ORDER : Mr. R. Suresh Kumar, J. The prayer in the Writ Petition is for a Writ of Certiorarified mandamus, calling for tie records relating to the order of the responds in TNSTC/Kumba/legal/Sa2/10/2007, dated 27.12.2008, quash the same and consequently to direct the respondent to re-employ the petitioner as conductor as per G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 and to pay him the wages forth; period of his non-employment from 01.01.2007 and other benefits. 2. Though the petitioner in this Writ Petitioner seeks for re-employment as conductors the respondent-Corporation, this case have a checkered history, as the present Writ Petition is the fourth round of litigation by the present petitioner. The petitioner was appointed as conductor temporarily in the month of October, 1984 at the respondent-Corporation and he was paid wages on daily rated basis one in a month. Though he has continuously employed for more than 240 days of service in 12 calendar months, he was not made permanent. While so, in the year 1989, sit the respondent-Corporation had undergone the exercise of appointing conductors on permanent basis, since the name of the petitioner had also been sponsored by the Employ Exchange for the said regular appointment of the conductor in Government Transport Corporation, Trichy, which is part of the respondent-Corporation, he had attended the interview. However, he was not considered for appointment though number of his juniors, who had been appointed on temporary basis, had been considered and appointed on permanent basis. 3. Therefore, the petitioner had come out with the first round of litigation in W.P. No. 3559 of 1991, wherein, he had also sought for an injunction from terminating the services of tie petitioner. Though injunction was granted w this Court in the said Writ Petition, the petitioner's service was dispensed with by the respondent-Corporation from 14.10.1996. hereafter, the Writ Petition was finally heard and disposed of by this Court on 14.10.1998. Is the said order, this Court had directed the respondent-Corporation to issue orders in favour of the petitioner, making him permanent as conductor in the Corporation concerned. However, challenging the said order of the learned Single Judge of this Court, the respondent-Corporation had preferred a Writ Appeal in W. A. No. 667 of 1999 and the same was pending for some time. 4. However, challenging the said order of the learned Single Judge of this Court, the respondent-Corporation had preferred a Writ Appeal in W. A. No. 667 of 1999 and the same was pending for some time. 4. Subsequently, similarly placed persons like that of the petitioners, since had approached this Court and pursuant to the various orders of this Court, the Government had come forward to issue a Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006. Among other things, the main import of the said G.O is to regularize the services of the temporary/retrenched employees by way of giving re-employment in the respondent-Corporation under four categories, as has been provided at para 4 of the said G.O, which is reproduced hereunder:- "(i) Preference shall be given to the persons who were retrenched from service but obtained orders from High Court for reemployment in terms of Section 25(H) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1974. (ii) Preference shall also be given to similarly placed persons who have approached the Court and whose cases are still under consideration. (iii) Preference shall be given to those persons whose services were terminated and who are similarly placed like persons mentioned in clause (1) and (ii) who have not yet approached the Court, when they approach the Managing Directors seeking similar appointment. (iv) While giving such preference, the conditions imposed by High Court of Madras in the Judgment dated 07.04.2006 in W.P. No. 38097 of 2005 viz., (a) Physical fitness and eye fitness (b) driving skill test in respect of drivers shall be followed". 5. In spite of the said G.O having been issued by the Government, the benefit of the said G.O since was not conferred on the petitioner, he had filed another Writ Petition by way of second round of litigation in W.P(MD)No. 9889 of 2006 before this Court. The said Writ Petition was finally disposed of by orders of this Court, dated 10.11.2006, wherein, a direction was given to the respondents therein to consider the request of the petitioner for re-instating the petitioner and to make him permanent as conductor in the respondent-Corporation without prejudice to the right of the petitioner in the pending Writ Appeal ie., W.A. No. 667 of 1999 and to pass orders in accordance with G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 within a time frame. 6. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 within a time frame. 6. Pursuant to the said order of this Court, dated 10.11.2006, the respondent-Corporation passed an order on 27.12.2006, wherein, once again the request of the petitioner for re-appointment and making him permanent as conductor has been rejected. This time, the main reason adduced by the respondent-Corporation in the said order, dated 27.12.2006 is that the Writ Appeal in W.A. No. 667 of 1999 was pending before this Court and further if the same is disposed of, then only action can be taken on the request of the petitioner. 7. Challenging the said order of the respondent, dated 27.12.2006, the petitioner had approached this Court as a third round of litigation, wherein, he filed a Writ Petition in W.P (MD) No. 1738 of 2007. This Court, by its final order, dated 10.04.2007, after considering the merits of the case and rival submissions, was pleased to issue a direction, after quashing the said order, dated 27.12.2006, to the respondent to re-employ the petitioner within a period of four weeks. 