JUDGMENT & ORDER : This revisional application is directed against the judgment and order dated 05.03.2013, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in Criminal Appeal No. 33(4) of 2010 whereunder the learned Addl. Sessions Judge upheld the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31.07.2010, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.5, Agartala in CR Case No. 2893/2000 under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, N.I. Act). 2. Heard learned counsel, Mr. A. Sengupta for the complainant-petitioner (hear-in-after mentioned as complainant). Learned counsel, Mr. John Debbarma on behalf of learned P.P. is present. No representation on behalf of respondent No.2 i.e. the accused. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he filed a complaint case No. CR 2893 of 2000 before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala against the accused-respondent No.2, Paresh Debbarma, seeking punishment of the accused under Section 138 of N.I. Act. 4. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the complainant is that, the accused-respondent No.2 Paresh Debbarma was to pay certain dues and for that purpose the accused-respondent issued one account payee cheque of Rs.28,000/- dated 28.05.2000 drawn on Tripura Gramin Bank, Mohanpur Extension Counter, Bankim Nagar Branch. The complainant-petitioner presented that cheque to the bank for encashment and on 08.07.2000 the cheque was returned with an endorsement of insufficient fund. It is the case of the complainant that he thereafter issued notice to the accused respondent Paresh Debbarma through his engaged learned counsel, Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik on 12.07.2000 but the respondent did not pay the amount and therefore, he filed the complaint before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 5. Cheque No.611061 dated 28.05.2000 has been proved as Exbt.1. The return slip issued by the Tripura Gramin Bank dated 29.06.2000 has been proved as Exbt.2. Copy of the notice issued to the accused-respondent and the postal registration slip has been proved as Exbt.4 series. 6. The trial Court by impugned judgment dated 31.07.2010 has held that the complainant has failed to prove the service of demand notice on the accused and therefore, acquitted the accused from the charge. The appellate Court affirmed the judgment. Hence, this revisional application. 7. 6. The trial Court by impugned judgment dated 31.07.2010 has held that the complainant has failed to prove the service of demand notice on the accused and therefore, acquitted the accused from the charge. The appellate Court affirmed the judgment. Hence, this revisional application. 7. Proviso (b) to Section 138 of N.I. Act prescribes thus— “(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and…” 8. The complainant is to prove that he has given a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque. The trial Court observed that the complainant has failed to prove the service of the notice and therefore, acquitted the accused. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr., reported in (1999) 7 SCC 510 in Para 17 to 21 has observed thus— “17. The more important point to be decided in this case is whether the cause of action has arisen at all as the notice sent by the complainant to the accused was returned as “unclaimed.” The conditions pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer, have been formulated and incorporated in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. The said clauses are extracted below : "(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice." 18. On the part of the payee he has to make a demand by “giving a notice” in writing. On the part of the payee he has to make a demand by “giving a notice” in writing. If that was the only requirement to complete the offence on the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of such “giving”, the travails of the prosecution would have been very much lessened. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days “of the receipt” of the said notice. It is, therefore, clear that “giving notice” in the context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer in the correct address. 19. In Black's Law Dictionary, “giving of notice” is distinguished from “receiving of the notice.” (vide page 621) "A person notifies or gives notice to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in the ordinary course, whether or not such other actually comes to know of it." A person “receives” a notice when it is duly delivered to him or at the place of his business. 20. If a strict interpretation is given that the drawer should have actually received the notice for the period of 15 days to start running no matter that the payee sent the notice on the correct address, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by different strategies and he could escape from the legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act. It must be borne in mind that Court should not adopt an interpretation which helps a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee as that would defeat the very legislative measure. 