JUDGMENT : Servesh Kumar Gupta, J. The judgment and order of learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Pauri Garhwal rendered in the S.C.C. Suit No.5 of 2008 ‘Baba Nihal Singh Bhalla v. M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. & another’ has been assailed by the tenant/revisionist, herein. Learned Judge decreed the suit of eviction with a further direction to the tenant to make payment of arrears of rent and mesne profits along with 9 percent per annum simple interest. 2. Having heard the learned Counsels of either party, it transpires that the revisionist-Corporation, namely, M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, was a tenant on a piece of land measuring 408.89 square meters located in Kotdwar town, District Pauri Garhwal. On that land, a fuel station was being run through its agent Garhwal Motor Operators Union for a long time, probably eversince nineties. Several times, the dispute erupted between the two as regards the rate of rent and the arrears, which was fought by the parties up to the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court and later on, such litigation was received by this Court and during transfer of the lis between the two, a further registered Lease Deed was executed on 23.12.2002, depicting a fresh start of tenancy with effect from 1.9.2001 to 31.8.2006 at the rate of Rs.5,500/- per mensem, and this way, the tenancy had to be continued for five years. Thereafter, the tenancy could be renewed at the terms and conditions settled by the parties de novo at their sweet desire, provided the tenant did not make any breach or non-observance of any of the covenants which were reduced into writing in such deed; and such renewal could have further been effective w.e.f. 1.9.2006 to 31.8.2011 at the monthly rent of Rs.6,000/-, i.e. for next five years’ term. 3. There is no dispute to the fact that no such renewal of the lease deed was ever executed between the parties, as there was no request from the tenant to that effect. But the fuel station continued to run on the land, in question, and since there was disruption on the regular payments of rent, so a notice was issued on 27.1.2007 by the landlord asking the tenant to pay off the dues amounting to Rs.24,000/- with interest @18 percent thereon. But the fuel station continued to run on the land, in question, and since there was disruption on the regular payments of rent, so a notice was issued on 27.1.2007 by the landlord asking the tenant to pay off the dues amounting to Rs.24,000/- with interest @18 percent thereon. But, it seems that issuance of such a notice could not yield any positive result, therefore, the landlord, by issuing another notice on 8.9.2008 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminated the tenancy of the tenant and instituted the Suit No.5 of 2008 on 20.12.2008, seeking eviction and arrears of rent. Learned SCC Judge has decreed the said suit, as aforementioned. 4. Learned counsel for the revisionists has vehemently stressed on the point that the suit was instituted by the power of attorney holder whereas, it ought to have been filed by the landlord himself. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ‘Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & another Vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd. & others’ (2005) 2 SCC 217 . 5. I have gone through the aforesaid law of the Hon’ble Apex Court and feel that such law does not have any application in the present controversy. The reason being that in that case, the necessity for the appellants to appear, in person, in the witness box was indispensable where the case was remanded by the Superior Court to the Trial Court only for this purpose; in such a condition, there was no room to make stand the power of attorney in the witness box and to examine him only. 6. On the other hand, the correct position of law on the subject has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Man Kaur (Dead) by LRS. Vs. Hartar Singh Sangha’ (2010) 10 SCC 512 , wherein it was clarified that in landlord-tenant matters, if the proceedings are initiated, then the following power of attorney holders, viz. husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother, exclusive managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad, can be examined in the witness box. There is no infirmity in asking them to depose before the court below. husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother, exclusive managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad, can be examined in the witness box. There is no infirmity in asking them to depose before the court below. All that which precludes such power of attorney holders to state about the affairs which are in the personal knowledge of the executor but as regards the pleadings and other factors, which are in the knowledge of power of attorney holder, the same can well be deposed and answered while facing the examination, either in chief or in cross, before the court concerned. 7. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further stressed about the striking off defence under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. by the court, all the same, arrears of rent had been deposited by the tenant. This contention is wholly unsubstantial for the reason that firstly, this factual aspect about the minimal calculations of rent for different purposes and the defaults on the part of tenant, has elaborately been discussed by the court below in the impugned judgment and this Court is not supposed to go through the same scrupulously again and to make recalculations of every minute details of the payments of rent. Secondly, in fact, there was no striking off defence by the court below since the defendant-tenant was rendered full opportunity, not only to file its documentary evidence but his witness DW1 Mr. Mayank Bhatnagar (power of attorney holder of the tenant-Corporation) was examined in the court; furthermore, even learned counsel for the defendants also exercised the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Birendra Jeet Singh Bhalla, the plaintiff’s witness, on 16.6.2011. All these oral and documentary evidence has well been discussed by the court below in the judgment, under challenge. Therefore, no question of striking off the defence remains. Simply writing a sentence to the effect of striking off defence, either in the order-sheet or in the impugned judgment, cannot be looked into against the factual position, as indicated hereinabove. 8. All these oral and documentary evidence has well been discussed by the court below in the judgment, under challenge. Therefore, no question of striking off the defence remains. Simply writing a sentence to the effect of striking off defence, either in the order-sheet or in the impugned judgment, cannot be looked into against the factual position, as indicated hereinabove. 8. It was next argued for the revisionists that the Judge, SCC was of the view that the lease deed had been renewed up to 31.8.2011 by way of implications, so now, this Court cannot look into that aspect and would accept as if the lease was renewed, as has been held by the court below. Again, I find that this contention does not hold any water for the reason that the lease cannot be deemed to have been renewed automatically after 31.8.2006, until and unless it could have been got renewed as per the stipulations of the lease deed dated 23.12.2002, and a reference of such condition has also been made hereinabove by this Court. There was no question of renewal while there were repeated failures and disruptions on the part of the tenant in making regular payments of rent and for this reason only, the landlord was constrained to issue a notice, not only on 27.1.2007 but on 8.9.2008 as well, which was the basis of instituting the suit. 9. It has further been argued that the presentation of the suit was premature because the lease was in force up to next five years. This argument again is wholly untenable because the lease stood expired on 31.8.2006 and there was no continuation of lease at all. Even if, by some stretch of imagination, the contention of learned counsel for the revisionists is considered for a moment, then also, presentation of suit, before 31.8.2011, by itself, could not have been a ground for its dismissal. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of in the case of ‘Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union Bank of India’ (2005) 4 SCC 315 , in paragraphs nos.9, 22 and 23, has held as under:- “9. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of in the case of ‘Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union Bank of India’ (2005) 4 SCC 315 , in paragraphs nos.9, 22 and 23, has held as under:- “9. In our opinion, a suit based on a plaint which discloses a cause of action is not necessarily to be dismissed on trial solely because it was premature on the date of its institution if by the time the written statement came to be filed or by the time the Court is called upon to pass a decree, the plaintiff is found entitled to the relief prayed for in the plaint. Though there is no direct decision available on the point but a few cases showing the trend of judicial opinion may be noticed. 22. We may now briefly sum up the correct position of law which is as follows:- A suit of a civil nature disclosing a cause of action even if filed before the date on which the plaintiff became actually entitled to sue and claim the relief founded on such cause of action is not to be necessarily dismissed for such reason. The question of suit being premature does not go to the root of jurisdiction of the Court; the Court entertaining such a suit and passing decree therein is not acting without jurisdiction but it is in the judicial discretion of the Court to grant decree or not. The Court would examine whether any irreparable prejudice was caused to the defendant on account of the suit having been filed a little before the date on which the plaintiff's entitlement to relief became due and whether by granting the relief in such suit a manifest injustice would be caused to the defendant. Taking into consideration the explanation offered by the plaintiff for filing the suit before the date of maturity of cause of action, the Court may deny the plaintiff his costs or may make such other order adjusting equities and satisfying the ends of justice as it may deem fit in its discretion. The conduct of the parties and unmerited advantage to plaintiff or disadvantage amounting to prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be relevant factors. A plea as to non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of its being premature should be promptly raised by the defendant and pressed for decision. The conduct of the parties and unmerited advantage to plaintiff or disadvantage amounting to prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be relevant factors. A plea as to non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of its being premature should be promptly raised by the defendant and pressed for decision. It will equally be the responsibility of the Court to examine and promptly dispose of such a plea. The plea may not be permitted to be raised at a belated stage of the suit. However, the Court shall not exercise its discretion in favour of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases:- (i) When there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event; (ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of a particular time or occurrence of a particular event would have the effect of defeating a public policy or public purpose; (iii) if such premature institution renders the presentation itself patently void and the invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root of the Court's jurisdiction, and (iv) where the lis is not confined to parties alone and affects and involves persons other than those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition which affects and involves the entire constituency. (See: Samar Singh Vs. Kedar Nath and Ors., 1987 Supp. SCC 663). One more category of suits which may be added to the above, is: where leave of the Court or some authority is mandatorily required to be obtained before the institution and was not so obtained. 23. In the case at hand, the act of the plaintiff filing the suit before 25.6.1984 cannot be said to be malicious or intended to overreach the Court. The defendant's reply dated 8.11.1983 prompted the plaintiff in filing the suit inasmuch as the plaintiff reasonably thought that a cloud was already cast on his entitlement to recover the property and he should promptly approach the Court. True, the defendant could have changed his mind and thought of delivering the possession of the property to the plaintiff on or after 25.6.1984, the date whereafter only the suit could ordinarily have been filed and in that case there would have been no occasion at all for filing the suit. True, the defendant could have changed his mind and thought of delivering the possession of the property to the plaintiff on or after 25.6.1984, the date whereafter only the suit could ordinarily have been filed and in that case there would have been no occasion at all for filing the suit. The defendant filed its written statement much after that date. The objection as to maintainability of the suit was taken in the written statement. If only it would have been pressed for decision and the Court would have formed that opinion at the preliminary stage then the plaintiff could have withdrawn the suit or the Court could have dismissed the suit as premature. In either case, the plaintiff would have filed a fresh suit based on the same cause of action soon after 25.6.1984. By the time the suit came to be decided on 12.2.1992, the dismissal of the suit on the ground of its being premature would have been a travesty of justice when the plaintiff was found entitled to a decree otherwise. The learned Single Judge rightly overruled the defendant's objection and directed the suit to be decreed. The Division Bench ought not to have interfered with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge.” 10. In the above-quoted authority, the Apex Court has said that dismissal of suit on the ground of its being premature would have been a travesty of justice when the plaintiff was found entitled to the relief prayed for in the plaint. By any implication, even if the lease is considered as if renewed upto 31.8.2011, then also, such period stood expired almost five years ago and this has also been made a ground by the Judge, SCC for decreeing the suit and I do concur with such opinion. 11. It was lastly argued that Garhwal Motor Operators Union, who is running the fuel station, has not been impleaded while it was a necessary party. To my view, it was not at all necessary to be impleaded because the lease deed was effective only between the plaintiff/respondent and the tenant/revisionist, whereas the said Union was only an agent engaged by the tenant to run its petrol pump. So, it cannot be termed as a necessary party at all and furthermore, on this score alone, the suit cannot fail. 12. So, it cannot be termed as a necessary party at all and furthermore, on this score alone, the suit cannot fail. 12. So, in view of what has been stated above, I do not find any force in this revision. It is, accordingly, dismissed. 13. Interim order dated 14.05.2013 stands vacated. 14. Let a copy of this judgment along with the LCR be sent back to the court below.