8. However, challenging the said order of this Court, dated 10.04.2007 made in W.P (MD) No. 1738 of 2007 Intra-Court appeal was filed in W.A (MD) No. 623 of 2008 by the respondent-Corporation. The said Writ Appeal was also decided finally by a Division Bench of this Court on 30.09.2008, wherein, the Division Bench of this Court though had not accepted the plea raised by the respondent, however, modified the order of the learned Single Judge to an extent that instead of granting a positive direction, the following direction has been given in para 4 of the said Judgment, which is re-produced hereunder:- "4.The other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is to the effect that the question as to whether the respondent had worked for more than 240 days within the year, is a question of fact to be established before the appropriate forum and that could not have been decided in the Writ Petition. Even though ordinarily such contention would be acceptable, we feel that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, such contention cannot be countenanced. As a matter of fact, no counter had been filed in the Writ Petition and therefore, it has to be construed that there was no denial of the averment that the respondent had worked for 240 days. As a matter of fact, no counter had been filed in the Writ Petition and therefore, it has to be construed that there was no denial of the averment that the respondent had worked for 240 days. However, the order passed by the learned single Judge requires to be modified to the extent that instead of giving a positive direction for re-employment, the application of the respondent is required to be considered in the light of the Government Order passed in G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006. Such application shall be considered within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order". 9. Only pursuant to the said order passed by the Division Bench of this Court as referred to above, the present impugned order has been passed by the respondent, dated 27.12.2008 which is under challenge in this Writ Petition. In the present impugned order, the respondent has once-again rejected the request of the petitioner. But this time, the reason adduced by the respondent is that in G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, at para 3, it has been held that the I Government had decided to give preference ton those persons appointed from 1997 onwards and terminated later in view of the directions in various cases issued by the High Court of Madras with reference to the retrenched employees. By quoting this para 3 of the said G.O., the impugned order proceeds to say that since the petitioner has not been appointed after 1997 and retrenched, he would not be covered under the said G.O and therefore, the request of the petitioner was rejected. Challenging the said order of the respondent, dated 27.12.2008, the petitioner has come out with this fourth round of litigation in the present Writ Petition with the aforesaid prayer. 10. Heard both sides. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that two important aspects had been omitted to be taken into consideration by the respondent-corporation before passing the impugned order. According to the learned counsel for the petitions, the first one is that, as against the said import of para 3 of the Government Order in G.O. Ms. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that two important aspects had been omitted to be taken into consideration by the respondent-corporation before passing the impugned order. According to the learned counsel for the petitions, the first one is that, as against the said import of para 3 of the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, number of Writ Petitions were filed by the affected employees before Principal seat of this Court, wherein, a final order was passed on 14.12.2006 in a batch of cases in the matter of W.P. Nos. 26195 of 2006 etc. In the said Judgment, all the issues touching upon the employment, retrenchment, re-employment as well as import of the said G.0., had been widely discussed. The learned Judge ultimately in para 135 and 136 of the said Judgment has set aside para 3 of the said G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006. The relevant portion of the said order in para 135 and 136 is extracted hereunder:- "115. As far as the Clause 3 of the impugned G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 is concerned. as correctly pointed out by the learned counsel Ms. D. Nagasaila and other learned counsels who have adopted her arguments, there is no rational nexus in conferring the benefits of the G.O. in giving preference in respect of employees appointed from 1997 onwards and were terminated later and to the object of giving preference to the retrenched employees as per Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As have narrated earlier Section 25(H) of the Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for the purpose of giving preference except to state that the conditions mentioned for the purpose of retrenchment, has to be complied with. Therefore, there is absolutely no reason for the respondent Corporation to restrict the right of preferential treatment in reemployment to be given only to those employees, who were appointed from 1997 and terminated thereafter, which means retrenched thereafter. 136. In view of the same, the portion of the said impugned G.O. Ms. Therefore, there is absolutely no reason for the respondent Corporation to restrict the right of preferential treatment in reemployment to be given only to those employees, who were appointed from 1997 and terminated thereafter, which means retrenched thereafter. 136. In view of the same, the portion of the said impugned G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (Cl) Department, dated 13.07.2006, Clause 3 in so far as it applies regarding reemployment to the persons, appointed from 1997 is set aside, making it clear that the right of re-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, shall be made applicable to all persons appointed by the respondent Corporations earlier and thereafter terminated irrespective of the year of their appointment and retrenchment." 12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would also submit that yet another development, wherein, the said Writ Appeal No. 667 of 1999 filed by the respondent-Corporation as against the order passed by this Court by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 3559 of 1991, dated 14.10.1998 was also dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by an order, dated 26.09.2008, of course, for default. As against the said order, dated 26.09.2008, no further steps had been taken by the respondent-Corporation being the appellant therein in the Writ Appeal and therefore, the said order having become final, the import of the order of this Court made in the said Writ Petition in W.P. No. 3559 of 1991, dated 14.10.1998 has come into operation and the same has to be complied with by the respondent-corporation. 13. Per contra, the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that, no doubt, para 3 of the said G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, was set aside by this Court and also the appeal in W.A. No. 667 of 1999 was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. The petitioner's candidature, even if it is independently considered, he would not be entitled to get back the job as originally he was appointed as conductor on daily rated wages basis once in a month and he did not complete 240 days of service in 12 calendar months and therefore, the question of making him permanent even under the relevant provisions of the relevant Act for making permanent would not at all arise. Though para 3 of the said G.O was set aside by this court, the four conditions imposed therein under para 4 of the said G.O would not cover the case of the petitioner, as he was not retrenched and was not entitled for the benefit of retrenchment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, for these reasons, assuming that para 3 of the said G.O was set aside, the impugned order can be saved independently and in that view of the matter, no interference is required in this Writ Petition as the Writ Petitioner is not entitled to claim either reemployment or absorption on permanent basis pursuant to the said G.O. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation submitted that the Writ Petition has to be dismissed. 14. This Court have considered the said rival submission made by the learned counsel for the respective parties as well as various orders passed by this Court and other materials placed before this Court for perusal. 15. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, insofar as the present impugned order, dated 27.12.2008 is concerned, the only reason cited by the respondent-corporation is that under para 3 of the said G.O. Ms. No. 41, Transport (C.1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, preference was directed to be given only to those persons, who had been appointed from 1997 onwards and terminated later, in view of the various directions of the High Court of Madras with reference to the retrenched employees. The said import at para 3 of the said G.O, since had been set aside as early as on 14.12.2006 itself, the applicability of the said para 3 of the said G.O would be no more available for any such employees including the petitioner. When that being the only reason cited in the impugned order and the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law in view of the catergorical pronouncements of the Court and the same have become final, as there was no appeal filed by the respondent-Corporation or anyone, the impugned order is certainly liable to be interfered with and accordingly, it is liable to be quashed and therefore, it is quashed. 16. 16. It may also be taken note of the fact that in earlier round of litigations ie., challenging the order of the respondent, dated 27.12.2001 the petitioner had filed W.P(MD)No. 1738 of 2007, wherein, by an order, dated 10.04.2007 this Court had given a positive direction to re-employ the petitioner within a time frame and that order was put under challenge by the respondent-Corporation in W.A (MD)No. 621 of 2008 and by order dated 30.09.2008, the Division Bench of this Court, only modified the said order and the contentions raised by the respondent-corporation that the petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days within the year also was rejected. Even in the said order, dated 27.12.2006, which was subject-matter in the above referred Writ Petition and Writ Appeal, the only reason cited by the respondent-Corporation for not considering the request of the petitioner for re-employment was the pendency of the Writ Appeal ie. W.A. No. 667 of 1999. It is now become clear that the said Writ Appeal was dismissed as early as on 26.09.2008 itself. Having known about the said fact, the respondent-Corporation has passed the present impugned order, dated 27.12.2008. of course, with a different reason and that reason' also is no more available for the respondent-1 corporation and therefore, the attitude of the respondent-corporation right from the beginning shows that they wanted to reject the case,' of the petitioner by giving one reason or other, knowing fully well that the reasons would not, stand in legal scrutiny and these reasons are not at all available for the respondent corporation to make and thereby driving the petitioner to approach this Court for four times, which action of the respondent-1 corporation is deplorable and this attitude on the part of the respondent-corporation cannot be considered as a good move, since the respondent-corporation is a Governmental authority, it must have acted as a model employer. 17. In view of these peculiar facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that this Writ Petition should be allowed with exemplary costs. However, in order to save the petitioner from being dragged on to further litigation, as if cost is awarded, certainly on that ground the respondent-corporation may further go for Intra Court appeal and the very grievance of the petitioner would not be redressed immediately, this Court restrained itself from awarding cost. 18. However, in order to save the petitioner from being dragged on to further litigation, as if cost is awarded, certainly on that ground the respondent-corporation may further go for Intra Court appeal and the very grievance of the petitioner would not be redressed immediately, this Court restrained itself from awarding cost. 18. In the result, the following order is passed in this Writ Petition:- (i) The Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned order, dated 27.12.2008 passed by the respondent is quashed. (iii) Since the order of this Court, dated 14.10.1998 passed in W.P. No. 3559 of 1991 has become final, the petitioner is entitled to claim appointment pursuant to the said order and therefore, the appointment to be made for the petitioner by way of re-employment or otherwise as conductor in the respondent-corporation shall date back at-least from 14.11.1998 I.e., after one month period of the said order, dated 14.10.1998. (iv) Since the petitioner was out of service for all these years, he would not be entitled for full back-wages. If such appointment is given to the petitioner as directed above from 14.11.1998, the petitioner shall be entitled to get only 25% of the salary for those period. The petitioner shall also be entitled to get continuity of service ie, from 14.11.1998 and his service continuity has to be calculated from that period for all consequential service benefits. (v) The aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondent-Corporation within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs.