JUDGMENT : Nishita Mhatre, J. The grievance of the petitioner in this case is against the decision of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal in O.A.1114 of 2010. By the impugned order the application filed by the petitioner before the Administrative Tribunal for quashing the order of termination dated 4th November, 2009 and for reinstatement with all consequential benefits has been dismissed. 2. A few facts which are relevant for the determination of the dispute in the present writ petition are as follows: The petitioner was appointed as a casual employee in 21st June, 2001 by the District Magistrate and Collector, Hooghly in a Group D post. His appointment was purely on a temporary basis. On 16th June, 2006 the petitioner’s services were terminated by the District Magistrate and Collector, Hooghly on the direction of the Assistant Secretary, Land and Land Reforms Department. The petitioner challenged this order of termination of his service by preferring Original Application being O.A. No.2455 of 2006 before the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the order of termination had not been passed by following the appropriate procedure and was in a breach of the law applicable. Accordingly, the order of termination was quashed and set aside by the Tribunal. However, it permitted the concerned authority to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. 3. The petitioner was afforded a personal hearing by the District Magistrate, Hooghly in order to comply with the directions of the Administrative Tribunal. By an order dated 4th November, 2009 the District Magistrate cancelled the appointment of the petitioner with effect from 16th June, 2006. This was because the Finance Department had not approved of the appointment of the petitioner and two other persons who are appointed as Group D employees as the appointment was not against a sanctioned post. 4. It must be stated here that soon after the petitioner was issued his appointment order, the District Magistrate had informed the Joint Secretary, Land and Land Reforms Department that 3 posts of Group D in the Collectorate had been vacant from different dates from February, 2001. Accordingly, the District Magistrate found it fit to appoint the petitioner who was a casual worker in the Collectorate from 12th April, 1987. It appears that the Administrative Tribunal had in an earlier order passed in O.A. 1748 of 1998 directed that an appointment order should be issued to the petitioner. Accordingly, the District Magistrate found it fit to appoint the petitioner who was a casual worker in the Collectorate from 12th April, 1987. It appears that the Administrative Tribunal had in an earlier order passed in O.A. 1748 of 1998 directed that an appointment order should be issued to the petitioner. It was in these circumstances that the District Magistrate sought post facto approval so that the salary of the candidates who were in dire financial straits could be disbursed. As the salary was not paid, the petitioner approached the Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A.11 of 2003. An order was passed by the Tribunal accepting the petitioner’s version that he was entitled to be paid salary and that he had been deprived of the same for no fault of his although he had worked. The Tribunal directed the State to pay arrears of salary within six months of the order. This order was passed on 31st June, 2006. 5. The amount was not paid within the time stipulated and therefore the petitioner filed a contempt petition before the Tribunal being C.C.P. No. 1661 of 2009. The arrears were paid after 06.11.2007. However, since the petitioner’s services had already been terminated with effect from 16th June, 2006, he had to once again approach the Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 1114 of 2010 for quashing the order terminating him from service and for reinstatement with all consequential benefits. In the reply filed to that original application, the State contended that the appointment order issued to the petitioner was cancelled with effect from 16th June, 2006 because of the order dated 4th November, 2009 passed by the District Magistrate. It was further contended that the services of the petitioner had not been terminated but the appointment order had been cancelled. Therefore, he was not entitled to any relief. 6. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, has found that since the appointment order had been issued to the petitioner in contravention of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi and others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , the appellant was not entitled to any relief. 7. Mr. S.K. Dutta, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the entire approach of the Tribunal while deciding the original application is erroneous. 7. Mr. S.K. Dutta, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the entire approach of the Tribunal while deciding the original application is erroneous. According to him, when the Tribunal had on an earlier occasion set aside the order of termination issued on 16th June, 2006, the District Magistrate could not, by cancelling the order of appointment, ensure that the same consequences followed after termination of the petitioner’s service. He pointed out that the District Magistrate’s communication dated 7th August, 2001 for post facto sanction clearly indicate that 3 vacancies in the Group D posts were available and that he had appointed the petitioner who was a casual employee as a temporary hand pursuant to the order of the Tribunal. The learned Counsel then drew our attention to the chronology of events which according to him indicate that it was only because the petitioner had to be paid his wages for the work rendered by him pursuant to the order of the Tribunal that his services had been terminated as a counter blast. The learned Counsel has relied on several judgments, which we will advert to, in support of his contentions. Mr. Dutta also submitted that when a person had already been appointed on a temporary basis by the State, his services could not be terminated without following the due process of law which the Tribunal had already held in its order passed in O.A. 2455 of 2006. He also drew our attention to the fact that merely because the Supreme Court had delivered the judgment in the case of Umadevi (supra) it did not direct that persons who had already been appointed in service should be thrown out with the stroke of the pen. He therefore submitted that the impugned order of Tribunal is required to be quashed. 8. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the State, argued that there is no need for this Court to interfere with the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. He pointed out that the petitioner had been appointed without any advertisement being issued, without considering whether there were sanctioned posts and without paying heed to the requirements for the post. According to the learned Counsel, the Finance Department had not agreed to the appointment of the petitioner as it had been made in contravention of the prevailing Rules for recruitment. Mr. According to the learned Counsel, the Finance Department had not agreed to the appointment of the petitioner as it had been made in contravention of the prevailing Rules for recruitment. Mr. Mukherjee then submitted that a back-door entry into service is to be discouraged in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Umadevi (supra). The Tribunal had considered all these factors and had therefore dismissed the Original Application, submitted the learned Counsel. He then urged that the judgment of Umadevi (supra) is retrospective in operation as held in General Manager, Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi and Others reported in (2009) 7 SCC 205 . He then submitted that the relief of reinstatement in service cannot be granted to a person whose initial employment was made in gross violation of law as held in the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and Others reported in (2009) 5 SCC 65 . He pointed out that the Supreme Court in this judgment had frowned upon the High Courts showing sympathy for those who had been employed illegally. 9. It was not the intention of the Supreme Court in Umadevi’s case (supra) to set at naught appointments, whether temporary or casual, or regularisation as permanent employees by orders of the Court or which had been granted earlier by the State. The Supreme Court clarified that the decisions which run counter to the principle settled in Umadevi’s case (supra) or in which directions contrary to those which were laid down by the Constitution Bench in that case would stand denuded of their status as precedents. Umadevi’s case (supra) was decided on 10th April, 2006, after which the order of termination of service has been passed in this case. In our opinion, Umadevi’s case (supra) would have no application at all to the facts before us as the petitioner had been appointed on a temporary basis right from 2001 on the directions issued by the Tribunal in OA 1748 of 1998 and his appointment could not have been "cancelled" on the whim of the employer after five and half years. 10. In the present case, the petitioner had been appointed as a Group D employee in a particular pay-scale on a temporary basis. 10. In the present case, the petitioner had been appointed as a Group D employee in a particular pay-scale on a temporary basis. This appointment was accorded to him because he had been in service since 1987 and the Tribunal had directed that he should be appointed. Three vacancies had arisen in the Group D posts which led the District Magistrate to consider the petitioner and two other persons for employment in those posts. While granting employment, the District Magistrate had noted that 2 of the persons had been working for a long number of years as casual employees while the 3rd person’s case had been pending for compassionate employment. The District Magistrate had sought post facto approval of their appointment. This communication was sent by the District Magistrate to the Land and Land Reforms Department on 7th August, 2001. The order of termination was passed 5 years thereafter, with effect from 16th June, 2006. While he was in service from 2001 onwards, the petitioner’s salary had not been paid and therefore, he had approached the Tribunal for relief. The Tribunal had directed payment of his salary in O.A. 11 of 2003. This order was passed by the Tribunal on 31st January, 2006. It was only thereafter that the State thought it necessary to terminate the services of the petitioner. There can be no doubt from the material on record that it was because of the petitioner’s insistence for being paid his wages and relief being granted by the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal in the Original Application filed by him that he felt the repercussions and was terminated from service. 11. After the letter of termination of service was served on the petitioner, he challenged the same by filing O.A. 2455 of 2006. The Tribunal while disposing of the Original Application, held thus: "Now, looking into the impugned order of termination and having heard the parties before us and specially looking into the appointment order issued in favour of the petitioner we are convinced to accept that the aforesaid termination order has not been passed following the appropriate procedure and in accordance with law and the same has also violated the terms of the appointment order issued against the petitioner. That being the position, we quash and set aside the aforesaid order of termination. That being the position, we quash and set aside the aforesaid order of termination. This order, however, shall not prevent the concerned authority to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law and in the event they decide to proceed against him further the aforesaid exercise shall be made complete within a period of next 2 months from the date of communication." 