JUDGMENT Mr. Mohammad Rafiq, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners-plaintiffs against order dated 18.11.2013 passed by Additional District Judge No. 1, Alwar (for short 'the first appellate court') whereby application filed by the respondents-defendants in their appeal has been allowed and it has been directed by the first appellate court that rejoinder filed by the plaintiffs in response to amended written statement shall be kept confined to newly added para 4(a) of the amended written statement and rest of the averments made in the rejoinder shall be excluded from consideration. 2. Facts of the case are that a suit for eviction and arrears of rent was filed by plaintiff late Shri Rang Bahadur. Eviction of the defendants was sought on the ground of personal bona fide necessity of the suit shop by plaintiff as well as denial of title by defendants. The petitioners are predecessors in title of late Shri Rang Bahadur, who died during pendency of the suit. The trial court vide judgment dated 15.12.1995 decreed the suit. The first appellate court, on appeal filed by the respondents-defendants, vide judgment and decree dated 22.12.1998 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial court. The defendants-respondents filed second appeal before this Court, bearing No. 47/1999, which was admitted on 10.02.1999. It may be noted that during pendency of the appeal, the defendants-respondents filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written statement to bring on record subsequent events, especially the fact about death of Shri Rang Bahadur and that his office at Alwar has now become available for his son Mahendra Kumar Mathur to pursue practise as an advocate and what would be effect of second shop owned by this plaintiff and earlier occupied by "Prince Dry Cleaners" being vacated and possession thereof was handed over to the legal representative of the plaintiff. This Court vide order dated 20.09.2013 granted opportunity to the defendants to file amended written statement before the first appellate court and allowed the plaintiff to file his rejoinder thereto and while doing so remanded the matter back to the first appellate court by framing following two additional issues :- "1. This Court vide order dated 20.09.2013 granted opportunity to the defendants to file amended written statement before the first appellate court and allowed the plaintiff to file his rejoinder thereto and while doing so remanded the matter back to the first appellate court by framing following two additional issues :- "1. Whether on the death of plaintiff Rang Bahadur Mathur, his office, if any, at Alwar became available for his son Mahendra Kumar Mathur to pursue his practise as an Advocate there from and the bona fide and reasonable necessity of the tenanted shop for Mahendra Kumar Mathur ceased thereupon ? 2. Whether the second shop owned by the plaintiff and earlier occupied by "Prince Dry Cleaners" has been vacated and possession thereof handed over to the legal representatives of the plaintiff and if so its affect on the suit for eviction based on bona fide and reasonable necessity of plaintiff's son Mahendra Kumar Mathur for setting up his office as an Advocate?" 3. The petitioners-plaintiffs challenged the aforesaid order dated 20.09.2013 passed by this Court before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal No. 5925/2014. The Supreme Court taking note of the fact that Issue No. 1 does not pertain to subsequent event since Shri Rangbahadur Mathur died as early as in 1986, vide its order dated 07.09.2015 set aside that part of the order passed by this Court in second appeal and maintained the order only in respect of Issue No. 2 with direction that the first appellate court shall record its findings within a period of six months from the date of communication of that order. Both the parties appeared before the first appellate court. The defendants-respondents filed amended written statement on 04.10.2013. The petitioners-plaintiffs filed rejoinder thereto. It was thereafter that the respondents-defendants moved an application before the first appellate court with the prayer that the rejoinder may be taken on record only to the extent of reply to newly added para 4(a) of the amended written statement and not to other paras to which earlier already written statement was filed. The aforesaid application was allowed by the first appellate court vide order dated 18.11.2013. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-plaintiffs have approached this Court by this writ petition. The aforesaid application was allowed by the first appellate court vide order dated 18.11.2013. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-plaintiffs have approached this Court by this writ petition. At this stage, it may be noted that in view of the directions of the Supreme Court, though this matter was listed before this Court on 18.02.2016 on application for early listing of the writ petition, but the matter was heard finally and closed for orders. 4. Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners-plaintiffs argued that impugned order is contrary to law and material available on record. The first appellate court has committed serious illegality in exercising its jurisdiction while allowing the application of the defendants for confining the rejoinder only to amended paragraph of the written statement whereas there is no such direction given by this Court. First appellate court committed serious illegality in exercising of its jurisdiction by not allowing the plaintiffs-petitioners to file the rejoinder as a whole. Once an amendment is being allowed for amending the written statement, plaintiffs get all the rights to submit the rejoinder to the entire written statement, particularly, when earlier no rejoinder has been filed. It is argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case when after passing the judgment and decree for eviction by trial court which has been confirmed by the first appellate court and this Court remanded the matter by framing additional issue, then only remedy available for the plaintiffs-petitioners is to file detailed rejoinder concerning to the scope of newly framed issues. It is necessary for the plaintiffs to submit the rejoinder covering all the pleadings concerning personal and bona fide necessity as well as the comparative hardship. 5. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that the first appellate court committed serious illegality by not objectively considering the direction given by this Court in its order dated 20.09.2013 which ought to have been read in its entirety as the basic issue is personal bona fide necessity of Mahendra Kumar and when there is personal and bona fide necessity, then it is necessary to submit rejoinder in relation to new facts under the name of subsequent events which have been referred in the written statement. If the entire rejoinder is not taken on record, the plaintiffs would suffer serious prejudice to defend their case and the defendants will be put in an advantageous position. If the entire rejoinder is not taken on record, the plaintiffs would suffer serious prejudice to defend their case and the defendants will be put in an advantageous position. Amendment being sought by the defendants, which has been allowed by this Court relates to the subsequent events but the same is in relation to personal and bona fide necessity of the plaintiffs, therefore, the entire rejoinder ought to have been taken on record. The first appellate court wrongly relied upon the decisions cited by the defendants, which are not relevant and the judgments cited by the petitioners were relevant, which could not have been ignored by the first appellate court. In relation to status of shop alleged to have been vacated by Prince Dry Cleaners as well as other facts referred in para No. 3 and 2, they require specific reply in the form of rejoinder. It is necessary to submit that after death of Shri Rang Bahadur what is the status of shop in possession of Prince Dry Cleaners on various grounds inter alia that such shop has come to the share of brother Virendra Kumar, who also got his practicing Sanad renewed in the year 2008. In support of his argument, learned Senior Counsel relied on judgment of this Court in Om Prakash v. The Municipal Board, Gangapurcity and Others, 2007 WLC (Raj.) UC page 228. 6. Per contra, Mr. Mahendra Kumar Jain and Mr. Madho Swami learned counsels for the respondents submitted that this Court while remanding the matter to the first appellate court on two additional issues permitted the respondents-defendants to introduce new para 4(a) by incorporating subsequent events and in that context also observed that the plaintiffs-petitioners would be free to file rejoinder thereto. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that a bare perusal of the order passed by this Court would indicate that rejoinder was permitted to be file only to the extent of para 4(a) but the plaintiffs-petitioners taking undue advantage of this fact situation went on to add number of additional paras thus creating new case, which was not permissible as per settled preposition of law. Learned first appellate court rightly directed exclusion of all those additional paras wherefore there was no permission granted. Learned first appellate court rightly directed exclusion of all those additional paras wherefore there was no permission granted. Learned counsel submitted that this Court in catena of decisions while analyzing scope of provisions of Order 8, Rule 9 CPC has held that no new case can be allowed to be set up by filing rejoinder without permission of the Court. Reliance in this connection has been placed on judgments of this Court in Surendra Mehta v. Babu Lal and another, 2008 (2) WLC (Raj.) 744; Karam Singh and another v. Mukhtiyar Singh, 2000 (1) WLC (Raj.) 188 and State of Rajasthan v. Mohd. Iqbal, DNJ (Raj.) 275. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions, carefully examined the material on record and respectfully studied the judgments cited by learned counsel for the parties. 8. Perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned first appellate court indicates that it refused to entertain argument of the plaintiffs that once the written statement has been allowed to be amended on the basis of subsequent events, it was open to the plaintiffs to make whatever additional pleas they wanted to make and give further clarifications. First appellate court also did not accept the argument of the plaintiffs-petitioners that no restriction has been placed by this Court in its order dated 20.09.2013 passed in aforesaid second appeal with regard to right of the plaintiffs to file rejoinder. First appellate court has largely been guided by the order dated 20.09.2013 passed by this Court in aforesaid Second Appeal No. 47/1999, which reads as under: 'This second appeal was admitted on 10-2-1999 on the following substantial question of law : Whether the office of the original plaintiff, Rang Bahadur, Advocate, which became available subsequent to his death, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Mahendra Kumar, for whose need the suit for eviction has been preferred by the original plaintiff ? Heard learned counsel for the appellant-defendant (hereinafter 'the defendant') and respondents-plaintiffs (hereinafter 'the plaintiffs'). Learned counsel for the defendant has submitted that the state of law with regard to suits for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity is that the cause of action should obtain for the plaintiff not only on the date of commencement of suit, but also at the time of passing of the final judgment and decree. Learned counsel for the defendant has submitted that the state of law with regard to suits for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity is that the cause of action should obtain for the plaintiff not only on the date of commencement of suit, but also at the time of passing of the final judgment and decree. He submits that in this context subsequent events having a bearing on reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff on which suit for eviction had been laid have to be necessarily taken into consideration by the courts. It is submitted that in the instant case the subsequent event of the unfortunate death of the plaintiff has not been taken into consideration by the trial as well as the first appellate court nor its effect on the bona fide and reasonable necessity of the tenanted premises for the son of the plaintiff to set up an office taken into consideration. Learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sheshambal (dead) through LRs v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others [ 2010(3) SCC 470 ] in support of his contention reference to para 29 of the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case referred above would be apposite, he submits. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus :- "In the light of what we have stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that on the death of the petitioners in the original eviction petition their rights to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement for the demised premises became extinct and no order could on the basis of any such requirement be passed at this point of time." In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction of the tenanted shop on the ground that the shop was required for the purpose of setting up office for his son, who was then soon to be enrolled as an Advocate, as he was then reading in third year of LLB. It however appears that even before framing of issues in the suit, the plaintiff an Advocate stated to be practicing both at Alwar and Behror unfortunately expired. It however appears that even before framing of issues in the suit, the plaintiff an Advocate stated to be practicing both at Alwar and Behror unfortunately expired. The defendant now the appellant before this court appears to have amended the written statement thereupon stating that consequent to death of the plaintiff, his office at Alwar was available for the "son" in the event he joined the profession rendering the reasonable and bona fide need for the purpose defunct. It is stated that this defence was not considered in its true perspective and the courts below disgraced into the issue of "choice" of the landlord to require the premises for his bona fide and reasonable necessity. Learned counsel has further submitted that aside of above, during pendency of this second appeal another tenanted shop occupied by a tenant "Prince Dry-cleaner" was vacated and possession thereof has been handed over on 5-5-2001 to Mahendra Kumar Mathur, the son of the plaintiff Rang Bahadur Mathur, on whose requirement the suit had first been filed for the tenanted premises. Affidavit in support of the application to bring this subsequent events on record by way of amendment of the written statement has been filed inter alia by Jagmohan son of the said tenant Bihari Lal (Prince Dry-cleaner's proprietor) stating therein that vacant possession of the said tenanted shop has been handed over to Mahendra Kumar Mathur. This argues counsel, also needs consideration in the present appeal by the defendant presently suffering a judgment and decree of eviction from the tenanted shop. Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Aditya Mathur on behalf of the plaintiff has emphatically denied the factum of the another shop occupied by "Prince Dry Cleaners having been vacated or its possession has been handed over to Mahendra Kumar Mathur. He has further submitted that the issue of office of Rang Bahadur Mathur, following his death being available to Mahendra Kumar Mathur is not relevant because the plaint was laid specifically for the need of plaintiff's son Mahendra Kumar Mathur for whom the tenanted shop was required and vacancy of another premises, as alleged following the plaintiff's death is of no consequence. Particularly when the plaintiff is the best person to determine the suitability of a premises for his reasonable and bona fide need. Particularly when the plaintiff is the best person to determine the suitability of a premises for his reasonable and bona fide need. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that in the state of law presently obtaining with regard to subsequent events being considered in eviction petitions based on bona fide and reasonable necessity of the landlord, it necessary to require the first appellate court to consider the matter in its true perspective and determine as to whether the subsequent events alleged by the defendant have any impact on the suit for eviction based on bona fide and reasonable necessity of the Mahendra Kumar Mathur to set up his office as an Advocate in the tenanted shop. This issue, is an issue of fact, which cannot obviously be addressed by this court in this second appeal under section 100 CPC. The said issue would required to be determined by the court of facts on basis of evidence laid before it. In the circumstances obtaining, the application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC filed by the appellant-defendant to amend the written statement and bring on record subsequent events is allowed. The defendant shall file the amended written statement before the first appellant court. The respondent-plaintiff shall be free to file his rejoinder thereto. Consequently, in my considered opinion, resorting to power under Order 41, Rule 25 CPC, I would direct the first appellate court, as the last court of facts, to determine the question of subsequent events impinging on the reasonable and bona fide need of the plaintiff (through Legal Representatives) since laying of the suit for eviction. Both the parties shall submit their evidence oral and documentary before the first appellate court for decision on the following issues which additionally arise in the obtaining facts:- 1. Whether on the death of plaintiff Rang Bahadur Mathur, his office, if any, at Alwar became available for his son Mahendra Kumar Mathur to pursue his practise as an Advocate there from and the bona fide and reasonable necessity of the tenanted shop for Mahendra Kumar Mathur ceased there upon ? 2. Whether on the death of plaintiff Rang Bahadur Mathur, his office, if any, at Alwar became available for his son Mahendra Kumar Mathur to pursue his practise as an Advocate there from and the bona fide and reasonable necessity of the tenanted shop for Mahendra Kumar Mathur ceased there upon ? 2. Whether the second shop owned by the plaintiff and earlier occupied "Prince Dry Cleaners" has been vacated and possession thereof handed over to the legal representatives of the plaintiff and if so its affect on the suit for eviction based on bona fide and reasonable necessity of plaintiff's son Mahendra Kumar Mathur for setting up his office as an Advocate ? The first appellate court i.e. Additional District Judge No. 1, Alwar is directed to decide the issues within a period of six months from the date of receipt of record of this case. Both the parties are directed to appear before the first appellate court on October 07, 2013. Adjournment if nay whenever sought shall be entertained only on an application in writing and granted, when necessary, by a reasoned and speaking order. The first appellate court is also directed that after recording the findings on the issues aforesaid within a period of four months, the same be sent immediately along with the record of the case to this court such that this second appeal be decided there upon. The record of the case be sent through special messenger to the court of first appellate court on or before October 07, 2013 when both the parties are to appear before that court. The second appeal be listed before this court immediately after receipt of the findings on the two issues as framed above by the first appellate court." 9. Perusal of the order of this Court indicates that this Court while permitting defendants-respondents to incorporate additional pleas in newly added para 4(a), it categorically directed that, "respondent-plaintiff shall be free to file rejoinder thereto." This clearly shows that right to file rejoinder was confined to whatever additional and new pleas were added in para 4(a) and not beyond that. The petitioners-plaintiffs therefore could not be permitted to set up new pleas and on that basis new case, which they originally did not plead in the originally filed suit. The petitioners-plaintiffs therefore could not be permitted to set up new pleas and on that basis new case, which they originally did not plead in the originally filed suit. This Court in M/s. Ajanta Enterprises v. Bimla Charan Chatterjee and another, 1987(1) RLR 991 while examining the ambit and scope of provisions of Order 8, Rule 9 CPC held that in the garb of submitting the rejoinder, a plaintiff cannot be allowed to introduce new pleas in his plaint so as to alter the basis of his plaint. In a rejoinder he has to simply explain if certain additional facts have been mentioned in the written statement and the plaintiff cannot be allowed to come forward with an entirely new case in his rejoinder. The position of the plaintiff, to make changes in his plaint, cannot be the same changes which can be allowed to be made in the written statement, for the reason that a defendant my be allowed to make amendments, which may be different from his earlier pleas but the plaintiff cannot be allowed to alter his original cause of action on which, he has come before the Court. On this reasoning, it can be said that the plaintiff cannot by way of rejoinder introduce pleas which are not consistent with earlier pleadings. 10. This Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Mohd. Iqbal (supra) after considering the various judgments of different High Courts including the judgment of this court in M/s. Ajanta Enterprise (supra), held that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to introduce new pleas under the garb of filing rejoinder, so as to alter the basis of his plaint. In rejoinder, plaintiff has a right to explain only the additional facts incorporated by the defendant in his written statement. In rejoinder, plaintiff cannot be permitted to come forward with an entirely new case or raise inconsistent pleas so as to alter his original cause of action. 11. This Court in Shakoor Chand v. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, 1986 RLR 942, in para 7 made the following observations : "Order 8, Rule 9 permits the subsequent pleadings by the leave of the Court. This provision no doubt relates to the proceedings in a suit, but Section 141 deals with miscellaneous proceedings. 11. This Court in Shakoor Chand v. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, 1986 RLR 942, in para 7 made the following observations : "Order 8, Rule 9 permits the subsequent pleadings by the leave of the Court. This provision no doubt relates to the proceedings in a suit, but Section 141 deals with miscellaneous proceedings. The wordings of Section 141 clearly lay down that the procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed so far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. The proceedings for temporary injunction are miscellaneous proceedings which are separately registered and decided by a separate order. Any order passed under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2-A, Rule 4 or Rule 18 of order is appeal able under clause (r) of Order 43 Order 43, Rule 1 and Rule 2 is temporary in the sense that it remains in force till the final disposal of the suit, but it cannot be lost sight of that such order has a very important effect and bearing as the main suit takes long number of years before final decision. Such order passed on an application for temporary injunction. Sometime, the Court has to pass an order in the form of mandatory injunction on an application for temporary injunction in order to meet the ends of justice." 12. In view of above discussion, this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the order dated 18.11.2013 passed by the first appellate court and the same requires no interference. There is no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. Stay application also stands dismissed.