JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 7.6.2004, rendered by District Judge, Kullu, HP in Civil Appeal No. 24-2004. 2. “Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that the respondent No.1-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiff' for convenience sake) filed a suit for declaration against the appellant No.2, Amar Jolly and respondents No. 3 to 6, who were defendants before the learned trial Court (hereinafter referred to as 'defendants' for convenience sake), to the effect that the plaintiff has become owner of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 100/113, Khasra No. 2383/2344 measuring 2-3-0 bighas, Khata Khatauni No. 101/113/1 Khasra No. 2390/646 measuring 2-5-0 Bigha out of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 102/114 Khasra No. 2388/699 measuring 1-17-0 Bigha, total land measuring 4-13-0 Bigha situate in Phati Bihar, Kothi Chehni, Tehsil Banjar, District Kullu, HP, on the failure of the defendants to redeem the mortgage within the period of limitation. Suit land was previously owned by Sangat Ram, who on 11.6.1969, mortgaged the suit land in favour of Chaine Ram, father of the plaintiff, for a sum of Rs.2500/- as mortgage debt/money. Possession of the suit land was delivered in favour of Chaine Ram on 11.6.1969 by Sangat Ram. Chaine Ram came in possession of the suit land as mortgagee under Sangat Ram till his death. Chaine Ram died on 6.1.1996. He bequeathed his property in favour of the plaintiff through a registered Will dated 12.6.1979. He came in possession of the suit land as mortgagee. Shri Gian Chand and Tek Chand acquired ownership to the extent of 108/125 shares measuring 1-12-0 bighas in the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 102/114 measuring 1-17-0 Bigha and redeemed the same. However, defendants and their predecessor-in-interest failed to redeem the suit land within limitation. Thus, the plaintiff had become the owner of the suit land on 11.6.1999. 3. Suit was contested by the defendants. Defendant No. 2 namely Umesh Kumar was proceeded ex parte. Written statement was filed by defendants No. 1 and 3 to 5, namely Amar Jolly, Jeet Ram, Ritam Chand and Jai Singh. It is admitted on merits that the suit land was owned and possessed by Sangat Ram, however, factum of mortgage was disputed. It is pleaded that Chaine Ram never remained in possession of the suit land. Written statement was filed by defendants No. 1 and 3 to 5, namely Amar Jolly, Jeet Ram, Ritam Chand and Jai Singh. It is admitted on merits that the suit land was owned and possessed by Sangat Ram, however, factum of mortgage was disputed. It is pleaded that Chaine Ram never remained in possession of the suit land. Possession of the suit land remained with Sangat Ram. After his death, suit land was inherited by Kewali Ram who remained in possession of the suit land. Defendants purchased the suit land from Kewali Ram. They were in possession of the suit land as owners. It is further pleaded that at the time of the execution of the sale deed in the revenue record, no entry regarding mortgage was existing and as such defendants are bona fide purchasers for consideration and entries showing the plaintiff as mortgagee are wrong and illegal. 4. Replication was filed. Issues were framed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Lahul & Spiti at Kullu on 19.5.2000. He dismissed the suit on 24.2.2004. Plaintiff filed an appeal before the District Judge, Kullu. The learned District Judge, Kullu allowed the appeal on 7.6.2004. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 5. The Regular Second Appeal was admitted on 29.3.2005 on various substantial questions of law as detailed in the grounds of appeal. It would be pertinent to observe at this stage that vide Order dated 29.3.2005, in CMP No. 798/2004, Shri Alam Chand was permitted to assail the impugned judgment and decree dated 7.6.2004, since he had stepped into the shoes of defendant No. 1, Amar Jolly during the pendency of he suit by virtue of civil suit decreed on 23.8.1999, filed by Amar Chand against Amar Jolly. Similarly, Amar Jolly was allowed to be transposed as appellant No.2 alongwith Alam Chand by way of CMP No. 997/2004. 6. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate, on the basis of substantial questions of law framed, has vehemently argued that no evidence has been led by the plaintiff to prove the factum of creation of mortgage deed dated 11.6.1969 orally. Creation of mortgage could not be presumed merely on the basis of mutation and revenue entries. 7. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate has supported the judgment and decree dated 7.6.2004. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the judgments and decrees as well as record carefully. Creation of mortgage could not be presumed merely on the basis of mutation and revenue entries. 7. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate has supported the judgment and decree dated 7.6.2004. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the judgments and decrees as well as record carefully. 9. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected, as such were taken up together for discussion to avoid repetition of evidence. 