JUDGMENT Mohammad Rafiq, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-plaintiffs against order dated 9.1.2014 passed by Additional District Judge No. 1, Alwar (for short 'the First Appellate Court') whereby application filed by the respondent No. 2-defendant in his appeal has been allowed and it has been directed that family settlement dated 5.1.2001 filed by the petitioner-plaintiffs along with the rejoinder, being unregistered and insufficiently stamped, is not admissible in evidence and it be not exhibited. 2. Facts of the case are that a suit for eviction and arrears of rent was filed by the original plaintiff late Shri Rang Bahadur on 15.1.1982. Eviction of the defendant-tenant was sought on the ground of personal bonafide necessity of the suit shop by plaintiff as well as denial of title by defendants. Petitioners are predecessors in title of late Shri Rang Bahadur, who died during pendency of the suit. The Trial Court vide judgment dated 15.12.1995 decreed the suit. The First Appellate Court, on appeal filed by the respondents-defendants, vide judgment and decree dated 22.12.1998 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The defendants-respondents filed second appeal before this Court, bearing No. 47/1999, which was admitted on 10.2.1999. It may be noted that during pendency of the appeal, the defendants-respondents filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. seeking amendment in the written statement to bring on record subsequent events especially the fact about death of Shri Rang Bahadur and that his office at Alwar has now become available for his son Mahendra Kumar Mathur to pursue practice as an Advocate and that what would be the effect of second shop owned by this plaintiff and earlier occupied by "Prince Dry' Cleaners" being vacated and possession thereof handed over to the legal representative of the plaintiff. This Court vide order dated 20.9.2013 granted opportunity to the defendants to file amended written statement before the First Appellate Court and allowed the plaintiff to file his rejoinder thereto and while doing so, remanded the matter back to the First Appellate Court by framing following two additional issues : "1. This Court vide order dated 20.9.2013 granted opportunity to the defendants to file amended written statement before the First Appellate Court and allowed the plaintiff to file his rejoinder thereto and while doing so, remanded the matter back to the First Appellate Court by framing following two additional issues : "1. Whether on the death of plaintiff Rang Bahadur Mathur, his office, if any, at Alwar became available for his son Mahendra Kumar Mathur to pursue his practice as an Advocate therefrom and the bonafide and reasonable necessity of the tenanted shop for Mahendra Kumar Mathur ceased thereupon ? 2. Whether the second shop owned by the plaintiff and earlier occupied by "Prince Dry Cleaners" has been vacated and possession thereof handed over to the legal representatives of the plaintiff and if so its affect on the suit for eviction based on bona fide and reasonable necessity of plaintiffs son Mahendra Kumar Mathur for setting up his office as an Advocate ?" 3. The petitioner-plaintiffs challenged the aforesaid order dated 20.9.2013 passed by this Court before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal No. 5925/2014. The Supreme Court taking note of the fact that issue No. 1 does not pertain to subsequent event since Shri Rang bahadur Mathur died as early as 1986, vide its order dated 7.9.2015 set aside that part of the order passed by is Court in second appeal and maintained the order only in respect of issue No. with direction that the First Appellate Court shall record its findings within a period of six months from the date of communication of that order. Both the parties appeared before the First Appellate Court. The defendants-respondent filed tended written statement on 4.10.2013. The petitioner-plaintiffs filed rejoinder’ thereto. Along with the rejoinder, the petitioner-plaintiffs submitted family settlement dated 5.1.2001 along with a map. The respondent No. 2 who was appellant before the First Appellate Court, filed an application before the First Appellate Court with the prayer that the family, settlement dated 5.1.2001 filed by tie petitioner-plaintiffs along with the rejoinder being unregistered and insufficiently stamped is not admissible in evidence and therefore it should not be allowed to be exhibited. The respondent No. 2 who was appellant before the First Appellate Court, filed an application before the First Appellate Court with the prayer that the family, settlement dated 5.1.2001 filed by tie petitioner-plaintiffs along with the rejoinder being unregistered and insufficiently stamped is not admissible in evidence and therefore it should not be allowed to be exhibited. The First Appellate Court vide order dated 9.1.2014 allowed that application holding that in view of provisions of Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short 'the Act'), aforesaid document was required to be registered and in the absence of registration, it was not admissible in evidence. First Appellate Court therefore directed that the said document shall not be exhibited. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners-plaintiffs have approached this Court by this writ petition. At this stage, it may be noted that though this matter was listed before this Court on 18.2.2016 on application for early listing of the writ petition, but in view of the directions of the Supreme Court, the matter was heard finally and closed for orders. 4. Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that First Appellate Court has failed to appreciate that family settlement in question was a memorandum of earlier partition and it was not required to be registered under Sections 17 and 49 of the Act. The First Appellate Court erred in holding that the family settlement was not a memorandum of partition and that it created rights to certain parties and relinquished rights of certain parties and therefore, required registration. Learned Counsel referred to para 3 of the family settlement and argued that therein it was clearly mentioned that in order to avoid any future differences, a settlement was arrived amongst the members of the family during life time of their father but at that time it could not be given written shape, therefore, now it was being described in writing so that there remains no dispute thereabout. In para 4 of the family settlement, it was again mentioned that family settlement was arrived amongst the members of the family during lifetime of their father but now it was being given written shape. In last para of the family settlement it was yet again mentioned that the settlement was being written on a stamp paper of Rs. In para 4 of the family settlement, it was again mentioned that family settlement was arrived amongst the members of the family during lifetime of their father but now it was being given written shape. In last para of the family settlement it was yet again mentioned that the settlement was being written on a stamp paper of Rs. 10/- and three pie papers by enclosing therewith a map, which was signed by witnesses and attested by Notary in the presence of the witnesses. Merely because the family settlement was later on reduced in writing by document dated 5.1.2001, it could not be held to be compulsorily registrable. The First Appellate Court without reading the family settlement has mechanically recorded the finding that it is not memorandum of earlier partition and by this document, rights have been created and relinquished in favour of certain parties. 5. Learned Counsel has argued that the First Appellate Court has misconstrued the statement of PW-1, Virendra Kumar, which was recorded as back as on 22.9.1987. Family Settlement dated 5.1.2001 cannot be required to be registered merely on the basis of earlier statement. It is settled preposition of law that a family settlement regarding earlier transaction does not require registration. In support of his arguments, learned Counsel relied upon the decisions in Roshan Singh & Ors. v. Zile Singh & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 881 ; Prahlad v. Shiv Nandan Kumari (Dead.) through LRs & Ors., ILR 2010 2441; Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., (1976) 3 SCC 119 and Ram Singh v. Smt. Kewar Kanwar & Ors., 2011 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 371. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Mahendra Kumar Jain and Mr. Madho Swami, learned Counsels for the respondents while supporting the impugned order argued that First Appellate Court was perfectly justified in holding that family settlement dated 5.1.2001 was compulsorily required to be registered because this document creates rights in favour of certain parties and relinquishes rights of certain other parties. The aforesaid document has been cleverly prepared to avoid its registration on payment of stamp duty and this is evident from the fact that this document has been prepared on 5.1.2001, much after Filing of civil suit in the year 1986. The aforesaid document has been cleverly prepared to avoid its registration on payment of stamp duty and this is evident from the fact that this document has been prepared on 5.1.2001, much after Filing of civil suit in the year 1986. Document, family settlement clearly shows that the sisters have relinquished their share in favour of their brothers and therefore, the said document, as per provisions of Section 17 of the Act was required to be compulsorily registered and if the same is not registered, as per the provisions of Section 49 of the Act, such document was not admissible in evidence. Learned Counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the decisions in Ramesh Chandra & Ors. v. Additional District Judge & Ors., 2010 AIR (Raj.) 59; LRs of Late Shri Chittar Mai v. Addl. Civil Judge (SD) & Ors., 2005(1) DNJ 366; Kale & Ors. (supra); Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishan Mishra, 2009 (2) SCC 532 ; Rukmani Devi and Anr. v. Nand Kishore through its Legal Representative & Ors., 2006 (1) DNJ 11; Harshvardhan Singh v. Ranveer Singh & Ors., 1997(1) WLC (Raj.) 47 and Ravi Setia v. Somlal Setia, 1998 (2) WLC (Raj.) 674. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions, carefully examined the material on record and respectfully studied the judgments cited by learned Counsel for the parties. 