JUDGMENT : Introduction: The issue in this writ petition concerns the statutory benefit of `preference' to an exonerated licencee. To be precise, once an erstwhile licencee is exonerated of an abkari offence, at what specific stage can he claim his preferential right to licence? Should he wait until the end of the licence period of the subsequent licencee, whatever be the length of the licence period? Facts: 2. The 1st petitioner and the 2nd petitioner's deceased husband along with the 7th respondent were the licensees of Toddy Shop Nos. 54 to 59 in Group No. X of Erattupetta Excise Range under Kottayam Division. It was for the abkari year 2012- 13. 3. On 19.01.2012 the excise authorities took a sample of toddy from the petitioners' Shop No. 55 and subjected it to chemical analysis. On the allegation that starch had been found mixed in the toddy, the Excise Inspector, Erattupetta Range, registered Crime No. 52/2012 against the licencees: the 1st petitioner, the 2nd petitioner's husband, and the 7th respondent. As a corollary, the authorities have cancelled their toddy licence, too. 4. In the subsequent auction, the 6th respondent, who is none other than the 7th respondent's brother, emerged successful. He is currently the licencee. Thus, no Sherlock Homean acumen is required to realise why the 7th respondent, one of the joint licencees, has not joined the fray along with the petitioners in staking a claim for the preferential right. 5. The crime was tried before JFCM, Erattupetta, in C.C. No.833/2013. But it ended in a clean acquittal, as is evident from Ext.P1 judgement, dt.06.08.2015. To employ the phraseology of Abkari Rules, I may say the licencees were exonerated. 6. Disqualification lifted, two of the three erstwhile licencees--of course, one as a legal heir--have staked their claim for the preference in the new Abkari Year beginning from 1st April, 2016. Fortified by Rule 5(1)(a) of Abkari Shops Disposal Rules 2002 (`the Rules'), the petitioners have submitted Ext.P3 representation to the 2nd respondent, in furtherance of their claim. 7. When their representation bore no fruit, the petitioners have filed this writ petition claiming their preferential right to licence as has been provided under Rule 5 (1) (a) of Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002. 8. 7. When their representation bore no fruit, the petitioners have filed this writ petition claiming their preferential right to licence as has been provided under Rule 5 (1) (a) of Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002. 8. The petitioners' claim for preference seems to have been negated by the authorities because the amended Rule 7(26) of the Rules, notified vide G.O. (P) No.33/2014(TTD), dated 22-2- 2014, has conferred on the subsequent licencee an uninterruptible right for three successive years from initial grant of the licence. In other words, despite their exoneration, the petitioners should wait till the licence period of the subsequent licencee comes to an end. Summary of Submissions: Petitioners': 9. In the above context, the Sri K. Reghu Kottappuram, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the amended Rule 7 (26) of the Rules is not a permissible piece of legislation: It guarantees and extends the privilege for vending toddy in advance for successive years receiving no consideration like kist or rental. 10. Referring to entry 8 of list II of 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India, the learned counsel contends that sale of intoxicating liquor under the said entry is actual sale but not a putative or projected one. According to him, actual sale is characterised by remittance of the sale consideration at the very threshold. As per the amended Rule 7 (26), the sale for further years, insists the learned counsel, is nothing but a future transaction--contingent and uncertain. It is anticipatory and, therefore, not an actual sale. 11. The learned counsel thus encapsulates his constitutional contentions that the amended Rule is repugnant and excessive of the delegated legislative power of the Executive. Respondents': 6th Respondent's: 12. Sri Karthikeyan, the learned counsel for the 6th respondent, the subsequent licencee, has submitted that the 6th respondent initially got the licence for the abkari year 2012-13. And later he got the allotment on preferential basis for the year 2013-14 as well. It is his specific contention that the Government in 2014 ordered the licence to be given for three years. As a result, the 6th respondent, urges the learned counsel, has the allotment for the year 2015-16, too, as is evident from Exhibit R6 (a). 13. The learned counsel has further submitted that the Government already issued guidelines concerning the extension of the privilege for the year 2016-17. As a result, the 6th respondent, urges the learned counsel, has the allotment for the year 2015-16, too, as is evident from Exhibit R6 (a). 13. The learned counsel has further submitted that the Government already issued guidelines concerning the extension of the privilege for the year 2016-17. According to him, as per the said policy, the 6th respondent should have the extension for the year 2016-17 as well, for the 6th respondent has the privilege extended to him for three years--2014-17. In other words, the petitioners' right to preference could come into picture only at the end of the 6th respondent's licence period of three years; that is, by 2017. 14. Eventually, the learned counsel has submitted that the 6th respondent has already paid the rent or licence fee for the 2016-17 too, apart from paying three month's contribution to welfare fund in advance and bank guarantee equivalent to one month's wages of the employees as per rules. According to him, the authorities have already extended the privilege by endorsing on the license. 15. Concluding his submissions, Mr. Karthikeyan has contended that the 2nd petitioner has no locus standi being the legal heir of a deceased licencee; the 1st petitioner and the 7th respondent can claim preference along with the 6th respondent for the allotment of the toddy shops only from the year 2017-18 onwards. Responds 1 to 5's: 16. The learned Government Pleader, to begin with, fairly concedes the petitioners' claim. But he has submitted that the preference claimed by the petitioners cannot be extended to them at present because of the policy declared by the Government through G.O.(MS) No. 22/2014/TD dated 12.02.2014. 17. Referring to Exhibit R4 (a) Government Order, the learned Government Pleader submits that the Government has decided to give privilege to a prospective licencee to vend for three years from 01.04.2014 to 31.03.2017 through a public auction. Accordingly, the privilege of toddy shop Nos. 54 to 59 in Grop No. 10 of Erattupetta range has been granted to the 6th respondent, who is the brother of the 7th respondent, through re- sale as per rules. Till the end of the three-year period, there can be no sale or resale of the privilege to vend toddy, asserts the learned Government Pleader. 18. 54 to 59 in Grop No. 10 of Erattupetta range has been granted to the 6th respondent, who is the brother of the 7th respondent, through re- sale as per rules. Till the end of the three-year period, there can be no sale or resale of the privilege to vend toddy, asserts the learned Government Pleader. 18. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the 6th respondent, as well as the learned Government Pleader, apart from perusing the record. Issues: 1. Does the Executive, as a delegate, lack the vires to amend Rule 7 (26) of the Rules? 2. Do the changed policy of the Government and the consequential statutory amendments affect the rights of an exonerated licencee from claiming preferential right for vending toddy in terms of Rule 5 (1) (a) of the Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002? 3. Does Rule 7 (26) of the Rules have an overriding effect on the preferential right guaranteed under Rule 5 (1) of the Rules? Discussion: 19. Apart from addressing Issue No.1, I deem it appropriate to treat both issues 2 & 3 compendiously as they are intricately interconnected. Indeed, the facts are not in dispute. The resolution of the issues hinges on three aspects: exoneration, preference, and changed policy. 20. To put the issue in perspective, I may summarise the facts leading to the litigation: The 1st petitioner and the 2nd petitioner's deceased husband along with the 7th respondent had the toddy licence for the abkari year 2012-13. In the very beginning of 2012, they were subjected to criminal prosecution on the allegation of adulterating the toddy. Inevitable fall out was the cancellation of the licence. To fill the void--the remaining licence period--the authorities reauctioned the privilege.The7th respondent secured the licence. 21. The crime in C.C. No.833/2013 ended in acquittal: the licencees were exonerated through Ext.P1 judgement, dt.06.08.2015. Initially for the new abkari year 2015-2016, the petitioners staked their claim. 22. Both the Government and the 6th respondent have taken a uniform stand: the policy declared by the Government in Ext.R4 (a) comes in the way. As per the said policy, now the minimum licence period is three years. The 6th respondent has it allotted to him till 2017, only when can the petitioners revive their claim for preference. 23. 22. Both the Government and the 6th respondent have taken a uniform stand: the policy declared by the Government in Ext.R4 (a) comes in the way. As per the said policy, now the minimum licence period is three years. The 6th respondent has it allotted to him till 2017, only when can the petitioners revive their claim for preference. 23. It is also their plea that in tune with Ext.R4 (a) policy declaration by the Government, consequential amendments have been made to the Abkari Shops Disposal Rules. Accordingly, along with other provisions in the Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, Rule 7 of the Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002 was amended through G.O. (P) 33/2014 TD dated 22.02.2014. 24. The upshot of the submissions is that the petitioners are entitled to the preferential right, but it should be at the end of the third year--31.03.2017. Issue No.I: 25. A suitor may mount a multi-pronged attack on an executive or legislative measure. But the judiciary, while adjudicating, needs to obviate, as far as possible, attack on legislative invalidation if the issue can be resolved on other counts. Stated differently, judicial invalidation of legislation should be the last measure of adjudication in dispute resolution. 26. In the present instance, I reckon that the issue can be resolved without calling into question the vires of the provisions. As such, any discussion on the constitutional validity of the provision as has been canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is avoided. Resultantly, any reference to the precedential position on that aspect is obviated, too. Issue No.II & III: Statutory Scheme: 27. As much hinges on Rule 5 (1) (a) of the Rules, it pays to examine the provision, which, to the extent relevant, reads as follows: "While giving privilege, preference shall be given to those licensees who has conducted toddy shops during the preceding three years consecutively from 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09, provided no Abkari case is registered against him other than under section 56 of the Abkari Act. The licensees who have conducted the shops during 2002-03 and subsequent years and whose licences cancelled due to registration of Abkari cases and subsequently exonerated by the Courts and those Licensees who could not complete the preceding three years on account of the closure of shops shall also be given preference." 28. The licensees who have conducted the shops during 2002-03 and subsequent years and whose licences cancelled due to registration of Abkari cases and subsequently exonerated by the Courts and those Licensees who could not complete the preceding three years on account of the closure of shops shall also be given preference." 28. This provision, as has been interpreted earlier, lends to the following analysis: (1) While extending the privilege to vend toddy, the Department shall prefer those licencees who have conducted the toddy shops during the preceding three consecutive years; (2) the incumbent licencee shall not have any crime registered against him under any provision of the Act other than Section 56 thereof; and (3) if the incumbent licencee has not been preferred because of his facing criminal charges, any subsequent exoneration should revive his claim to preference. 29. Now, we may also examine the talisman of a provision for the Government and the rescue boat for the 6th respondent--Rule 7 (26): "[T]he licensee of the Group/ Range of toddy shop who have purchased the privilege for more than one year shall remit the annual rental for succeeding Abkari year before 31st March of the current Abkari year and should get the privilege for vending toddy extended for the succeeding year by duly furnishing required eligibility Certificate before the Deputy Commissioner of Excise concerned, failing which the licence shall be cancelled and toddy shops shall be resold for the remaining period'' 30. In fact, Section 24 of the Abkari Act (`the Act') delineates the power and procedure as regards the duration of the licence and the related aspects. The provision reads as follows: Section 24. Every licence or permit granted under the Act shall be a. On payment of such fees b. For such period c. Subject to such restriction and on such conditions d. shall be in such form and contain particulars - as the Government may direct either generally, or in any particular instance in this behalf. Shall be in such form and contain particulars as the government may direct either generally or in particular instances. (emphasis supplied) 31. From Section 24 of the Act, it is evident that the Government has the plenary powers and discretion to fix the period of the licence. It shall be on payment of such fees as are to be prescribed. Shall be in such form and contain particulars as the government may direct either generally or in particular instances. (emphasis supplied) 31. From Section 24 of the Act, it is evident that the Government has the plenary powers and discretion to fix the period of the licence. It shall be on payment of such fees as are to be prescribed. The legislature, in my view, has advisedly employed the plural `fees' rather than the singular `fee'. The licence may be for more than one year. In such an event, the licencee is required to pay the fees or the multiple years at the inception. 32. Adverting to the facts, I may observe that though the Government contends that the licence period is three years, it seems the licence fee is collected annually. 33. The reason for the annual remittance of the fee can be gathered from Rule 7 (26) which mandates that the licensee who has purchased the privilege for more than one year shall remit the annual rental for succeeding Abkari year before 10th January of the current Abkari year. A combined reading of Section 24 and Rule 7 (26) leads to an irresistible conclusion that the period of three years is contingent upon the licencee paying the subsequent annual licence fee; the licencee needs to have the licence extended, too. Had the licence been invariably fixed for three years, the question of extending it does not arise: the three- year period is conditional, even contingent. 34. Alternatively, we may approach the issue from another perspective: the semantic significance of the provision. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 12th Ed. (COED, 9th Edn.), defines acquittal as a judgement or verdict that a person is not guilty of a criminal charge. According to the same lexicon, the verb exonerate has the following meanings: 1 officially absolve from blame. 2 (exonerate someone from) release someone from (a duty or obligation). 35. Viewed comprehensively, acquittal is a word of art: it has different shades of meaning--some purely technical, too. The word acquittal does not mean that the trial must have ended in a complete acquittal; it would also include the case where an accused has been acquitted of graver offence, but may have been convicted of a minor offence. 35. Viewed comprehensively, acquittal is a word of art: it has different shades of meaning--some purely technical, too. The word acquittal does not mean that the trial must have ended in a complete acquittal; it would also include the case where an accused has been acquitted of graver offence, but may have been convicted of a minor offence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has affirmed this view in Tarachand Damu Sutar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 130 and Kishore Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 2267 Ipso facto, there can be an acquittal on merits or by default, want of sanction being one of the many technical factors contributing for the latter. It therefore follows that an acquittal does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that there is an acquittal from blame. 36. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, Merriam-Webster Inc., 1984 draws out the semantic distinction, if any, between exoneration and acquittal. Exculpate, absolve, exonerate, acquit, and vindicate are all synonyms having their own shades of meaning, though. We may focus on the two principal expressions: exonerate and acquit. Exonerate implies relief, often in a moral sense, from what is regarded as a load or burden. (Eg. [N]o reason for exonerating him [a judge] from the ordinary duties of a citizen--Justice Holmes). 37. In general exonerate more frequently suggests such relief from a definite charge that not even the suspicion of wrongdoing remains (exonerate a person charged with theft). Acquit implies a decision in one's favour with reference to a specific charge (acquit a suspect of all participation in a crime). 38. Rule 5 (1) (a) of the Rules is a beneficial provision for the licencee. With the abysmal rate of conviction--and the falsity of charges not entirely ruled out--the unproven charge of crime should not prove fatal to the livelihood of the licencee--at least, that seems to be the intention of the provision in providing for the revival of the right of privilege in the licencee's favour upon exoneration. 39. Summing up, I may observe that once a person has been exonerated of a crime, he is relieved from a definite charge that not even the suspicion of wrongdoing remains. That said, I should further examine the consequences of exoneration. Hypothetically stated, a person has his licence in January, 2016; the tenure is three years. 39. Summing up, I may observe that once a person has been exonerated of a crime, he is relieved from a definite charge that not even the suspicion of wrongdoing remains. That said, I should further examine the consequences of exoneration. Hypothetically stated, a person has his licence in January, 2016; the tenure is three years. He faces criminal charges of, say, adulteration in the very next month--February. His licence was cancelled and reallotted, in the interim, to somebody else. The trial meanders on for, unsurprisingly, three years and ends in acquittal or exoneration. It is in February 2019. Continuing our fiction, I assume that in January 2019, the third party licencee has the licence extended for the next three years; that is, up to 2021. 