10. PW-1 Yaad Singh deposed that Sangat Ram mortgaged the suit land on 11.6.1969 in favour of his father, Chaine Ram for Rs.2500/- as mortgage debt/money and possession of the suit land was delivered on the same day. Mutation was entered and sanctioned in favour of his father. Suit land was mortgaged 31 years back hence, the rights of the defendants over the suit land stood extinguished and he had become owner of the suit land because suit land was not redeemed within the period of limitation by the defendants. He refuted that after the death of Sangat Ram, Kewali Ram came in possession of suit land and thereafter, defendants purchased suit land from Kewali Ram. 11. It is not in dispute that Sangat Ram was the owner-in-possession of the suit land. Plaintiff is the legal heir of Chaine Ram. 12. In Column No. 13 of the mutation Ext. P2 dated 24.9.1969, possession of the suit land was delivered under oral mortgage in favour of Chaine Ram on 11.6.1969 for Rs.2500/-. Mutation was duly sanctioned and attested in the presence of Sangat Ram, the then owner of the suit land. It was attested by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade. In sequel to mutation dated 24.9.1969, necessary entries were made in the Jamabandi for the year 1969-70, Ext. A-1, Jamabandi for the year 1974-75, Ext. A-2, Jamabandi for the year 1979- 80, Ext. A-3, Jamabandi for the year 1984-85, Ext. A-4 and Jamabandi for the year 1989- 90, Ext. A-5 and also in Ext. P-1 i.e. Jamabandi for the year 1994-95. In all these Jamabandis, Chaine Ram remained recorded as mortgagee in possession of the suit land and after his death, plaintiff became mortgagee in possession of the suit land. 13. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate has also vehemently argued that the legal heirs of Sangat Ram were not arrayed as respondents. P-1 i.e. Jamabandi for the year 1994-95. In all these Jamabandis, Chaine Ram remained recorded as mortgagee in possession of the suit land and after his death, plaintiff became mortgagee in possession of the suit land. 13. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate has also vehemently argued that the legal heirs of Sangat Ram were not arrayed as respondents. The Court is of the considered view that the legal heirs of Sangat Ram were not necessary party for full, final and effective adjudication of the suit. Plaintiff has always remained in possession of the suit land. Oral mortgage is dated 11.6.1969 for a consideration of Rs.2500/-. 14. In view of overwhelming revenue record it can not be presumed that the defendants were not aware of the status of Chaine Ram and after his death, of plaintiff, as mortgagee. In view of the mutation attested vide Ext. P-2 dated 24.9.1969, and subsequent Jamabandis, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove payment of mortgage money to Sangat Ram. Similarly, in the presence of Jamabandis Ext. P-1 and mutation Ext. P-2, Khasra Girdwari was not necessarily required to be produced. Presumption of truth is attached to the Jamabandis, though rebuttable. However, defendants have not led any evidence to rebut the revenue entries. Exts. A-1 to A-5 were proved by moving application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. These were not objected to. More particularly, the defendants have not produced the copy of Jamabandi, on the basis of which sale deed was executed. They could produce documents to prove that Chaine Ram or the plaintiff was not recorded as mortgagee in possession of the suit land. Defendants have not redeemed the suit land within the period of limitation, thus their rights stood extinguished and the plaintiff has become owner of the suit land. 15. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate has also argued that since the suit land earlier fell in the State of Punjab, mortgage was required to be registered. 16. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the mortgage was not required to be registered under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under: “59. 16. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the mortgage was not required to be registered under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under: “59. Mortgage when to be by assurance :- Where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses. Where the principal money secured is less than one hundred rupees, a mortgage may be effected either by a registered instrument signed and attested as aforesaid, or (except in the case of a simple mortgage) by delivery of the property. 17. It would be apt at this stage to refer to Section 5 of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1955, whereby areas of Shimla, Kangra, Kullu and Lahul & Spiti, were merged in Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1.11.1966. 