JUDGMENT & ORDER : The legality of the order dated 3-10-2013 passed by the learned Special Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur framing the charges against the petitioner U/s 409/120-B IPC and Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is called into question in this revision petition. 2. The petitioner belongs to Tripura Civil Service Grade-II and was serving as Block Development Officer of Satchand R.D. Block under Sabroom Sub-Division, South Tripura District from 12-10-2009 till 21-5-2010 when he was transferred out for some other posting. On 15-6-2010, the Block Development Officer, Satchand RD Block, who had replaced the petitioner, lodged an FIR with Manu Bazar Police Station against the petitioner and 14 others for misappropriation of Government fund. The case was duly investigated into by the IO of the case, who, in due course of time, submitted the charge sheet against the petitioner and others under Section 409/120-B IPC and Section 13(1)(c) of the PC Act. On so forwarded, the learned Special Judge, South Tripura registered Special Case No. 1 of 2013 against the petitioner and other accused. At the time of charge hearing, the petitioner filed an application under Section 227, CrPC for discharging him on the ground that there was absolutely no evidence against him. The learned Special Judge, however, by the impugned order rejected the application for discharge, which is under challenge now. 3. The case of the petitioner is that there was an order for supply of ginger rhizomes issued by him to the NERAMAC Ltd., which is a Government of India undertaking, with the approval of Satchand Block Advisory Committee (BAC) headed by the accused No. 2. According to the petitioner, the informant with oblique motive suppressed in the FIR the fact of payment to NERAMAC by him with the approval and direction from the accused No. 2, the then Chairman of BAC. He, however, paid the running bills to NERAMAC Ltd. against the supply of ginger rhizomes on the basis of certificates of receipt in the challans acknowledging the receipt of quantities as per documents issued by the Village Chairpersons and/or Implementing Officers (Panchayat Secretaries of the concerned villages) and no dispute had arisen at that time. He, however, paid the running bills to NERAMAC Ltd. against the supply of ginger rhizomes on the basis of certificates of receipt in the challans acknowledging the receipt of quantities as per documents issued by the Village Chairpersons and/or Implementing Officers (Panchayat Secretaries of the concerned villages) and no dispute had arisen at that time. Before issue of the cheque for last payment amounting to Rs.18,37,500/-, the Chairman of the BAC on or about 16-4-2010 certified that ginger rhizomes were properly supplied to each of the villages and, therefore, directed the payment of all pending bills. It was after receipt of such note that the petitioner issued the cheque for the said amount. Claiming that he is innocent of the charge, this criminal revision petition is filed by the petitioner to set aside the impugned order. 4. It is the contention of Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, that the informant lodged the FIR on the basis of the allegations contained in the two inquiry reports submitted by one Smt. Tanushree Debbarma, Additional District Magistrate, South Tripura dated 14-5-2010 and dated 29-5-2010, which do not show any material to frame the charges against the petitioner. The learned senior counsel further submits that all the payments including the final payments were made to the NERAMAC Ltd. only as per the supply order after they were actually supplied to 18 ADC villages with the approval of the BAC and on the certificates issued by the Implementing Officers and there is, therefore, question of misappropriation of public fund. It is also the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that charges have been framed against the petitioner without framing charge against the other co-accused persons who were responsible for supplying the ginger rhizomes and who could be answerable for any possible shortage of the quantities supplied; those accused have been let off without any rhyme or reason. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to set aside the impugned order and discharge the petitioner. Heavy reliance is placed by the senior counsel on State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, AIR 1977 SC 1489 to bolster his submission. 5. Refuting the contentions of the learned senior counsel, Mr. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to set aside the impugned order and discharge the petitioner. Heavy reliance is placed by the senior counsel on State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, AIR 1977 SC 1489 to bolster his submission. 5. Refuting the contentions of the learned senior counsel, Mr. R.C. Debnath, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, draws my attention to the charge sheet and forcefully submits that there are prima facie case against the petitioner inasmuch as no Purchase Committee was ever formed by him nor did he make a publicity by short quotation through newspapers or by publishing the same in the website; this is in gross violation of the Delegation of Financial Powers Rules, Tripura, 2007 (“the Financial Rules”). According to the Additional Public Prosecutor, the petitioner also did not obtain the permission of the Supply/Work Advisory Board for purchasing of some three lakhs kgs of ginger at the cost of Rs.1 crore and 5 lakhs, which was constituted by the Finance Department, Government of Tripura to monitor purchase of materials above the cost of Rs.30 lakhs; this falls foul of the Financial Rules. He, therefore, submits that there is reasonable ground for raising strong suspicion that the petitioner was involved in such financial scam, and the criminal revision petition filed has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. 