JUDGMENT : Deepak Gupta, J. 1. This appeal by the convicted accused is directed against the judgment dated 4.12.2001 delivered by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur in Sessions Trial No. 240 of 2000, whereby he convicted the accused/Appellant for having committed offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced him as follows: Conviction Sentence Under Section 498A IPC 3 Years Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/-,in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months Under Section 304B IPC Under Section 304, IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for Life and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months 2. The undisputed facts are that deceased Parmeshwari Bai was married to accused Jeth Prasad about 4-5 years prior to the occurrence. It is not disputed before us that her death had occurred within 7 years of the marriage. Another undisputed fact is that on 27.5.2000, at about 7:30 p.m., deceased Parmeshwari Bai poured kerosene on her and then set herself on fire. She was taken to the hospital where she succumbed to her injuries. The third important fact is that the dying declaration (Ex. Another undisputed fact is that on 27.5.2000, at about 7:30 p.m., deceased Parmeshwari Bai poured kerosene on her and then set herself on fire. She was taken to the hospital where she succumbed to her injuries. The third important fact is that the dying declaration (Ex. P-27) of the deceased was recorded before she died and as per the version of the prosecution the statement of the deceased reads as follows: e`R;q iwoZ 'kiFk iwoZd c;ku fnukad 28-03-2000 le; 3-10 A.M. vki dk D;k uke gS\ ijes'ojh] ifr dk D;k uke gS\ tsB izlkn] mez D;k gS\ 23 lky] tkfr & daoj] fdruk i<+h gks\ 9 oh] dgka dh jgus okyh gks\ Qwuxh] ek;ds dgka gS\ gs<+liqjA 'kknh fdrus o"kZ iwoZ gqvk gS\ pkj lky gksor gsA firk dk D;k uke gS\ nsoukjk;.k dSls tyh %& viu mij e ekVh rsy Mkj ds ekfpl ekj ysgsA D;ksa vkx yxkbZ %& eSa ej tkuk pkgr go eksyk th;sy ubZ Hkkr gsA ml le; rqEgkjk ifr dgka Fkk %& oks le; e Vh0oh0 ns[ks] vm iapk;r cqykgw dgr x; jghlA dgka Vh0oh0 ns[kus x;k Fkk%& Qwuxh cLrh esa] nwjh fdruh gS] ,d fd0eh0 D;ksa ej tkuk pkgrh gks] D;ksa thuk ugha pkgrh %& eksj ifr gj rhu pkj fnu gks xbl ckrphr ub djr gkos] vm mYVk iapk;r Hkh djkr gsA ;sdj ls grkl gks x; go] tsdj dkju viu mij vkxh yxk;A rqEgkjk ifr rhu&pkj fnu rd ckrphr D;ksa ugha dj jgk Fkk\ igyh bykt djk nsok fQj crkgwA Nkrh esa tyu vm njn gksor gsA rqEgkjs llqjky okys ijs'kku rks ugha dj jgs gSa\ %& ckn esa crkgw] vkxs cksy ugha ik jgh gSA 3. The English rendering of the relevant portion of the statement is that: "For the last 3-4 days my husband was not talking to me, but on the other hand, he was threatening to call a Panchayat. Therefore, I was depressed and set myself on fire". When the deceased was taken to the hospital, Rojnamcha Sanha, Ex. P-25C was recorded. Thereafter, her dying declaration, Ex. P-27, which has been quoted above, was also recorded. After the death of the deceased, merg intimation, Ex. P-1 was recorded. There are two First Information Reports in the case, one before the death of the deceased and one after the death of the deceased. 4. The Learned Trial Court convicted the accused under Sections 498A and 304B, IPC. P-27, which has been quoted above, was also recorded. After the death of the deceased, merg intimation, Ex. P-1 was recorded. There are two First Information Reports in the case, one before the death of the deceased and one after the death of the deceased. 4. The Learned Trial Court convicted the accused under Sections 498A and 304B, IPC. Conviction under Section 304B, IPC can only be rendered when there is demand of dowry and it is further proved that the death is relatable to the demand of dowry. Even in the dying declaration, there is not a word that the husband of the deceased had demanded dowry. Even PW-10, Akti Bai, mother of the deceased and PW-11, Deonarayan, father of the deceased have not spoken a word about any demand of dowry. Therefore, the question of any conviction under Section 304B, IPC does not arise. 5. The next issue is whether the deceased was being treated with cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A, IPC. Section 498A, IPC clearly lays down that for the purpose of this section the cruelty should be wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. We are not concerned with the second part of the section which admittedly has not been proved or even alleged in this case. There are two sets of evidence in this regard. According to PW-10, Akti Bai, mother of the deceased, the accused had an illicit relationship with his brother's wife and this was the reason for the marital discard between the husband and the wife (deceased). Other than the bald statement of PW-10, there is no evidence in this regard. A mere allegation of an illicit relationship cannot be accepted on its face value because if the statement of the mother (PW-10) is accepted to be correct, this not only affects the rights of the accused who is represented before us but also raises questions about the character of a woman who is not a party to these proceedings. It is easy to make such allegations, but allegations are only allegations and these allegations must be proved beyond doubt before these allegations can be taken to be correct and the character of a woman is besmirched. It is easy to make such allegations, but allegations are only allegations and these allegations must be proved beyond doubt before these allegations can be taken to be correct and the character of a woman is besmirched. We cannot accept such allegations on their face value unless the prosecution leads more cogent evidence to prove that there was an illicit relationship. 6. Furthermore, in the so called dying declaration, there is not a word about such illicit relationship between the husband of the deceased and his sister-in-law. If this had been a cause for the deceased to commit suicide, she would have definitely made a statement to this effect to the Executive Magistrate concerned. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the husband had an illicit relationship, can it be said that merely because when one of the spouse is in an illicit relationship is a cruelty to such an extent that the other spouse had a ground to commit suicide or bodily harm or cause injury. We are of the opinion that this cannot be a sufficient ground. 7. As far as the dying declaration is concerned, all that is said therein is that for last 3-4 days, the husband was not talking to the deceased and he had threatened her that he would call a Panchayat. There is no allegation that the husband was beating her. There is no allegation that he had ill-treated her. What had happened was that he was not talking to her and had threatened her that he would call a Panchayat to settle the dispute between them. Any marital relationship has its ups and downs. There may be days and occasions when spouses, may not talk to each other. This cannot be called cruelty to such an extent that it leads to a spouse to commit suicide. Even if one of the spouses is hypersensitive and commits suicide, the other spouse, in our considered opinion, cannot be held guilty of cruelty to such an extent to fall within the ambit of Section 498A, IPC. In this view of the matter, we hold that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case. 8. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Trial Court is set aside. The accused/Appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him. In this view of the matter, we hold that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case. 8. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Trial Court is set aside. The accused/Appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The bail bonds of the Appellant shall remain operative for a further period of six months from today in terms of Section 437A, Cr.P.C.