JUDGMENT : Mr. P.B. Suresh Kumar, J. The plaintiff in the suit is in appeal. The defendant is the daughter of the plaintiff. The mother of the defendant has obtained divorce from the plaintiff and is living separately with the defendant since 2003 at Mumbai. The case of the plaintiff is that on 03/05/1989, when the defendant was less than six months of age, he purchased the plaint A schedule property, hereinafter referred to as 'the suit property', as per Ext. A1 sale deed, in the name of the defendant as he believed then that purchasing a property in the name of his newly born child would bring good luck to him and to his family. The vendor of the suit property was none other than the maternal grand mother of the defendant. It is also the case of the plaintiff that since the suit property was not purchased for the benefit of the defendant, he is the real owner of the suit property, though the property stands in the name of the defendant. It is alleged by the plaintiff that he has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit property and has been remitting the land tax in respect of the property all along. It is also alleged by the plaintiff that he has improved the suit property by planting coconut saplings, nutmeg, etc. According to the plaintiff, since the document in respect of the suit property stands in the name of the defendant, the suit is necessitated for a declaration of his title over the suit property. The plaintiff also sought in the suit a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit property. 2. The defendant resisted the suit by filing a written statement. It was contended by the defendant that her grandmother who owned the suit property wanted to gift the same to her in consideration of her love and affection towards the defendant and the plaintiff who was asked to make the arrangements for the execution of the document, has prepared Ext. A1 document as if it is a sale deed obtained by him in the name of the defendant with ulterior motives. It was also contended by the defendant that the vendor of the document has not received any consideration from the plaintiff for executing Ext. A1 document. A1 document as if it is a sale deed obtained by him in the name of the defendant with ulterior motives. It was also contended by the defendant that the vendor of the document has not received any consideration from the plaintiff for executing Ext. A1 document. According to the defendant, she is therefore the absolute owner of the suit property. 3. The Trial Court found that the suit property has been purchased by the plaintiff in the name of the defendant for consideration. Despite the said finding, the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court holding that the suit property was purchased by the plaintiff in the name of the defendant for the benefit of the defendant and that therefore she is the absolute owner of the suit property. It was observed by the Trial Court that the possession of the suit property by the plaintiff can only be regarded as the possession of the plaintiff as the natural guardian of the defendant. The plaintiff took up the matter in appeal. The Appellate Court, on a re-appraisal of the evidence on record, confirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The plaintiff is aggrieved by the concurrent decisions against him and hence this second appeal. 4. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law have been framed for decision in the appeal: (i) Whether the plaintiff/appellant succeeded in rebutting the presumption under Section 3(2) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, to prove that Ext. A1 transaction was not intended for the benefit of the defendant/ minor daughter? (ii) Whether Ext. A1 document evidence as a gift in favour of the minor daughter by father in the absence of any express or implied acceptance by the donee? (iii) Whether the Appellate Court is justified in relying on Exts. B1 and B2 for dismissing the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title? 5. Heard the appellant/plaintiff in person as also the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant. 6. (iii) Whether the Appellate Court is justified in relying on Exts. B1 and B2 for dismissing the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title? 5. Heard the appellant/plaintiff in person as also the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant. 6. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short clarifies that the provision contained in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act shall not apply to the purchase of property by any person in the name of his unmarried daughter and that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the unmarried daughter. In other words, in a case where a property is purchased by a person in the name of his unmarried daughter, if the presumption referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act is rebutted, by producing cogent evidence to prove that the suit property was purchased in the name of the unmarried daughter by him for his benefit, the title of the property will remain with him (See G. Mahalingappa v. G.M. Savitha, 2005 KHC 1285 : (2005) 6 SCC 441 : 2005 (4) KLT SN 45). In Jaydayal Poddar (Deceased) through LRs. and Another v. Mst. Bibi Hazra and Others, 1974 KHC 370 : AIR 1974 SC 171 : (1974) 1 SCC 3 : 1974 (2) SCR 90 the Apex Court held that though the question whether a sale is a benami or not is largely one of fact, and for determining this question, no absolute formulae or acid test, uniformly applicable in all situations can be laid down; yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevant indicia, the Courts are usually guided by the circumstances; (1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour; (4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title-deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale. It was also held by the Apex Court in the said case that the above criterion are not exhaustive and their efficacy varies according to the facts of each case. Though benami transactions are prohibited subsequently by virtue of the provision contained in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, insofar as sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act excludes transactions in the nature of Ext. A1 from the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 3, the tests laid down by the Apex Court can be safely followed for the purpose of ascertaining whether the transaction in a given case was intended for the benefit of the unmarried daughter. 7. As far as the present case is concerned, the defendant has no case in the written statement that Ext. A1 is a purchase made by the plaintiff for her benefit. Her contention, on the other hand, was that the same was a gift given to her by her maternal grandmother and the plaintiff has, with ulterior motive, got the document executed as if it is a purchase effected by him. As noted above, the said case is repelled by the Courts below holding that Ext. A1 is a purchase effected by the plaintiff in the name of the defendant. It is beyond dispute that at the time when Ext. A1 document was executed, the defendant was a minor aged below one year. Ext. A1 does not state that the purchase of the property effected as per the said document was intended for the benefit of the defendant. The plaintiff has produced the original of Ext. A1 in Court. The Trial Court has found that the plaintiff was all along in possession of the suit property, though it observed that the right of possession exercised by the plaintiff was in his capacity as the guardian of the defendant. It has come out in evidence that the plaintiff has been paying tax in respect of the suit property all along. The fact that the plaintiff has provided a way having a width of 3.5 meters through the suit property to the plaint B schedule property before the said property was purchased by him is not in dispute. Likewise, the fact that the plaintiff has subsequently purchased the plaint B schedule property and was holding both the properties together is also not in dispute. Ext. Likewise, the fact that the plaintiff has subsequently purchased the plaint B schedule property and was holding both the properties together is also not in dispute. Ext. A2(a) evidences payment of tax in respect of both the properties together. Likewise, the fact that the plaintiff has later sold the plaint B schedule property after providing a way having a width of 3.5 meters through the suit property is also not in dispute. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I have no doubt in my mind that the suit property is one purchased by the plaintiff for his own benefit and not for the benefit of the defendant at all. It is all the more so as there is no reason for the plaintiff to purchase the suit property for the benefit of the defendant at a point of time when she was aged less than one year. 8. Now, I shall deal with the reasons given by the Courts below for holding that Ext. A1 transaction is a purchase effected by the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant. The view taken by the Trial Court is that Ext. A1 is a gift made by the plaintiff to the defendant. Ext A1, going by its recitals, cannot be construed as a gift made by the plaintiff in respect of the suit property in favour of the defendant. True, in Ext. B1 objection preferred by the plaintiff in the execution petition filed by the mother of the defendant against the plaintiff for executing the decree for maintenance obtained by her against him, the plaintiff has taken the stand that the suit property is one given by him to the defendant. The defendant has no case that the suit property is one gifted by the plaintiff to her. So long as the defendant has no case the suit property is one gifted by the plaintiff to her, the said statement in Ext. B1 does not preclude the plaintiff from taking the stand that he is the real owner of the property, in a subsequent proceedings. Yet another reason given by the Courts below for holding that Ext. A1 is a purchase effected by the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant is the stand taken by the plaintiff in Ext. B2 objection preferred by the plaintiff in the above referred execution petition. In Ext. Yet another reason given by the Courts below for holding that Ext. A1 is a purchase effected by the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant is the stand taken by the plaintiff in Ext. B2 objection preferred by the plaintiff in the above referred execution petition. In Ext. B2, the plaintiff has taken the stand that the suit property stands in the name of the defendant. It is settled that an admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matter stated therein. It is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. It can be shown to be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made has not acted upon it to his detriment, when it might become conclusive by way of estoppel. The defendant has no case that she has acted upon the said stand taken by the plaintiff in Ext. B2 to her detriment. As such, Ext. B2 only proves that the plaintiff has made such an admission in an earlier proceedings. When materials on record establish beyond doubt that the plaintiff is the real owner of the property, it cannot be held otherwise merely on account of the stand taken by the plaintiff in Ext. B2. The findings rendered by the Courts below that Ext. A1 is a purchase made by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant are therefore perverse. 9. The plaintiff has thus rebutted the presumption contained in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act that the purchase effected as per Ext. A1 was for the benefit of the defendant. The questions formulated for decision are thus answered in favour of the appellant. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed, the impugned judgments are set aside and OS No. 471 of 2009 is decreed as prayed for. All the interlocutory applications in the appeal are closed.