Research › Search › Judgment

Tripura High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 433 (TRI)

Bhagirath Roy, S/o Late Bhupendra Kumar Roy v. Ila Das, D/o Late Sukhlal Das, W/o Shri Subhendu Sekhar Das

2016-12-06

S.C.DAS

body2016
JUDGMENT & ORDER : In this appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellants challenged the judgment and decree dated 21.11.2008 passed by learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Dharmanagar, North Tripura in Title Suit No.3 of 2008. 2. Heard learned counsel Mr. D.K. Biswas for the appellants and learned Sr. counsel, Mr. S.M. Chakraborty assisted by learned counsel, Ms. B. Chakraborty for the respondents. 3. The respondents, as plaintiffs (hereinafter mentioned as plaintiffs), instituted Title Suit No. 03 of 2008 in the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Dharmanagar seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit land described in the schedule of the plaint. 4. It is inter alia contended by the plaintiffs that their father Sukhlal Das (since deceased) while was residing in the then East Pakistan in the year 1950 sent money to his younger brother Hiralal Das who was working as S.I. of Police and was living in the State of Tripura to purchase landed property for him (Sukhlal) in Tripura and accordingly Hiralal Das purchased two kanies of land from one Rajendra Kumar Chakraborty by a registered Deed of purchase but the purchase was not made in the name of Sukhlal but it was made in the name of Hiralal himself. Subsequently Sukhlal also came to Tripura and started residing on the land purchased by Hiralal and started living there land by constructing dwelling house. Sukhlal Das also purchased another 11 gandas of land from one Watir Ali and his brother Chatir Ali by a registered Deed of purchase dated 01.01.1951. In the year 1951 another brother of Sukhlal namely Makhanlal Das was also came to Tripura from erstwhile East Pakistan and started living with Sukhlal. In the year 1963 said Makhanlal and Hiralal created disturbance claiming the property of Sukhlal and so Sukhlal instituted Title Suit No.5 of 1963 against Makhanlal Das and Hiralal Das in the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Agartala and the suit was decreed in favour of Sukhlal by judgment and decree dated 19.12.1964. It was declared that the plaintiff Sukhlal was the exclusive owner of the suit land having jote right and that the defendants had no right, title and interest over the suit land. The land owned by Sukhlal was mutated in his name and Khatian No.2269 and 2270 of Mouja Dharmanagar Town was created. It was declared that the plaintiff Sukhlal was the exclusive owner of the suit land having jote right and that the defendants had no right, title and interest over the suit land. The land owned by Sukhlal was mutated in his name and Khatian No.2269 and 2270 of Mouja Dharmanagar Town was created. In the subsequent survey and settlement operation, Khatian No.4277 and 4278 of Mouja Dharmanagar Town was created in the name of the plaintiffs for a total area of land measuring 0.591 acre. In the year 1977, Hiralal Das having no right, title and interest over the suit land, by a registered Deed No.1-400 dated 04.02.1977 sold out land measuring 0.32 acres to one Bhupendra Roy, the predecessor of the defendant-appellants (hereinafter mentioned as defendants) beyond the knowledge of the plaintiffs and created record or right in respect of that land. It is contended by the plaintiffs that Hiralal had no right, title over the said land and so the Sale-deed was a nullity and not binding upon the plaintiffs. In the last survey and settlement operation, Khatian No.4277 was prepared in the name of the plaintiffs and the defendants were shown as permissive possessor in respect of the suit land of Dag No.5512, 5513, 5514 and 5516. The plaintiffs requested the defendants to vacate the suit land to which the defendants took time but ultimately did not vacate the suit land. The defendants were allowed time upto 31st December, 1997 but by that date the defendants did not vacate the suit land and on 01.01.1998 the defendants denied to vacate the suit land and, therefore, the plaintiffs instituted the suit seeking declaration of right, title, interest and recovery of possession. 5. The appellants, (hereinafter mentioned as defendants) by filing written statement contested the suit denying the averments made in the plaint and contended that their predecessor Bhupendra Kr. Roy purchased the suit land from Hiralal Das by a registered Sale-deed No.1-400, dated 04.02.1977 and got possession of the suit land from the seller. After purchase the land was mutated in the name of Bhupendra Roy in Khatian No.5279 of Mouja Dharmanagar Town for an area measuring 0.320 acres. Bhupendra constructed his house over the suit land and also excavated pond, planted trees and was living on the suit land with the family proclaiming his title over the land to the knowledge of all concerned. Bhupendra constructed his house over the suit land and also excavated pond, planted trees and was living on the suit land with the family proclaiming his title over the land to the knowledge of all concerned. Hiralal had purchased the land by a registered Sale-deed No.1300, dated 03.09.1950 from the original owner Rajendralal Chakraborty and was possessing the purchased land. After the death of Bhupendra, the name of his legal heirs were incorporated in the Khatian No.5279 of Mouja Dharmanagar Town. At the time of Bhujarat of Settlement operation, the plaintiffs filed an objection before the Settlement authority regarding the land of Khatian No.5279 and it was registered as Objection Case No.18 dated 16.07.1983 and at that time plaintiffs submitted judgment and decree of T.S. 5 of 1963 and on the basis of that judgment and decree the Kanungo of the Settlement Department passed order in favour of the plaintiffs and the record of right was prepared in the name of the plaintiffs showing the defendants as permissive possessors wrongly and illegally. The defendants filed Objection before the Assistant Settlement Officer against order dated 22.06.1987, passed by the Kanungo and that Objection Case was registered as Case No.239 of 1991 but the Settlement Officer also illegally and arbitrarily upheld the order of Kanungo by order dated 18.11.1991. It is further contended that the decree of T.S. 5 of 1963 was not lawful and it was not binding on the defendants since it was never acted upon. The defendants, their predecessor and Hiralal Das were never permissive possessor of the plaintiffs. Hiralal was all along in possession and after purchase from Hiralal, Bhupendra got the possession and neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors raised any objection about the possession. The defendants also contended that Hiralal Das, Watir Ali and Chatir Ali were not made parties in the suit and so the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The defendants, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. Considering the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issue : i. Is the suit maintainable? ii. Whether plaintiffs have any cause of action to file this suit? iii. Is the suit barred by law of limitation? iv. Have the plaintiffs right, title, interest over the suit land? v. Whether defendants are permissive possessor over the suit land? vi. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? vii. ii. Whether plaintiffs have any cause of action to file this suit? iii. Is the suit barred by law of limitation? iv. Have the plaintiffs right, title, interest over the suit land? v. Whether defendants are permissive possessor over the suit land? vi. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? vii. Whether the decision of TS.5 of 1963 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Agartala, West Tripura, is binding upon the defendants? viii. Whether defendants got right, interest over the suit land on the strength of purchase deed hearing no.1-400, dated 4/2/1977? ix. Are the plaintiffs entitled to get the decree as prayed for? x. To what other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled? 7. In course of trial, plaintiff Nos. 4 and 3 examined themselves as P.Ws 1 and 2 and also examined another witness namely P.W.3, Narugupal Banerjee. The plaintiffs also proved the following documents: Exbt.-1(series):- Certified copy of judgment & decree, dt. 19.12.64 in c/w T.S.5 of 1963. Exbt.-2:- Certified copy of khatian No.2270; Exbt.-3:- Certified copy of Khatian No.4277; Exbt.-4:- (series):Original land revenue receipts. 8. Defendant No.1 examined himself as D.W.1 and also another witness namely D.W.2 Makhanlal Majumder. Defendants also proved the following documents: Exbt.-A:- Deed No.1-400; and Exbt.-B:- Khatian No.5279 of Mouja Dharmanagar Town. 9. The trial Court decided the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. 10. Aggrieved, the defendants preferred the present first appeal. 11. The first argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. Biswas is that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation since the plaintiffs did not institute the suit within 12 years from the date the predecessor of the defendants entered in possession of the suit land. Referring to the pleadings and evidence on record it is argued by learned counsel, Mr. Biswas that Bhupendra Roy, the predecessor of the defendants purchased the suit land on 04.02.1977 from Hiralal and got physical possession which supposes that Hiralal was in possession on the date of purchase and thereafter Bhupendra continued his possession by constructing his house in the suit land which has been inherited by the defendants after the death of Bhupendra. Such uninterrupted continuous possession of the defendants suggests that the plaintiffs and their father were never in possession of the suit land and so the suit is barred by limitation as per provision contained in Article 65 of Schedule-1 to the limitation Act. Such uninterrupted continuous possession of the defendants suggests that the plaintiffs and their father were never in possession of the suit land and so the suit is barred by limitation as per provision contained in Article 65 of Schedule-1 to the limitation Act. Further referring to Section 27 of the Limitation Act, it is argued by learned counsel, Mr. Biswas that the right of the plaintiffs has been extinguished after elapse of 12 years from the date of purchase by Bhupendra i.e. 04.02.1977. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Chakraborty, learned Sr. counsel submitted that Article 65 will come into operation only when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. There is no claim of adverse possession. So, mere possession of the defendants cannot operate as a bar in instituting the suit for recovery of possession. 13. Article 65 of the schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes thus— Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run “65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.” 14. Section 27 of the Limitation Act reads thus “27. Extinguishment of right to property.—At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” 15. The plaintiffs claimed title over the suit land based on the decree in T.S. 5 of 1963. Certified copy of judgment and decree in T.S.5 of 1963 has been proved as Exbt.-1 series. It shows that the suit was instituted by Sukhlal Das, the father of the plaintiffs against Hiralal Das and Makhanlal Das seeking declaration that the plaintiff (Sukhlal Das) was the exclusive owner of the suit land with jote right and that the defendants had no right, title over the suit land. In that suit Hiralal and Makhanlal both appeared and submitted their pleadings but ultimately did not contest the suit and the suit was decreed ex parte against both Hiralal and Makhanlal declaring that the plaintiff (Sukhlal Das) was the exclusive owner of the suit land with jote right and the defendants had no right, title over the suit land. The plaintiffs contended that Sukhlal sent money to Hiralal to purchase landed property but Hiralal purchased it in his name in the year 1950. The plaintiffs contended that Sukhlal sent money to Hiralal to purchase landed property but Hiralal purchased it in his name in the year 1950. When Sukhlal came to Tripura he was possessing the land and Makhanlal also joined with him and in the year 1963 Sukhlal instituted T.S. 5 of 1963 against Hiralal and Makhanlal seeking declaration as aforesaid. The defendants in their written statement contended that Hiralal purchased the suit land by Deed No.1300 dated 03.09.1950 from Rajendralal Chakraborty and that is the pleadings of the plaintiffs also. So, while the title suit instituted by Sukhlal was decreed in his favour, the right, title and interest of Hiralal was extinguished by dint of the judgment and decree in T.S.5 of 1963. Hiralal had no saleable interest in the suit land. So, the sale by Hiralal to Bhupendra by registered deed dated 04.02.1977 i.e. Exbt.-A was of no value in the eye of law. By such purchase Bhupendra acquired no title over the purchased land since his predecessor Hiralal had no title in the sold out land. Khatian No.5279 of Mouja Dharmanagar town was prepared in the name of Bhupendra after his purchase but that Khatian had been changed in the Objection Case No.18 of 1983 and the appeal filed by the defendants was also dismissed on 18.11.1991 by the Assistant Settlement Officer and the defendants did not proceed further against that decision. 16. The defendants in their pleadings not even made a whisper that they were in possession of the suit land denying the title of the plaintiffs and that the right, title, interest of the plaintiffs in the suit land has been extinguished because of the defendants’ adverse possession of the suit land. No evidence also adduced to that effect. While there is no such case pleaded by the defendants, Article 65 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to arrive at a conclusion that the right of the plaintiffs to claim recovery of possession based on title has been extinguished. Mere possession for any passage of time cannot confer title to the possessor unless the possessor denies the title of the rightful owner and continued in possession with hostile assertion of right. The argument of learned counsel, Mr. Biswas that the suit is barred by limitation, therefore, cannot stand in the eye of law. 17. The next argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. The argument of learned counsel, Mr. Biswas that the suit is barred by limitation, therefore, cannot stand in the eye of law. 17. The next argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. Biswas is that the Khatian No.5279 of Mouja Dharmanagar was prepared in the name of Bhupendra, the predecessor of defendants after his purchase and that Khatian was changed subsequently in the objection raised by the plaintiffs and the defendants have been wrongly recorded as permissive possessor. Referring to the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 3, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel submitted that P.W.1 in his cross-examination stated that the defendants were permissive possessor of the suit land by the Government permission and similar statement has been made by P.Ws 3 also. Such statement makes it clear that the defendants were actually not a permissive possessor of the plaintiffs. 18. On the contrary, Mr. Chakraborty, learned Sr. counsel, submitted that the Khatian prepared in the name Bhupendra was changed in the Objection case and the land was recorded in the name of the plaintiffs in Khatian No.4277 and the defendants were recorded as permissive possessor. The defendants preferred appeal before the Settlement Officer but the appeal was also dismissed. Khatian No.4277 was finally published. The defendants did not challenge that Khatian at any point of time. So, the defendants cannot raise the plea that they were not permissive possessor of the plaintiffs. 19. The defendants in their written statement in Paragraph 23 made the following statements: “23. That, after bhujarat stage of settlement operation the plaintiffs filed an objection before settlement authority and during hearing of dispute case no.18 dated 16.07.1983 the plaintiffs submitted judgment and decree of T.S.05 of 1963 (ex parte decree) and the basis of said judgment & decree kanungo of settlement department passed order in favour of plaintiffs and record of right prepared in the names of plaintiffs showing defendants as permissive possessor most illegally for which defendants filed objection before the Asstt. Settlement officer against order dated 22.06.1987 of Kanungo. And said objection was registered as objection case no.231 of 1991. But Ld. Asstt. Settlment Office most illegally and arbitrarily uphold the order of Kanungo vide order dated 18.11.1991.” 20. Settlement officer against order dated 22.06.1987 of Kanungo. And said objection was registered as objection case no.231 of 1991. But Ld. Asstt. Settlment Office most illegally and arbitrarily uphold the order of Kanungo vide order dated 18.11.1991.” 20. From the above averments made by the defendants, it is clear that Khatian No.5279 which was prepared in the name of Bhupendra after his purchase of the suit land was cancelled at the time of settlement operation and the land of Khatian No.5279 was recorded in the name of plaintiffs in Khatian No.4277 and the defendants were recorded as permissive possessor. That entry in the Khatian has been finally published and the Khatian has been proved and marked as Exbt.-3. The entries in the Khatian, therefore, remain undisturbed. Mere statement of P.Ws 1 and 3 that the defendants were given the status of permissive possessor by the Government does not change the character and status of the defendants in respect of the entry made in the Khatian. While the record of rights shows that the defendants were permissive possessor of the suit land and the defendants did not challenge that entry in due course, they cannot claim that they were not permissive possessor of the suit land. 21. I have already discussed here-in-before that there is no pleading of the defendants that they were/are in adverse possession of the suit land denying title of the plaintiffs. While they have not advanced any such pleading claiming right by way of adverse possession denying title of the plaintiffs and while their status as permissive possessor remains in the record of right they cannot now say that it was incorrect recording made by the Settlement authority in the course of survey and settlement operation. Section 43(3) of the TLR and LR Act prescribes that every entry in the record right as finally published shall, until the contrary is proved be presumed to be correct. So, the entry made in the finally published Khatian i.e. Exbt.-3 while not challenged shall be presumed to be correct and it shall be presumed that the plaintiffs were the rayat of the suit land and the defendants were permissive possessor of the suit land. 22. Mr. So, the entry made in the finally published Khatian i.e. Exbt.-3 while not challenged shall be presumed to be correct and it shall be presumed that the plaintiffs were the rayat of the suit land and the defendants were permissive possessor of the suit land. 22. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that this court may draw a presumption that even after decree in T.S. 5 of 1963, Hiralal continued his possession in the suit land and he handed over possession to Bhupendra. It shows that the plaintiffs and their predecessor were never in possession of the suit land. So, a presumption as contemplated in Section 114 of Evidence Act should be drawn that the title of the plaintiffs and their predecessor had been extinguished. He relied on the decision of Limbaji and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2001) 10 SCC 340 . The observation of the Apex Court was made referring to Section 114 of the Evidence Act while deciding an appeal relating to a criminal offence. The ratio of that decision can in no way be applied in the present case. 23. Here, even if it is accepted that Hiralal was in possession after decree in T.S. 5 of 1963 and Hiralal handed over possession to Bhupendra after executing the Sale-deed , by itself cannot confer any right on Bhupendra to exert his title since Hiralal had no title over the suit land. From handing over of possession and continuation of such possession for whatever period may be does not extinguish the title of rightful owner and confer any right on the possessor. It is a settled law that possession follows title. While the title remains with the plaintiff, possession of the defendants and their predecessor for whatever period may be, cannot confer any right to continue or to remain in possession once the rightful owner is claiming the same for their own. 24. The next argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. Biswas is that in T.S. 5 of 1963 Sukhlal simply prayed for a declaration of his ownership over the suit land. He did not pray for any injunction against Hiralal and Makhanlal and that means that Hiralal and Makhanlal were allowed to remain in possession. 24. The next argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. Biswas is that in T.S. 5 of 1963 Sukhlal simply prayed for a declaration of his ownership over the suit land. He did not pray for any injunction against Hiralal and Makhanlal and that means that Hiralal and Makhanlal were allowed to remain in possession. Since Sukhlal did not pray for injunction, the plaintiffs in the present suit cannot get further declaration and recovery of possession in view of the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 25. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act prescribes thus— “34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.” 26. Exbt.-1, the judgment and decree of T.S.5 of 1963 shows that Sukhlal instituted the suit seeking declaration that he was exclusive owner of the suit land and that the defendants have no right, title over the suit land. He did not pray for any other relief. Even if it is presumed that Hiralal was in possession of the suit land, when that declaration was made by the Court, I find nothing to hold that the present plaintiffs who are the successors of Sukhlal cannot claim recovery of the possession of the suit land on the ground that Sukhlal did not pray for any injunction against Hiralal and Makhanlal. This argument of learned counsel, Mr. Biswas does not convince me in any way to hold that the plaintiffs cannot seek the relief of recovery of possession. 27. It has also been argued by learned counsel, Mr. Biswas that Bhupendra purchased the suit land by a registered Deed of purchase dated 04.02.1977 i.e. Exbt.-A. That registered Deed is still in force and the plaintiffs did not pray for declaring that Sale-deed as void and while that Sale-deed is still valid, the plaintiffs cannot get recovery of possession. 28. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Sr. Biswas that Bhupendra purchased the suit land by a registered Deed of purchase dated 04.02.1977 i.e. Exbt.-A. That registered Deed is still in force and the plaintiffs did not pray for declaring that Sale-deed as void and while that Sale-deed is still valid, the plaintiffs cannot get recovery of possession. 28. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Sr. counsel for the defendants submitted that the Sale-deed is a nullity since in the year 1964 by judgment dated 19.12.1964 in T.S. 5 of 1963 the Court has held that Hiralal had no right and title over the suit land. 29. Mr. Chakraborty referred the case of Prem Singh & Ors. Vs. Birbal & Ors., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 (Para 15 and 16). We may gainfully quote here Para 15 and 16 which reads as follows :- “15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief. 16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.” 30. In view of the above observation of the apex Court, while Hiralal had no right, title over the suit land, the Sale-deed executed by him was just a nullity and while it was a nullity there was no requirement for the plaintiffs to get a declaration that it as void. The Khatian which was prepared in the name of Bhupendra i.e. Exbt.-B cannot have any existence since it has already been changed by the Revenue authority in due process and that was not challenged by the defendants which is evident in their pleadings and evidence itself. 31. The plaintiffs proved their title over the suit land by documentary evidence and so the trial Court rightly held that they are entitled to get recovery of possession. I find no infirmity in the judgment passed by the trial Court and hence, the appeal stands dismissed with cost. 32. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.