JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This appeal has been instituted against Judgment dated 1.10.2015 rendered by the learned District Judge (Forests), Shimla, HP in HMA Petition No. 17-S/3 of 2013. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 8.7.1992 according to Hindu rites and customs at Gopal Mandir, Boileauganj, Shimla. Appellant is working in the HP Secretariat and the respondent is working as a Junior Basic Trained Teacher in the Department of Elementary Education at Government Primary School, Kelti, Mashobra Block, District Shimla. From the wedlock of the appellant and respondent, two children were born, one son and one daughter. Daughter was 18 years of age and son was 14 years of age. In the year 1995, respondent brought her two brothers and five sisters to live with the appellant and completely devoted herself to their education, upbringing and other responsibilities towards them and she started completely shirking from her matrimonial duties and consistently avoided to look after her children and she refused to perform any of the matrimonial duties towards her children. She even stopped preparing food for her husband and children. From the year 2000, respondent completely stopped fulfilling her conjugal duties and obligations towards the appellant as his wife. Respondent even called appellant a dog and a pig and used to tell him that he was no longer her husband and she used to spit on him in the presence of his friends. On 5.9.2005, respondent left the matrimonial house and started living separately at K.L. Sood Niwas, Mashobra and since then there is no contact between the appellant and the respondent. The appellant was forced to file a divorce petition against the respondent, which was contested by the respondent. Respondent made false promise and misguided the appellant that she will mend her ways but she again continued with her cruelty and desertion by insulting the appellant repeatedly in the presence of relatives and friends. 3. Petition was contested by the respondent. Respondent has admitted the factum of marriage. According to her, divorce petition instituted by the appellant against her was dismissed on 23.4.2008. She is pursuing JBT training. Relations between the parties were cordial. Appellant used to insist upon giving her entire salary to him. Daughter was pursuing studies in B.A. 1st Year in St. Petition was contested by the respondent. Respondent has admitted the factum of marriage. According to her, divorce petition instituted by the appellant against her was dismissed on 23.4.2008. She is pursuing JBT training. Relations between the parties were cordial. Appellant used to insist upon giving her entire salary to him. Daughter was pursuing studies in B.A. 1st Year in St. Bedes College and the son was studying in 9th Standard at Kendriya Vidyalaya Jakhoo. Appellant forced her to abort the pregnancy from a private medical practitioner at Solan. They resided together at Village Malyana till 1997. Then they shifted to Dhobighat, Shimla and started living there in tenanted premises belonging to one Daya Ram. Thereafter, government accommodation was allotted in favour of the appellant and they started living there. She has been looking after the children properly. She was given beatings by the appellant. In the month of September 2005, he levelled false and frivolous allegations against her and she was thrown out of the house. She never called her husband dog or pig. She never uttered that appellant was not her husband. She never spat on him. 4. Issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 4.7.2014. He dismissed the petition on 1.10.2015. 5. Mr. Adarsh K. Vashista, Advocate, has vehemently argued that the appellant has proved cruelty as well as desertion against the respondent. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and also gone through the record carefully. 7. Appellant has appeared as PW-6. According to him, initially the behaviour of the respondent was normal. However, after 1995, he called her two brothers and five sisters to stay with them at Shimla and got their education in the school. She concentrated only on sisters and brothers. She totally ignored the children. In the year 2000, she started treating him with cruelty. Her attitude became indifferent and careless. She refused to perform matrimonial obligations. She stopped cooking, washing clothes, cleaning utensils and refused to do any domestic work. Appellant was forced to do all domestic work. She even refused to recognize him as her husband. She used to insult him in the presence of children, guests and friends and even called him a dog and a pig. She even used to spit on him. On 5.9.2005, she left the matrimonial house but his son and daughter remained with him. She even refused to recognize him as her husband. She used to insult him in the presence of children, guests and friends and even called him a dog and a pig. She even used to spit on him. On 5.9.2005, she left the matrimonial house but his son and daughter remained with him. He looked after his children and was forced to do all domestic work. He filed divorce petition against the respondent which was compromised in the year 2009. Respondent admitted her fault and promised to behave properly and tendered apology as well. She joined the matrimonial home but 2-4 days later she again started misbehaving with him. She was in the habit of leaving the matrimonial house without informing him and used to remain missing for about 9-10 days. He was forced to lodge complaint with the police. She even refused to provide meals to the children. In his cross-examination, he admitted that presently respondent is living in US Club. He further admitted that he and respondent are residing in Set No. 15 in US Club. His son and daughter are also living in the same house. Sometimes, he used to live in Mehali and sometimes in the house in US Club. Neither the son nor the daughter has been cited as witness. He has not lodged any complaint in the Women Commission or with the Police against the respondent. 8. PW-1 Yash Pal Sharma, in his cross-examination admitted that he did 3 years course in Electrical Engineering from Una and he stayed at Una for three years. He was unemployed. He also admitted that the appellant was living in Government accommodation. Respondent and children were also living in the same house. 