JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.—Original Suit No. 1028 of 1974, Ramayan and another v. Ramjiyawan and another, was filed for the relief of recovery of possession and permanent injunction. This suit was dismissed by the judgment dated 10.2.1978 of Ist Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur. Against this judgment of trial Court, Civil Appeal No. 163 of 1978 Ramayan and another v. Ramjiyawan and another, was preferred, which was heard and partly allowed, and original suit No. 1028/1974 was partly decreed by judgment dated 21.2.1980. against the judgment dated 21.2.1980 of first appellate Court Second Appeal No. 1505 of 1980 Ramayan and another v. Ramjiyawan and another, was preferred by the two plaintiffs of the original suit against the two defendants of the original suit, which was admitted on 8.9.1980 by this Court. 2. During pendency of this second appeal all parties of this second appeal, both appellants and both respondents had died. 3. The respondent side had moved Abatement application No. 242955/2015 (dated 22.7.2015) when no party was substituted after the death of all appellants and respondents. This was supported by affidavit of Sant Lal, son of original respondent No. 2 Bhogai. In this affidavit it is written that (1) appellant No. 1 died in year 1992, (2) appellant No. 2 died in year 1994, (3) respondent No. 1 died in year 2010, and (4) respondent No. 2 died in year 1995; so this appeal should be dismissed as abated. 4. Substitution application No. 218246/2015 was filed for substitution of deceased appellants No. 1 and 2, stating that there is no legal heir of deceased appellant No. 1 Ramayan (died on 10.8.1992), and deceased appellant No. 2 Satya Narayan (died on 2.11.1994) should be substituted by his two sons. 5. Admittedly no substitution application was moved within the period of limitation, so appeal had already abated. It has to be considered as to whether, for the reasons mentioned in delay condonation application for condoning delay in moving the same, the abatement of this second appeal may be set aside and dealay condonation application may be allowed. 6. Substitution Application No. 218243/2015 was filed for substitution of deceased respondent Nos. 1 and 2, in which date of death of respondent No. 1 was mentioned as 5.11.2010 and date of death of respondent No. 2 was mentioned as 10.3.1995. 6. Substitution Application No. 218243/2015 was filed for substitution of deceased respondent Nos. 1 and 2, in which date of death of respondent No. 1 was mentioned as 5.11.2010 and date of death of respondent No. 2 was mentioned as 10.3.1995. An application No. 218240/2015 for condonation of delay (dated 5.7.2015) is also filed alongwith this substitution application. These applications are supported with affidavit of Chandra Bhan Pal, son of appellant No. 2 Satya Narain, aged about 60 years. Only said Chandra Bhan Pal had filed his Vakalatnama. 7. The grounds for condonation of delay in filing substitution applications is mentioned in affidavit dated 5.7.2015 of Chandra Bhan Pal, which is as under: “That deponent is not aware about the case which is pending before this Hon’ble Court and father of the applicant had never say about the case which is pending before this Hon’ble Court when deponent started construction the house in disputed plot then son of opposite party say that there is a case pending before Hon’ble High Court then deponent enquire about the case on 8.7.2015 deponent came to knowledge about case.” 8. At the time of hearing on above application on 8.1.2016 point of non filing of Vakalatnama on behalf of proposed appellants was raised, and matter was adjourned on request of counsel for the appellant for today. But no Vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the proposed legal representative No. 2 of deceased appellant No. 2. 9. In both affidavits dated 5.7.2015, the deponent mentioned the date of knowledge of this second appeal as on 8.7.2015. There may be possibility of clerical error in mentioning correct date, but in fact, correct date of alleged knowledge was not informed to Court. The date/time of alleged start of construction were also not informed. 10. The appellant No. 1 Ramayan died on 10.8.1992, the appellant No. 2 was alive. So for substituting him period of limitation had started running from next day of his death. 11. In substitution application the date of death of respondent No. 1 is mentioned as 5.11.2010 and date of death of respondent No. is mentioned as 10.3.1995. The limitation for substituting them had also started running from next day of their death. 12. So for substituting him period of limitation had started running from next day of his death. 11. In substitution application the date of death of respondent No. 1 is mentioned as 5.11.2010 and date of death of respondent No. is mentioned as 10.3.1995. The limitation for substituting them had also started running from next day of their death. 12. Original parties of the suit/second appeal as well as their proposed legal representatives are resident of same village and are neighbours, there is no averment that parties or their LRs, including the deponent Chandra Bhan Pal, had no knowledge of death of any other party, appellant or respondent. 13. According to his affidavit the age of applicant/deponent Chandra Bhan Pal is about 60 years in year 2015. This means he was major at the time of institution of original suit No. 1028/1974. It appears unbelievable that during such long litigation in trial Court as well as in first appellate Court and also in second appeal before this Court he had no knowledge of this pending contested litigation from year 1974 to year 1994 till death of his father in year 1994, and thereafter till July 2015, that is for period of about 41 years. The reasons given by appellant side for the condonation of delay in moving two substitution applications for appellants and respondents are not sufficient. 14. Section-2(a) and Section 9 of Indian Limitation Act reads as under: “2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— (a) “applicant” includes— (i) a petitioner; (ii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply; (iii) any person whose estate is represented by the applicant as executor, administrator or other representative” “9. Continuous running of time.—Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stop it” 15. The facts discussed above reveals that the second appeal had abated within knowledge of parties, but they had not cared to get its abatement set aside deliberately for long time. But in year 2015 said applications were moved by one legal representative/heir, not by all, of deceased appellants. The reasons of no knowledge of second appeal are also found unsatisfactory and unbelievable. 16. The substitution application on behalf of proposed appellants is moved for substituting two persons, but only one had moved application and filed power/vakalatnama. But in year 2015 said applications were moved by one legal representative/heir, not by all, of deceased appellants. The reasons of no knowledge of second appeal are also found unsatisfactory and unbelievable. 16. The substitution application on behalf of proposed appellants is moved for substituting two persons, but only one had moved application and filed power/vakalatnama. In spite of time being afforded other proposed appellant had not filed his power. Reason for it was not explained to Court. 17. The contention of learned counsel for the applicant was that Court should be liberal in such delay condonation and setting aside abatement for deciding old disputes on merit of the case. Such arguments are not incorrect. But every case has to be considered on its own facts and merits. No one should be permitted to misuse process of Court, and there should be sufficient reasons for granting relief. If the acts of applicant are found mala fide or incorrect or unsatisfactory then it is appropriate not to grant relief that may encourage the misuse of process of law. Such is the case in present matter. The reasons given in delay condonation application are found not satisfactory, and are apparently incorrect and mala fide. 18. In this matter the appeal had abated in year 1994 when last surviving appellant had died. There appears no sufficient reason to condone the delay in moving the substitution applications for applicants. Since the respondent No. 2 had died in year 1995 without being substituted so no sufficient reason appears there to condone the delay in moving the substitution applications for him in year 2015. Likewise the respondent No. 1 had died in year 2010 without being substituted so no sufficient reason appears there to condone the delay in moving the substitution applications for him. The second appeal has already abated and the grounds taken for delay in moving application for substitution are not found sufficient. 19. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the delay condonation application No. 218240/2015 is hereby rejected. The abatement application No. 242955/2015 is allowed. The Second Appeal is dismissed as abated. Accordingly the two substitution applications No. 218246/2015 and No. 218243/2015 are dismissed.