ORDER : M. Sundar, J. I propose to dispose of all the eight applications by this common order. 2. There are two suits. The sole plaintiff in both the suits is one and the same and it is a private limited company. The sole defendant in each of the suits is different and they are also private limited companies. Both the suits pertain to two separate agreements of sale, both dated 27.07.2005, under which each of the defendant companies agreed to sell to the plaintiff company adjacent properties. Plaintiff company in both the suits is the applicant in six applications. Each of the defendant companies is applicant in two of the above said applications, they being reject the plaint applications in the respective suits. Though the defendant company in the two suits are different, as the facts are identical and as I propose to dispose of all these applications by a common order, the term ‘defendant companies-is used in this order to collectively denote the two companies which have been arrayed as sole defendant in the two suits. With regard to other aspects, the parties in these applications are referred to by their respective ranks in the main suit, for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity. 3. Plaintiff company instituted two suits in C.S.Nos. 831 & 833 of 2005 in this Court inter alia seeking a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant companies from alienating, encumbering or dealing with the respective schedule mentioned properties in favour of any third party other than the plaintiff. The two suits were launched on the basis of the above said two agreements of sale between the plaintiff company and the defendant companies. As stated supra, both agreements of sale are dated 27.07.2005. In C.S.No. 831 of 2005 the subject-matter of the agreement of sale (which is also the plaint schedule property) is land and superstructure in Plot No.66 (Old No.42), Second Main Road, Ambattur Industrial Estate, Chennai 600 058, admeasuring 1.24 grounds or thereabouts. The subject-matter of the other agreement of sale (plaint schedule property in C.S.No.833 of 2005) is land and superstructure in Plot No.65 (Old No.43) Second Main Road, Ambattur Industrial Estate, Chennai 600 058 admeasuring 16.40 grounds or thereabouts. It is stated at the Bar that the two properties are adjacent properties and the lands are contiguous parcels of land. There are superstructures on each parcel of land. It is stated at the Bar that the two properties are adjacent properties and the lands are contiguous parcels of land. There are superstructures on each parcel of land. This is evident from the address/description of the two properties in the agreements of sale and in the schedules to the plaints. 4. In each of the aforesaid suits, the plaintiff company had stated that under the respective agreements of sale, different amounts were tendered to the respective defendant companies, but under the pretext of some charge over the said properties resulting in alienation being restrained, the defendant companies did not perform its part of the obligations under the agreements of sale. It is further stated that the defendant companies vide a letter dated 01.08.2005 had communicated to the plaintiff company that there is a charge over the properties resulting in alienation being restrained owing to some proceedings against the defendant companies by the Central Excise Department on account of revenue dues. 5. Interestingly and intriguingly, while the two agreements of sale are dated 27.07.2005, this communication from the defendant companies are dated 01.08.2005 barely four days later. In the letter dated 01.08.2005, the defendant companies state that they were informed by the Central Excise Department that the Department is going to issue a notice stating that defendant companies should not alienate the said properties. The defendant companies had also gone on to state that the dues to the Central Excise Department is to the tune of Rs.2.16 crores but they have obtained stay before Appellate Authority. It is further stated that they were so informed about the action by the Central Excise Department all of a sudden, but no specific date on which they were so informed has been given. It is not the specific case of the defendant companies that the defendant companies were so informed in the four days intervening between the agreements of sale dated 27.07.2005 and the date of the letters namely, 01.08.2005. No copy of communication from the Central Excise Department has been annexed either. 6. It is represented that there were some communications between the plaintiff company and the defendant companies that the cheque by which an advance was given shuttled back and forth between the plaintiff company and the defendant companies. No copy of communication from the Central Excise Department has been annexed either. 6. It is represented that there were some communications between the plaintiff company and the defendant companies that the cheque by which an advance was given shuttled back and forth between the plaintiff company and the defendant companies. Therefore, on 16.09.2005 plaintiff company launched the above suits, in the above background alleging that the defendant companies are attempting to frustrate the agreements for sale. The plaintiff company stated that the alleged dues to the Excise Department is lesser than the sale consideration. Under such circumstances, the suits were predicated by the plaintiff company on the basis that the defendant companies are attempting to sell the suit schedule properties to some other third parties and for interdicting the same, above said suits were launched. 7. The aforesaid suits were launched with prayers for permanent injunction restraining the defendant companies from in any manner alienating or dealing with the schedule of properties in favour of any third parties as set out above. In the suits, two applications namely App.Nos.4260 of 2005 and 4259 of 2005 in C.S.No.831 of 2005 and 833 of 2005 respectively, were taken out invoking Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’ for brevity), seeking permission to the plaintiff to omit the relief of specific performance of the agreements of sale dated 27.07.2005 as also the relief of damages for breach of contract against the defendants. 8. The suits and the leave/permission applications were taken on file together, assigned numbers and posted before the Court. It is now submitted by both sides and it is not in dispute between the parties that an interim injunction was granted and that the same is operating even now. Subsequently, on 29.05.2007 the plaintiff company filed two suits namely O.S.Nos.202 and 203 of 2007 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur inter alia with prayers for specific performance of the agreements of sale dated 27.07.2005. 9. The time for completing the sale, under the agreements of sale is six months, the same expired on 26.01.2006 and the suits in the Tiruvallur District Court, were filed on 29.05.2007. 10. C.R.P. Nos.3758 & 3759 of 2007 were filed by the defendant companies with prayers to call for the records in O.S.Nos. 9. The time for completing the sale, under the agreements of sale is six months, the same expired on 26.01.2006 and the suits in the Tiruvallur District Court, were filed on 29.05.2007. 