JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri R.C. Singh, learned counsel for appellants and Sri S.A. Murtaza, learned counsel for respondent. 2. This is defendants’ appeal under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure(hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) arising from judgment dated 29.3.1997 and decree dated 9.4.1997, respectively, passed by Sri Amar Singh, Additional Civil Judge(1), Bareilly decreeing Original Suit No. 370 of 1986, Nisha Agnihotri v. Food Corporation of India and another, for recovery of Rs. 15,99,369 alongwith interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 3. The plaint case set up by plaintiff-respondent vide plaint dated 26.9.1986, amended vide Court’s order dated 12.11.1986 and 26.7.1989, is that plaintiff is owner of four acres of land situated on Bareilly-Pilibhit road. Defendant appellant-1 i.e. Food Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘FCI’) is a body corporate, carrying on business of purchase and storage of agricultural commodities. Defendant-2 is District Manager and Principal Officer, FCI at Bareilly district. 4. Defendants needed adequate space for storing ‘Ravi’ crop and wanted to take land with appurtenant building for storage of agricultural produce. Land of plaintiff was inspected by officers of FCI. They found land suitable and approved the same. Plaintiff offered to let out land to FCI on the conditions that lease would be for a minimum period of three years and rent chargeable shall be Rs. 0.40 per square ft. per month. Defendants vide letter dated 24.3.1986 accepted above conditions and required plaintiff to carry out certain constructions immediately over the land to make it usable for storage purpose. These conditions were: (a) To keep the land ready by 15.4.1986 with brick soling. (b) To construct 20' wide approach road connecting plot from main Highway with double layer of brick soling. (c) To construct one R.C.R. Hume Pipe Culvert. (d) To level the plot with heavy road roller. (e) To fix at least 2 metre barbed wire fencing around the entire plot. (f) To fix hand pump for water facility. (g) To construct rooms for staff and security cabin near the gate. 5. The plaintiff in order to comply with the aforesaid conditions borrowed Rs. 7,00,000/- and more from bank, friends and relatives and by selling jewellary. She incurred expenses of more than Rs. 7 lacs and liability to pay interest on bank loan, to make land suitable and fulfill the condition as directed by FCI. 5. The plaintiff in order to comply with the aforesaid conditions borrowed Rs. 7,00,000/- and more from bank, friends and relatives and by selling jewellary. She incurred expenses of more than Rs. 7 lacs and liability to pay interest on bank loan, to make land suitable and fulfill the condition as directed by FCI. Defendants took possession of entire land measuring 1,17,617 sq. ft. with appurtenant building etc. on 5.5.1986 and started storing agricultural produce thereon. During pendency of suit, on 25.11.1986 defendants vacated land and other property, and removed their effects without intimation or consent of plaintiff. As per contract, at the rate of Paise 40 per sq.ft. per month, defendants were liable to pay rent of Rs. 62,734.40 to plaintiff which they failed. Defendants insisted upon plaintiff to accept rent on much lower rate. Total amount of rent for three years comes to Rs. Rs. 22,48,438.40. Defendants have committed breach of contract causing loss of rent to plaintiff. She is entitled for compensation from defendants to the tune of Rs. 22,48,438.40 alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Defendants have paid Rs. 94,459.15 towards part payment of rent for the period from 1.5.1986 to 25.11.1986 which amount was received by plaintiff without prejudice to her rights. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover Rs. 21,53,979.25 with interest at the rate of 18% per annum pendente lite and future interest thereon. The contract to let out land was completed when defendants took possession thereon. Agreed conditions were never modified or altered by both the parties. Defendants have also caused loss to plaintiff by imposing certain conditions for construction over the land so as to make it ready for use by them. For carrying out those conditions, plaintiff incurred huge expenses i.e.Rs.7,00,000/- and odd which has also caused apparent loss to her. 6. Suit was contested by defendant-appellants by filing written statement dated 13.1.1987. Their case is that plaintiff is owner of land in dispute and defendant-1 is a body corporate. Defendant-2 is a Principal officer of defendant-1 for district Bareilly. There is regional office for State of U.P. at Lucknow, headed by Senior Regional Manager, and Head Office at New Delhi, headed by Managing Director. The land in dispute was inspected by two officers of defendant-1. The site was approved immediately for storing ‘Ravi’ crop of 1986-1987. Plaintiff was informed about deficiencies and shortcomings upon the land. There is regional office for State of U.P. at Lucknow, headed by Senior Regional Manager, and Head Office at New Delhi, headed by Managing Director. The land in dispute was inspected by two officers of defendant-1. The site was approved immediately for storing ‘Ravi’ crop of 1986-1987. Plaintiff was informed about deficiencies and shortcomings upon the land. She was also informed that to make out land useful for longer period, she would have to get it perfected according to specifications of FCI. The offer containing conditions for a minimum period of three years and rent at the rate of Paise 40 per sq. ft. per month was accepted by letter dated 24.3.1986. However, aforesaid acceptance was subject to fulfillment of required specifications mentioned in Circular dated 21.9.1984, issued by FCI. The requirements which plaintiff had to fulfill were stated in the letter dated 19.6.1985. Letter dated 24.3.1986 was in continuation of previous correspondence but appears to have not been well drafted by office of FCI. The offer was explained further vide letter dated 2.4.1986. It was made clear that three years term and rent at the rate of Paise 40 per sq.ft. per month stated in letter dated 14.2.1986 cannot be accepted. The plot in question can be hired on month to month basis till it is in use of FCI. The rent will be decided by Regional office, Lucknow as per Rules and existing instructions of FCI. Possession of part of land was delivered by plaintiff to defendants on 5.5.1986 and rest part on 8.5.1986. In the delivery of possession letter, in column 5, it was mentioned that rent is to be decided by district office, FCI, Bareilly/Regional office, FCI, Lucknow. 7. It further said that Plaintiff’s husband insisted to take land on the condition, as it was, since plaintiff had invested some amount and cannot make further investment, satisfying specifications of FCI. Rent may be decided by Regional Office. The specifications of area given in para 6 of plaint is not correct. Plaintiff is claiming exorbitant rent which was not payable. It is not correct that plaintiff has raised constructions making huge investment. Grains stored by FCI was removed and land was vacated. It was taken temporarily. Land did not satisfy requirements of FCI, being shallow, low-lying, sinking and covered only with one layer of bricks. Grains stored FCI were likely to be damaged. 8. It is not correct that plaintiff has raised constructions making huge investment. Grains stored by FCI was removed and land was vacated. It was taken temporarily. Land did not satisfy requirements of FCI, being shallow, low-lying, sinking and covered only with one layer of bricks. Grains stored FCI were likely to be damaged. 8. FCI has no objection for payment of reasonable amount towards rent from the date land and building remained in possession of FCI but it is not liable for any damage etc. The amount claimed by plaintiff is not payable. Land was taken temporarily. She did not fulfil requirement and specifications of FCI. Relief claimed for injunction to restrain defendants from removing food grains stocks stored at disputed land is misconceived and cannot be granted. There is no liability of defendants to pay any amount for three years at the rate of Paise 40 per sq.ft. per month. It is not maintainable. 9. FCI invited tenders by publication of advertisement in various newspapers vide letter dated 21.9.1984. The form and specifications were to be purchased by offerer on payment of Rs. 5/- from 1.10.1984 till 29.10.1984. Plaintiff also purchased same and submitted offer. She was fully aware of specifications and requirements of FCI. The site was visited by two officers of FCI. They informed plaintiff for increase of height by 12 inches after filling the land. This remark was also written on the form of inspection report sent to Regional Office, Lucknow vide letter 19.6.1985. Copy of this letter was endorsed to plaintiff in reference to her letter dated 25.5.1985. No reply was received by District office. Husband of plaintiff enquired from District office, Bareilly about need for open storage. He was informed that FCI will require place for storage of ‘Ravi’ crop of 1986-87. In view of verbal talks, plaintiff submitted offer dated 14.2.1986 mentioning that land has been seen and approved by officers of FCI. During verbal talks, plaintiff’s husband acted as her agent, undertook to raise heights and soling of bricks as per specifications of FCI. Plaintiff also undertook to provide electricity. She also informed that office accommodation alongwith accommodation for Watchman was available. 10. In view of aforesaid undertaking by plaintiff, acceptance letter dated 24.3.1986 was issued to plaintiff. Some additional deficiencies were also pointed out in this letter. Plaintiff also undertook to provide electricity. She also informed that office accommodation alongwith accommodation for Watchman was available. 10. In view of aforesaid undertaking by plaintiff, acceptance letter dated 24.3.1986 was issued to plaintiff. Some additional deficiencies were also pointed out in this letter. Plaintiff failed to raise height by 12 inches, hence acceptance communicated vide letter dated 24.3.1986 was withdrawn vide letter dated 2.4.1986 i.e. before taking possession of land. However, plaintiff insisted for taking of her land on month to month basis as per letter 2.4.1986 and that rent may be settled by Regional Office. FCI needed land for temporary use. In the possession letter it was mentioned that rate of rent shall be decided by District Office/Regional Office. Accepting authority is not vested with power independently. It could have been accepted only by Head Office and so-called acceptance communicated by defendants is not binding on defendant-1. 11. For storage it should be taken on three years guarantee basis. It should contain open platforms of 70 ft. X 200 ft. with a minimum height of 2 ft. above top on the road formation level. Parameter wall should be 0.23 Meter thick and 1.83 Meter high with 0.81 Meter barbed wire fencing over wall. Premises should have facility of heavy trucks, conveyance, electricity, drinking water, sanitary posts and small office blocks. 12. Plaintiff claimed mandatory injunction for payment of rent but no Court fee was paid on the amount claimed. However, amount has been specified. The land is shallow, low-lying and damp etc. This type of land can only be occupied for seasonal and temporary use and not for three years. 13. Plaint was amended after land in question was vacated by defendants. 14. An additional written statement was also filed by FCI stating that land remained in occupation from 5.5.1986 to 25.11.1986. Rent was payable at the rate of Rs. 0.12 per sq. ft. per month and it was actually paid vide cheque dated 2.2.1987. No further amount is payable. No lease was executed for letting out land in question nor any document was registered though it was necessarily registerable. Hence any document containing terms of lease for the period of three years is not admissible in evidence for any purpose vide Section 49 of Indian Registration Act(hereinafter referred as ‘ Registration Act’). The claim is barred by limitation. 15. No lease was executed for letting out land in question nor any document was registered though it was necessarily registerable. Hence any document containing terms of lease for the period of three years is not admissible in evidence for any purpose vide Section 49 of Indian Registration Act(hereinafter referred as ‘ Registration Act’). The claim is barred by limitation. 15. Trial Court formulated 21 issues which read as under: 1- D;k oknuh us okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k gS vkSj U;k;kyh; 'kqYd vi;kZIr Hkqxrku fd;k gS\ 2- D;k izfroknhx.k us oknuh ds lkFk mldh Hkwfe dks fdjk;s ij ysus ds fy, fdjk;s ij 3 o"kZ ds fy, 40 iSls@izfr oxZ fQV izfrekg fdjk;s ij ysus gsrq lafonk dh Fkh tSlk fd oknuh dk okn i= dh /kkjk&4 o 6 esa vfHkdFku gS\ 3- D;k izfroknhx.k us 1]17]617 oxZ fQV Hkwfe ftlds lkFk esa layXu Hkou Hkh cuk Fkk fnukad 5 o 8 ebZ 1986 dks vius i= fnukad 24&3&86 ds vuqlkj dCts esa fy;k tSlk fd oknuh dk okn i= dh /kkjk 5 o 6 esa vfHkdFku gS\ 4- D;k izfroknhx.k izfrekg :i;s 62]734&40 iSls lafonk dh 'krksZ ds vuqlkj tks i{kdkjksa ds e/; fnukad 14&2&86 o 24&3&86 ds i= ds vuqlkj gqvk Fkk nsus ds fy, mRrjnk;h gSA tSlk fd okn i= dh /kkjk&7 esa vfHkdFku gS\ 5- D;k oknuh us fookfnr Hkwfe ij izfroknh x.k ds i= fnukad 24&3&86 ds vuqlkj fuekZ.k dk;Z fd;kA ;fn gka rks izHkko\ 6- D;k oknuh us lafonk dk izLrko fu'kk 'kyHk ds uke ls Hkh izfroknh ds ikl Hkstk Fkk\ 7- D;k oknuh ds Hkw[k.M esa tks dfe;ka Fkh og dfe;ka i= fnukad ¼19&6&85½ esa n'kkZ;h x;h Fkh\ 8- D;k oknuh dk izLrko fnukad 14&2&86 o izLrko dh Lohd`fr fnukad 24&3&86 fu'kk 'kyHk ds fiNys izLrko ds izfjizsf{; esa bu dUV~;wus'ku esa Fkh\ 9- D;k oknuh us izfroknh [kkn~; fuxe ds }kjk Hkw[k.M ij n’kkZ;h x;h dfe;ksa dks iwjk dj fn;k Fkk ftls oknuh 40 iSlk izfr oxZ fQV dh nj ls fdjk;k izkIr dj ldsA ;fn ugha rks bldk izHkko\ 10- D;k Lohd`fr fnukad 24&3&86 [kafMr i= fnukad 2&4&86 ds }kjk dj fn;k x;k Fkk\ 11- D;k oknuh ds }kjk izLrqr izLrko dh Lohd`fr tks izsf"kr dh x;h Fkh og fdjk;s ds lEcU/k esa jhtuy vkfQl Hkkjrh; [kkn~; fuxe y[kuÅ ds fu.kZ; ds vk/kkj ij vk/kkfjr Fkh\ 12- D;k Lohd`fr fnukad 24&3&86 dks mfpr vf/kdkjh ds }kjk Lohdkj ugha fd;k x;k Fkk vkSj bl izdkj izfroknh la0&1 blls okf/kr ugha gS\ 13- D;k oknuh us fookfnr Hkwfe dk miHkksx izfroknh ds }kjk djus esa ck/kk mRiUu dh ;fn gka rks izHkko\ 14- oknuh D;k vuqrks"k ikus dh vf/kdkfj.kh gS\ 15- D;k oknuh vkSj izfroknhx.k ds e/; lEcfU/kr lEifRr ds lEcU/k esa 3 o"kZ ds fdjk;snkjh dk oS/k vuqcU/k gqvk ;fn gks rks izHkko\ 16- fdjk;snkjh dh D;k nj r; gqbZ Fkh\ 17- D;k izfroknhx.k us mDr fdjk;snkjh vuqcU/k dh 3 o"kZ dh vof/k iw.kZ gksus ls iwoZ gh lacaf/kr lEifRr ls fdjk;snkjh dk vdkj.k ifjR;kx fd;kA ;fn gka rks bldk izHkko\ 18- D;k okn dky ckf/kr gS\ 19- D;k okn esa dbZ ckn dkj.kksa dks n'kkZus dk nks"k O;kIr gS\ 20- D;k 3 o"kZ dk iVVk tks 40 iSls izfr oxZ fQV izfr ekg dh fdjk;snkjh dk FkkA Hkkjrh; [kkn~; fuxe ds vf/kdkfj;ksa us fd;k Fkk vkSj D;k ;g oS/k vkSj i{kdkjksa ij ckf/kr fcuk iathdj.k ds gS\ 21- D;k fdjk;s dk okn fe;kn ckgj gS\** “1. Whether the plaintiff has undervalued the suit and underpaid the Court fee? 2. Whether the defendants, as averred in paras 4 and 6 to the plaint of the plaintiff, had entered into a contract with the plaintiff to take her land on rent for three years at the monthly rate of 40 paise/square feet? 3. Whether the defendants, as mentioned in the plaint of the plaintiff, took possession of 1,17,617 square feet of land alongwith the appurtenant building on 5th and 8th May 1986, as per their letter dated 24.3.1986? 4. Whether the defendants, as mentioned in para 7 of the plaint, are liable to pay Rs. 62,734.40 per month as per terms and conditions of the contract executed between the parties as per letters dated 14.2.1986 and 24.3.1986? 5. Whether the plaintiff had undertaken construction on the disputed land as per letter of the defendants dated 24.3.1986? If so, its effect? 