21. In Maxwell's Interpretation of Statues the learned author has emphasized that "provisions relating to giving of notice often receive liberal interpretation." (vide page 99 of the 12th edn.) The context envisaged in Section 138 of the Act invites a liberal interpretation for the person who has the statutory obligation to give notice because he is presumed to be the loser in the transaction and it is for his interest the very provision is made by the legislature. The words in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act show that payee has the statutory obligation to “make a demand” by giving notice. The thrust in the clause is on the need to “make a-demand”. It is only the mode for making such demand which the legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the notice for doing his part for giving the notice. Once it is despatched his part is over and the next depends on what the sendee does.” 10. The legal requirement is that the complainant has to prove that a notice was given and here the complainant has proved that the notice was given to the correct address of the accused which is evident from the address given in the complaint as well as in the address given in the notice. In the complaint petition following is the address given for service of notice Sri Paresh Debbarma, S/o Sri Dasarath Debbarma, Rajababu Street, Supari Bagan, Colonel Choumuhani, P.S. West Agartala, West Tripura, Agartala. The summons to the accused was issued in the said address. Record shows that pursuant to the summons, the accused appeared on 03.11.2000 and was released on bail. Exbt.4 series, the lawyer’s notice dated 12.07.2000 shows exactly the same address. The registration slip, Exbt.4 series, is also dated 12.07.2000 and it shows that the registration was in the name of the accused mentioning the address Rajababu Street, Supari Bagan, Agartala. It is not necessary at all that the entire address of the accused is to be mentioned in the registration slip. While it is proved that a notice was given to the accused by registered post, the accused after receipt of the summons from the Court on his appearance simply prayed for bail and did not propose to make payment of the amount and then to get rid of the charge under Section 138 of N.I. Act proposing that he did not receive the notice. 11. In the case of C.C. Alvi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 555 , the Apex Court in Para 17 of the judgment relying on its earlier decision in the case of K. Bhaskaran (supra) has observed thus— “17. 11. In the case of C.C. Alvi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 555 , the Apex Court in Para 17 of the judgment relying on its earlier decision in the case of K. Bhaskaran (supra) has observed thus— “17. It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case (supra), if the “giving of notice” in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the “receipt of notice” a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” 12. In the case of M/S Ajeet Seeds Ltd. v. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 4321, the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle. The Court held that Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. In the present case, the complaint was filed alleging that the cheque issued by the respondent-accused for repayment of a legally recoverable debt bounced. The High Court quashed the complaint on a short ground that on reading verification of the complaint, it is explicit that there are no recitals to demonstrate that the notice issued under Section 138 of the NI Act by the complainant was served upon the respondent-accused on any specific date. The High Court observed that there is no proof that either the notice was served or it was returned unserved/unclaimed and that there is no averment in the complaint about the same. The High Court concluded that, therefore, there could not be a cause of action to prosecute the accused under Section 138 of the NI Act. Held, the High Court clearly erred in quashing the complaint on the ground that there was no recital in the complaint that the notice under Section 138 of the NI Act was served upon the accused. The High Court also erred in quashing the complaint on the ground that there was no proof either that the notice was served or it was returned unserved/unclaimed. That is a matter of evidence. 13. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court committed a great blunder in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the complainant failed to prove the service of demand notice. Once it is proved by the complainant that a notice was given by registered post, the onus shifts on the accused on his appearance to say that he did not receive the notice and he would tender the amount and would make appropriate prayer before the Court that he could not make payment because he did not receive the notice. Once it is proved by the complainant that a notice was given by registered post, the onus shifts on the accused on his appearance to say that he did not receive the notice and he would tender the amount and would make appropriate prayer before the Court that he could not make payment because he did not receive the notice. The dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the complainant could not prove the service of the demand notice was altogether a wrong decision and therefore, the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31.07.2010, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Agartala, West Tripura in CR 2893 of 2000 and the judgment and order dated 05.03.2013, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.33(4) of 2010 are set aside. The case is liable to be remanded back to the trial Court to decide afresh from the stage of argument keeping in mind the observation made above. On other points the trial Court will be at liberty to consider the evidence on record and take appropriate decision according to law. 14. Accordingly, the case is remanded back to the trial Court to hear argument afresh and to pass judgment according to law. 15. The revisional application stands disposed of.