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2016 DIGILAW 447 (JK)

Kafait Ullah v. State of J&K

2016-09-02

JANAK RAJ KOTWAL

body2016
JUDGMENT : JANAK RAJ KOTWAL, J. 1. This is a writ petition. Background facts leading to and necessary for its disposal are required to be stated first: (a) Petitioner, Kafait Ullah, a Constable in Jammu and Kashmir Police, was posted in District Police Line, Kathua in the year 1998. On 09.06.1998, a police party comprising of the petitioner and HC Paramjeet Singh among others headed by ASI Jagdish Dutt was deputed to Srinagar and Shopian for producing detenues from District Jail, Kathua and Sub-Jail, Hiranagar before the Courts of 1st and 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar and Sub-Judge, Shopian. They proceeded by a Bus bearing registration No. JK02A-3361. On their way back from Shopian on 10.06.2009, they halted at Qazigund at about 9.00 PM. One detenue, namely, Abdul Rashid Bhat, wanted to answer a call of the nature. The petitioner and HC Paramjeet Singh took him to a toilet adjacent a Hotel. It is alleged that the detenue fled away taking advantage of darkness. Information in this regard was lodged at Police Station, Qazigund and was registered as FIR No. 87/98. ASI Jagdish Singh, HC Paramjeet Singh and the petitioner were served with Charge Sheet for dereliction of duties and facilitating escape of the detenue and departmental inquiry against them was initiated. The petitioner replied to the Charge Sheet and was put to inquiry. On conclusion of the inquiry, Superintendent of Police-Kathua-respondent No.4 issued a Show Cause Notice dated 06.03.1999 to the petitioner informing him that charges against him have been proved in the inquiry and asked him to show cause as to why the punishment of removal from service for the proved misconduct may not be imposed. Petitioner replied to this notice through his Advocate. (b) After considering the reply filed by the petitioner, respondent No. 4 passed Order No.387 of 1999 dated 26.03.1999 removing the petitioner from service. Appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jammu-Kathua Range-respondent No.3 vide Order No.132 dated 25.03.2000. Petitioner assailed both these orders in SWP No.1555/2000 before this Court. This Court vide Judgment dated 10.11.2004 quashed both these orders finding that both the orders were bad because of non-furnishing of the copy of inquiry report to the petitioner. Petitioner assailed both these orders in SWP No.1555/2000 before this Court. This Court vide Judgment dated 10.11.2004 quashed both these orders finding that both the orders were bad because of non-furnishing of the copy of inquiry report to the petitioner. Having quashed both the orders, this Court issued following direction: "With the quashment of these orders and the fact that the inquiry proceedings have not been questioned and nor the same can be said to be contrary to law, respondents are directed to pass fresh order after furnishing the inquiry report to the petitioner and providing him opportunity to make representation, within a period of three months, in accordance with law. Though impugned orders have been quashed, however, the petitioner's reinstatement shall depend upon the passing of fresh order by the respondents." (underling by me) (c) In LPA (SW) No.48/2005 filed by the petitioner, a learned Division Bench vide order dated 11.04.2005 issued a clarification in regard to the direction issued by the Writ Court and in this regard, I quote the operative part of the order: Wide order dated 28.03.2005 notice was issued both in the condonation matter as well as in the appeal. Having heard counsel for the parties, while condoning the delay in filing the appeal, being further of the opinion that the appellant must be allowed to challenge the finding of the enquiry officer lest furnishing him copy of the report would be meaningless, we clarify that on receipt of copy of the enquiry report, as directed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant would be entitled to challenge the findings of the Enquiry Officer in accordance with law." (d) In order to comply with the judgment in the writ petition dated 10.11.2004 read with the order dated 11.04.2005 in the LPA, the Disciplinary Authority was required to pass fresh order after furnishing the inquiry report to the petitioner and providing him opportunity of making representation. This exercise should have been completed within three months after order in the LPA dated 11.04.2005. To meet the dead line of three months, it was required of the Disciplinary Authority to provide copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner without any loss of time so that it was in a position to pass fresh order within the stipulated three months. To meet the dead line of three months, it was required of the Disciplinary Authority to provide copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner without any loss of time so that it was in a position to pass fresh order within the stipulated three months. The Disciplinary Authority, however, did not furnish the copy of inquiry report to the petitioner and in the result, neither representation could be filed by the petitioner nor was fresh order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, till the petitioner filed this writ petition in March, 2006. 2. By the medium of this writ petition, as it was originally filed, petitioner sought mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate him with all consequential benefits on the ground that respondents did not provide him copy of the inquiry report and have failed to comply with the judgment of the court. It has been averred that after disposal of the LPA, he provided copies of the judgment and the order to respondent No.4 through a covering letter of his counsel dated 29.04.2005. He sent a reminder through his counsel vide his letter dated 18.06.2005. In response to the reminder dated 18.06.2005, in-charge, CPO-Kathua vide his letter No.534/CPOK dated 30.06.2005 sent a copy of order No.387/98 dated 26.03.1998 (supra) to his counsel, which had been quashed by this Court by the aforementioned judgment. He made another request for providing him copy of the inquiry report vide letter dated 23.07.2005 of his counsel. 3. Respondents, in their reply filed somewhere in May, 2006, while not denying that copy of the inquiry report was not provided by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner, in para 15 of their reply gave the reason for not doing so till that time. I reproduce para 15 for ready reference: "In reply to para 15, it may be submitted here that during the course of pendency of the earlier writ petition of the petitioner, the original inquiry report was sent to the then Additional Advocate General, Sh. Ashok Parihar in which the complete original report is also lying. The case enquiry report is still lying with the Additional Advocate General and steps are being taken to call back the said record/enquiry report. However, the other relevant record pertaining to his case was provided to him." 4. Ashok Parihar in which the complete original report is also lying. The case enquiry report is still lying with the Additional Advocate General and steps are being taken to call back the said record/enquiry report. However, the other relevant record pertaining to his case was provided to him." 4. Respondents ultimately provided copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner on 23.04.2011, six years after the order in the LPA (supra). After receiving copy of the inquiry report, the petitioner with leave of this Court amended the writ petition seeking issue of writ of certiorari quashing Order No. 330 of 1998 dated 12.06.1998, whereby respondent No. 5 was appointed as Inquiry Officer by respondent No. 4, the inquiry proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Officer and the inquiry report No. 925/DE/DAR dated 07.12.1998 submitted by him to respondent No. 4. Besides, petitioner seeks issue of writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as constable with consequential benefits, that is, arrears of pay and salary, seniority and further promotions. 5. The amended relief is sought by the petitioner, mainly, on the ground of inordinate delay of six years in furnishing copy of inquiry report to him. It is contended that petitioner has been highly prejudiced due to pendency of the inquiry proceedings as neither was he exonerated nor he could apply for any other job. 6. Respondents have opposed the amended petition by filing their objections though not disputing that copy of the inquiry report was provided to the petitioner on 23.04.2011. It is reiterated by the respondents in their reply to the amended petition that copy of the inquiry report could not be furnished to the petitioner as the said report was lying with the then Additional Advocate General. Objection raised also is that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner 'for not furnishing the inquiry report as the petitioner never sought for the same nor invoked any legal remedy in this behalf/ 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Star and the core argument of Mr. O.P. Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner was that inordinate delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings has been held a sufficient ground for quashing the entire proceedings and exonerating the delinquent officer. Mr. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Star and the core argument of Mr. O.P. Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner was that inordinate delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings has been held a sufficient ground for quashing the entire proceedings and exonerating the delinquent officer. Mr. Thakur urged that respondents have not shown any reliable reason to explain inordinate delay of over six years in providing the copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner. The delay in providing copy of the report has caused serious prejudice to him because, besides immense hardship and monetary loss caused to him, after a long gap of time since the date of alleged incident he would not be in a position to effectively assail the inquiry report. Mr. Thakur placed reliance on Supreme Court judgments in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and anr. AIR 1990 SC 1308 and State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 . Allahabad High Court judgment in Sita Ram v. State of U. P. and ors. 2012 (92) ALR 609 and Calcutta High Court in Prabhat Kumar Paul v. State of West Bengal, 2010 (8) SLR 491. 9. Per contra, Mr. W. S. Nargal, learned Additional Advocate General, made a strenuous effort to compartmentalise the disciplinary proceedings in two segments and draw a distinction between the two, one, according to him, the inquiry by the inquiry officer and the other, proceedings by the Disciplinary Authority pursuant to report of the inquiry officer. Mr. Nargal sought to make out that providing copy of inquiry report to the delinquent officer and calling objections from him is not part of disciplinary inquiry so delay, whatsoever, in completing this aspect of the proceedings by the Disciplinary Authority cannot confer any right on the delinquent officer. Mr. Nargal submitted also that the delay in providing the report to the petitioner was not intentional. 10. Questions, thus, raised for determination in this writ petition are; whether there is unexplained inordinate delay of six years in providing copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner after disposal of the LPA and, whether due to this inordinate delay, the entire disciplinary proceedings are liable to be quashed. 11. In the State of Madhya Pardesh v. Bani Singh and anr. 11. In the State of Madhya Pardesh v. Bani Singh and anr. AIR 1990 SC 1308 (supra), therein respondent, an IPS Officer, was served with charge sheet on 22.04.1987 and departmental inquiry proceedings were initiated against him in respect of certain incidents that happened in 1975-76. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, in an appeal filed by the respondent quashed the charge memo and the departmental inquiry on the ground of inordinate delay of over twelve years in the initiation of departmental proceedings with respect to the incident having taken place in 1975-76. In appeal against order passed by the Administrative Tribunal, Supreme Court in para 4 of the judgment held: "4.The appeal against the order dated 16.12.1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal'' 12. In State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishnan, (1998) 4 SCC 15 (supra), Supreme Court has held in para 19 of the reporting: "19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. In State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishnan, (1998) 4 SCC 15 (supra), Supreme Court has held in para 19 of the reporting: "19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse consideration." (underlining by me) 13. In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and ors. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse consideration." (underlining by me) 13. In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and ors. (2006) 5 SCC 88 (supra), Supreme Court noticed that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and observed that "initiation of disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer" (para 16). In so observing, Supreme Court in this case referred with approval to Bani Singh's case (supra). 14. In Sita Ram Verma v. State of U.P. 2012 (92) ALR 609 (supra), the alleged misconduct was of the year 1986-87, inquiry was initiated on 20.12.1988, inquiry report was submitted on 27.06.2003 and order on its basis was passed on 19.06.2006. High Court of Allahabad in this case after surveying authorities' right from Bani Singh's case concluded that "delay in initiating departmental proceedings as well as concluding the inquiry, both are fatal and allowed the writ petition". 15. In Prabhat Kumar Paul v. State of West Bengal, 2010 (8) SLR 491 (supra), the alleged misconduct relating to acquisition of disproportionate assets took place during the period 1990 to 1999. Decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings was taken on 22.02.2010. High Court of Calcutta quashed the proceedings holding that "after lapse of more than ten years, this Court cannot permit the respondent Authorities to proceeds with disciplinary proceedings" as the "unexplained inordinate delay initiating the disciplinary proceedings would seriously prejudice the petitioner." 16. It may be stated that the alleged misconduct in the case on hand relates to the year 1998, exactly on 10.06.1998. The disciplinary proceedings appear to have been commenced immediately after the incident and the inquiry report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer in December, 1998. Order of discharge from service against petitioner was passed by respondent No.4 on 26.03.1999 and appeal against this order preferred by the petitioner was rejected in March, 2000. So far the Authorities acted in due course without any loss of time and it was okay. Order of discharge from service against petitioner was passed by respondent No.4 on 26.03.1999 and appeal against this order preferred by the petitioner was rejected in March, 2000. So far the Authorities acted in due course without any loss of time and it was okay. The earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner came to be decided by this Court on 10.11.2004 and the LPA against the judgment of the Writ Court was disposed of in April, 2005. Unusualness, however, started after that. 17. The Disciplinary Authority did not provide the copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner nor was the fresh order passed by him within stipulated period of three months. Nothing in this behalf was done even till the time of filing of this writ petition by the petitioner in March, 2006. The Disciplinary Authority did not provide the copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner even after filing of this writ petition by him and surprisingly respondents opted to state in their objections/reply to the writ petition, filed in May, 2006, that copy of the report could not be provided to the petitioner for the reason that record of the inquiry including inquiry report had been sent to Additional Advocate General, Sh. Ashok Parihar, in connection with the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner and has not been collected from there. Even in spite of stating in their objections that steps were being taken to call back the record from the Additional Advocate General, it took respondents another five years to provide a copy of the report to the petitioner on 23.A .2011 giving him sufficient cause to seek leave of this Court to amend his writ petition, which was granted by this Court. In their reply/objections to the amended writ petition, the reason stated is the same that the record containing the inquiry report was lying with the Additional Advocate General. 18. It is thus clear, and it is manifest, that respondents in their reply have not stated any reason, much less a plausible reason, for not having provided the copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner and passed fresh order in the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner within three months as stipulated by this Court in the earlier writ petition vide Judgment dated 10.11.2004 read with order dated 11.04.2005 of the learned LPA Court. They have not given any reason for not providing copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner even during the long period of over five years after filing of this writ petition. To say that the record was lying with the Additional Advocate General is no explanation for not providing copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner and is rather admission on the part of the respondents that the direction issued by this Court was ignored without any fear of or seriousness about its consequences. 19. The failure of the Disciplinary Authority in providing copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner was a sheer carelessness or non-seriousness on his part and even looks like a deliberate omission that resulted into inordinate delay in completing the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. It is highly incomprehensible as to why inquiry report was not provided to the petitioner even after filing of this writ petition by the petitioner and reply thereto by the respondents. What was expected of the Disciplinary Authority was to provide copy of the report to the petitioner immediately after receiving notice in the Writ Petition and fix the responsibility for failure in this regard and take appropriate action. Respondents might have scored a point in their favour had this been done and this Court informed in this regard instead of filing objections stating that record was lying with the Additional Advocate General. Some point might have been scored by the respondents even if copy of the report was provided to the petitioner immediately after filing of objections to the writ petition in May, 2006 rather than causing further delay of about five years. 20. I would, thus, hold that the Disciplinary Authority did not provide copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner and failed in passing fresh order in the disciplinary proceedings within three months stipulated time after disposal of the LPA on 11.04.2005 (supra). The Disciplinary Authority delayed the delivery of copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner for over six years till it was provided to him on 23.04.2011. This delay on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is inordinate and has not been explained and I have no hesitation in holding - that no effort has been made to explain this delay. This delay on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is inordinate and has not been explained and I have no hesitation in holding - that no effort has been made to explain this delay. This delay, in turn, has resulted in inordinate delay of more than eleven years after the disposal of the LPA till this time in conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. Had -the Disciplinary Authority, even after his failure to comply with three months' deadline, provided the copy of report to the petitioner immediately after the notice in this writ petition, the scenario might have been different. 21. The unexplained delay of over six years in providing copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner has led to unnecessary and avoidable delay of over eleven years in conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner, therefore, has a point in seeking quashment of the entire proceedings. However, the point raised by learned Additional Advocate General is required to be addressed. The point raised is that delay may have some adverse effect if it occurs in completion of the disciplinary inquiry by the Inquiry Officer but has no adverse effect on the proceedings pursuant to the report of the Inquiry Officer. To say otherwise, in the opinion of the learned AAG, it is open for the Disciplinary Authority to take any time in conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings after he receives the inquiry report from the Inquiry Officer. 22. Section 126(2) of the Constitution of the State partly corresponding to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India provides that no person, who is a member of Civil Service of the State or holds a civil post under the State shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. The compliance of Article 126 (2) necessitates holding of inquiry for which generally an Inquiry Officer is appointed by the Disciplinary Authority and giving reasonable opportunity to the Delinquent Officer for making a representation on the penalty proposed by the Inquiry Officer. The compliance of Article 126 (2) necessitates holding of inquiry for which generally an Inquiry Officer is appointed by the Disciplinary Authority and giving reasonable opportunity to the Delinquent Officer for making a representation on the penalty proposed by the Inquiry Officer. This entire exercise required to be completed in terms of Section 126 (2) is called the holding of disciplinary proceedings or departmental proceedings. The disciplinary proceedings contemplated under Section 126 of the State Constitution, thus, has two aspects: (a) Disciplinary inquiry proceedings by the Inquiry Officer, and (b) Providing of reasonable opportunity to the Delinquent Officer by the Disciplinary Authority for making representation against proposed penalty. 23. No justification can be found in suggesting or taking a view that adverse effect of inordinate delay is relatable to disciplinary inquiry proceedings only and not to the proceedings by the Disciplinary Authority pursuant to the making of report by the Inquiry Officer. The comprehensive statement of law contained in N. Radhakrishnan (supra), leaves little doubt in making it clear that inordinate delay relates to the completion of disciplinary proceedings on the whole and not to disciplinary inquiry alone. The Delinquent Officer has a right to expeditious completion of the disciplinary proceedings so a duty is cast on the Disciplinary Authority to commence and conclude expeditiously and not to cause any unnecessary or avoidable delay in commencement and conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. Inordinate delay, for which there is no explanation from the Disciplinary Authority and the cause of delay is not attributable to the Delinquent Officer, causes prejudice to the Delinquent Officer and vitiates the proceedings. 24. The inordinate and unexplained delay in commencement and conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, as it causes prejudice to the Delinquent Officer and vitiates the proceedings, has been held as a sufficient ground for quashing and terminating the proceedings. However, nature and complexity of charge against the Delinquent is an important factor for consideration before taking a decision about termination of the proceedings. 25. The petitioner and HC Paramjeet Singh were charged with the allegation of dereliction in duty and facilitating escape of detenue, Abdul Rashid Bhat, from the custody of the police when the police party headed by ASI Jagdish Dutt was bringing a group of detenue back from Srinagar/Shopian. The report of the Inquiry Officer, Dy. SP (DAR), Kathua, is annexed to the writ petition (annexure-H). The report of the Inquiry Officer, Dy. SP (DAR), Kathua, is annexed to the writ petition (annexure-H). On analysing the material/evidence produced at the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer has arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner 'was very negligent towards his duty from the very beginning of the journey from Kathua to Srinagar' and that 'despite of repeated instructions of his senior he did not bother to comply with the directions and deliberately provided several opportunities to the detenue under his custody for fleeing away'. The other conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer is that 'detenue Abdul Rashid fled away with the connivance of ct. Kifait Ullah', that is, the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer 'in view of the gravity of the misconduct' recommended forfeiture of three annual increments of the petitioners 'to serve him as corrective in future'. The Inquiry Officer in regard to HC Paramjeet Singh had found that he in his capacity as Commander of the petitioner 'did not bother to keep watch on the said constable as well as detenue under his custody' in spite of being aware about the fact that the said constable, that is, the petitioner was negligent towards his duty. In his case also the Inquiry Officer recommended forfeiture of three annual increments 'to serve him promptly in future'. 26. What is clear that both the petitioner and HC Paramjeet Singh were found negligent towards their duty, the former in complying with the directions issued by his Commander and the latter in keeping watch on the former. However, in spite of finding it to be a case of negligence on the part of both the officials, the Inquiry Officer went on to hold that the detenue had fled away with the connivance of the petitioner. Question whether it was a case of negligence or connivance could have been agitated by the petitioner before the Disciplinary Authority had the copy of the report provided to him and he given opportunity of filing objections and this could have been done more conveniently had the copy of the report provided in time. Nonetheless, .is noticed and needs to be underlined that in both the cases the Inquiry Officer had realised the possibility of improvement in conduct of both the officials and necessity of imposing penalty as a corrective measure. Nonetheless, .is noticed and needs to be underlined that in both the cases the Inquiry Officer had realised the possibility of improvement in conduct of both the officials and necessity of imposing penalty as a corrective measure. The Inquiry Officer is in a position to have an objective feel of the evidence and material produced before him so his opinion and the view taken by him deserve due weight to be given thereto. 27. Having regard to the nature of charge, nature of finding arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and the nature of penalty proposed by him, I find this to be a fit case for terminating the disciplinary proceedings for the inordinate delay in concluding the proceedings caused by unexplained delay of six years in providing the petitioner the copy of the inquiry report after the disposal of the LPA. 28. For all that said and discussed above, this writ petition has merit and is allowed. Entire disciplinary proceedings as also the report of the Inquiry Officer dated 07.12.1998 are quashed and it is directed that petitioner be reinstated in service forthwith. However, in tune with the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.V. Bijlani (supra), he shall be paid 50% of the back wages keeping in view the fact that he has not worked in the department during this period. He shall, however, be entitled to seniority and other benefits under rules.