10. C.R.P. Nos.3758 & 3759 of 2007 were filed by the defendant companies with prayers to call for the records in O.S.Nos. 202 and 203 of 2007 and strike off the plaints mainly on the ground that the suits are hit by Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. This Court following the principle/ratio laid down in R. Vimalchand and another v. Ramalingam and others, reported in 2002 (3) MLJ 177 refused to strike off the pleadings. The case law reported in 2002 (3) MLJ 177 (R.Vimalchand and another v. Ramalingam and others) is hereinafter referred to as R. Vimalchand's case for brevity. In R. Vimalchand’s case, in somewhat identical circumstances, where a specific performance suit and a bare injunction suit on the file of the City Civil Court were filed, this Court [a Division Bench] held that Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC can be made applicable only if the earlier suit is disposed of and thereafter fresh suit is filed for the same cause of action for fresh relief. The relevant paragraph is paragraph No.28 and the same be usefully extracted. Paragraph No.28 reads as follows: ‘There is however, a ‘distinction’ between ‘cause of action and the ‘right of action’These terms are not synonymous and interchangeable. A right of action is a right to presently enforce a cause of action a remedial right affording redress for the infringement of a legal right belonging to some definite person; a cause of action is the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. The right of action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action, and may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitations, through an estoppel, or by other circumstances which do not affect the cause of action. There may be several rights of action and one cause of action and rights may accrue at different times from the same cause.? 11. Even on the submissions made in the course of hearing of these applications, there was no dispute or disagreement as between the learned counsel on both sides that this was the then obtaining position of law. There may be several rights of action and one cause of action and rights may accrue at different times from the same cause.? 11. Even on the submissions made in the course of hearing of these applications, there was no dispute or disagreement as between the learned counsel on both sides that this was the then obtaining position of law. The matter was carried to Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India vide order dated 07.09.2012, allowed the Civil Appeals and set aside the above said judgment of this Court in CRP. Nos.3758 and 3759 of 2007. Supreme Court of India, did not accept the position of law stated by a Division Bench of this Court in R. Vimalchand's case. After dealing with Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC and its purport the Supreme Court laid down the law on the point and said that Order 2, Rule 2 will apply even to a situation where the first suit was not disposed of and when the second suit has been filed during the pendency of the first suit. Therefore, the law laid down in R. Vimalchand's case by a Division Bench of this Court was reversed by the Supreme Court in the Civil Appeals referred to supra. 12. In the above context, it is necessary to notice that the Supreme Court, while allowing the Civil Appeals, had clearly held that the learned single Judge of this Court very rightly was bound to follow the Division Bench ratio in R.Vimalchand's case. Therefore, the Supreme Court had taken note of the fact that the then obtaining position of law was that Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC will come into play only if the prior suit is disposed of and not when the prior suit is pending. This is noticed in paragraph No. 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court which reads as follows: ‘16. The learned single Judge of the High Court had considered, and very rightly, to be bound to follow an earlier Division Bench order in the case of R.Vimalchand and M. Ratanchand v. Ramalingam, T. Srinivasalu and T. Venkatesaperumal (supra) holding that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC would be applicable only when the first suit is disposed of. As in the present case the second set of suits were filed during the pendency of the earlier suits, it was held, on the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 (3) will not be attracted. Judicial discipline required the learned single Judge of the High Court to come to the aforesaid conclusion. However, we are unable to agree with the same in view of the object behind the enactment of the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC as already discussed by us, namely, that Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC seeks to avoid multiplicity of litigations on same cause of action. If that is the true object of the law, on which we do not entertain any doubt, the same would not stand fully subserved by holding that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC will apply only if the first suit is disposed of and not in a situation where the second suit has been filed during the pendency of the first suit. Rather, Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC will apply to both the aforesaid situations. Though direct judicial pronouncements on the issue are somewhat scarce, we find that a similar view had been taken in a decision of the High Court at Allahabad in Murti v. Bhola Ram and by the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji v. Raghunath’( AIR 1954 Bom 125 ). 13. The above judgment of the Supreme Court has been reported and the citation is Virgo Industries (Eng.) P. Ltd. v. M/s. Venkatachalam Solutions P. Ltd., [ 2013 (1) SCC 625 ]. Therefore, the plaints in the two suits filed in the Tiruvallur District Courts where struck off and the position of law qua application of Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC was laid down. Immediately after the said judgments of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff took out four of the above said six applications i.e., Appl. Nos.607, 608, 617 & 618 of 2013 in the two suits. Broadly stated one set of applications is to amend the respective plaints, to include the relief of specific performance and make averments pertaining thereto. This set of applications were essentially under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC. 14. Nos.607, 608, 617 & 618 of 2013 in the two suits. Broadly stated one set of applications is to amend the respective plaints, to include the relief of specific performance and make averments pertaining thereto. This set of applications were essentially under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC. 14. The other set of applications were to exclude [under Section 14 of the Limitation Act] the time spent in pursuing the suits in the Tiruvallur District Courts. To state specifically, the time from the date of institution of the suit in the Tiruvallur District Court to the date of Supreme Court judgment namely, 27.07.2005 to 07.09.2012 was sought to be excluded for the purpose of incorporating the relief of specific performance in the suits. In other words, for the purpose of testing the Order 6, Rule 17 applications, qua limitation. 15. In the said four applications counter’ affidavits were filed and the matters were heard. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. P.S. Raman, leading the counsel on record appearing for the plaintiff company would submit that the suits in this Court were instituted based on the then obtaining position of law which ultimately changed only on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the instant case and therefore the prayer in the applications deserve to be acceded to. 16. Per contra, Mr. V. Achuthan, learned counsel appearing for the defendant companies would refer to the above said judgment of the Supreme Court in the instant case in the Civil Appeal and say that the relief of specific performance cannot now be claimed by the plaintiff as according to him the same has been foreclosed and sealed by the Supreme Court vide its above said judgment dated 07.09.2012. 17. In reply, learned Senior Counsel Mr. P.S. Raman, would submit that the Supreme Court has not foreclosed or sealed plaintiff company’s relief for specific performance and he would oppose his submissions on the ibij jus ubi remedium principle. 18. Therefore, a very close and careful understanding of judgment of the Supreme Court dated 07.09.2012 is pivotal for deciding the instant applications. 19. Before I venture to do that, I refer to the judgments that were pressed into service by the plaintiff company in the course of the hearing. 18. Therefore, a very close and careful understanding of judgment of the Supreme Court dated 07.09.2012 is pivotal for deciding the instant applications. 19. Before I venture to do that, I refer to the judgments that were pressed into service by the plaintiff company in the course of the hearing. They are as follows: (i) A.K.Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation [Civil Appeal 10.09.1065 : ( AIR 1967 SC 96 )], it has been held thus : ‘Before the learned trial Judge several issues were raised but it is necessary to mention only two. One issue was as to the maintainability of the suit in the form in which it had been framed and the other issue was as to the proper interpretation of the clause. The first of these issues was not pressed at the hearing. The other issue having been decided by the trial Court in favour of the appellant, the suit was decreed. The other issues which had been raised, had also not been pressed. The Court had further given the appellant leave under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to sue later for the amount due under the contract. It is not in dispute that at the date of the application for amendment, a suit for a money claim under the contract was barred. The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on the new case or cause of action is barred: Welch v. Neale. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation, see Charan Das v. Amir Khan ( AIR 1921 PC 50 ) and L.J. Leach and Company Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co. ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ). Now, how does the present case stand on these principles ? Does the amendment introduce a new cause of action or a new case? We do not think it does. The suit was on the contract. ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ). Now, how does the present case stand on these principles ? Does the amendment introduce a new cause of action or a new case? We do not think it does. The suit was on the contract. It sought the interpretation of a clause in the contract only for a decision of the rights of the parties under it and for no other purpose. It was the contract which formed the cause of action on which the suit was based. The amendment seeks to introduce a claim based on the same cause of action, that is, the same contract. It introduces no new case or facts. Indeed the facts on which the money claim sought to be added is based are not in dispute. Even the amount of the claim now sought to be made by amendment, was mentioned in the plaint in stating the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction. The respondent had notice of it. It is quite clear that the interpretation of the clause was sought only for quantifying the money claim. In the written statement the respondent specifically expressed its willingness to pay the appellant’s legitimate dues which could only mean such amount as might be due according to the rates applicable on a proper interpretation of the clause. The respondent was fully aware that the ultimate object of the appellant in filing the suit was to obtain the payment of that amount. It was equally aware that the amount had not been specifically claimed in the suit because the respondent had led the appellant to believe that it would pay whatever the court legitimately found to be due. It in fact said so in the written statement. If there was any case where the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of the law of limitation, the present is that one. The respondent cannot legitimately claim that the amendment will prejudicially effect his right under that law for really be had no such right. It is a case in which the claim for money was in substance in the plaint from the beginning though it had not formally been made.' (ii) Roshanlal Kuthiala and Ors. The respondent cannot legitimately claim that the amendment will prejudicially effect his right under that law for really be had no such right. It is a case in which the claim for money was in substance in the plaint from the beginning though it had not formally been made.' (ii) Roshanlal Kuthiala and Ors. v. R.B.Mohan Singh Oberoi [Civil Appeal No. 2248 of 1968 dated 17.10.1974 : ( AIR 1975 SC 824 ) it has been held as follows: 'The slow flow of the plaintiff’s rights along the stream of statutory limitation would have normally been stilled into a final freeze, for the prescribed life span of six years under Article 117 of the Limitation Act had admittedly run out. The rescue raft on which Shri Oberoi clutched O survival (sic) of his right to sue was Section 19 and his life-belt, as it were, was Section 14. The facts and law are fairly clear; their rival interpretations by counsel diverged so much that the encounter generated at the bar as ‘much heat as light-inevitable, ‘May be, in an adversary system. Be that as it may, we will scrutinise the case urged by the plaintiff to attract these rejuvinatory and exclusionary provisions. Courts must as far as is reasonably permissible put a liberal construction on documents to save, not to scuttle, when faced with a plea of limitation to non-suit an otherwise good claim.' (iii) Rameshwarlal v. Municipal Council, Tonk and Ors. [SLP. [C] No. 16339 of 1996 dated 27.08.1996], it has been held as follows : 'Normally for application of Section 14, the Court dealing with the matter in the first instance, which is the subject of the issue in the later case, must be found to have lack of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature to entertain the matter. However, since the High Court expressly declined to grant relief relegating the petitioner to a suit in civil Court, the petitioner cannot be left remediless. Accordingly, the time taken in prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court and this Court obviously pursued diligently and bona fide, needs to be excluded. The petitioner is permitted to issue notice to the Municipality within four weeks from today. After expiry thereof, he could fine suit within two months thereafter. Accordingly, the time taken in prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court and this Court obviously pursued diligently and bona fide, needs to be excluded. The petitioner is permitted to issue notice to the Municipality within four weeks from today. After expiry thereof, he could fine suit within two months thereafter. The trial Court would consider and dispose of the matter in accordance with law on merits.' (iv) Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and another [Civil Appeal Nos. 1061-1062 of 1998 dated 25.02.2004 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3079 )], it has been held as follows: 'In the submission of Mr. Malhotra, placing reliance on The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow v. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, (1975) 4 SCC 22 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1039 ) to attract the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act the following requirements must be specified. '(1) both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party: (2) the prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith: (3) the failure of the prior proceedings was due to a defect of jurisdiction or other case of a like nature; (4) both the proceedings are proceeding in a Court.’? In the submission of the learned senior counsel, filing of civil writ petition claiming money relief cannot be said to be a proceeding instituted in good faith and secondly, dismissal of writ petition on the ground that it was not an appropriate remedy for seeking money relief cannot be said to be ‘defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature’ within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the writ petition was not dismissed by the High Court on the ground of defect of jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide in its application, inasmuch it is not confined in its applicability only to cases of defect of jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases where the prior proceedings have failed on account of other causes of like nature. The expression 'Other cause of like nature’came up for the consideration of this Court in Roshanlal Kuthalia and Ors. The expression 'Other cause of like nature’came up for the consideration of this Court in Roshanlal Kuthalia and Ors. v. R. B. Mohan Singh Oberoi, AIR 1975 SC 824 : (1975) 4 SCC 628 and it was held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where the defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstances, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the Court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the Section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has right.' (v) M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commnr. of Central Excise [Civil Appeal No.4367 of 2004 dated 23.04.2015] it has been held thus: '21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service: (1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; (2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; (3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature; (4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and; (5) Both the proceedings are in a court.’ (vi) Mount Mary Enterprises v. Jivratna Medi Treat Pvt. Ltd. [Civil Appeal No.1323 of 2015 dated 30.01.2015 (AIR 2015 SC (Supp) 600), it has been held as follows : '4. It had been also submitted by the learned counsel that in normal circumstances an amendment application is always granted unless by virtue of the amendment, nature of the suit is changed or some irreparable harm is caused to the defendant. According to him, in the instant case neither nature of the suit was changed nor was the defendant being put to any hardship. The amendment was also not likely to cause any prejudice to the defendant. The amendment which was sought to be made was just and proper because actual market value of the said property was Rs.1,20,00,000/-. According to him, in the instant case neither nature of the suit was changed nor was the defendant being put to any hardship. The amendment was also not likely to cause any prejudice to the defendant. The amendment which was sought to be made was just and proper because actual market value of the said property was Rs.1,20,00,000/-. For the aforesaid reasons, it had been submitted by him that the impugned judgment confirming the order rejecting the amendment application should be set aside and the appellant should be permitted to amend the plaint. 7. In our opinion, as per the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, the amendment application should be normally granted unless by virtue of the amendment nature of the suit is changed or some prejudice is caused to the defendant. In the instant case, the nature of the suit was not to be changed by virtue of granting the amendment application because the suit was for specific performance and initially the property had been valued at Rs.13,50,000/- but as the market value of the property was actually Rs. 1,20,00,000/-, the appellant-plaintiff had submitted an application for amendment so as to give the correct value of the suit property in the plaint.' 20. On the side of defendant companies, no judgments were relied upon. 21. For a careful and considered understanding of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the instant case it has become necessary to extract a major portion of the said judgment. After extracting rival submissions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Virgo Industries (Eng.) P. Ltd. [Civil Appeals arising out of ‘Tiruvallur District court suits in’ instant matter] as '8. The necessary discussions that will have to follow may be initiated by extracting the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC: 'ORDER II 2. Suit to include the whole claim. (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim-Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim-Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs : A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation - For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action.' 9. Order 2, Rule 1 requires every suit to include the whole of the claim to which the plaintiff is entitled in respect of any particular cause of action. However, the plaintiff has an option to relinquish any part of his claim if he chooses to do so. Order 2, Rule 2 contemplates a situation where a plaintiff omits to sue or intentionally relinquishes any portion of the claim which he is entitled to make. If the plaintiff so acts, Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC makes it clear that he shall not, afterwards, sue for the part or portion of the claim that has been omitted or relinquished. It must be noticed that Order 2, Rule 2 (2) does not contemplate omission or relinquishment of any portion of the plaintiffs claim with the leave of the court so as to entitle him to come back later to seek what has been omitted or relinquished. Such leave of the Court is contemplated by Order 2, Rule 2 (3) in situations where a plaintiff being entitled to more than one relief on a particular cause of action, omits to sue for all such reliefs. In such a situation, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a subsequent suit to claim the relief earlier omitted except in a situation where leave of the Court had been obtained. In such a situation, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a subsequent suit to claim the relief earlier omitted except in a situation where leave of the Court had been obtained. It is, therefore, clear from a conjoint reading of the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 (2) and (3) of the CPC that the aforesaid two sub-rules of Order 2, Rule 2 contemplate two different situations, namely, where a plaintiff omits or relinquishes a part of a claim which he is entitled to make and, secondly, where the plaintiff omits or relinquishes one out of the several reliefs that he could have claimed in the suit. It is only in the latter situations where the plaintiff can file a subsequent suit seeking the relief omitted in the earlier suit proved that at the time of omission to claim the particular relief he had obtained leave of the Court in the first suit. 10. The object behind enactment of Order 2, Rule 2 (2) and (3) of the CPC is not far to seek. The Rule engrafts a laudable principle that discourages/prohibits vexing the defendant again and again by multiple suits except in a situation where one of the several reliefs, though available to a plaintiff, may not have been claimed for a good reason. A later suit for such relief is contemplated only with the leave of the Court which leave, naturally, will be granted upon due satisfaction and for good and sufficient reasons. The situations where the bar under Order 2, Rule 2 (2) and (3) will be attracted have been enumerated in a long line of decisions spread over a century now. A later suit for such relief is contemplated only with the leave of the Court which leave, naturally, will be granted upon due satisfaction and for good and sufficient reasons. The situations where the bar under Order 2, Rule 2 (2) and (3) will be attracted have been enumerated in a long line of decisions spread over a century now. Though each of the aforesaid decisions contain a clear and precise narration of the principles of law arrived at after a detailed analysis, the principles laid down in the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal ( AIR 1964 SC 1810 ) may be usefully recalled below: 'In order that a plea of a bar under O. 2, R. 2(3), Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (1) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based, (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief, (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar.’? The above principles have been reiterated in several later judgments of this Court. Reference by way of illustration may be made to the judgments Deva Ram and Anr. v. Ishwar Chand and Anr. ( AIR 1996 SC 378 ) and M/s. Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. M/s. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Co. and Anr. ( AIR 1997 SC 1398 ). 11. The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order 2, Rule 2 (2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit. and Anr. ( AIR 1997 SC 1398 ). 11. The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order 2, Rule 2 (2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit. It will be wholly necessary to enter into any discourse on the true meaning of the said expression, i.e. cause of action, particularly, in view of the clear enunciation in a recent judgment of this Court in the Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee ( AIR 2012 SC 3912 ). The huge number of opinions rendered on the issue including the judicial pronouncements available does not fundamentally detract from what is stated in Halsburys Law of England, (4th Edition). The following reference from the above work would, therefore, be apt for being extracted herein below: 'Cause of Action ‘has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. Cause of action ‘has also been taken to mean that particular action the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.' 12. In the instant case though leave to sue for the relief of specific performance at a later stage was claimed by the plaintiff in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005, admittedly, no such leave was granted by the Court. The question, therefore, that the Court will have to address, in the present case, is whether the cause of action for the first and second set of suits is one and the same. Depending on such answer as the Court may offer the rights of the parties will follow. 13. A reading of the plaints filed in C.S. Nos. The question, therefore, that the Court will have to address, in the present case, is whether the cause of action for the first and second set of suits is one and the same. Depending on such answer as the Court may offer the rights of the parties will follow. 13. A reading of the plaints filed in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005 show clear averments to the effect that after execution of the agreements of sale dated 27.7.2005 the plaintiff received a letter dated 1.8.2005 from the defendant conveying the information that the Central Excise Department was contemplating issuance of a notice restraining alienation of the property. The advance amounts paid by the plaintiff to the defendant by cheques were also returned. According to the plaintiff it was surprised by the aforesaid stand of the defendant who had earlier represented that it had clear and marketable title to the property. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, it is stated that the encumbrance certificate dated 22.8.2005 made available to the plaintiff did not inspire confidence of the plaintiff as the same contained an entry dated 1.10.2004. The plaintiff, therefore, seriously doubted the claim made by the defendant regarding the proceedings initiated by the Central Excise Department. In the aforesaid paragraph of the plaint it was averred by the plaintiff that the defendant is ‘finding an excuse to cancel the sale agreement and sell the property to some other third party.’? In the aforesaid paragraph of the plaint, it was further stated that in this background, the plaintiff submits that the defendant is attempting to frustrate the agreement entered into between the parties.' 14. The averments made by the plaintiff in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005, particularly the pleadings extracted above, leave no room for doubt that on the dates when C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005 were instituted, namely, 28.8.2005 and 9.9.2005, the plaintiff itself had claimed that facts and events have occurred which entitled it to contend that the defendant had no intention to honour the agreements dated 27.7.2005. In the aforesaid situation it was open for the plaintiff to incorporate the relief of specific performance along with the relief of permanent injunction that formed the subject-matter of above two suits. In the aforesaid situation it was open for the plaintiff to incorporate the relief of specific performance along with the relief of permanent injunction that formed the subject-matter of above two suits. The foundation for the relief of permanent injunction claimed in the two suits furnished a complete cause of action to the plaintiff in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 to also sue for the relief of specific performance. Yet, the said relief was omitted and no leave in this regard was obtained or granted by the Court. 15. Furthermore, according to the plaintiff, which fact is also stated in the plaints filed in C.S. Nos. 831 and 833, on the date when the aforesaid two suits were filed the relief of specific performance was premature inasmuch as the time for execution of the sale documents by the defendant in terms of the agreements dated 27-7-2005 had not elapsed. According to the plaintiff, it is only after the expiry of the aforesaid period of time and upon failure of the defendant to execute the sale deeds despite the legal notice dated 24.2.2006 that the cause of action to claim the relief of specific performance had accrued. The above stand of the plaintiff found favour with the High Court. We disagree. A suit claiming a relief to which the plaintiff may become entitled at a subsequent point of time, though may be termed as premature, yet, cannot per se be dismissed to be presented on a future date. There is no universal rule to the above effect inasmuch as ‘the question of a suit being premature does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court’as held by this Court in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India ( AIR 2005 SC 1891 ). There is no universal rule to the above effect inasmuch as ‘the question of a suit being premature does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court’as held by this Court in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India ( AIR 2005 SC 1891 ). In the aforesaid case this Court has taken the view that whether a premature suit is required to be entertained or not is a question of discretion and unless ‘there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event’?, the Court must weigh and balance the several competing factors that are required to be considered including the question as to whether any useful purpose would be served by dismissing the suit as premature as the same would entitle the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on a subsequent date. We may usefully add in this connection that there is no provision in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 requiring a plaintiff claiming the relief of specific performance to wait for expiry of the due date for performance of the agreement in a situation where the defendant may have made his intentions clear by his overt acts. 16. The learned single Judge of the High Court had considered, and very rightly, to be bound to follow an earlier Division Bench order in the case of R. Vimalchand and M. Ratanchand v. Ramalingam, T. Srinivasalu and T. Venkatesaperumal (supra) holding that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC would be applicable only when the first suit is disposed of. As in the present case the second set of suits were filed during the pendency of the earlier suits, it was held, on the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 (3) will not be attracted. Judicial discipline required the learned single Judge of the High Court to come to the aforesaid conclusion. However, we are unable to agree with the same in view of the object behind the enactment of the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC as already discussed by us, namely, that Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC seeks to avoid multiplicity of litigations on same cause of action. However, we are unable to agree with the same in view of the object behind the enactment of the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC as already discussed by us, namely, that Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC seeks to avoid multiplicity of litigations on same cause of action. If that is the true object of the law, on which we do not entertain any doubt, the same would not stand fully subserved by holding that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC will apply only if the first suit is disposed of and not in a situation where the second suit has been filed during the pendency of the first suit. Rather, Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC will apply to both the aforesaid situations. Though direct judicial pronouncements on the issue are somewhat scarce, we find that a similar view had been taken in a decision of the High Court at Allahabad in Murti v. Bhola Ram and by the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji v. Raghunath ( AIR 1954 Bom 125 ). 17. In the light of the above discussions we are of the view that the present appeals deserve to be allowed. Accordingly we allow the same and set aside the judgment and order dated 6.10.2009 passed by the High Court of Madras in C.R.P.PD. Nos.3758 and 3759 of 2007. Consequently, we strike off the plaint in O.S. Nos.202 and 203 of 2007 on the file of District Judge, Thiruvallur.' 22. The Honourable Supreme Court of India, was testing the correctness or otherwise of the order dated 06.10.2009 made by this Court (Madras High Court) in CRP. Nos.3758 and 3759 of 2007 wherein and whereby, a single Judge of this Court, refused to interdict the proceedings that were taken on file in O.S. Nos.202 and 203 of 2007 on the file of the learned District Judge, Tiruvallur. 23. A perusal of the common order of this Court dated 06.10.2009 in CRP. Nos.3758 & 3759 of 2007, will show that this common order was passed by this Court, in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred as ‘COI’ for brevity). The prayer in the said CRPs before this Court was to strike off the plaints in O.S. Nos. Nos.3758 & 3759 of 2007, will show that this common order was passed by this Court, in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred as ‘COI’ for brevity). The prayer in the said CRPs before this Court was to strike off the plaints in O.S. Nos. 202 and 203 of 2007 on the file of the learned District Judge, Tiruvallur respectively. 24. The sheet anchor of the case of the revision petitioners was that the said suits in the Tiruvallur District Courts are hit by the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 , CPC as the same were launched without obtaining leave of this Court under Order 2, Rule 3 of CPC. 25. Though applications seeking such leave in the Appl. Nos.4259 and 4260 of 2005 (2 of the instant applications out of the six applications which are being disposed off) was sought, the prayers were not acceded to. The prayers were not negatived either. 26. The above draws me to the age old practise on the Original Side of this Court wherein a suit would be assigned a number and taken on file only after leave is granted under Order 2, Rule 3 of CPC whenever such an application is filed. This procedure is akin to a suit with an application for leave to sue under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. In the instant case, that procedure was not adopted. The suit was assigned a number, the two leave applications were also assigned numbers along with the suit, the suit was admitted and notice was ordered in the said leave application also. When the suit summons were issued. Therefore, for all practical purposes the Order 2, Rule 3 applications of the plaintiff are pending in this Court and the same fall for consideration. This has been clearly noticed by the Honourable Supreme Court of India and the same will be evident from the extracted paragraphs wherein the Supreme Court has clearly noticed that the leave applications have not been ordered. It has also been noticed that prayer in the leave applications were not negatived either. 27. As contended by Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Senior Counsel, the Supreme Court has noticed the then obtaining position of law being the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in R. Vimalchand's case. It has also been noticed that prayer in the leave applications were not negatived either. 27. As contended by Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Senior Counsel, the Supreme Court has noticed the then obtaining position of law being the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in R. Vimalchand's case. Supreme Court has clearly held that the single Judge of this Court was right in refusing to strike off the plaints in Tiruvallur Court by relying on following the ratio in R.Vimalchand's case. Thereafter, in the instant case the Supreme Court reversed the then obtaining position of law in R. Vimalchands case and held that Order 2, Rule 2 of C.P.C. will apply even in the second suit, during the pendency of the earlier suit. 28. Therefore, when the Supreme Court has clearly held that this Court was right in refusing to strike off the plaints by relying on the R. Vimalchand's case, the parties cannot be found fault with for filing the instant suits in this Court. The parties were under the impression that the ratio in R. Vimalchand's case would apply, when the instant suits were filed in this Court. Only on 07.09.2012, the Supreme Court reversed the position of law qua Order 2, Rule 3 of C.P.C. If 07.09.2012 is taken as the relevant date, on 05.02.2013, the instant applications for, amendment of the instant suits together with exclusion of these petitions under Section 14 of the Limitation Act have been filed by the parties. 29. Now this takes me to the next question, as to whether, the amendment applications under Order 6, Rule 17 of C.P.C. and the applications under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, deserve to be considered favourably or do they deserve to be dismissed? 30. The Supreme Court has clearly noticed the two instant suits. The Supreme Court has also gone as far as noticing that the two applications seeking leave to omit the relief of specific performance by invoking Order 2, Rule 3 of C.P.C. have been taken out. It has been noticed that the said applications were neither allowed nor negatived. However, the instant suits and the questions therein have not been terminated. Therefore, the inference that can be drawn from the order of the Supreme Court is that the instant suits were left to be carried to their logical ends in a manner known to law. 31. It has been noticed that the said applications were neither allowed nor negatived. However, the instant suits and the questions therein have not been terminated. Therefore, the inference that can be drawn from the order of the Supreme Court is that the instant suits were left to be carried to their logical ends in a manner known to law. 31. In the light of the above understanding and the above perspective of the Supreme Court order, I now proceed to test the amendment applications and Section 14 applications. 32. Be that as it may, for so testing there are some other features, which are striking in the instant case and they are as follows : i. These are specific performance suits. Therefore, the Court is sitting in equitable discretionary jurisdiction. The fact that the agreements for sale are dated 27.07.2005 and that the letters from the defendant companies wriggling out of the agreement are dated 01-08-2005, prima facie raises a serious doubt in the mind and conscience of the equitable jurisdiction of the Court and impels the Court to conclude that the matter requires further examination. Even if there is further examination, as these are specific performance suits and the Court is exercising not only equitable but also discretionary jurisdiction, the plaintiffs may not straightway get a decree, even if all parameters are satisfied and even if the cause of action is proved. Ultimately, it is the discretion of the Court. As a corollary to these observations and reasons, it axiomatically follows that no harm would be caused to the defendant companies if the suits are allowed to be amended and if there is a full fledge trial. ii. It is also axiomatic that there can be fight shy of facing trial. iii. The amendment prayers being acceded to would only mean that the main suit can be carried to its logical end and the bona fides/genuineness of wriggling out/exiting from the agreements of sale within four days can be tested, one way or the other in the main suit. iv. I draw inspiration from another judgment of the Supreme Court rendered on 29.10.2014 [barely six weeks after the judgment dated 07.09.2012 in the instant case]. iv. I draw inspiration from another judgment of the Supreme Court rendered on 29.10.2014 [barely six weeks after the judgment dated 07.09.2012 in the instant case]. This judgment of the Supreme Court is in Rathnavathi's case (2014 AIR SCW 6288) wherein a Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, after referring to 07.09.2012 judgment in the instant case, held that cause of action has also been taken to mean that particular action on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint. This is found in paragraph Nos.28 and 30 of Rathnavathi's case which read as follows : 28. This Court has consistently followed the aforesaid enunciation of law in later years and reference to only one of such recent decisions in Virgo Industries (Eng.) P. Ltd. v. Venturetech Solutions P. Ltd., (2013) 1 SCC 625 would suffice wherein this Court reiterated the principle of law in following words: The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order 2, Rules 2(2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit. It will be wholly unnecessary to enter into any discourse on the true meaning of the said expression, i.e. cause of action, particularly, in view of the clear enunciation in a recent judgment of this Court in the Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society represented by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, JT 2012 (6) SC 149 : ( AIR 2012 SC 3912 ). The huge number of opinions rendered on the issue including the judicial pronouncements available does not fundamentally detract from what is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edition). The following reference from the above work would, therefore, be apt for being extracted herein below: ‘Cause of Action’ has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from the earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the Plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a Defendant would have a right to traverse. The phrase has been held from the earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the Plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a Defendant would have a right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that particular action on the part of the Defendant which gives the Plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.' 29. In the instant case when we apply the aforementioned principle, we find that bar contained in Order 2, Rule 2 is not attracted because of the distinction in the cause of action for filing the two suits. So far as the suit for permanent injunction is concerned, it was based on a threat given to the plaintiff by the defendants to dispossess her from the suit house on 2.1.2000 and 9.1.2000. This would be clear from reading Para 17 of the plaint. So far as cause of action to file suit for specific performance of agreement is concerned, the same was based on non performance of agreement dated 15.2.1989 by defendant No. 2 in plaintiffs favour despite giving legal notice dated 6.3.2000 to defendant No. 2 to perform her part. 30. In our considered opinion, both the suits were, therefore, founded on different causes of action and hence could be filed simultaneously. Indeed even the ingredients to file the suit for permanent injunction are different than that of the suit for specific performance of agreement’. v. There is no dispute between the parties that the position of law pertaining to Order 2, Rule 3 of C.P.C was understood and administered, by all concerned, based on ratio in R. Vimalchand's case until 07.09.2012. Thereafter, when the law laid down by this Court in R. Vimalchand's case was reversed by the Supreme Court, the dynamics changed. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff company would certainly be entitled to exclusion of time spent from 29.05.2007 to 07.09.2012. That takes me to the further question, as to whether, the plaintiff company is entitled to amendments to the plaint, which they have sought for. In the light of holding that the plaintiff company is entitled to prayer in its application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, it necessarily follows that the amendments sought are live. That takes me to the further question, as to whether, the plaintiff company is entitled to amendments to the plaint, which they have sought for. In the light of holding that the plaintiff company is entitled to prayer in its application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, it necessarily follows that the amendments sought are live. In other words, cause of action qua the amendments that are now sought to be made are live. The amendments are live and the nature of the amendments are only those in view of the new position of law laid down by the Supreme Court on 07.09.2012. vi. In paragraph 19 supra, I have set out the case laws pressed into service by the plaintiff company. While so setting out, I have also extracted the relevant paragraphs in each of the judgments. This makes the proposition for which the respective judgments were cited clear. The judgments cited by plaintiff company, the proposition for which they were pressed into service and my reading of the same have been set out in paragraph 19. In other words, paragraph 19 is self-explanatory. The judgments pressed into service certainly further the case of the plaintiff company. 33. On drawing inspiration from the findings of the Supreme Court in Rathnavathi's case (2014 AIR SCW 6288) I am convinced that the amendment applications and Section 14 applications deserve to be allowed, in favour of the plaintiff company. On these applications being allowed, the application taken out by the plaintiff company at the time of inception, seeking leave under Order 2, Rule 3 of C.P.C. become unnecessary. Equally, application for rejection of plaint taken out by the defendant companies immediately after institution of the suit, being application in A.Nos.222 and 242 of 2006 primarily on the ground that the suit is hit by Order 2, Rule 3 of C.P.C. as specific performance prayer also has not been included, now become Otiose and not relevant. It might be appropriate to close these applications as unnecessary. 34. It might be appropriate to close these applications as unnecessary. 34. To make the position very clear, it might sub-serve the purpose to crystallise the order of this Court in the following manner: i. A. No.608 of 2013 in C.S. No.833 of 2005 and A. No.618 of 2013 in C.S. No.831 of 2005 for excluding the time period between the institution of suits and the Supreme Court judgment under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, are allowed. ii. A. No.607 of 2013 in C.S. No.833 of 2005 and A. No.617 of 2013 in C.S. No.831 of 2005 seeking amendment of plaints are allowed. iii. A. No.4259 of 2005 in C.S. No.833 of 2005 and A. No.4260 of 2005 in C.S. No.831 of 2005 with prayers seeking leave to omit the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 27.07.2005 and the relief of damages are closed as unnecessary, in the light of the amendment applications being allowed. iv. A. No.242 of 2006 in C.S. No.833 of 2005 and A. No.222 of 2006 in C.S. No.831 of 2005 taken out by the defendant companies in the respective suits seeking rejection of plaint on the primary ground that it is hit by Order 2, Rule 3 of C.P.C, are closed as infructuous, in the light of the amendment applications being allowed. All the eight applications are thus disposed of, one way or the other as crystallised and set out supra. 35. In the light of the orders that I have passed in all the eight applications, as set out supra, it is deemed relevant and imperative to draw up a calendar for disposal of the main suit. This is moreso as the suits are of the year 2005 and are now more than a decade old. These suits which are more than a decade old have been perambulating in various corners of this Court only on interlocutory applications, which have been taken out on one ground or the other. Now that all the interlocutory applications have been disposed of, it would sub-serve the purpose of the disposal of the main suit to draw up a calendar, which will be as follows: i. Amendments to the plaints shall be carried out within a fortnight from the date of the copies of this order being furnished. ii. The amended plaints shall be duly served on the defendants within the above fortnight. iii. ii. The amended plaints shall be duly served on the defendants within the above fortnight. iii. After service of amended copies of the plaints, the defendant companies shall file a comprehensive written statements in each of the suits within a period of four weeks there from. iv. After completion, of pleadings within a six weeks time frame as aforesaid, both the parties shall exchange draft issues and bring up the matter for framing issues before the Court within a fortnight therefrom and get the issues framed by the Court. v. Post framing issues all the pre trial formalities, such as list of witnesses, discovery of documents, etc., shall be completed by both the parties within a fortnight therefrom. vi. Immediately after completion of pre trial formalities, in any event, within a fortnight from the date of completion of pre trial formalities, the matter shall be posted before one of the learned Additional Masters for letting in evidence, if any. 36. Though obvious, for the purpose of abundant clarity, it is made clear that all the views and opinions expressed in this order are solely for the purpose of disposing of the above said eight applications and the main suit will be tested/tried and decided uninfluenced and untrammeled by the observations herein.

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