6. The provision for discharge of an accused is found at Section 227, CrPC, which reads thus: “227. Discharge.— If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” 7. In exercise of the power conferred under Section 227, CrPC, the High court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The scope of this salutary provision came up for consideration before the Apex Court recently in State of T.N. v. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 . After making comparative study of Sections 227, 239 and 245, CrPC, the Apex Court held: “29. The scope of this salutary provision came up for consideration before the Apex Court recently in State of T.N. v. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 . After making comparative study of Sections 227, 239 and 245, CrPC, the Apex Court held: “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476 , in which, after analysing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2008) 2 SCC 61 : (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat case (supra)) “15. ‘11. ‘11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.’ (Onkar Nath case(supra))” (emphasis in original) 31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 and Dilawar Balu Karane v. State of Mahashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused: 31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it “considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it “considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction”. 31.2. Section 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken. 31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1986) 2 SCC 716 . The same reads as follows: “43. … Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of ‘prima facie’ case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.” 8. Keeping in mind the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in the foregoing, I proceed to examine the facts of the present case. In the charge sheet, the IO of the case stated that the petitioner did not form any purchase committee and did not make any publicity by calling short quotation through newspapers or by publishing the same in the website thereby violating the provisions of the Financial Rules. In the charge sheet, the IO of the case stated that the petitioner did not form any purchase committee and did not make any publicity by calling short quotation through newspapers or by publishing the same in the website thereby violating the provisions of the Financial Rules. He also stated that the petitioner did not obtain the permission of the Advisory Board for purchasing 3 lakhs of ginger at the cost of Rs.1 crore and 5 lakhs whereas as per the Financial Rules, the Advisory Board constituted by the Finance Department, Government of Tripura was authorized to monitor purchasing of materials worth exceeding Rs.30 lakhs. Those apart, suffice it to refer to some of the others charges against the petitioner: (a) The accused BDO made a note dated 21-2-2010 in the file that 1,50,000 kgs of ginger and 1,50,000 kgs turmeric would be procured from NERAMAC Ltd., A.D. Nagar, Agartala. (b) On receipt of the supply order, NERAMAC authority expressed their inability to supply turmeric where the Chairman, BAC made a note in the file dated nil and converted the supply of turmeric to the supply of ginger in same quantity. This was not discussed in the forum of BAC meeting held on 3-12-2009. The above mentioned note was beyond norms and motive of his personal interest acted there. 9. What needs to be considered at the stage of framing the charges is whether, on the basis of the case set up by the IO as adverted to above, there is a ground for presuming that the offences have been committed, and not whether grounds for convicting the petitioner have been made out. As noticed earlier, even strong suspicion founded on material which could lead the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offences alleged would justify the framing of charges against the petitioner in respect of the commission of those offences alleged against him. In my judgment, the question to ask is not whether there are sufficient evidence for the conviction of the petitioner, but the question is whether there are sufficient materials in the charge sheet to raise strong suspicion which could lead the Court to form a presumptive opinion to justify the framing of the charges against him? In my judgment, the question to ask is not whether there are sufficient evidence for the conviction of the petitioner, but the question is whether there are sufficient materials in the charge sheet to raise strong suspicion which could lead the Court to form a presumptive opinion to justify the framing of the charges against him? The answer is that there are definitely sufficient material to form a strong suspicion to justify the framing of the charges against the petitioner under Sections 409/120-B IPC and Section 13(1)(c) of PC Act as has been correctly held by the trial court. In the view that I have taken, there is absolutely no ground for my interference in the impugned order. 10. The result of the foregoing discussion is that this revision petition is devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. The trial court must now make an attempt to dispose of the trial without further loss of time. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 4-1-2017 at 10.30 AM for further proceedings. Nothing stated in the foregoing shall, however, be construed to be a final observation on the merit of the case, which is yet to be decided by the trial court after adducing evidence by the parties. Transmit the LC record.