18. The Central Government had exempted retrospectively with effect from 1st January, 1950 the operation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of S. 54 and Ss. 59,107 and 123 from all the territories in the State of Himachal Pradesh except (i) an area within the limits of a municipality, and (ii) a notified area as declared and notified under Sec. 241 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as applied to Himachal Pradesh. Section 59 was extended to whole of the Punjab with effect from 10.6.1968. The sub para 5 of para 8.1 of =Record of Rights', contained in the Himachal Pradesh Land Record Manual, reads as under: “5. Some times the patwaris do not enter mutations based upon oral transactions referred to in sub para (3) above. Even if the mutations are entered, the Revenue Officers generally refuse to attest such mutations on the plea that the registration was not done, which was compulsory under Registration Act. This is an incorrect interpretation of law. Mutations either based upon oral transaction or registered deed must conform to the provisions of section 38 of the HP Land Revenue Act subject to the provisions of Deputy Secretary Revenue to the H.P. Govt. letter No. 17-13/66, Rev. This is an incorrect interpretation of law. Mutations either based upon oral transaction or registered deed must conform to the provisions of section 38 of the HP Land Revenue Act subject to the provisions of Deputy Secretary Revenue to the H.P. Govt. letter No. 17-13/66, Rev. I Dated 6.1.1971, Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 and Section 3 of H.P. Transfer of Land Regulation Act, 1968 read with paras 18.24, 18.25, 18.26 and 18.29 infra. Revenue Officers are not competent to refuse mutations based upon oral transactions under the law, if the acquisitions conform to the provisions of Section 38 ibid but subject to the exceptions mentioned above. It was held in Gulab singh another V Smt. Dilbag and others (ILR Himachal Series), 1987 pages 536 to 542) by the H.P. High Court that oral exchange was valid because all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were not applicable in Tehsil Kullu which was then State of Punjab in 1963. By virtue of Notification No. 1605 R/C55-69) 5.5.54 (sale) S. 107 (Lease) and S. 123 (gift) were made applicable in the State of Punjab. An oral exchange was thus permissible in Tehsil Kullu because section 118 of the Transfer of Property Act was not made applicable to the State of Punjab – an exchange could be effected between the parties and it was not necessary to effect the same by a registered document only.” 19. Thus, when the area of Punjab was merged in the union territory of H.P., Section 59 was not applicable to areas falling in District Kullu. Provisions of Section 59 have been made applicable to the State of Punjab only with effect from 10.6.1968. In this case, suit land fell in District Kullu which became an integral part of the territory of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1.11.1966. Thus, the oral mortgage was permissible because of the fact that operation of paras 2, 3 of Sections 54 and 59 to the territories in the State of Himachal Pradesh was exempted retrospectively. 20. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Purusottam Das v. Desouza, reported in AIR 1950 Orissa 213, have held that an invalid (unregistered) mortgage deed can be referred to for ascertaining the nature and character of possession and for determining the quantum of interest for which the defendant prescribed under the invalid mortgage. 20. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Purusottam Das v. Desouza, reported in AIR 1950 Orissa 213, have held that an invalid (unregistered) mortgage deed can be referred to for ascertaining the nature and character of possession and for determining the quantum of interest for which the defendant prescribed under the invalid mortgage. The Division Bench have held as under: “[11] The question, however, further remains whether and to what extent the invalid mortgages themselves can be used in evidence to gather the terms of the mortgage, the right to which in the defendant has become ultimately perfected by adverse possession and precaution. On that question, there has been difference of opinion as disclosed in Appamma v. Channavadu, 1924 11 AIR (Mad) 292. In that case one of the learned Judges, Spencer J. was inclined to the view that "a plaintiff who sues For redemption on the strength of an unregistered mortgage-deed can never succeed because for obtaining a decree to redeem it is necessary to prove what the terms of the mortgage were and they cannot be proved by any other evidence than the document itself. This is the effect of Sections 17 and 49, Registration Act, read with Section 91 , Evidence Act." The other two learned Judges, however, namely, Venkatasubba Rao and Ramesam JJ. came to a differs it conclusion. It was pointed out by them that in view of the Privy Council decision in Vorada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, 1919 6 AIR (PC) 44 the invalid mortgage-deed could be referred to for ascertaining the nature and character of possession, (a proposition which was not disputed even by Spencer J.) and that accordingly it may be referred to for determining the quantum of interest for which the defendant prescribed. To determine the character of the possession, the quantum of the interest under which possession is purported to have been taken, has to be ascertained by a reference to the document itself. That quantum is necessarily defined and limited by the terms of the document and does not offend against Sections 17 and 49 , Registration Act or Section 91 , Evidence Act. The attempt to use the document to prove the quantum of the interest and the character of possession thereunder is not the use of the document for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage itself under the document. The attempt to use the document to prove the quantum of the interest and the character of possession thereunder is not the use of the document for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage itself under the document. The document is not used as the source of the mortgagee's title--the title itself having been acquired by adverse possession and prescription. I would therefore respectfully follow and adopt this view of the majority in Appamma v. Chinnavadu,1924 11 AIR (Mad) 292.” 21. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sukra Oraon v. Jagat Mohan reported in AIR 1957 Patna 245 have held that even where the mortgage is not a valid transaction, because of non-compliance with S.59, T.P. Act, still the defendants who are inducted on the property as mortgagees acquire the character of mortgagees of that property because of prescription when it is proved that they were holding the said property in that character during the period of prescription. The Division Bench has held as under: “[2] The main argument On behalf of the heirs of defendant No. 3, who have preferred this appeal, is that the zarpeshgi deed dated 23-1-1932, was not a registered document and, therefore, the plaintiffs had no title to redeem. In support of this argument learned Counsel relied upon a decision of the High Court, Bishun Singh v. Sheodhari Das (AIR 1947 Pat 110 (A) , and another decision of the High Court, Bhukhan Mian v. Radhika Kurmi Debi 19 Pat LT 489: (AIR 1938 Pat 479) (B). It was argued that the requirements of Section 59, Transfer of Property Act, had not been complied with and the entry in the record. of rights that the mortgagees were in possession in that capacity was not sufficient to establish the transaction of mortgage and the suit for redemption could not be entertained. It is necessary for us to state that the question with regard to the invalidity of the zarpeshgi had not been raised in the lower Courts and there is no finding of the lower Courts on this point. The only question debated before the lower appellate Court was whether Sato or defendants Nos. It is necessary for us to state that the question with regard to the invalidity of the zarpeshgi had not been raised in the lower Courts and there is no finding of the lower Courts on this point. The only question debated before the lower appellate Court was whether Sato or defendants Nos. 3 to 3 (b) had acquired the status of an occupancy raiyat with regard to the disputed plots and on that question the lower appellate Court has discussed the evidence elaborately and has come to the finding that Sato was not in possession as a raiyat and that defendant No. 3, who was the purchaser from Sato, was also not in possession of the land as raiyat. On the contrary, the finding of the lower appellate Court is that Sato was cultivating the suit land on behalf of the zarpeshgidars and that defendants 3 to 3 (b) also were in possession of the land in the same capacity. It is true in this case that the survey record-of-rights has an entry to the effect that the zarpeshgi was effected by an unregistered document. It may be that the requirements of Section 59, T. P, Act, had not been complied with and that the zarpeshgi of 23-1-1932, is not legally valid. But the point raised by Mr. Mukherji on behalf of the respondents is that even if the mortgage was invalid, both Sato and his transferees were in possession of the land in the character of mortgagees from the year 1932 to the year 1949, for a period of more than twelve years. The suit was brought on 27-1-1949, and the argument on behalf of the respondents is that the defendantappellants were mortgagees by prescription and a decree for redemption has been rightly passed in favour of the plaintiffs by the lower appellate Court. In our opinion, this argument is well-founded. On the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court, it is clear that the mortgage was effected on 23-1- 1932, and, according to the entry in the record-of-rights, the document of zarpeshgi was not a registered document. It has also been found by the lower appellate Court that the mortgagees entered into possession and Sato was in possession of the disputed land not in the character of a teanant but in the character of a mortgagee. It has also been found by the lower appellate Court that the mortgagees entered into possession and Sato was in possession of the disputed land not in the character of a teanant but in the character of a mortgagee. The lower appellate Court rejected the claim of the defendants that they were occupying the land as occupancy tenants. It is, therefore, clear that upon the finding of the lower appellate Court Khatia Grain and Manga Grain and Sato were in possession as mortgagees and, later on defendants 3 to 3 (b) , who were transferees from Sato, were also in possession of the land in the status of mortgagees, till the year 1949 when the present suit was brought. Upon these facts it must be held that in spite of the invalidity of the mortgage of 23-1-1932, the defendants had acquired the status of mortgagees by the doctrine of prescription. On behalf of the appellants reference was made to 19 Pat LT 489: (AIR 1938 Pat 479) (B) , where there is an observation of Wort, J. that the rights of a mortgagee cannot be acquired by prescription. Manqhar Lall, J. also agreed with Wort, J. though he said in the course of his judgment that it was not necessary to consider whether the defendant can ever be held in law to be able to prescribe against a true owner his rights as a mortgagee. Indeed, this question was not necessary to be decided in that case, because the entry in the record-of-rights was of the year 1921 and the period of twelve years from that starting point had not expired when the suit was instituted in 1933. Any observation made by either Wort, J. or Manohar Lall, J. on this question is, therefore, in the nature of obiter and not in the nature of ratio decidendi. It is necessary, however, to "record our opinion that the view taken by their Lordships is not correct. Any observation made by either Wort, J. or Manohar Lall, J. on this question is, therefore, in the nature of obiter and not in the nature of ratio decidendi. It is necessary, however, to "record our opinion that the view taken by their Lordships is not correct. If has been pointed out by Jagannadha Das, J. in Pursottam Das v. S. M. Desouza AIR 1950 Orissa 213 (C) , that in 19 Pat LT 489: (AIR 1938 Pat 479) (B) both the learned Judges have failed to notice that the possession of a mortgagee under a void mortgage was permissive so far as the absolute title was concerned, and adverse only in so far as the limited interest was concerned, and the learned Judges have further failed to bear in mind that the mortgagee's interest was an interest was an interest in immoveable property and not merely a contractual security for a loan, and that adverse possession and prescription was as much a root of title to interest in immoveable property as a contractual document satisfying the requirements of the Transfer of Property Act, At page 216 Jagannadhada's J. has stated as follows : in Bhukhan Mian v. Radhika Kumari Debi, AIR 1938 Pat 479: 176 Ind Cas 35 (B) , the learned Judges, however, held that a person cannot prescribe for a limited interest like a tenancy or a mortgage. With great respect, I am unable to persuade myself that that proposition is correct. On the facts of that case, the question itself did not arise for a direct decision as pointed out by Manohar Lall, J. at page, fight-hand column, where the learned Judge stated as follows: "if as was argued, the defendant must be taken to have prescribed his rights as a mortgagee from the date of this entry, it is enough to state that the period of 12 years from that starting point had not expired when the suit was instituted in 1933'. The dictum of the learned Judge was, therefore, obiter; but in view of the fact that both the learned Judges discussed the question on principle and were inclined to give their assent to the proposition as above stated, weight and respect is due to that statement. The dictum of the learned Judge was, therefore, obiter; but in view of the fact that both the learned Judges discussed the question on principle and were inclined to give their assent to the proposition as above stated, weight and respect is due to that statement. On a close examination, however, of the reasoning of the learned Judges in support of the proposition, it is found that the same is based on two assumptions (1) that the position of the mortgagee under the void mortgage is adverse in the sense that it is entirely in derogation of the owner's full title; (2) that a mortgage interest can be created only by a contract as prescribed in the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judges have failed to notice that the possession of the mortgagee under a void mortgage is permissive so far as the absolute title is concerned and adverse only in so far as the limited interest is concerned. They have further failed to bear in mind that a mortgagee's interest is an interest in immoveable property and not merely a contractual security for a loan and that adverse possession and prescription is as much a root of title to interest in immovable property as a contractual document satisfying the requirements of the Trans'fer of Property Act. That Section 28, Limitation Act, is operative not only to extinguish the title of the rightful owner, but to transfer the title to the wrongful possessor is now well settled. Bee Gossain Dass v. Issur Chunder Nath ILR 3 Cal 224 (D) , Akhauri Haliwant v. Deo Narain, AIR 1941 Pat 181: ILR 19 Pat 852 (E) and Fakirappa Jotappa v. Ningappa Shidlingappa, AIR 1943 Born 265: 209 Ind Cas 251 (F). I am, therefore, unable with all due respect to follow the decision in AIR 1938 Pat 479 : 176 Ind Cas 35 (B) and I am definitely of the view that such a limited interest can be acquired by adverse possession". 'this view of the law has been accepted as correct by a Division Bench of this High Court in Dukhu v. Nand Lal, ILR 30 Pat 997: ( AIR 1952 Pat 239 ) (G) and Phekua Mahton v. Padu Mahton, 1955 BLJR 29 (H). 'this view of the law has been accepted as correct by a Division Bench of this High Court in Dukhu v. Nand Lal, ILR 30 Pat 997: ( AIR 1952 Pat 239 ) (G) and Phekua Mahton v. Padu Mahton, 1955 BLJR 29 (H). Applying the principle laid down in this line of authorities, we hold that even if the mortgage of 23/1/1932, was not a valid transaction because of non-compliance of Section 59, T. P. Act, still the defendants acquired the character of mortgagees of the disputed land because of prescription, and therefore, the plaintiffs have been rightly granted a decree for redemption by the lower appellate Court. We therefore affirm the decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.” 22. Another Division Bench of the Patna High Court while relying upon the judgment cited above, in Rupa Nonia v. Ram Brich reported in AIR 1959 Patna 164, have held as under: “[3] A point was, however, raised in the course of the argument as to whether and to what extent the invalid mortgage document itself can be used in evidence' to gather the terms of the mortgage. On that question there is a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Appanna Nadapena v. Saripilli Venkatasami, ILR 47 Mad 203: (AIR 1924 Mad 292) in which it was held by a majority of the learned Judges that an invalid mortgage document could be referred to for ascertaining the nature and the character of the possession and that accordingly it may be referred to for determining the Quantum of interest for which the defendant prescribed. It is obvious that in determining the character of the possession the quantum of the interest under which possession is purported to have been taken has to be ascertained by reference to the document itself. That quantum of interest is necessarily defined and limited by the terms of the document itself. I think that an attempt to use that document for the purpose does not offend against Section 17 and 49 of the Registration Act or Section 91 of the Evidence Act. The attempt to use the document to prove the quantum of the interest prescribed for and the character of possession is not the use of the document for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage itself under the document. The attempt to use the document to prove the quantum of the interest prescribed for and the character of possession is not the use of the document for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage itself under the document. The document is not used as a source of the mortgagee's title--the title itself having been acquired by adverse possession and by prescription. On this point I would respectfully adopt the view of the learned Judges in ILR 47 Mad 203: (AIR 1924 Mad 292).” 23. The Division Bench have held that where a person enters possession of immovable property not on the assertion of any absolute title but on the basis of an unregistered rehan bond in his favour and remains in possession for more than twelve years, he acquires the status of a mortgagee by the doctrine of prescription and so even though the rehan bond is not a valid transaction for want of registration, the mortgagor is entitled to redeem the property. 24. A Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Siri Chand v. Nathi reported in AIR 1983 Punjab & Haryana 171, have held that a mortgage having been entered before S. 59 was made applicable to the State of Haryana, is valid and limitation for redemption of such mortgaged is 30 years. The Division bench have held as under : “[12] In the present case, admittedly the oral mortgage had been made on June 14, 1948. At that time the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act had not been made applicable to the area. The said transaction at that time was, therefore, valid and legally enforceable one and the fact whether the mortgage was registered or not, was wholly irrelevant with regard to the issue of its validity. Consequently, the terminus for limitation for redemption has to run from the aforesaid date of June 14, 1948. The application for bringing the legal representatives, having been admittedly brought after the period of 30 years therefrom, namely, on Aug. 16, 1978 was thus beyond the period prescribed. This application, therefore, must be held to be barred by time. This Civil Revision has, therefore,, to be allowed and the application for bringing the legal representatives is hereby dismissed on the ground of limitation and the impugned order of the trial Court is hereby set aside.” 25. 16, 1978 was thus beyond the period prescribed. This application, therefore, must be held to be barred by time. This Civil Revision has, therefore,, to be allowed and the application for bringing the legal representatives is hereby dismissed on the ground of limitation and the impugned order of the trial Court is hereby set aside.” 25. In the instant case also, relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were not made applicable to the area i.e. Kullu. Thus, the transaction made on 11.6.1969 was valid and enforceable, whether the mortgage was registered or not, was wholly irrelevant. 26. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 27. In view of the discussion and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application (s), if any, also stand disposed of. No costs.