6. Whether the plaintiff has sent a proposal of the contract to the defendants also under the name of Nisha Shalabh? 7. Whether the defects of the land of the plaintiff were shown in the letter dated 19.6.1985? 8. Whether the proposal of the plaintiff dated 14.2.1986 and the approval of the proposal dated 24.3.1986 were in continuation of the previous proposal of Nisha Shalabh? 9. Whether the plaintiff had removed all such defects on the land as pointed out by the defendant, Food Corporation, thereby entitling her to get rent at the rate of 40 paise per square feet? If not, its effect? 10. Whether the acceptance dated 24.3.1986 was cancelled by the letter dated 2.4.1986? 11. Whether approval of plaintiff’s proposal sent to her was based on the determination of the Food Corporation of India, Regional Office, Lucknow in relation to rent? 12. Whether acceptance dated 24.3.1986 was not approved by the competent authority and hence, defendant No. 1 is not bound by it. 13. Whether the plaintiff created obstacles in the use of the disputed land by the defendant? If so, its effect? 14. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief? * 15. Whether a valid contract for three years’ tenancy in relation to the property concerned was executed between the plaintiff and the defendants? If so, its effect? 16. What rate of rent was fixed? 17. If so, its effect? 14. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief? * 15. Whether a valid contract for three years’ tenancy in relation to the property concerned was executed between the plaintiff and the defendants? If so, its effect? 16. What rate of rent was fixed? 17. Whether the defendants had forsaken the said tenancy of the property for no reason even before expiry of three years’ period of the aforesaid tenancy? If so, its effect? 18. Whether the suit is time barred? 19. Whether the suit is vitiated because of several causes of action being shown therein? 20. Whether the lease for three years at the monthly rate of 40 paise per square feet was made by the officers of Food Corporation of India and whether it is valid and binding on parties and whether it is without registration? 21. Whether the tenancy suit is barred by limitation?” (English translation by Court) 16. Plaintiff examined Surendra Nath Agnihotri (PW-1), herself as PW-2 and again Surendra Nath Agnihotri as PW-3 while defendant appellants examined Shyam Mohan Saxena (DW-1) in the context of application 82-C and for other purposes H.L. Singh (DW-1), V.K. Awasthi (DW-2) and Shyam Mohan Saxena(DW-3). 17. Issue 1 relating to valuation of Court fee was answered in favour of plaintiff by order dated 27.2.1987 and same was made part of final judgment and decree. Issues 2,3,4,5,9 and 10 were taken together and answered in favour of plaintiff. Issue 6 has been answered in affirmative. Issue 7 has been answered in negative holding that it could not be said that defects mentioned in notice under letter dated 19.6.1985 were not removed. Issue 8 was also answered in favour of plaintiff. Issues 11,12 and 13 were answered in negative. Issues 15 and 16 were answered holding that parties agreed to let out premises for three years on monthly rent of Paise 40 per sq. ft. Issue 17 has been answered observing that defendants without any reason vacated premises before expiry of three years. Issue 18 was answered in negative holding that defendants could not show as to how suit was barred by limitation. Similarly, issue 19 was answered in negative observing that defendants could not show any illegality in the suit. Issue 20 was answered in favour of plaintiff and issue 21 in negative. 18. Issue 18 was answered in negative holding that defendants could not show as to how suit was barred by limitation. Similarly, issue 19 was answered in negative observing that defendants could not show any illegality in the suit. Issue 20 was answered in favour of plaintiff and issue 21 in negative. 18. Ultimately issue-14 has been answered by observing that actual area of which possession taken was less than what was claimed by plaintiff and therefore she was entitled for damages and compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,99,369/- only. Trial Court accordingly decreed suit for recovery of Rs. 15,99,369/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum vide judgment dated 29.3.1997 and decree dated 9.4.1997. Hence this appeal. 19. Learned counsel for appellants contends before this Court that there was no agreement or contract between the parties. In any case, a lease document for a period of three years requires to be compulsorily registered vide Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred as “Act 1908) but no such registered document was available. Hence, Court below has erred in decreeing the suit. He pleaded that in view of Section 156 and 157 of The Uttar Pradesh Zamindarti Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred as ‘U.P. Act, 1950’), plaintiff-respondent could not have let out premises and entire plaint case set up by plaintiff on the basis of illegal unauthorized deed was liable to be dismissed. He also submitted that claim submitted by plaintiff was barred by Section 106, 107 and 108 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred as ‘T.P. Act, 1882). The claim was not enforceable. 