JUDGMENT : 1. The above noted appeal as indicated under Item No. A has been filed by the unsuccessful defendant in Title Suit No. 725 of 2000-I challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Divn.), Balasore therein decreeing the suit filed by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 as the plaintiffs in part directing the defendant-appellant to pay the arrear house rent at the rate of Rs.600/-per month to the plaintiff-respondent no. 3 and 4 with effect from 4.9.2000 onwards. The appeal as finds mention under Item No.B has been filed by the same person being unsuccessful plaintiff-appellant in Title Suit No. 903 of 2000-I challenging the judgment and decree passed therein by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Divn.), Balasore dismissing his suit filed for specific performance of contract against the respondent nos. 1 and 2 as the defendant nos. 1 and 2 who have been arraigned as also respondent nos. 3 and 4 as defendant nos. 3 and 4. 2. It is pertinent to state here that the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Divn.) has disposed of the above noted suits by a common judgment since the subject matter in both the suits remain the same. At this stage, it may also be noted that the appellant in both the above noted appeals who was the defendant in T.S. No. 725 of 2000 giving rise to the appeal under Item No. B and the plaintiff in T.S. No. 903 of 2000 giving rise to the appeal under Item No. A having died during the pendency of these appeals before this Court, his legal representatives have been substituted who are now pursuing these appeals. In the above state of affair both the above noted appeals under Item Nos. A and B have been heard together and are thus taken up for disposal by the common judgment. 3. For the sake of convenience, in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the court below in the Title Suit No. 903 of 2000 as indicated in item no. ‘A’. 4. The defendant nos. 3 and 4 had filed the suit giving rise to the appeal under Item No.B for eviction of the plaintiff and his family members from the suit house with further prayer for directing him to pay the arrear house rent. ‘A’. 4. The defendant nos. 3 and 4 had filed the suit giving rise to the appeal under Item No.B for eviction of the plaintiff and his family members from the suit house with further prayer for directing him to pay the arrear house rent. It is their case that the suit house originally belonged to one Debendranath Panda and after his death, his two sons defendant nos. 1 and 2 succeeded to the same. They sold away the suit house to the defendant nos.3 and 4 under registered sale deed dated 18.11.97 for valuable consideration and had delivered possession to them. Accordingly, the defendant nos. 3 and 4 got the suit house and the land over which it was standing recorded in their names by way of mutation. The plaintiff was a monthly tenant under the vendors i.e. the defendant nos.1 and 2 in respect of the 1st floor of the house. It is stated that after sale, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 intimated it to the plaintiff. It is further stated that before the said sale, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 had also intimated the plaintiff either to the vacate the suit house or to purchase the same by paying arrear monthly rent as overdue but that had not been responded to. The case of the defendant nos. 3 and 4 is that the plaintiff being a tenant under their vendors, the defendant nos. 1 and 2, became a tenant under them after their purchase. They served notice upon the plaintiff asking him to vacate 1st floor of the suit house and also to clear up the arrear house rent. In response to the notice dated 27.12.97, the plaintiff agreed to pay the arrear house rent at the rate of Rs.2000/-per month and to vacate the suit house after expiry of one year. The plaintiff acknowledging the defendant nos. 3 and 4 to be the owners of the suit house had also sent house rent by money orders at the rate of Rs. 350/-per month. The defendant nos. 3 and 4 however did not receive the same as it was too low. The plaintiff acknowledging the defendant nos. 3 and 4 to be the owners of the suit house had also sent house rent by money orders at the rate of Rs. 350/-per month. The defendant nos. 3 and 4 however did not receive the same as it was too low. Thus as the plaintiff did not vacate the 1st floor of the suit house and instead continued to remain in occupation of the same with the status as that of trespasser, they filed the suit for eviction and realization of arrear house rent with effect from 18.11.97 till actual vacation. They also allege that the plaintiff has managed to create an unregistered agreement purported to have been executed by defendant nos. 1 and 2 on 28.07.1997 for sale of the suit house and that is a forged one. According to them, the plaintiffs had not derived any right by virtue of the so called agreement so far as the subject matter of the suit is concerned. 