education Foundation submitted its 2nd application amending the requirement of the land as 25 acres on 17.6.2003. In the meantime opinion had been sought from Shri Anil Verma, the then RM, Kanpur on the availability of 50 acres of land, whereupon, Shri Anil Verma vide his letter dated 20.6.2003 had opined that except for Rooma Industrial area there is no other area, where 50 acres of land could be made available as developmental work in Rooma area was yet to start. Accordingly on 2.7.2003 finally allotment of land was approved by Shri P. Shudhakar, IAS, MD. xxx xxx xxx 67. That, on 27.6.2003 M/s. Indus Education Foundation got itself renamed as M/s. Industrial Technical Education Society and the following were members. 1. Anil Kumar Agarwal (Business man age: 44 years) 2. Vipul Jain 3. Neena Verma (wife of Sh. Anil Verma) 4. Ashok Kumar Agarwal (brother of Anil Kumar Agarwal) 5. P.K. Jain (father of Sh. Vipul Jain 6. Ruchi Jain (wife of Sh. Vipul Jain) 7. M.K. Bansal (Father-in-law Sh. Vipul Jain) 8. Tej Ram Verma (Father of Anil Verma) 68. That enquiry has further revealed that Smt. Neena Verma wife of suspect Anil Verma and Shri Tejram Verma, father of suspect Shri Anil Verma are members of M/s. Indus Technical Education Society and inquiry has also revealed that the Managing Director of USIDC has found Shri Anil Kumar Verma guilty in the allotment of 25 acres of land in Rooma Industrial Area of USIDC to M/s. Industrial Technical Education Society, to the extent of not intimation the office about family members being members of M/s. Industrial Technical Education Society and as such awarded minor Penalty of entry of adverse remarks in the ACR of Shri Anil Verma. 69. That inquiry revealed that when M.D. approved the allotment of land to M /s. Industrial Technical Education Society, he had approved the allotment subject to the condition that NOC for setting up educational institution on the allotted land shall be obtained by the allottee itself from KDA. 69. That inquiry revealed that when M.D. approved the allotment of land to M /s. Industrial Technical Education Society, he had approved the allotment subject to the condition that NOC for setting up educational institution on the allotted land shall be obtained by the allottee itself from KDA. When the allottee approached KDA for NOC, KDA vide its letter dated 29.7.2003 informed that it had nothing to do with the NOC, as the land under reference had already been transferred to UPSIDC. After the same was received, Shri Anil Verma, the then RM proceeded ahead with the execution of lease deed. 70. That inquiry further revealed that as per clause No. 6 & 17 of the U.P. State Industrial Development Act 1976 for land within the jurisdiction of the Authority shall be excluded from the purview of the said Act. Hence, as per this Act UPSIDA/UPSIDC becomes the whole sole authority to take decision on allotment/use of land. 71. That enquiry has also revealed that as per clause no.41 of Board Meeting 241 dated 22.5.2002 of the UPSIDC, MD has full power for approval of Layout plan and amendments therein, fixation of rates of premium, Allotment, Cancellation, Restoration, Restoration-cum-transfer, Subletting, Subdivision, Reconstitution/Transfer of plots/sheds/houses and all allied matters pertaining thereto including extension of time, change of project conversion of land use and issuance of recovery certificates etc. In view of the above, the MD of the Corporation was competent to allot land to any party and for conversion of land use also. 72. That enquiry has not revealed any pending similar application from anyone for allotment of similar land for similar purpose by ignoring which M/s. Industrial Technical Education Society was given preferential treatment. Hence, as there was no loss of opportunity to anyone because of allotment of land to M/s. Industrial Technical education Society, hence, no criminality can be attributed to anyone. 73. That inquiry further revealed that as per Government Order No. 3712 (1/9-Aa-3-2000-26 LUC/91 dated 21.8.2001) the conversion charges from Industrial Land use to community facilities were not chargeable. Hence, it cannot also be said that there is any loss of revenue to the corporation because of the allotment of land to M/s. Industrial Technical Education Society, hence, also no criminality can be attributed to anyone.” (emphasis supplied) 46. Hence, it cannot also be said that there is any loss of revenue to the corporation because of the allotment of land to M/s. Industrial Technical Education Society, hence, also no criminality can be attributed to anyone.” (emphasis supplied) 46. On the basis of the aforesaid conclusions, the CBI has submitted that no further action is liable to be taken. It has accordingly prayed for closure of the proceedings. 47. The conclusions arrived at by the CBI have clearly astounded us. The CBI admits that no other entity had applied for the allotment of land in the Rooma Industrial Area. This for the simple reason that no advertisement was ever issued nor was any public announcement made inviting applications for allotment of land. Despite this, it concludes that there was no evidence to establish that there was a loss of opportunity to any other party. It holds in para 53 of its report that no loss of opportunity was suffered by any party on account of allotment of land to the petitioner society. This conclusion surprisingly, as noted above, does not take into account the fact that no applications at all were invited. Despite this being the admitted position, how the CBI could record or come to a conclusion that there was no loss of opportunity is unfathomable. In the absence of any advertisement or invitation seeking bids it cannot be known as to who else would have been ready and willing to apply for allotment of a very huge plot of land at the rate at which it was handed over to the petitioner society. Insofar as the allotment process is concerned, the CBI holds that the entire allotment was handled at the level of Managing Director. It holds that only after all approvals had been granted that a final lease deed came to be executed by the then Regional Manager. The facts leading up to the allotment of land in favour of the petitioner society have been detailed by us in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. These facts reveal the expediency with which the application of the petitioner Society was entertained, processed and granted. It has chosen to deliberately ignore the fact that the original application dated 26 June 2003 was not on record. These facts reveal the expediency with which the application of the petitioner Society was entertained, processed and granted. It has chosen to deliberately ignore the fact that the original application dated 26 June 2003 was not on record. In fact a minute examination of the file notings between 21 June 2003 to 15 July 2003 as extracted from File No. SIOC/PH/Costing Rooma and submitted by Sri Rahul Agarwal appearing for the Corporation reveal that there is not one mention of the so called application dated 26 June 2003. The letters dated 11 June 2003, 17 June 2003 and 21 June 2003 are all of “Indus Education Foundation”. There is no letter of the petitioner society on record. The record reveals and bears out that there was no approval of the lay out plan by either the Joint M.D. or the M.D. of the Corporation. The layout plan appended with the original record handed over by CBI shows that it does not bear the signatures of the aforementioned two officers. The note sheet of 3 July 2003 shows that four blue prints of “approved drawings” are placed on the record. The drawings themselves do not bear any sign of approval of the Joint M.D. or the M.D. Between 3 July 2003 to 14 July 2003 there are no notings which may indicate or establish an approval of the drawings by the aforementioned two officers. Despite the above, the noting of 14 July 2003 proceed on the basis that the lay out plan has been duly approved. A bare perusal of the lay out plan which bears a date of 27 June 2003 shows that it does not answer the description of a lay out plan at all. The only plot earmarked on the said drawing is that proposed to be allotted to Indus Education Foundation. This plan is liable to be compared to a lay out plan prepared for Industrial Area Salempur Aligarh which will ex facie demonstrate the complete lack of details in the plan upon which the application of the petitioner society was processed. Despite the startling state of the record, the CBI has chosen to hold that no wrongdoing stood evidenced. Dealing with the issue of costing, the CBI holds and notes that the then Deputy Manager (PM), UPSIDC had worked out the costing at Rs. 175/- per sq. Despite the startling state of the record, the CBI has chosen to hold that no wrongdoing stood evidenced. Dealing with the issue of costing, the CBI holds and notes that the then Deputy Manager (PM), UPSIDC had worked out the costing at Rs. 175/- per sq. m. It notes that this costing was duly approved by the Joint Managing Director and finally by the Managing Director. Although it notes that the minimum value at which the adjacent land was worked out at Rs. 750/- per sq. m, it has tacitly accepted the explanation advanced on behalf of the Corporation. It becomes pertinent to note that the land was transferred to the petitioner Society at cost value. The manner in which the price of Rs. 175/- per. sq. m., is computed shows that the entire land was transferred to the petitioner Society without any premium being charged or recovered by the Corporation. The CBI notes that the land adjacent to the plot allotted to the petitioner society was transferred at Rs. 1140/- per sq. m. Despite the same, the CBI surprisingly concludes that no loss of revenue can be said to have been caused to the Corporation and no criminality can be attributed to anyone. The CBI also notes that the lay out plan was approved by the Corporation and that therefore no illegality was as such committed in allotment of the land in favour of the petitioner Society. It appears to have conveniently lost sight of the fact that the lay out plan itself was finalized only on 22 September 2003 whereas the allotment in favour of the petitioner Society was made on 15 July 2003 and the lease deed executed on 1 August 2003. 48. As we have noted the facts of this case, we have found that the officers and employees of the Corporation alongwith the then Regional Manager acted in concert and as a part of a larger conspiracy to ensure the allotment of a huge chunk of land to the petitioner society. The involvement and interest of the then Regional Manager in the petitioner society was not disclosed or permitted to appear on the record. The involvement and interest of the then Regional Manager in the petitioner society was not disclosed or permitted to appear on the record. The fact that the then Regional Manager had a direct interest in the petitioner society is noted by the CBI itself in its status report submitted in respect of PE 7(A) in which it records that the then Regional Manager has invested huge monies in the society in the form of loans and had also earned interest on these amounts. The CBI in fact while computing the major heads of income of the then Regional Manager relating to the check period of 1 April 1986 to 31 March 2013 has itself noted that the then Regional Manager and his family members earned Rs. 1,36,00,000/- in the form of withdrawals made from the petitioner society. It further records that they earned Rs. 47,79,408.25 in the shape of interest income against investments made in the petitioner society. Despite such facts staring in its face, it has proceeded to hold that no criminality can be attributed to anyone. 49. We find ourselves unable to affirm the conclusions recorded by the CBI by shutting our eyes to the admitted facts. The CBI in its report admits that the then Regional Manager did not disclose his connection to two members of the petitioner society. This however has been glossed over by noting that certain disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the then Regional Manager and that adverse remarks came to be recorded against him. According to the CBI, if its report were to be accepted, this was in itself a sufficient reprimand. The blind eye syndrome which appears to have afflicted the CBI reminds us of the famous quote of Admiral Nelson who said : “You know, Foley, I have only one eye - and I have a right to be blind sometimes... I really do not see the signal.” 50. We are constrained to observe that a deliberate attempt has been made to gloss over and to push under the carpet the serious acts of misdemeanor which stood evidenced against the members of the petitioner Society, the then Regional Manager and the other officials of the Corporation. The conspiracy hatched amongst them in order to confer undue favor upon the petitioner society stares one in the face and is apparent from the record. The conspiracy hatched amongst them in order to confer undue favor upon the petitioner society stares one in the face and is apparent from the record. The conclusion of the CBI that no criminality is evidenced, therefore, does not commend acceptance. 51. We accordingly refuse the prayer of the CBI for closure of investigation and direct it to proceed in the matter afresh against all persons including the officers and employees of the Corporation that may be found to have been involved in the arbitrary and illegal allotment of land to the petitioner society, undertake an enquiry into their specific roles and take further action as may be warranted in accordance with law. The CBI will file a status report in the PIL within a period of 2 months from today. The PIL for all other issues shall be listed in due course. 52. Accordingly and for the reasons aforenoted, we dismiss Writ Petition No. 17859 of 2016 and uphold the order canceling the allotment made in favor of the petitioner society. We further declare the lease deed and all other actions of the Corporation connected with the allotment of land in favor of the petitioner society to be illegal, null and void. PIL No. 35628 of 2013 shall now be listed to review compliance by the CBI in light of the directions issued above.