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2016 DIGILAW 449 (ORI)

Maa Chandi Stone Crushing v. State of Odisha

2016-06-23

B.R.SARANGI, VINEET SARAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : Vineet Saran, J. For the year 2012-13, the petitioner was granted lease of one year for extraction of minor minerals from the quarry in question. For the next year also, i.e. 2013-14, a lease for one year was executed in its favour. In the auction held for the quarry in question for the year 2014-15, the petitioner was again the highest bidder and a lease for one year was to be executed, but for certain reasons, no lease could be executed in favour of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, it did not operate the mines or extract the minerals during the said year 2014-15. The petitioner, however, filed a writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No. 2848 of 2014 challenging the auction notice for the year 2014-15, claiming that in terms of the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629 , the period of the lease ought to have been for five years instead of one year. After considering the issues involved, the said W.P.(C) No. 2848 of 2014 was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 21.03.2014, which was on the basis of the general decision of the State Government dated 12.03.2014, which was extracted in the said order of this Court dated 21.03.2014. 2. By the said order, no direction was given for extending the lease period of the petitioner for the year 2014-15 from one year to five years. Since, even after the order dated 21.03.2014, the lease of the petitioner was not extended for five years, the petitioner filed a contempt petition, bearing CONTC No. 1372 of 2014, which was dismissed by order dated 21.07.2015. After the Orissa Minor Minerals Concession Rules were suitably amended w.e.f. 16.09.2014 giving effect to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Kumar (supra), and it was provided that the lease period for the auction in question would be for five years instead of one year, a fresh auction for the years 2015-16 to 2019-20 was held in terms of the amended provisions. In the said auction, the petitioner did not participate, ostensibly on the ground that with regard to the auction for the area in question, a note had been made in Annexure-3 that it would be decided as per the order to be passed in W.P.(C) No. 2848 of 2014. The said writ petition had already been decided on 21.03.2014 (much prior to the advertisement dated 04.02.2015 issued for auction of lease for a period of five years from 2015-16 to 2019-20) in which no relief was granted in favour of the petitioner. In the said auction, in which the petitioner did not participate, one S.T./S.J. Minerals was the highest bidder. 3. It is noteworthy that, though the prayer made in the writ petition is for a direction to the opposite parties not to execute the lease agreement for the year 2015-16 onwards, yet the highest bidder for the said period has not been impleaded as an opposite party. The other prayer made in the writ petition is for a direction to the Tahasildar-opposite party no.3 to execute the lease agreement in favour of the petitioner for a period of five years on the basis that the petitioner was highest bidder for the financial year 2014-15. 4. We have heard Mr. D.Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. B.P. Pradhan, learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the opposite parties and perused the record. 5. The claim of the petitioner is based on the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Deepak Kumar (supra), wherein, though it has been observed that for reasons stated in the judgment, the lease period should be five years, but there is no direction that the period for existing leases would also be extended from one year to five years. 6. In Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 , the Apex Court held that it is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. 6. In Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 , the Apex Court held that it is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. Similar view has been taken in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B., AIR 1960 SC 936 , State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramachandra, AIR 1961 SC 307 , Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Bahadur Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar Rathod, AIR 1990 SC 1849 , Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 2472 , Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 5100 , J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2011) 6 SCC 570 . In Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors, (2012) 11 SCC 1 , the Apex Court held that there is a presumption of prospectively articulated in the legal maxim ‘nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis’, i.e. ‘a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past’, and this presumption operates unless shown to the contrary by express provision in the statute or is otherwise discernible by necessary implication. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. Valsala, AIR 1998 SC 3502 amendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 by Act No. 30 of 1995 enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident was held not to apply to accidents taking place before the amending Act came into force. In Sashikalabai v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1999 SC 706 , the Apex Court held that a new law enhancing compensation in case of death by electric shock and saying that ‘cases already closed shall not be reopened’, was construed to apply to all cases which were not closed, i.e., to all cases pending or yet to be instituted in respect of accidents taking place before the amendment. 7. 7. Applying the above mentioned statutory interpretation to the present context, under Rule 36 of Orissa Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, which relates to the period of lease, it was earlier provided that the maximum period for validity of an auction shall not exceed one year, but the same has been amended with effect from 16.09.2014 providing for fresh leases to be granted for a period of five years. From the above, what can be inferred is that where fresh auctions are held after the amendment, the lease period would be of five years. It cannot be construed to mean that where auctions have already been held earlier for a period of one year, the same would be automatically extended to five years. 8. The consideration for offering the bids, when the mining lease period is of five years, is totally different from the one where the mining lease period is of one year. The bid amount for long term leases would be different. The petitioner had offered its bid for one year in the auction which was held for the year 2014-15, which was after the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Deepak Kumar (supra). The bidders in such auction had offered their bid, keeping in mind that the lease to be executed was to be for one year. Extending the period of lease after the auction is finalized, would amount to changing the terms of the auction after its finalization, which is not permissible in law. On the basis of the said bid, the petitioner cannot thus be permitted to be granted a lease for a period of five years. As such, the claim of the petitioner for extension of lease for a period of five years, on the basis of the petitioner being the highest bidder for the auction held in the year 2014-15, does not deserve to be granted. 9. As far as quashing of the direction issued by the Tahasildar on 01.06.2016 is concerned, which relates to the auction for the year 2015-16, we are of the opinion that in the said auction, which was for a period of five years, S.T./S.J. Minerals was the highest bidder, but neither the said highest bidder nor other bidders who had participated, have been impleaded as parties to this writ petition. As such, this prayer also does not deserve to be granted. 10. As such, this prayer also does not deserve to be granted. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the opinion that the prayers made in the writ petition do not deserve to be granted. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs.