JUDGMENT AND ORDER(ORAL) Heard Mr. D. J. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. R. C. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the respondent. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 19.11.2014, delivered in Crl. A. No. 39(4) of 2013 by the Sessions Judge, Gomati Tripura. By the said judgment dated 19.11.2014, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 16.09.2013, delivered in G.R. Case No. 458 of 2010 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gomati, Tripura has been affirmed. The prosecution case has its root in the written ejahar filed by one Parimal Majumder, Chief Inspector of Food (CS & CA), Udaipur, Gomati District, on 18.08.2010, based on which R. K. Pur P.S. case No. 297 of 2010, under Sections 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955( the E.C. Act, in short) was registered. 3. The crux of the allegations that has been distinct laid in the ejahar is that on a collective raid 10,150 kgs of sugar and 100 ltrs. of PDS kerosene oil were discovered in the storage of the petitioner and those were deemed to have been stored for illegal sale and black marketing in the open market. The further allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner violated the PDS Control order, 2001, Tripura Food Stuff Dealers licensing order, 2010 and Tripura Kerosene Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1971. 4. Since these orders are issued under Section 3 of the E.C. Act, violation thereof is punishable under Section 7(1) (a) (ii) of the E. C. Act. 5. On completion of the investigation, the final police report chargesheeting the petitioner was duly filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur (as it then was) and on having taken cognizance, the charge was framed against the petitioner for committing an offence punishable under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the E.C. Act. 6. To substantiate the charge, as many as 9 witnesses including the informant namely, Sri Parimal Majumder (PW6) and the Investigating Officer, Smt. Sarmistha Chakraborty (PW 9) were adduced. The prosecution introduced 5 documents including the 4 seizure lists (Exhibits-1, 2, 3 & 5). 7. From the defence, there no evidence was adduced in rebuttal or to project any other relevant fact. The prosecution introduced 5 documents including the 4 seizure lists (Exhibits-1, 2, 3 & 5). 7. From the defence, there no evidence was adduced in rebuttal or to project any other relevant fact. Having appreciated the recorded evidence, by the judgment dated 16.09.2013, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur (as it then was) has observed as under: “By the aforesaid evidence of the witnesses, defence directly admitted the recovery of the aforesaid bulk quantity of sugar and kerosene oil on the fateful date, time and place from the constructive possession of the accused. Though there is no evidence with regard to the source of the procurement of such a bulk quantity of sugar and kerosene oil by the accused and subsequent illegal storage but as from the evidence of the witnesses it clearly reveals that at the time of raid and search and subsequent recovery of such bulk quantity of PDS sugar and kerosene oil from the business premises of the accused at Rajarbag Motor Stand and from his rented godown situated near Satsangha Ashram, Rajarbag. Furthermore, defence also failed to justify the procurement of such PDS sugar and kerosene oil and subsequent possession and storage in the business premises of the accused through any documentary evidence. From the evidence of the witnesses so far examined on behalf of the prosecution, I find that accused Brajadulal Saha, though present at the time of raid and search and subsequent recovery, he failed to show any stock register to justify the storage of seized sugar and kerosene oil. But the trial court has also observed that the prosecution also fails to show that accused procured such sugar and kerosene oil from any Govt. godown or from any Fair Price Shop, basically there is no evidence with regard to the pilferage of such a bulk quantity of PDS sugar and kerosene oil. But is a technical defect on the part of the prosecution and such defects are curable by the direct evidence. In the given case, the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses, as I discussed above, all are the eye witnesses and their evidence are direct and I find weight in their evidence since, defence fails to bring any contrary evidence to rebut the evidence of such witnesses.” Having observed thus, the petitioner was found guilty for commission of the offence punishable under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the E.C. Act. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. D. J. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the allegation of contravening the PDS Control Order 2001 has been disproved as there is no evidence at all that the so called sugar or the kerosene oil were taken out of the PDS from any corner. 9. According to Mr. Saha, learned counsel, none of the witness has produced a chit of paper or order from the licensing authority under Tripura Kerosene Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1971 what stock an individual person can maintain after purchasing the kerosene oil from the open market. These are not part of the Tripura Kerosene Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1971. 10. Since such order pertains to the authority of the Licensing Authority of various jurisdictions. If such order was not placed before the trial court, there cannot be any foundation to establish that there was any breach at all under Tripura Kerosene Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1971. 11. He has further stated that regarding the contravention of the Tripura Food Stuff Dealers Licensing Order, 2010, the petitioner would submit that mere storage of some crystals which look like sugar is not sufficient to prove those stocks were of ‘sugar’ within the meaning of the E.C. Act 1955. ‘Sugar’ has been defined by Section 2(e) of the Act which is as follows: “Section 2(e): Sugar means (i) any form of sugar containing more than ninety percent, of sucrose, including sugar candy; (ii) khandsari sugar or bura sugar or crushed sugar or any sugar in crystalline or powered form; or (iii) sugar in process in vacuum pan sugar factory or raw sugar produced therein.” 12. Mr. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has thus submitted that unless it is chemically established that the crystals those were recovered from the storage maintained by the petitioner cannot be termed as ‘sugar’ within the meaning of the E.C. Act, 1955. Unless it is established that the seized materials were sugar, obviously it will be of no relevance so far the Tripura Food Stuff Dealers Licensing Order, 2010 is concerned or the restriction as imposed by the Order 3(ii) of the Tripura Food Stuff Dealers Licensing Order, 2010. 13. That apart, Mr. Unless it is established that the seized materials were sugar, obviously it will be of no relevance so far the Tripura Food Stuff Dealers Licensing Order, 2010 is concerned or the restriction as imposed by the Order 3(ii) of the Tripura Food Stuff Dealers Licensing Order, 2010. 13. That apart, Mr. Saha, learned counsel has further submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the owner ship of the premises from where those stocks were recovered or to prove that the place of seizure belong to the petitioner. The owner of the premises whose identity has been revealed in the prosecution’s case, namely, Sri Rajiv Dutta, has not been examined to show that there existed any lease or agreement under which the petitioner was maintaining the premises to store those stocks. As a result, the prosecution has failed to prove the vital ingredient of the charge and hence the petitioner is entitled to benefit of doubt. 14. Mr. R. C. Debnarth, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the respondent has fairly submitted that no chemical test was carried out to established those crystals of huge quantity which were recovered from the premises of the petitioner were ‘sugar’. Unless it is admitted by the accused that those were the sugar, in absence of the chemical test, the requirement of Section 2(e) of the E.C. Act cannot be held to have been satisfied. 15. In the circumstances as emerged, this Court is of the view that the benefit must go to the accused even had it been established that the stocks those were seized from the alleged premises of the petitioner were of ‘sugar’, the reverse burden would have been automatically shifted to the petitioner to prove how he had maintained storage without proper license from the Licensing authority. There cannot be any amount of doubt that the sugar falls within the Schedule-I of the Tripura Food Stuff Dealers Licensing Order, 2010, but since the challenge to the identity of the stock has succeeded, this Court is of the view that the petitioner shall be acquitted from the charge on benefit of doubt. Accordingly, he is acquitted. The sureties are discharged from their respective obligation. In the result the impugned judgment and order is set aside. The petition stands allowed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.