20. For the purpose of adjudication of this appeal, we find following points for determination, need to be answered by this Court : A. Whether there was enforceable agreement between parties? B. Whether defendant-appellants by taking possession of property in dispute are liable for payment of compensation and damages by making breach of conditions stipulated in contract/communications between parties? C. Whether plaintiff -respondent was entitled for compensation and Court below has rightly decreed the suit? D. Whether Sections 156 and 157 of UP Act, 1950 are attracted in this case and would make any difference to the prejudice of plaintiff-respondent in this case? E. Whether the claim submitted by plaintiff was barred by Sections 106 and 107, 108 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882? 21. D. Whether Sections 156 and 157 of UP Act, 1950 are attracted in this case and would make any difference to the prejudice of plaintiff-respondent in this case? E. Whether the claim submitted by plaintiff was barred by Sections 106 and 107, 108 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882? 21. Certain disputed facts as emerged from record may be culled out at one place so as to have a clear idea as to what has transpired between the parties. An offer was made by plaintiff-respondent Smt. Nisha Agnihotri vide letter dated 14.2.1986 about the land in dispute to be leased out to defendants-appellants for the purpose of storage etc. The same was offered as per advertisement dated 21.9.1984. The offer admittedly contains following terms and conditions. 1. Contract shall be minimum for a period of three years. 2. Rent chargeable shall be Paise 40 per square ft. Per month. 22. This fact has been admitted by defendants-appellants in its written statement. In paragraph 4 thereof, appellants have stated as under : “No doubt letter dated 24.3.1986 contains acceptance of the offer dated 14.2.1985 containing the rate of 0.40 N.P. per sq. ft. as rent and the period of three years but this acceptance is related to previous correspondence regarding this property and the letter of acceptance is to be interpreted in the light of the facts mentioned in the additional plea.” 23. Appellants admitted acceptance of offer vide letter dated 24.3.1986 which reads as under : “With reference to your offer of dated 14.2.1986 I am to inform you, that the offer of the land situated on Bareilly Pilibhit main highway has been accepted with the conditions that the following facilities are provided : 1. Land should be provided with brick soling and kept ready on or before 15.4.86. 2. A 20' wide approach road connecting the plot from main highway with double layer of brick soling. 3. One R.C.C. Hume pipe culvert. 4. All the indulations have to be removed and plot is to be rolled with heavy road roller properly. 5. At least 2 metre high barbed wire fencing having minimum 10 horizontal rows of wire and 2 diagonals between two posts, 2.5 metre apart all round the plot with one 18' wide main gate. 6. One hand pump for drinking water facility. 7. A room for staff and one security cabin near the main gate.” 24. 5. At least 2 metre high barbed wire fencing having minimum 10 horizontal rows of wire and 2 diagonals between two posts, 2.5 metre apart all round the plot with one 18' wide main gate. 6. One hand pump for drinking water facility. 7. A room for staff and one security cabin near the main gate.” 24. The acceptance letter, therefore, shows that offer made by plaintiff-respondent was accepted by appellants without any objection or reservation vis-a vis the rate of rent or the period of lease. The acceptance letter requires plaintiff-respondent only to provide certain facilities which according to appellants were lacking on the disputed land. It is also admitted by appellants that possession of disputed land was taken by them on 5th and 8th of May, 1986. Total area of land taken in possession was 1,17,617 sq. ft. with appurtenant residential construction on the land. Appellants used and enjoyed land for storage of grains etc. and continued with possession of disputed land till 25.11.1986. Disputed land was vacated on 25.11.1986. 25. No formal lease-deed or lease agreement was executed between the parties setting out terms or conditions separately, except aforesaid correspondence, pursuant whereto, possession was taken. Possession document is exhibit Ka-3 and it does not mention that disputed land did not satisfy facilities required to be provided to appellants vide letter dated 24.3.1986 (Exhibit Ga-10). 26. Thus contract between parties for letting out disputed land was complete and acted upon when possession was taken by appellants and they started enjoying and using the same. Land was let out for storage of grains and actually used for that purpose. 27. Learned counsel for appellants submitted, since there was no written and registered agreement between the parties laying down terms and conditions of lease, there was no enforceable contract between the parties and therefore, Trial Court erred in law in decreeing damages and compensation to plaintiff-respondent. 28. Submission requires us to refer to certain provisions of T.P. Act, 1882. Sections 105 to 117 deal with leasing of immovable property. “Lease”, “premium” and “rent” as also term “lessor” and “lessee” have been defined, Section 105 reads as under : “105. 28. Submission requires us to refer to certain provisions of T.P. Act, 1882. Sections 105 to 117 deal with leasing of immovable property. “Lease”, “premium” and “rent” as also term “lessor” and “lessee” have been defined, Section 105 reads as under : “105. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined : The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.” 29. It cannot be doubted that immovable property in the case in hand, was transferred to appellants by plaintiff-respondent creating a right to enjoy such property for certain time, for consideration of price or promise. The transferee accepted transfer on the terms and offer of the transferer. Money promised to be rendered periodically also satisfies definition of “rent”. Therefore, to constitute a “lease” in terms of Section 105, and money agreed between the parties as “rent” satisfies required ingredients. 30. Section 106 presently available in T.P. Act, 1882 is one which is substituted by Act No. 3 of 2003 with effect from 31.12.2002. In the present case, we are concerned with Section 106 as it was available in 1986 and at that time it read as under: “106. 30. Section 106 presently available in T.P. Act, 1882 is one which is substituted by Act No. 3 of 2003 with effect from 31.12.2002. In the present case, we are concerned with Section 106 as it was available in 1986 and at that time it read as under: “106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage- In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days, notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy.” Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at this residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.” 31. Aforesaid provision simply refers to the period of lease and procedure of its termination in absence of a contract or local law or usage otherwise, if the lease of immovable property is for agricultural or manufacturing purpose. In absence of contract etc. it shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year basis and for other purposes, it shall be from month to month, terminable by either of parties by giving 15 days notice, expiring with the end of month of tenancy. 32. We propose to consider the effect of Section 106 after referring to Section 107 which is crux of the entire arguments on behalf of appellants. Section 107 provides the manner in which lease is required to be made and reads as under : “107. A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee: PROVIDED that the State Government from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession. 33. It shows that a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument. In the present case, rent accepted between the parties was monthly rent of Paise 40 per sq. ft. The period of lease as offered by plaintiff-respondent and accepted by defendants appellants was three years and, therefore, for such a lease, a registered instrument was necessary by virtue of Section 107. In a case where parties intended to act upon a lease of immovable property for a term exceeding one year but no registered agreement is made but parties have actually acted upon the lease by handing over possession and transferee starts enjoying the property letting out to it, the consequence of such a case would be that the lease by itself may not be treated to be from year to year or for any term exceeding one year. The duration of such lease would be governed by Section 106 which is applicable in case of absence of written contract. It provides that in such a case, lease of immovable property shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable by lessor or lessee by giving 15 days notice. The absence of registered agreement of lease does not mean that despite the lessee having enjoyed lease, would not be bound to discharge his part of obligation. 34. It provides that in such a case, lease of immovable property shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable by lessor or lessee by giving 15 days notice. The absence of registered agreement of lease does not mean that despite the lessee having enjoyed lease, would not be bound to discharge his part of obligation. 34. It cannot be said that lessor and lessee’s relationship has not been created between the parties as a result of offer and acceptance between them, accompanied by delivery of possession. We may refer to Section 4 of T.P. Act, 1882 which provides that the Chapters and Sections of T.P. Act, 1882 which relate to contracts shall be taken as part of Indian Contract Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred as IC Act, 1982). It also provides that Section 107 of T P Act, 1882 shall be read as supplemental to Indian Registration Act, 1908. 35. The fact of non-execution of registered instrument between the parties may result in denying specific performance of contract between the parties. If there is an agreement which is not registered, such document would not be admissible in evidence but where there is an oral agreement between the parties or there is an offer and acceptance by correspondence followed by transfer of possession, rights as lessor and lessee can be said to have created between the parties and duration of such kind of lease would be governed by Section 106. 