40. The above exemplum shows that a person was deprived of his licence in January 2016 on a mere allegation—in the end, proved to be a false charge. Until the trial concludes, inevitably, he will be kept away from staking any claim. Even after his exoneration--complete negation of the charge as false and unfounded--he will be kept away, again, from staking a claim for licence till 2019: six years. 41. With the exoneration, all the allegations have been wiped off. Fairness demands that the person whose prosecution, thus, borders on being malicious needs to have every one of his deprived benefits restored at the earliest. Can we in the name of policy keep him away from his legitimate licence period for six longs years--for no fault of his? 42. Nevertheless, I hasten to add that the Government's policy of fixing the licence period for three years, if it were, as per Rule 7 (26) does not necessarily come in conflict with the licencee's right to claim preferential rights after his exoneration. In other words, in all cases the government may fix the tenure of a licence as it desires for whatever period. But once a person gets his licence, in the interim, owing to the cancellation of a regular licence, his right to the tenure of the licence cannot be equated with that of a regular licencee, who gets it in the usual course. 43. But once a person gets his licence, in the interim, owing to the cancellation of a regular licence, his right to the tenure of the licence cannot be equated with that of a regular licencee, who gets it in the usual course. 43. Indeed, in Sunil Kumar P. T. v. Excise Commissioner, 2016 (1) KLT this Court has observed (para 68) that the existing licencee has a privilege conferred on him to have his licence renewed or his right to preference reckoned subject to his fulfilling all the conditions. In the same reckoning, it follows that the right of any other person depends on, if not subservient to, the right of the existing licencee. The Court went on to observe (para 69) that the legislature is conscious that once a policy of preference is to be operational, until the preferential right under the said policy has been conclusively rejected, the right of any other person is only contingent. In other words, if there is any bona fide dispute concerning the preference denied to an existing licencee, until the issue is resolved conclusively, the subsequent allottee can have licence unhindered so long as the cloud on the previous licencee's right remains. To that extent alone his right is indefeasible. 44. Of course, this Court, in the context of that case, has further observed (para 70) as follows: "70. A word of caution may be necessary here: provisional may be the licence, but it is not a Damocles sword hanging forever. Once the confirmation is made and by then the crime against the previous licencee has not been concluded; that is, ended in neither acquittal nor discharge, the subsequent allottee can enjoy the licence in full." 45. The learned counsel for the 6th respondent has latched on to the above observation. According to him, coupled with the above observation is the fact that Rule 7 (26) has already extended the period for three years. The 6th respondent is already said to have the licence confirmed for the next year also, so as to complete three years. 46. Regrettably, the learned counsel's contention fails to carry conviction. Sunil Kumar K. P., has not considered the amended Rule 7 (26), which has not even remotely presented itself for adjudication. The 6th respondent is already said to have the licence confirmed for the next year also, so as to complete three years. 46. Regrettably, the learned counsel's contention fails to carry conviction. Sunil Kumar K. P., has not considered the amended Rule 7 (26), which has not even remotely presented itself for adjudication. All that this Court has held is that the subsequent licencee need not be thrown out in the middle of the year merely on the premise that the previous licencee has been exonerated. It does not mean that the exonerated licencee could be kept at bay for years together in the name of, say, the extended tenure of licence--call it change in policy. In the facts and circumstances, this Court declares that the petitioners shall have their right to preference for the abkari year 2016-17, notwithstanding Rule 7 (26) for it operates in a different sphere. Consequently, the authorities shall consider the petitioners' claim to have the licence to vend toddy in Toddy Shop Nos. 54 to 59 in Group No. X of Erattupetta Excise Range under Kottayam Division in recognition of the petitioners' right to preference. As a natural corollary, this Court further declares that the 6th respondent's rights, if any, shall be subservient to those of the petitioners in this regard. To the extent indicated above, the writ petition is allowed. No order on costs.