9. PW-2 Jyotsana Sharma testified that the appellant had constructed house at Malyana and she alongwith her brother occasionally used to reside there. 10. PW-3 Archana Phul has stated that the relations between the parties were not cordial. In the year 2005, respondent left the house. Behaviour of the respondent towards appellant was hostile. She never performed her matrimonial obligations. All the domestic work was done by the appellant. 11. PW-4 Ramesh Chand Sharma deposed that on 18.8.2009, they reconciled the matter and during the compromise, respondent admitted her fault and tendered apology. 12. In the year 2005, respondent left the house. Behaviour of the respondent towards appellant was hostile. She never performed her matrimonial obligations. All the domestic work was done by the appellant. 11. PW-4 Ramesh Chand Sharma deposed that on 18.8.2009, they reconciled the matter and during the compromise, respondent admitted her fault and tendered apology. 12. PW-5 Bhawani Dutt has also supported the case of appellant by stating that the appellant used to do all the domestic work and used to look after the children. 13. Respondent has appeared as RW-1. She testified that in April, 1996, she was transferred to Baldeyan and Government accommodation was allotted to them in Chhota Shimla. She stayed there for five years in the house. Her sister was living at Malyana. Her husband used to come to house in late hours at about 9-10 PM and never looked after her children. He always told her to hand over her entire salary and when she refused, her husband used to level false allegations against her that she is spending salary on her brothers and sisters. He also used to give beatings to her. She has never refused to cohabit with the appellant. Appellant constructed a house at Mehali and one lady Durga was residing in that house with the appellant. Appellant levelled false allegations against the respondent that she was having illicit relations with her Jeeja. 14. The grounds taken in the petition by the appellant with regard to cruelty have not been proved. Parties are living together at US Club. RW-1 (respondent) has categorically testified that she has never refused to cohabit with the appellant. Appellants used to force her to give her entire salary to him. She was beaten up and thrown out of the house. She has never uttered the words like 'dog’ and 'pig’. Allegations levelled by the appellant are sketchy. Neither the son nor the daughter has been cited as witness by the appellant. None of the witnesses examined by the appellant supported the contention of the appellant that the respondent called appellant a dog or a pig. Instances narrated by the appellant are neither grave nor serious. The instances narrated by the appellant are 'ordinary wear and tear of the married life’. Appellant has failed to prove that the respondent has treated the appellant with cruelty. 15. Instances narrated by the appellant are neither grave nor serious. The instances narrated by the appellant are 'ordinary wear and tear of the married life’. Appellant has failed to prove that the respondent has treated the appellant with cruelty. 15. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar reported in 2010 (1) Divorce & Matrimonial Cases 451, have explained the term 'cruelty’ as under: “24. This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonable be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore, to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However, continued ill-treatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However, in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar vs. Julumidevi reported in (2010) 4 SCC 476 , have explained the term 'cruelty’ as under : “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it ma be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it ma be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial case can be of infinite variety – it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and word. That possible explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial case are never closed. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are (AC p.660) “.. In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.” 22. “About the changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi at AIR p. 123, para 5 of the report : (SCC p.108, para 5) “5. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been (a) marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties.” 17. Appellant has also taken ground that the respondent has deserted him. However, fact of the matter is that they are residing under one roof in US Club. Appellant has beaten up and humiliated the respondent. She was thrown out of the house. Thus, the appellant can not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrongs. In order to prove desertion, appellant was required to prove animus deserendi. Appellant has not led any tangible evidence to prove this plea. 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion: (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of interference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? “Rayden on Divorce” which is a standard work on the subject at p.128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms:- “Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party”. The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), VoL 12, in the following words:- “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), VoL 12, in the following words:- “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence”. Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co- exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955- 1 All E R 341 at p. 342 (A), may be referred to :- “These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution.......” With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the husband to take her back. 19. In view of the discussion and analysis made herein above, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application (s), if any, also stand disposed of. No costs.