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2016 DIGILAW 42 (JK)

Pankaj Dayal v. Vijay K. Sondhi

2016-02-12

B.S.WALIA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Mr. B.S. Walia, J. Vide this order, three petitions bearing 561-A Cr. P.C. Nos. 15, 16 and 17 of 2016 between the same parties, are being decided. Narration of facts is from 561-A Cr. P.C. Nos. 16 of 2016. 2. Brief facts of the case are that three criminal complaints i.e. No. 8615, 8616 and 8617 of 2015 were filed by the respondent against the petitioner in the Court of the Magistrate 1st Class (Sub Registrar), Srinagar u/s 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and on the basis of the same, the petitioner stands summoned. Summoning order is not on the record. However, copy of the complaint has been placed on record in each of the cases. 3. That as per averments in the petition, the petitioner allegedly borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- (Rs. One crore fifty lacs) from the respondent in the year 2011 under an agreement to repay the same as per agreement, that allegedly a notice of demand was issued on 07.10.2015, which was duly served upon the petitioner but was not responded to, leading to institution of a complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 before the Court of the Magistrate 1st Class (Sub Registrar) Srinagar. 4. That the proceedings initiated by the respondent byway of institution of complaint Nos. 8615, 8616 and 8617 of 2015 u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 have been challenged and quashing thereof sought inter alia on the grounds:- (i) That the proceedings/material on record leading to the filing of the complaint, at best discloses a civil dispute and does not on the face of it disclose any offence much less one punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; (ii) That the respondent, ordinarily a resident of New Delhi, had instituted the complaint at Srinagar with the sole object of harassing the petitioner, consequentially, filing of the complaint at Srinagar was an abuse of the process of law; and (iii) That the proceedings were liable to be quashed on account of the Court of the Magistrate 1st Class (Sub Registrar) Srinagar lacking jurisdiction which had been created by the respondent for getting the complaint entertained at Srinagar as the cause of action had arisen at New Delhi where all the agreements had been entered into and both the parties ordinarily resided. 5. 5. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 'Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra and another' (2014) 9 SCC 129 to contend that territorial jurisdiction in a cheque bouncing case lay with the Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was committed i.e. cheque was dishonoured by the bank on which it was drawn. It was contended that the aforementioned decision overruled the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510 . 6. In K. Bhaskarans case (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as under: “11. Under Section 177 of the Code “every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried in a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed”. The locality where the Bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criterion to determine the place of offence. 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) drawing of the cheque, (2) presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But a concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done..” 7. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done..” 7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathods case held that only that Court would have jurisdiction in respect of an offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 where the drawee bank was located. Relevant extract of the decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 is as under: “19. In this analysis we hold that the place, situs or venue of judicial inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be restricted to where the drawee bank is located. The law should not be warped for commercial exigencies. 21. The interpretation of Section 138 of the NI Act which commends itself to us is that the offence contemplated therein stands committed on the dishonour of the cheque, and accordingly JMFC at the place where this occurs is ordinarily where the complaint must be filed, entertained and tried .We clarify that the place of the issuance or delivery of the statutory notice or where the complainant chooses to present the cheque for encashment by his bank are not relevant for purposes of territorial jurisdiction of the complaints even though non-compliance therewith will inexorably lead to the dismissal of the complaint. We clarify that the complainant is statutorily bound to comply with Section 177, etc. of Cr. P.C. and therefore the place or situs where the Section 138 complaint is to be filed is not of his choosing. The territorial jurisdiction is restricted to the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, which in the present context is where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn.” 22. We are quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have to possibly lakhs of cases pending in various courts spanning across the country Consequent on considerable consideration we think it expedient to direct that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. To clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. To obviate and eradicate any legal complications, the category of complaint cases where proceedings have gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by us from the court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the court where it is presently pending. All other complaints (obviously including those where the respondent-accused has not been properly served) shall be returned to the complainant for filing in the proper court, in consonance with our exposition of the law..” 8. Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its aforementioned decision held that a case u/s 138 NIA could be filed only before the Court which had the territorial jurisdiction over the place where the cheque had been dishonoured by the Bank on which it was drawn. Thus if a cheque drawn by a person on his bank account at New Delhi was dishonoured, in such a case the complaint u/s 138 NIA could be filed only in the Court at New Delhi within whose territorial jurisdiction the said bank was located and not in other places e.g. payee, in respect of a cheque issued at New Delhi could not file a complaint at Ambala and harass the drawer of the cheque by filing the bouncing case at a place of his choice by deliberately choosing a different place or for sending notice etc. 9. However, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case did not deal with place for institution of complaint qua cheque payable at par at all branches of the Bank i.e. in respect of multicity cheque payable at par at all branches of the bank in question. 10. That the aforesaid question arose before the Mumbai High Court in the case of 'Ramanbhai Mathurbhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra' i.e. Criminal Writ Petition No. 2362/2014, decided on 25.08.2014. 10. That the aforesaid question arose before the Mumbai High Court in the case of 'Ramanbhai Mathurbhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra' i.e. Criminal Writ Petition No. 2362/2014, decided on 25.08.2014. In its decision, the Mumbai High Court held that the payee of a multicity cheque payable at par at all branches of the Bank could choose the place where he wanted to present the cheque, therefore if the same was sent for clearance to the nearest branch of the bank in a particular city, the Court having territorial jurisdiction over the clearing branch would have the territorial jurisdiction over the cheque bouncing case since a multi city cheque can be cleared/encashed by a branch without sending it to the branch where the drawer of the cheque has his account. Relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder: “04. The two cheques in question were admittedly issued by the petitioner in favour of the respondent No. 2. The first cheque of Rs. 9,90,000/- was drawn on State Bank of India, Gandhi Nagar Branch, Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The other cheque was drawn on Bank of Maharashtra, Gandhi Nagar Branch, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. Both the cheques were payable at par at all branches of the respective banks. The issue raised before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner, during the course of argument, is that both the cheques were dishonoured at Ahmadabad and that, therefore, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 2287 of 2009), Mumbai Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint. 05. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has submitted that since both the cheques were payable at all branches of respective banks and since both the cheques were dishonoured by the Mumbai branches of State Bank of India and Bank of Maharashtra situated within the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Magistrate, Kurla, the respondent No. 2 was right in filing the complaint in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate at Kurla. 06. The issue which needs determination is as to whether which Court will have territorial jurisdiction to try the offence punishable u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, when the cheque payable at all branches of the drawee bank has been dishonoured by one of the branches of the drawee bank. 06. The issue which needs determination is as to whether which Court will have territorial jurisdiction to try the offence punishable u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, when the cheque payable at all branches of the drawee bank has been dishonoured by one of the branches of the drawee bank. In the present case, the drawer had accounts at Gandhi Nagar branches of the two banks mentioned herein above and cheques have been dishonoured by the branches of the said two banks situated within the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Magistrate, Kurla. The question which arises for determination is as to whether the payee has to file complaint in the Court of Magistrate having jurisdiction over Gandhi Nagar branches or the branches which have dishonoured cheques. In this regard, one may refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra cited (supra). While summing up the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has said at para 31 as under: “31. To sum up: XXX.. (vi) Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured. (vii) The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of Cr.P.C. applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the dishonour takes place except in situations where the offence of dishonour of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof” 7. One may also refer to para 17 of the said judgment where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has said as under: “17. .. In our discernment, it is also now manifest that traders and businessmen have become reckless and incautious in extending credit where they would heretofore have been extremely hesitant, solely because of the availability of redress by way of criminal proceedings. It is always open to the creditor to insist that the cheques in question be made payable at a place of the creditor's convenience (emphasis supplied)”. 8. It is always open to the creditor to insist that the cheques in question be made payable at a place of the creditor's convenience (emphasis supplied)”. 8. It is thus clear that in the present case by issuing cheques payable at all branches, the drawer of the cheques had given an option to the banker of payee to get the cheques cleared from the nearest available branch of bank of (he drawer. It, therefore, follows that the cheques have been dishonored within the territorial jurisdiction of Court of Metropolitan Magistrate at Kurla. In view of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra cited (supra), the learned Metropolitan Magistrate of Kurla Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint in question.” 11. Aforementioned decision of the Mumbai High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court vide SLP (Cr.) No. 7251/2014 and the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order of tho Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 20.03.2015. 12. Subsequently, The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 came into force w.e.f. 15.06.2015. As per the amendment in the Ordinance, in the Principal Act, Section 142 was to be numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section (1) as so numbered, the following sub-section was inserted, namely: - “(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction, - (a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or (b) xxx Explanation. - For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.”. 4. 4. In the principal Act, after section 142, the following section shall be inserted, namely: - “142-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment, decree, order or directions of any court, all cases arising out of section 138 which were pending in any court, whether filed before it, or transferred to it, before the commencement of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 shall be transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1), and such complaint is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. (3) If, on the date of the commencement of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, more than one prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 before which the: first case was filed and is pending, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times.”. 13. 13. That the implication of the Ordinance was as under: (i) Complaint u/s 138 NIA could be filed only in the Court having jurisdiction over the place where the Bank in which the payee was having an account was located; (ii) On a complaint u/s 138 NIA having been filed in a particular Court in the manner aforesaid, subsequently in case of any other cheque of the same party i.e. drawer, then in that case complaint in respect of the same drawer was required to be filed in the same Court even if the payee had presented the cheques in some other bank in some other city in order to ensure that the drawer of the cheques was not harassed by filing numerous complaints at different places. In other words, even in respect of multicity bounced cheques, complaint against the same drawer could be filed only in one Court even though the payee had presented the second or subsequent cheques at a place different then the place where the first cheque had been presented; (iii) Complaints u/s 138 NIA pending as on 15.06.2015 in any Court in India were required to be transferred to the Court having jurisdiction i.e. pending cases were to be transferred to the Court which had jurisdiction over the place where the Bank of the payee was located but that if there were multiple complaints pending as on 15.06.2015 then all such multiple complaints were to be transferred to the Court where the first complaint had been filed. 14. In the instant case the cheques issued by the petitioner as are the subject matter of the three petitions are as under:- (I) 561-A Cr. P.C. No. 15/2016: (i) Cheque No. 605398, dated 25.08.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- and (ii) Cheque No. 605400, dated 25.08.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- were presented for payment on 05.10.2015, were dishonoured on 07.10.2015, Notice in respect thereto was issued on 02.11.2015 and served on the petitioner on 13.11 2015. (II) 561-A Cr. P.C. No. 16/2016: (i) Cheque No. 605396, dated 25.07.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- and (ii) Cheque No. 605397, dated 25.07.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- were presented for payment on 05.10.2015, were dishonoured on 07.10.2015, Notice in respect thereto was issued on 02.11.2015 and served on the petitioner on 13.11.2015. (III) 561-A Cr. P.C. No. 17/2016: (i) Cheque No. 605401, dated 25.09.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- and (ii) Cheque No. 605402, dated 25.09.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- and (ii) Cheque No. 605397, dated 25.07.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- were presented for payment on 05.10.2015, were dishonoured on 07.10.2015, Notice in respect thereto was issued on 02.11.2015 and served on the petitioner on 13.11.2015. (III) 561-A Cr. P.C. No. 17/2016: (i) Cheque No. 605401, dated 25.09.2015 for Rs. 50,00,000/- and (ii) Cheque No. 605402, dated 25.09.2015 for Rs. 25,00,000/- and (iii) Cheque No. 605399, dated 25.09.2015 for Rs. 25,00,000/- were presented for payment on 05.10.2015, were dishonoured on 07.10.2015 and Notice in respect thereto was issued on 02.11.2015 and served on the petitioner on 13.11.2015. 15. That the amendment carried out to the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 vide The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 received the assent of the President on December 29, 2015 and was deemed to have come into force w.e.f. June 15, 2015. Relevant extract of the amendment is reproduced hereunder: 3. In the principal Act, section 142 shall be numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section (1) as so numbered, the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely: - “(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction, - (a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or (b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated. Explanation. - For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.”. 4. 4. In the principal Act, after section 142, the following section shall be inserted, namely: - “142-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment, decree, order or direction of any court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, shall be deemed to have been transferred under this Act, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1) and such complaint is pending in that court., all subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. (3) If, on the date of the commencement of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, more than one prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, before which the first case was filed and is pending, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times. In the instant case, the cheques were delivered for collection through an account of the payee at HDFC Bank, Hari Singh High Street, Srinagar and the same were returned by Yes Bank with a memo stating “account closed”. Thus in terms of the amendment, the jurisdiction for a complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as amended would lie with the Court having jurisdiction over the branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account i.e. Srinagar. 16. Thus in terms of the amendment, the jurisdiction for a complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as amended would lie with the Court having jurisdiction over the branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account i.e. Srinagar. 16. That it would also be relevant to refer here to press note dated January 5, 2016 issued by the Ministry of Finance, clarifying jurisdiction related issues pertaining to filing of cases u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Said press note clarifies that the jurisdiction for filing of cases for offence committed u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as per the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 lay only in the court within whose local jurisdiction the bank branch of the payee, where the payee delivers the cheque for payment through his account, is situated, except in case of bearer cheques, which are presented to the branch of the drawee bank in which case the local court of that branch would get jurisdiction, Secondly, that the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 provided for retrospective validation for the new scheme of determining the jurisdiction of a court to try a case u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 besides mandated centralisation of cases against the same drawer to ensure protection of the interest of the complainant as also to ensure a fair trial. Thus the amendment, as brought about, has the effect of increasing the credibility of the cheque as a financial instrument, besides having the effect of helping trade and commerce in general so as to encourage the usage of cheque and enhance the credibility of the instrument so that the normal business transactions and settlement of liabilities could be ensured. 