36. Section 17 of Act, 1908 only suggests that an agreement of contract between the parties which is not registered, such instrument would not be admissible in evidence but that question does not arise here as no such formal agreement was executed between the parties. There was correspondence between the parties whereby plaintiff-respondent(owner of the premises) made an offer to let out immovable property owned by her on certain terms and conditions and that offer was accepted by defendant-appellants. Thus contract is complete. Thereafter land is used and enjoyed by defendant-appellants without any obstruction by plaintiff-respondent. 37. At this stage, learned counsel for appellants submitted that the offer contained in letter dated 14.2.1986 accepted on 24.3.1986 was repudiated by appellants before taking possession and was modified through another letter dated 2.4.1986(Exhibit Ga-38). In this regard, Court below has recorded its finding that this letter was not shown to have been served upon plaintiff-respondent. 37. At this stage, learned counsel for appellants submitted that the offer contained in letter dated 14.2.1986 accepted on 24.3.1986 was repudiated by appellants before taking possession and was modified through another letter dated 2.4.1986(Exhibit Ga-38). In this regard, Court below has recorded its finding that this letter was not shown to have been served upon plaintiff-respondent. The finding recorded by Court below are reproduced as under: ^^oknuh dk dFku gS fd mls ;g i= izkIr ugha gqvk gSA izn'kZ d&12 i= oknuh dks dc o fdl rkjh[k dks Hkstk x;k bldk dksbZ lk{; i=koyh ij ugha gSA ;g i= oknuh dks dc izkIr djk;k x;k bldk dksbZ lk{; i=koyh ij ugha gSA ;g i= okfnuh dks dc izkIr djk;k x;k bldk Hkh dksbZ lk{; ugha vk;k gSA izkfIr Lohd`fr jlhn Hkh nkf[ky ugha dh x;h gSA Mh0 MCyw0&1 ‘;ke eksgu lDlsuk Mh0MCyw&1 ,p0,y0 flag Mh0MCyw0&2 oh0ds0 voLFkh Mh0 MOyw&3 ‘;ke eksgu lDlsuk Hkh vius lk{; esa ;g rF; Li"V ugha dj ik;s gS fd izn'kZ d&12 dh izfr oknuh dks dc miyC/k djk;h x;h ,slh fLFkfr esa ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd bl i= ds }kjk Lohd`fr fnukad 24-3-86 dks [kafMr dj fn;k x;k FkkA ;fn Lohd`fr fnukad 24-3-86 [kafMr dj nh x;h Fkh rks mlds mijkUr fnukad 5-5-86 o fnukad 8-5-86 dks oknuh ds Hkw[k.M dk dCtk D;ksa ys fy;k x;kA blls Li"V gS fd mijksDr Lohd`fr [kafMr ugha dh x;h FkhA vr% dCtk Hkw[k.M dk fy;k x;k FkkA vr% okn fcUnq la[;k&10 dk fuLrkj.k udkjkRed :i ls fd;k tkrk gSA** “The lady plaintiff’s statement is that she has not received this letter. No evidence is available on record showing when and on which date the letter Ex A12 was sent to her. There is no record available on record showing when this letter was caused to be delivered to the lady plaintiff. No testimony has come on record showing when this letter was given to the lady plaintiff. Acknowledgement receipt has also not been filed. DW 1-H L Singh, DW 2-V K Avasthi and DW 3-Shyam Mohan Saxena, in their testimonies, have not been able to clear when the copy of Ex ka 12 was made available to the lady plaintiff. In this circumstance, it cannot be taken that through the said letter the acceptance dated 24.3.86 had been withdrawn. DW 1-H L Singh, DW 2-V K Avasthi and DW 3-Shyam Mohan Saxena, in their testimonies, have not been able to clear when the copy of Ex ka 12 was made available to the lady plaintiff. In this circumstance, it cannot be taken that through the said letter the acceptance dated 24.3.86 had been withdrawn. If the acceptance dated 24.3.86 had been withdrawn, why the possession of the plaintiff’s land was taken over after 5.5.86 and 8.5.86. It transpires that aforesaid acceptance had not been withdrawn. Hence, possession of plot was taken over. Hence, issue no 10 stands disposed off in the negative.” (English translation by Court) 38. Learned counsel for appellants submitted that letter dated 2.4.1986 was sent to plaintiff-respondent under Certificate of posting. The communication of letter dated 2.4.1986 has been denied by plaintiff-respondent. There is no presumption of service of a letter which was sent by ordinary post (under certificate of posting). Appellants were under onus to prove that letter dated 2.4.1986 was communicated and served upon plaintiff-respondent. Besides what is said by appellants is taken to be correct, then after acceptance of offer made by plaintiff-respondent to them, their case is of a counter offer, not accepted by plaintiff-respondent, hence there was no new contract. 39. Defendant-appellants admittedly proceeded to take possession of disputed land on 5th and 8th May, 1986. In the possession document also, nothing has been said about modified terms of contract. Hence initial contract was acted upon, remained intact. 40. In these facts and circumstances, when defendants-appellants proceeded to take possession of land in the manner which was offered by plaintiff-respondent, Court below has rightly held that it was in accordance with offer made by plaintiff-respondent vide letter dated 14.2.1986, accepted by defendants-appellants by letter dated 24.3.1986 and submission that this contract was mutually modified by letter dated 2.4.1986 is neither justified nor has been proved by appellants, therefore, cannot be accepted and has no substance. 41. Learned counsel for appellants then submitted that admittedly, land in dispute was vacated on 26.11.1986, hence defendant-appellants cannot be held liable for payment of any lease rent or damages for a period of three years and Court below while computing damages for three years has erred in law. 41. Learned counsel for appellants then submitted that admittedly, land in dispute was vacated on 26.11.1986, hence defendant-appellants cannot be held liable for payment of any lease rent or damages for a period of three years and Court below while computing damages for three years has erred in law. In this regard Court below has discussed the matter at length but we may also notice that admittedly plaintiff incurred expenses of substantial amount for making land useful for appellants. Plaintiff has incurred expenses of Rs. 7,00,000/- and odd and for that purpose she had obtained loan from bank. Obviously, plaintiff must have incurred additional liability of payment of interest also on the aforesaid amount. Plaintiff incurred aforesaid expenses expecting that disputed land shall earn substantial return by way of rent when occupied by appellants for a period of three years on monthly rent of Paise 40 per sq. ft. The occupied area was 1,17,617 sq. ft. Monthly rent, if computed at the rate of Paise 40 per sq. ft., would come to Rs. 47,050/-. Total return as per plaintiff-respondent thus comes to Rs. 16,93,828/- for a period of three years. In this regard, plaintiff had already incurred expenses of more than Rs. 7,00,000/- and said amount having been taken on loan from bank, plaintiff-respondent also incurred liability of interest for repayment of the said amount. Though defendants-appellants vacated premises on 25.11.1986 but it is admitted by learned counsel for appellants that no evidence has been adduced before Court below about serving 15 days notice, contemplated under Section 106 of T.P. Act, 1882. Section 106 clearly provides that notice must be in writing, signed or on behalf of person giving it, and either be sent to the person concerned or affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. Though oral evidence was adduced by DW-2 D.K. Awasthi that before vacating premises, plaintiff-respondent was communicated and given information but no such document has been placed on record to show that any such written notice was ever communicated to appellants. This fact has been noticed by Court below while adjudicating issue-17 and has not been disputed before us that no such notice was ever made part of record. There is no evidence to show that any written notice was given to plaintiff-respondent except oral statement of DW-2 D.K. Awasthi which had not been found worth by the Court below. 42. This fact has been noticed by Court below while adjudicating issue-17 and has not been disputed before us that no such notice was ever made part of record. There is no evidence to show that any written notice was given to plaintiff-respondent except oral statement of DW-2 D.K. Awasthi which had not been found worth by the Court below. 42. Court had also noticed that copy of notice was not adduced in evidence but in office record, copy of such notice was available. In the circumstances, suggestion that defendants vacated the premises terminating lease in terms of Section 106, cannot be accepted. 43. Further suggestion that land being agricultural land could not have been let out in violation of UP Act, 1950 for the reason that defendant-appellants had actually accepted contract, took possession of land and enjoyed the same for the purpose they required. They cannot abstain from liability of damages payable to plaintiff-respondent on the ground that land in question could not have been let out to them legally. 44. Section 156 of U.P. Act, 1950 prohibits letting of land except in cases covered by Section 157 or to a recognized educational institutions for a purpose connected with instructions in agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry. In our view, objection to this effect is not available to defendant appellants who themselves have availed benefit and enjoyed the land of plaintiff-respondent by taking it for carrying out its obligation regarding storage of foodgrains etc. Here the question is not about validity of lease but damages to which plaintiff-respondent is entitled to, on account of enjoyment of her property by defendant appellants. Therefore, in our view, no benefit can be extended to the defendant appellants in the case in hand. The aforesaid provisions will not bar her claim for damages on account of user of land by defendant appellants. 45. So far as Sections 107 and 108 of TP Act, 1882 are concerned, the same are not at all attracted in the case in hand. Defendant-appellants themselves have vacated premises in question but without terminating lease and despite our repeated query, learned counsel for appellants could not show as to how claim set up by plaintiff-respondent in any manner is affected otherwise by aforesaid provisions. Moreover, it does not show that aforesaid objections were pressed before Court below. No issue has been framed to this effect. Moreover, it does not show that aforesaid objections were pressed before Court below. No issue has been framed to this effect. Therefore, we do not find any reason to consider this aspect, for it has no substantial impact on the point in question at appellate stage, being raised for the first time by appellants. 46. In these facts and circumstances, we answer all aforesaid three points for determination in favour of plaintiff-respondent and against defendants-appellants. No other point has been argued. We, therefore, find no factual, legal or otherwise error in judgment and decree made by Court below. 47. The appeal is dismissed with cost throughout.