8. Perusal of the impugned order indicates that the First Appellate Court proceeded to decide this question at the outset by relying on the judgment of this Court in LRs of Late Shri Chittar Mai (supra) wherein it was held that question of admissibility in evidence should be decided at the preliminary stage. The First Appellate Court also relied upon judgment of this Court in Harshvardhan Singh (supra) wherein it was held that if a document creates right in the property then unless it is registered, it cannot be taken into evidence. The First Appellate Court also relied upon judgment of this Court in Harshvardhan Singh (supra) wherein it was held that if a document creates right in the property then unless it is registered, it cannot be taken into evidence. No doubt, it has been reduced into writing in the name and style of 'family settlement’, but in doing so, learned First Appellate Court disbelieved plea as also rejected argument of the plaintiff-petitioners based on paras 3, 4 and concluding para of the aforementioned memorandum of family settlement that actual division of the properties had taken place during lifetime of their father Late Shri Rang Bahadur, but as per his wishes, the parties had acted upon the same and now the same was being reduced into writing as memorandum of family settlement in order that there remains no dispute about the rights of the parties. 9. The Supreme Court in Kale & Ors. (supra) provided sufficient guidelines for deciding present controversy. The Supreme Court in that case held that the object of the family arrangement is to protect the family from long-drawn litigation of perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. Family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary. Registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Distinction should be made between the document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record of for information of the court for making necessary mutation. Their Lordships further held that in such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable. Their Lordships further held that a document which was no more than a memorandum of what had been agreed to did not require registration. Their Lordships further held that a document which was no more than a memorandum of what had been agreed to did not require registration. The document which is in the nature of a memorandum of an earlier family arrangement and which is filed before the Court for its information for mutation of names is not compulsorily registrable and therefore can be used in evidence of the family arrangement and is final and binding on the parties. 10. The Supreme Court in Roshan Singh & Ors. (supra) dealt with a case where the plaintiffs and defendants belonged to two branches of the family and had joint ancestral properties. There was some partition and in a deed executed by the parties, the factum of partition was embodied. This deed was not registered. Dispute arose as to the admissibility of the deed in evidence. The Supreme Court in Para 9 of the Judgment held as under : "9. It is well-settled that while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or severing ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act, a writing which merely recites that there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration. The essence of the matter is whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely an incidental recital of a previously completed transaction. The use of the past tense does not necessarily indicate that it is merely a recital of a past transaction. It is equally well-settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition is not an require registration. Section 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Section 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Two propositions must therefore flow : (1) A partition may be effected orally ; but if it is subsequently reduced into a form of a by itself to effect a division and embodies all the terms of bargain, it will be necessary to register it. If it be not registered, Section 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Secondly evidence of the factum of partition will not be admissible by reason of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Partition lists which are mere records of a previously completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered, to prove the fact of partition : See Mulla's Registration Act, 8th Edn., pp. 54-57." 11. This view was reiterated in later judgment of the Supreme Court in Prahlad (supra) in which their Lordships repelled the contention of the appellate therein that memorandum of partition not having been registered, could not have been relied upon by the Courts below. The Supreme Court held that the Courts below have found that there was an oral partition in the year 1968 and the terms thereof were embodied in the form of a memorandum subsequently and the same would not require registration. This Court in Rukmani Devi & Anr. (supra); Harshvardhan Singh (supra) and Ravi Setia (supra) judgments relied by learned Counsel for the respondents held that the memorandum of family settlement should be held to have been compulsorily registrable. 12. This Court in Rukmani Devi & Anr. (supra); Harshvardhan Singh (supra) and Ravi Setia (supra) judgments relied by learned Counsel for the respondents held that the memorandum of family settlement should be held to have been compulsorily registrable. 12. Notwithstanding the position of law as aforenoted, question whether the disputed document was actually a memorandum of partition creating rights in favour of certain members of the family (brothers) and extinguishing rights of certain other members of the family (sisters) or it had recitals of an event of family arrangement which had taken place as per the wishes of late Shri Rang Bahadur during his lifetime is a question of fact, which would be required to be proved by evidence, particularly when this document has been allegedly prepared on 5.1.2001 and produced much belatedly after remand of the case to the First Appellate Court by this Court in Second Appeal No. 47/1999, which arose out of civil suit filed as far as back on 15.1.1982. I am fortified in taking that view from the judgment of this Court in Radha Charan v. ADJ (FT) No. 1, Dholpur and Ors., 2013 WLC (Raj.) UC 41 wherein also the question was whether the document dated 31.3.1990 was memorandum of partition or a partition deed requiring registration and proper stamp duty. It was held that whether a document is admissible or not would be a matter of evidence and could not be decided without granting opportunity to parties to adduce evidence. This Court further held that the Trial Court not have come to the conclusion without any evidence on record that such document was merely a memorandum of partition and not partition deed itself. It was further held that the aforesaid question could not have been decided as preliminary issue without giving any opportunity to the parties to lead evidence thereabout. 13. Despite claim of the plaintiffs that the memorandum of family settlement was prepared on 5.1.2001, the same was produced in the proceedings of this litigation highly belatedly on 11.10.2013 with the rejoinder after remand of the matter to the First Appellate Court. 13. Despite claim of the plaintiffs that the memorandum of family settlement was prepared on 5.1.2001, the same was produced in the proceedings of this litigation highly belatedly on 11.10.2013 with the rejoinder after remand of the matter to the First Appellate Court. Case of the plaintiffs is that the family settlement aforesaid merely contained a recital of an already arrived at arrangement amongst the family members during life time of late Shri Rang Bahadur, but this fact was not brought on record by evidence or otherwise either during his life time when the suit was pending or even after death of late Shri Rang Bahadur in 1986 till filing of the rejoinder on 11.10.2013. It may be noted that the suit filed in the year 1986 was decreed on 15.12.1995. Moreover, if at all the document aforesaid was prepared on 5.1.2001, there was absolutely no justification for the plaintiffs in not producing the same on record even before this Court in the pending second appeal for as long as 12 years. No efforts whatsoever were made by the petitioners-plaintiffs in that appeal to bring the said document on record. Now the petitioners in the rejoinder have sought to expand the scope of remand enormously whereas rejoinder ought to be confined only to what was additionally pleaded by the defendants in amended written statement by way of amendment. This Court in an order separately passed today has upheld the order passed by the learned First Appellate Court, which has directed that rejoinder only to the extent of para 4(a) shall be read and other paras of rejoinder shall not be taken on record. Therefore, regardless of whether the document is memorandum of family settlement or memorandum of partition or whether it is required to be compulsorily registrable or is not sufficiently stamped, the fact remains that this document has been filed at the stage of remand which is confined to issue No. 2 only. The Supreme Court has directed the First Appellate Court to record its dings on the said issue within six months whereas much more period than that has lapsed. Therefore, at this stage, requiring the parties to produce evidence on it aspect to decide whether it was a memorandum of family settlement or memorandum of partition would further delay the proceedings. The Supreme Court has directed the First Appellate Court to record its dings on the said issue within six months whereas much more period than that has lapsed. Therefore, at this stage, requiring the parties to produce evidence on it aspect to decide whether it was a memorandum of family settlement or memorandum of partition would further delay the proceedings. Even if therefore the question of compulsorily registration and payment of stamp duty is not gone into, this Court is nonetheless persuaded to uphold the impugned order for its ultimate conclusion for different reason than the one given by the First Appellate Court for refusing to receive the document in question in evidence. 14. In view of above discussion, there is no illegality or infirmity in the order dated 9.1.2014 passed by the First Appellate Court and the same requires no interference by this Court for the aforementioned reasons. There is no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. Stay application also stands dismissed.