17. The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, 2015 deemed to have come into force on 15.06.2015 clarifies the issue beyond an iota of doubt that complaint in the instant case has rightly been filed at Srinagar as the cheques in question were multicity cheques and the complaint was filed in the Court within whose local jurisdiction the payees bank branch where his account is situated is located. In view thereof, the plea of jurisdiction fails. The complaint instituted at Srinagar is in accordance with law and is therefore maintainable. 18. In view thereof, the plea of jurisdiction fails. The complaint instituted at Srinagar is in accordance with law and is therefore maintainable. 18. That regarding the other plea i.e. of the dispute being a civil dispute and not disclosing any offence much less one punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it needs mention that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 deals with an offence punishable for bouncing or dishonour of a cheque on account of insufficiency of funds in the drawer account or on account of the fact that the cheque amount is more than the amount agreed to be paid by the bank and provides for penalty of such dishonour. A perusal of the complaint further reveals that the petitioner, engaged in the business of property development approached the complainant, who is an Advocate and a member of the Bar Council of Delhi, for loan with the promise to pay agreed rate of interest, thereby induced the complainant to advance the loan amount. He also made representations and promises to the complainant that the entire amount to be advanced to him as loan would be returned with interest and in view of the loan being for a period of three months only, a short term loan agreement was entered into i.e. Annexure-A (to the complaint) whereupon the complainant advanced Rs. Three Crores loan in all to the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to repay the loan amount along with interest and eventually after much follow up by the complainant, the petitioner vide confirmation dated 15.06.2015 undertook to re-pay the loan amount to the complainant on or before 31.07.2015 as also of the confirmation superseding any previous written arrangement with regard to the rate of interest i.e. Annexure 'C' to the complaint. 19. That pursuant thereto, the accused signed and issued post dated cheques on YES BANK Ltd., Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, Payable At Par At All Branches towards the payment of legal debts in favour of the complainant with the assurance that the said cheques would be honoured on and/or after the due date whenever they would be presented for payment. However, on presenting of the cheques through HDFC Bank, Hari Singh High Street, Srinagar, the same were returned by Yes Bank with a memo stating “account closed”. 20. That as per well settled law, the expression “amount of money... However, on presenting of the cheques through HDFC Bank, Hari Singh High Street, Srinagar, the same were returned by Yes Bank with a memo stating “account closed”. 20. That as per well settled law, the expression “amount of money... is insufficient” appearing in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is the genus and dishonour for reasons such “as account closed”, “payment stopped”, “referred to the drawer” are only species of the genus, and that dishonour of a cheque on the ground that the account had been closed was a dishonour falling in the first contingency referred to in Section 138. Relevant extract of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375 is reproduced hereunder: “16.1. This Court has in the decisions referred to above taken note of situations and contingencies arising out of deliberate acts of omission or commission on the part of the drawers of the cheques which would inevitably result in the dishonour of the cheque issued by them. For instance, this Court has held that if after issue of the cheque the drawer closes the account it must be presumed that the amount in the account was nil hence insufficient to meet the demand of the cheque. A similar result can be brought about by the drawer changing his specimen signature given to the bank or in the case of a company by the company changing the mandate of those authorised to sign the cheques on its behalf. Such changes or alteration in the mandate may be dishonest or fraudulent and that would inevitably result in dishonour of all cheques signed by the previously authorised signatories. There is in our view no qualitative difference between a situation where the dishonour takes place on account of the substitution by a new set of authorised signatories resulting in the dishonour of the cheques already issued and another situation in which the drawer of the cheque changes his own signatures or closes the account or issues instructions to the bank not to make the payment. So long as the change is brought about with a view to preventing the cheque being honoured the dishonour would become an offence under Section 138 subject to other conditions prescribed being satisfied.” 21. So long as the change is brought about with a view to preventing the cheque being honoured the dishonour would become an offence under Section 138 subject to other conditions prescribed being satisfied.” 21. Apparently, the petitioner had no intention to honour his obligations to repay the outstanding principal loan amount with interest to the complainant despite notice having served on him. The facts of the case make it clear beyond an iota of doubt that it is not a case where the plea of initiation of criminal proceedings instead of institution of a civil case is applicable. The case squarely falls within the ambit of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on account of failure of the petitioner to make the payment of amount as per the instrument. In view thereof, the plea of no offence being made out much less one punishable u/s 138 of the Act, is devoid of merit. In the facts of the case, amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 authorises filing of the complaints in the instant case at Srinagar. Consequently, the pleas as raised by the petitioner are devoid of merit and the petitions for quashing deserve dismissal and are accordingly dismissed. However, no orders as to costs.