12. The liberty given to the State required it to take action against the petitioner in accordance with law if it insisted on terminating his services. As the petitioner was already a temporary employee, it was necessary for the State to take action against him under the West Bengal Service Rules, assuming that it was of the opinion that it was necessary to terminate the services of the petitioner. Instead of following that procedure as directed by the Tribunal, the State adopted a novel method of ensuring that the petitioner does not continue in service by deciding that his order of appointment should be cancelled after 8 years. The original order by which the relationship of master and servant between the State and the petitioner ceased indicated that his services were being terminated. This happened 5 years after his appointment as a temporary employee. There was not even a whisper in that order that he had been illegally inducted in service and therefore his services were being terminated. As mentioned earlier the State took action against him because the petitioner had the temerity to approach the Tribunal seeking wages for the work performed by him. Furthermore, the State has misused the liberty granted by the Tribunal while disposing of O.A. 2455 of 2006. It has now sought to circumvent its order cancelling appointment of the petitioner by taking recourse to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). The Constitution Bench in Umadevi’s case (supra) has held that backdoor entrance into service is not to be tolerated and that Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India must be complied with in the matter of public employment. The Constitution Bench has overruled its earlier decisions where employees had been regularised in service de hors the Rules. However, Umadevi’s case (supra) does not say that those who are already in service consequent upon the decisions of the Supreme Court or other Courts or Tribunals should be terminated from service. The Constitution Bench has overruled its earlier decisions where employees had been regularised in service de hors the Rules. However, Umadevi’s case (supra) does not say that those who are already in service consequent upon the decisions of the Supreme Court or other Courts or Tribunals should be terminated from service. Furthermore, Umadevi’s case (supra) was with respect to the casual employees being regularised in service as permanent employees. 13. In the present case, the petitioner who was a casual employee from 1987 till 2001 has been appointed as a temporary hand. Thus, he had spent more than 10 years on a casual basis before he was appointed as a temporary employee. Umadevi’s case (supra) also takes note of such eventualities. Where an employee has served for more than 10 years continuously on a casual basis, the judgment directs the Government to formulate a policy with respect to such employees and to regularise them in service. 14. In the case of Nihal Singh & Ors v. State of Punjab & Ors reported in (2013) 14 SCC 65 the Supreme Court has observed thus: 20. But we do not see any justification for the State to take a defence that after permitting the utilisation of the services of a large number of people like the appellants for decades to say that there are no sanctioned posts to absorb the appellants. Sanctioned posts do not fall from heaven. The State has to create them by a conscious choice on the basis of some rational assessment of the need. 15. The initial appointment of the petitioner as a casual employee is not in question and was made in accordance with law. After working for about 14 years, the State appointed him on a temporary basis. Once he was appointed on a temporary basis, the State could not cancel the initial order of appointment as a temporary hand if it wanted to terminate the services of the petitioner. It was incumbent on the State to follow the due procedure in law with respect to termination of service of temporary employees. This has not been done in the present case. 16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Administrative Tribunal’s order is contrary to the principles of res judicata which are equally applicable to matters arising under the Administrative Tribunals Act. This has not been done in the present case. 16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Administrative Tribunal’s order is contrary to the principles of res judicata which are equally applicable to matters arising under the Administrative Tribunals Act. He has relied on the decision in Pradeep Kumar Maskara & Ors v. State of West Bengal & Ors reported in (2015) 2 SCC 653 in support of his contention. The learned Counsel has relied on this decision to counter the argument of Mr. Mukherjee that in view of Umadevi’s case (supra) the State had every right to cancel the appointment order. The Supreme Court in the judgment of Pradeep Kumar Maskara (supra) has observed thus: 26. It is well settled that even if the decision on a question of law has been reversed or modified by subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case it shall not be a ground for review of such judgment merely because a subsequent judgment of the Single Judge has taken contrary view. That does not confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to ignore the judgment and direction of the High Court given in the case of the appellants. 17. In our opinion therefore the State has acted in a high handed manner by cancelling the appointment order of the petitioner. The petitioner was inducted into service legally as a casual employee. He was employed on a temporary basis after the directions of the Tribunal in O.A. 1748 of 1998. The order terminating his services with effect from 16.04.2006 was found to be illegal by the Tribunal in O.A. 2455 of 2006. 18. The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside. The order of termination of the petitioner and the order of cancellation of his appointment are set aside. The petition is allowed. 19. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities.