JUDGMENT : This appeal has been filed calling in question the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jagatsinghpur in R.F.A. No.19 of 2007 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Jagatsinghpur in Title Appeal No.111 of 2002. 2. For the sake of convenience, in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the court below. 3. The respondent no.1 as the plaintiff had filed the suit for partition claiming his 1/4th share over the property described in the schedule of the plaint. According to his case, Bairagi the father of the parties died leaving behind three sons, such as, the plaintiff, defendant nos.1 and 2 and a daughter, the defendant no.3 and they having succeeded to the said property are as such entitled to 1/4th share each. It is further said that the suit properties were never partitioned by metes and bounds and as because the defendant no.1 attempted to dispossess the plaintiff by constructing the pucca house over a piece of home-stead land encroaching more than the extent of his entitlement as his share, the suit has been filed when the plaintiffs’ request for partition was finally turned down. The defendant nos.1 and 2 in their written statement asserted that there has been complete partition of the suit land and each of them are accordingly possessing the portion of land falling to their respective share. It is stated that the defendant no.3 having married in the year 1956, since then has been residing in her in-laws place. The defendant no.3 pleaded that her father having died in the year 1991, she is entitled to her legitimate share over the suit land while further expressing her readiness and willingness to sit across the table for a mutual partition if others so desire. 4. Faced with such pleadings, the trial court framed five issues. Coming to answer the crucial issue regarding the factum of prior partition as also the entitlement of the share over the same by the parties, upon examination of evidence in the backdrop of the pleadings, on facts it has been held that there was no prior partition by metes and bounds and the separate possession by the parties has been for mere convenience. It has been held that the properties being owned by the father of the parties, Bairagi, who died in the year 1989, his three sons and daughter being the class-I heirs as provided in the schedule of the Hindu Succession Act are entitled to 1/4th share each over the suit property. With such findings, preliminary decree for partition has been passed allotting 1/4th share each to the plaintiff and defendant nos.1,2 and 3. The trial court has further directed for partition of the same in the field by deputing a Civil Court Commissioner respecting the possession of the parties as far as and to the extent possible and practicable. 5. The defendant nos.1 and 2 being aggrieved by the above judgment and decree had carried an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The lower appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was no partition of the suit properties by metes and bounds and that the parties are in separate possession for convenience. In that view of the matter, the appeal stood dismissed, confirming the judgment and preliminary decree passed by the trial court. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Courts below have fallen in error by holding the defendant no.3 to be entitled to 1/4th share without framing an issue of ouster as pleaded by these two defendants and without rendering a specific finding on that. He also contends that the courts below are not correct and have committed error both in fact and law by going to hold that there was no prior partition merely on the ground that the defendant nos.1 and 2 have not filed any document in that regard. So, these, according to him are the substantial questions of law which arise in this case. 7. So far as the second limb of the submission is concerned, both the courts have gone to examine the evidence let in by the parties and have returned the concurrent finding of fact that there has been no prior partition and that their separate possession is for convenience. The settled position of law is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. The settled position of law is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. In the present case when the defendant nos.1 and 2 have resorted to the plea of prior partition to thwart the suit for partition, the burden of proof is squarely upon them to show that parties had partitioned the properties by metes and bounds. Law is well settled that mere separate possession of properties by the parties, enjoyment as such by them as also separate payment of land revenue or house tax etc. are themselves not enough to hold that there was a prior partition of the joint properties between the parties by metes and bound and those are all compatible with the fact that the parties are having separate arrangement for convenience. In that view of the matter, the courts below have rightly held that the defendants 1 and 2 are burdened to prove by leading satisfactory evidence as regards prior partition by metes and bounds. The evidence in the case in hand in order to come to a positive conclusion as regards prior partition is far from satisfactory. The learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to place any such material on record that the courts below either have not properly considered or have ignored any material evidence on that score of prior partition which if would have been duly taken note of, the finding might have been otherwise. Thus, this Court finds that such concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below does not suffer from the vice of perversity and rather the same is seen not only to have been based on sound appreciation of evidence and but also to have been rendered being alive to be settled position of law governing the field. 8. Adverting to address the first limb of submission, it is seen that the defendant nos.1 and 2 have simply pleaded that their sister-defendant no.3 having married since the year 1956 has been residing at her in-laws place and thus it is pleaded though not directly but as is seen inferentially that she being never in enjoyment of any part of the property, which is the subject matter of the suit she stood ousted. Such type of pleading to set up a case of ouster is not cognizable in the eye of law. Such type of pleading to set up a case of ouster is not cognizable in the eye of law. The party who sets up a case of ouster to deprive the other party of getting his/her legitimate share of the property has to plead necessary details that his/her right over the property at one point of time was wholly denied and when it was also so asserted; further the property being claimed by those who denied the right of the other as such enjoyed by them in total deprivation of the other. Simply because a co-sharer or co-owner does not enjoy the property for even quite a good length of time merely from the same no inference of ouster can be drawn on the face of the settled position of law that possession of one co-sharer is deemed in the eye of law as the possession for and on behalf of all the co-sharers and as such enures to the benefit of all. So for the purpose positive overact in denying the right of said co-sharer/co-owner is one of the most essential ingredients to be established and then the other follow up ingredients have to be proved by leading satisfactory evidence. It is oft quoted legal position is that such plea though is very easy to be taken but extremely difficult to be established. From the pleadings and the evidence let in by the defendant nos.1 and 2, it is seen that such plea was not specifically taken. Be that as it may, even accepting for a moment that it was so taken in an implied manner, there remains absolutely no proper foundation for the same nor any sort of evidence in support of it have been tendered by the defnedants. It may also be stated that neither during the trial of the suit nor in the appellate stage it had even been forcefully urged. 9. The above submissions relating to the setting up of a case of ouster by defendant nos.1 and 2, non-framing of an issue for a decision on that score as urged before this Court when seen with very pleading, is said to be misconceived and thus not acceptable. It is said that since the year 1956, the sister-defendant no.3 remained at her in-laws place and she having not enjoyed the property, has thus stood ousted being also never so allowed. It is said that since the year 1956, the sister-defendant no.3 remained at her in-laws place and she having not enjoyed the property, has thus stood ousted being also never so allowed. The fact remains that her father then was very-much alive. So, she had absolutely no right over the property during the lifetime of her father. She came to succeed to the property only upon the death of the father, which as per the admitted case took place in the year 1989. Therefore, non-enjoyment of the property during that period also has got nothing to do and is of no legal consequence at all and thus is not in any way detrimental to the right of the defendant no.3 over the property which came to be succeeded by her only in the year 1989 on the death of her father. There is neither any pleading as regards any overt act thereafter by the defendants in denying her of the right nor in not allowing her to enjoy as of right by any sort of overt act. For the aforesaid discussion and reasons, I find that no substantial question of law surfaces in this appeal so as to be certified for its admission. The appeal thus does not merit admission. 10. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to cost.