5. The plaintiff contested the said suit by filing written statement. While traversing the plaint averments, he admitted to have remained in occupation of the suit house as a tenant at will under the vendors of the defendant nos. 3 and 4 since January 1968 and accordingly to have been paying house rent to them at different rates and at different times. It is stated that initially he was paying house rent at the rate of Rs. 30/-per month and in course of time it being increased lastly stood at Rs.350/-per month. It is next stated that on 26.7.97 the defendant no. 1 gave a proposal to him to purchase the suit house for a consideration of Rs.1,80,000/-. But as he was then not having the financial capacity, he wanted to borrow sometime. It is stated that thereafter defendant no. 1 compelled him to make part payment of the consideration amount and told that he would execute the agreement for sale of the house in favour of the plaintiff. On 28.7.97 the plaintiff claims to have paid a sum of Rs.20,000/-to defendant no. 1 towards part-payment of agreed consideration. The defendant no. 1 then executed an agreement for sale in respect of the suit house in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff continued in remain in possession of the suit house as the proposed vendee since then. On 28.7.97 the plaintiff claims to have paid a sum of Rs.20,000/-to defendant no. 1 towards part-payment of agreed consideration. The defendant no. 1 then executed an agreement for sale in respect of the suit house in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff continued in remain in possession of the suit house as the proposed vendee since then. Thereafter, when the plaintiff became financially capable, he approached defendant no. 1 to execute necessary registered sale deed on receipt of balance consideration. However, the defendant no. 1 at that time deferred the matter. It is next stated that when such was the state of affair, the plaintiff to his astonishment received a summon from the court in T.S. No. 725 of 2000 from which the appeal under item no.‘B’ has arisen filed by the defendant nos. 3 and 4 seeking the relief of eviction and realization of the arrear and current house rent. On receipt of the said summon, the plaintiff could know that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 have sold the suit house to defendant nos. 3 and 4. So he immediately sent a notice in writing to the defendant no.1 asking him to execute necessary registered sale deed as per the agreement in respect of the suit land by 27.9.2000 on receipt of balance consideration. Since the defendant no. 1 did not come forward to execute the sale deed in conformity with the terms and conditions of the agreement, the suit i.e. T.S. No. 903 of 2000 has been filed for specific performance of contract and injunction. (Refers to RFA No. 151 of 2003 under item no.1). 6. The trial court on the above rival pleadings of both the suits which were tried analogously framed altogether eight issues. Taking up issue nos. 3 and 4 concerning the challenge to the agreement for sale of the suit house dated 28.07.1997 said to have been executed by defendant nos. (Refers to RFA No. 151 of 2003 under item no.1). 6. The trial court on the above rival pleadings of both the suits which were tried analogously framed altogether eight issues. Taking up issue nos. 3 and 4 concerning the challenge to the agreement for sale of the suit house dated 28.07.1997 said to have been executed by defendant nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff as fraudulent, forged, illegal, inoperative and void and as regards his entitlement to the relief of specific performance of the said agreement, upon consideration of evidence and on their analysis in the touch stone of the legal provisions holding the field has finally held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance of agreement for sale said to have been executed by defendant nos.1 and 2 in his favour. So this finding has resulted the dismissal of the suit which has given rise to the appeal under Item No.‘A’ as above. 7. Next going to answer issue nos. 5 and 8 concerning the suit filed by the defendant nos. 3 and 4 for eviction of the plaintiff and arrear of house rent, upon analysis of evidence, the finding has been recorded that since there has been no termination of tenancy in accordance with the provision of Section 106 of the T.P. Act, the defendant nos. 3 and 4 are not entitled to get the relief of eviction and their suit has thus been decreed only in respect of the arrear and current house rent. 8. With the above findings, the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of agreement for sale in respect of suit house stood dismissed and the suit filed by the defendant nos. 1 and 2 for eviction and payment of arrear of rent stood decreed in part by declining the relief of eviction. 9. The defendant nos. 3 and 4 have not carried any appeal against the said judgment and decree passed in T.S. No. 725 of 2000. Thus so far as their suit is concerned, they have accepted the part decree only in respect of grant of the claim of arrear and current house rent. However, the plaintiff has filed both the above noted appeals challenging thereby the decree directing him to pay the arrear and current rent of the suit house to the defendant nos. Thus so far as their suit is concerned, they have accepted the part decree only in respect of grant of the claim of arrear and current house rent. However, the plaintiff has filed both the above noted appeals challenging thereby the decree directing him to pay the arrear and current rent of the suit house to the defendant nos. 3 and 4 and also the judgment and decree by which the suit for specific performance of agreement for sale has been dismissed. So in the above noted appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is first called upon to judge the sustainability of the finding of the trial court in respect of the above issue no.3 by making necessary scrutiny of evidence and upon having their examination in the backdrop of the rival pleadings as also the surrounding circumstances which emerge out of the evidence let in by the parties keeping in view the settled position of law. It would not be out of place to mention at this place that in case this issue no. 3 is decided by rendering a finding that Ext. F is a forged document then the same would certainly obviate the necessity to examine the sustainability of other sub-issues of said issue no. 3 and issue no. 4. Therefore, the said exercise is required to be undertaken first. 10. The plaintiff relies upon the unregistered agreement dated 28.7.1997 said to have been executed between him and the defendant no.1. It is said to be an agreement for sale of land in his favour. The genuineness of the same stands disputed by the defendants. So for the purpose, the trial court had sent the same to the handwriting expert. The report having been submitted, the said Expert has been examined as C.W. 1. It has been reported that the disputed signatures are forged and not in the handwriting of the person who wrote the writings and made the standard signatures. The trial court in this connection as is seen has gone to discard the evidence of the handwriting expert. It has been adversely viewed because the Head of the Bureau has not put his signature on the report and next as the expert has not taken the photographs of the signatures. The trial court in this connection as is seen has gone to discard the evidence of the handwriting expert. It has been adversely viewed because the Head of the Bureau has not put his signature on the report and next as the expert has not taken the photographs of the signatures. The court below has held that opinion to be defective and thus cannot be taken as conclusive in the matter. 11. It has been the settled position of law that whenever an expert’s opinion is tendered, the Court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert and then come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that two writings are by the same person or not. This is not to say that the Court must play the role of an expert but to say that the Court may accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion of the expert. For the purpose the glaring discrepancies which could be discerned by naked eye, can be accordingly taken to arrive at a conclusion. It is not fair to approach the opinion evidence with suspicion but the correct approach would be to weigh the reason on which it was based and founded upon. The acceptance of his opinion would depend on the soundness of the reason on which it stands. Although hard and fast rule can be laid down in that behalf, yet the Court has to decide in each case on its own merits what weight it should attach to the opinion of the expert. The evidence is in the nature of opinion of expert which should be relied by the court after due satisfaction. It has been held in case of Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank, AIR 2003 SC 1795 that:- “It is to be noted that under sections 45 and 47 of the Evidence Act, the Court has to take a view on the opinion of others, whereas under section 73 of the said Act, the Court by its own comparison of writing can form its opinion. Evidence of the identity of handwriting is dealt with in three Sections of the Evidence Act. They are sections 45, 47 and 73. Both under sections 45 and 47 the evidence is an opinion. Evidence of the identity of handwriting is dealt with in three Sections of the Evidence Act. They are sections 45, 47 and 73. Both under sections 45 and 47 the evidence is an opinion. In the former case it is by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from frequent observations and experiences. In both the cases, the Court is required to satisfy itself by such means as are open to conclude that the opinion may be acted upon. Irrespective of an opinion of the handwriting expert, the Court can compare the admitted writing with disputed writing and come to its own independent conclusion. Such exercise of comparison is permissible under section 73 of the Evidence Act. Ordinarily, sections 45 and 73 are complementary to each other. Evidence of handwriting expert need not be invariably corroborated. It is for the Court to decide whether to accept such an uncorroborated evidence or not. It is clear that even when experts evidence is not there, the Court has the power to compare the writings and decide the matter.” 12. Giving a careful reading to the discussion as made by the trial court here it is not disputed that the expert as a Govt. servant has no axe to grind against the plaintiff and he having compared the signatures has arrived at a conclusion. Thus merely for nonperformance of certain other associated acts for the purpose, the trial court ought not to have discarded the report and the evidence of C.W.1 without taking up other exercises as pointed out in the foregoing para. The view thus for the reasons assigned by the trial court is not proper. It is seen that this expert, CW 1 has given detail reasons for his conclusion that there appears forgery characteristics such as pen lifts at unusual places, retouching, bad line quality, hesitation, slow and drawn movement etc. besides the suspicious similarities in form as also exact relation as regards spacing between the letters, words as revealing from super imposition of transparencies of the disputed signatures when the genuine signature showing variation in size, proportion and lateral spacing between each of the signatures; the disputed signatures are almost matching with each other. All these have been cumulatively viewed to record the opinion that the disputed signatures are forged. All these have been cumulatively viewed to record the opinion that the disputed signatures are forged. With these he has also noticed some special features and marks in letters, figure as indicated therein. In examining a disputed document the true test is not the extent of the similarities observed when compared with genuine documents, as forged documents usually are good imitations of genuine documents, but the nature and extent of the dissimilarities noticed. It is these differences which expose the true character of the document in question. This Court has also carefully gone through at those disputed and admitted signatures. The features as pointed out by the expert C.W.1 are clearly noticeable. In addition to this there remains the oral evidence of P.W. 3, who is defendant no.1, who has denied those signatures to be his own. This corroborates the expert evidence as he has further stated to have never executed any such agreement for sale when specifically confronted with the same. In view of all the above, the evidence and report in my considered view merit acceptance. Therefore, this Court disagrees with the view of the trial court on that issue. Thus, I hold that the agreement Ext. F which is projected as the trump card by the plaintiff is a forged one and that the signature of the executant i.e. defendant no. 1 is not his. 13. The above being the finding the basis of the case of the plaintiff crumbles and the suit as laid is bound to fail on this ground alone. Thus when the agreement itself has been found to be forged one, the inevitable conclusion arises that the plaintiff is bound to be non-suited and the suit for specific performance for said agreement Ext. F has to fail. This results the dismissal of the suit i.e. T.S. No. 903 of 2000. The appeal i.e. RFA No. 152 of 2003 is thus held liable to be dismissed. 14. The judgment and decree passed in T.S. No. 725 of 2000 filed by the defendant nos. 3 and 4 as the plaintiffs seeking the relief of eviction and realization of arrear and current house rent have been challenged in RFA No. 152 of 2003. Admittedly, the property belonged to the defendant nos. 1 and 2. The suit for specific performance of agreement for sale as filed by the plaintiff has failed. 3 and 4 as the plaintiffs seeking the relief of eviction and realization of arrear and current house rent have been challenged in RFA No. 152 of 2003. Admittedly, the property belonged to the defendant nos. 1 and 2. The suit for specific performance of agreement for sale as filed by the plaintiff has failed. So he does not have locus standi to challenge the sale made by the defendant nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the defendant nos. 3 and 4 particularly when defendant nos.1 and 2 clearly admit to have sold the property for valuable consideration to defendant nos.3 and 4. The trial court having held that there exists the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties since the defendant nos. 3 and 4 have stepped into the shoes of the original landlord on the strength of their purchase and by virtue of statutory attornment, the said finding cannot be said to be a flawed one. However, the prayer for eviction has been denied for noncompliance of the provision of Section 106 of the T.P. Act as no such notice as required under law has been served terminating the tenancy to there is no challenge by the defendant nos. 3 and 4 by preferring either any cross-appeal or objection. Therefore, the trial court having directed for recovery of the rent as quantified which also appears to be reasonable, this Court thus does not find any such infirmity therein calling for interference. In view of that at the ultimatum, the judgment and decree as passed in T.S. No. 725 of 2000 are hereby confirmed. The R.F.A. No. 152 of 2003 is found liable to be dismissed. 15. Resultantly, both the appeals under item nos. (A) and (B) stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances without cost throughout.