JUDGMENT : Mrs. B.V. Nagarathna, J. The defendant in O.S. No. 297/1992 has preferred this appeal, assailing judgment and decree passed in R.A. No. 121/1999 dated 1-6-2009 by the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) and JMFC, at Madhugiri by which the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 24-3-1999 passed in O.S. No. 297/1992 by the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Madhugiri has been set aside and the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff has been decreed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to, in terms of their status before the Trial Court. 3. The respondents-plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction against the defendant to declare them as the owners in possession and enjoyment of CDEF portions in the suit rough sketch and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his agents or servants or anybody claiming under him from opening any door or window at points D and E as shown in the rough sketch. It is the case of the plaintiffs that one Hanumanthappa, the husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff No.2 was the owner of house bearing Katha No.290/126 more fully described as plaint schedule and rough sketch. As Hanumanthappa was aged 80 years and as his eye-sight is decreasing day by day and is unable to move about, plaintiffs have filed the suit against the defendant. Plaintiffs house is shown as ABCD in the rough sketch which is their ancestral property with East-West side measuring 10 feet, North-South side measuring 30 feet and Western side has been kept open for tethering cattle and for storing haystack etc., plaintiffs house is facing towards the road on the northern side. Plaintiffs house as well as the suit site totally measures 30 ft., East-West and 30 ft., North-South. Plaintiffs and prior to them their ancestors were enjoying the house without any disturbance from anyone. Defendant is the owner of the house situated towards the southern side which is shown by the letters AEGH in the rough sketch. This house is facing on the eastern side since time immemorial. Plaintiffs and prior to them their ancestors were enjoying the house without any disturbance from anyone. Defendant is the owner of the house situated towards the southern side which is shown by the letters AEGH in the rough sketch. This house is facing on the eastern side since time immemorial. The defendant attempted to open the door towards the plaintiffs' passage open space CDEF at points D and E and trying to make use of the open space to reach the road on the northern side of the plaintiffs' house and that the defendant is not entitled to do so, as the defendant has no right, title and interest on CDEF to open the door at point DE and to make use of the passage. If the defendant was allowed to do so, plaintiffs' right over the open space or passage be lost or it cause irreparable less and injury. Hence, they filed the suit seeking the aforesaid reliefs. 4. In response to the suit summons and Court notices, the defendant appeared and filed his written statement denying the plaint averments and contended that the defendant is the owner of the house situated towards southern side shown in the AEGH in the rough sketch. It was denied that the defendant was trying to open the door towards the plaintiffs passage CDEF at points D and E and reach the road on the southern side. It was denied that the defendant had no manner of right, title and interest to use that passage The defendant contended that his house is facing towards the northern side only and the outer road is situated at points D and E of the rough sketch. That CDEF is used as a passage by the defendant to go to his house and not for tethering cattle and keeping haystack. That the outer door of the defendant's house is situated from time immemorial at D and E points and there is no necessity for the defendant to open one more door at the same place. The defendant has no other way to go to his house except through the passage shown as CDEF in the rough sketch. It was contended that there was no road existing on the southern and eastern side of the defendant's house and on the other hand, there were houses of Gangappa and Thippanna. Therefore defendant sought dismissal of the suit. 5. It was contended that there was no road existing on the southern and eastern side of the defendant's house and on the other hand, there were houses of Gangappa and Thippanna. Therefore defendant sought dismissal of the suit. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration :- "1. Whether plaintiffs prove that they are owners in possession of C.D.E.F. portion as shown in the hand sketch? 2. Whether plaintiffs prove that defendant has no right to open door or window in his wall on northern side at point D.E. as shown in hand sketch? 3. Whether cause of action arose to file this suit? 4. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for the reliefs sought for? 5. What Order or Decree?" In order to substantiate their case, the plaintiffs examined 5 witnesses. The 1st plaintiff was examined as PW1. They produced 14 documents which were marked as Exs.P1 to P14. While the defendant examined 2 witnesses. DW1 was the defendant. He produced 3 documents which were marked as Exs.D1 to D3. On the basis of the said evidence, the Trial Court answered issue Nos.1 to 4 in negative and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs by judgment and decree dated 24.03.1999. 6. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court RA No. 121/1999 was preferred before the First Appellate Court by the Plaintiffs. The First Appellate Court on hearing the learned counsel for the parties framed the following points for its consideration. "1. Whether the appellants/plaintiffs prove that they are the owners and in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property? 2. Whether the Judgment and Decree passed by the lower Court called for interference? 3. What Order?" 7. It answered point Nos.1 and 2 in the affirmative and allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the defendant has preferred this appeal. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs and perused the material on record as well as the records submitted by the Court below. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the defendant has preferred this appeal. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs and perused the material on record as well as the records submitted by the Court below. At this juncture it must be also noted that the Principal Civil Judge, District and Sessions Court, Tumkur has stated that the original records in OS No.297/1992 have been destroyed and whatever other records are available in the files have been sent to this Court, which I have perused. 9. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the First Appellate Court was not right in reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The Trial Court had rightly held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they are the owners in possession of the CDEF portions in the rough sketch and that the plaintiffs had also failed to prove that the defendant had no right to open the door or window on the southern side between D and E points. But the First Appellate Court while reversing the said findings had granted the reliefs to the plaintiffs without there being any evidence in substantiation of plaintiffs' case. He contended that in the rough sketch, it is evident that the plaintiffs have been using ABCD portions of the property and that CDEF portion is an open space which has been used by the defendant from time immemorial. That at D and E points there is already a door which has been put up by the defendant and through that door the defendant has been using the CDEF portion to reach the road on the northern side and the plaintiffs have not objected and therefore, the suit filed was without there being any cause of action. He contended that the CDEF portions does not belong to the defendant and that the said portion of the rough sketch belongs to Gram Panchayath. He therefore contended that the First Appellate Court is not right in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. That substantial questions of law arise in this appeal and therefore, the appeal may be admitted for a detailed hearing. 10. He therefore contended that the First Appellate Court is not right in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. That substantial questions of law arise in this appeal and therefore, the appeal may be admitted for a detailed hearing. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent - plaintiffs supporting the judgment of the First Appellate Court contended that the defendant who had deposed as DW1 had admitted in his cross-examination that the ABFE property is the ancestral property of the plaintiffs and that includes the suit schedule property which is CDEF. At any rate the dispute is with regard to the CDEF portions of the sketch which is admitted to be the ancestral property of the plaintiffs. That extent of land is not the Gramathana land. The rough sketch was considered by the First Appellate Court in juxtaposition with the evidence let in before the Trial Court in the form of Commissioner's report as per Exs.P12, 13, and 14. The Trial Court failed to appreciate the case of the plaintiffs but the First Appellate Court has appreciated the evidence on record and has rightly decreed the suit. The judgment of the First Appellate Court not call for any interference as no substantial question of law arise in the appeal, was the submission. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material on record and the original files sent by the Court below, it is noted that DW1 who is the defendant/appellant herein has admitted that the schedule property was possessed by the plaintiffs as it was their ancestral property. From the rough sketch it is noted that the ABFE property is the total extent of plaintiffs' properties. The ABCD measures 30 ft x 20 ft and CDEF measures 30 ft x 10 ft. The disputed portion which is the suit schedule property is CDEF. On the basis of admission made by the defendant in his evidence which is in consonance with the documents produced by the defendants in Exs.D1 to D3 as well as Exs.P12, 13 and 14, the First Appellate Court has held that the suit schedule properties CDEF belongs to the plaintiffs. It may be noted that the defendant was using the suit schedule property as a passage for ingress and aggress which is at the southern side of the plaintiffs property without having any right to do so. It may be noted that the defendant was using the suit schedule property as a passage for ingress and aggress which is at the southern side of the plaintiffs property without having any right to do so. Even though the defendant may have had a door at D and E points, it was the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant ought not to use that door for passing through CDEF portion of the suit rough sketch. Therefore, the plaintiffs sought injunction against the defendant. The First Appellate Court on noting the evidence on record, particularly the admission of defendant in his evidence came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have the right, title and interest in respect of the CDEF portions. Therefore, they have every right to protect their title and possession in respect of the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs were therefore, declared to be owners in respect of CDEF portions of the suit schedule property of the sketch. Consequently the defendant was rightly injuncted from using that portion of the property as a passage to reach the road on the northern side and therefore defendant was restrained from using any portion of the property through a door at D and E portion. I do not find any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court which has rightly set-aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court which has dismissed the suit of the respondent/plaintiffs. I do not find any substantial question of law which arise in this appeal the appeal is hence, dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.