JUDGMENT : K.M. JOSEPH, C.J. Petitioners, eight in number, seek the following prayers: “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities of the State of Uttarakhand and Uttarakhand Peyjal Nigam to take appropriate steps in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 27th April, 2012 and interim order dated 20th August 2015, for reverting the employees working in Uttarakhand Pey Jal Nigam who have been promoted on higher posts by taking benefit of reservation in promotion after 15th November 1997. (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Chairman, Uttarakhand Peyjal Nigam to take appropriate action for reversion of the employees whose names are mentioned in the list enclosed with the communication dated 4th September 2015 of the U.P. Jal Nigam, issued in compliance of the judgment and orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 27th April 2012 and 20th August 2015.” 2. The third respondent in the writ petition is the Uttarakhand Pey Jal Nigam (hereinafter referred to as the “Nigam”) through its Chairman. The fourth respondent is the Managing Director of the Nigam. Respondent Nos. 7 to 18 are the party respondents. 3. Petitioners and the party respondents are the employees of the Nigam. The party respondents have been given promotions, which, according to the petitioners, are accelerated promotions in terms of Section 3(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation For Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the “1994 Act”). The basis of the petitioners’ case is, obviously, the judgment dated 27th April, 2012 passed by the Apex Court, which is referred to in Prayer No. 1. The said judgment came to be delivered in appeals carried from the decisions of the Lucknow Bench and Allahabad Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The Lucknow Bench had declared Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act, as also Rule 8-A of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991, as inserted by the U.P. Government Servants Seniority (3rd Amendment) Rules, 2007, as invalid, ultra-vires and unconstitutional and granted other reliefs. The argument against the vires of the said provisions did not find favour with the Allahabad Bench. Hence, the appeals were heard and disposed of by the Apex Court. 4. The argument against the vires of the said provisions did not find favour with the Allahabad Bench. Hence, the appeals were heard and disposed of by the Apex Court. 4. In the said judgment, the Apex Court proceeded to declare Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act and Rule 8-A of the Rules as ultra-vires, as they ran counter to the dictum in M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 212 . It is, further, ordered that any promotion given on the dictum in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India & others, reported in 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 and without the aid or assistance of Section 3(7) and Rule 8-A shall remain undisturbed. The decision of the Allahabad Bench was set aside and the decision of the Lucknow Bench was affirmed, subject to the modification. 5. The next order, which is sought to be made the foundation for seeking the writ of mandamus, is interim order dated 20th August, 2015 passed by the Apex Court in the contempt petition. The said order reads as follows: “It is submitted by Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, learned counsel for the State of U.P. that the judgment passed in Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited vs. Rajesh Kumar and others (2012) 7 SCC 1 , shall be complied with in letter and spirit within three weeks hence and the officers, who are to be reverted shall be reverted and they shall not be given any kind of additional charge. The Chief Secretary of the State of Uttar Pradesh shall file an affidavit by 15th September, 2015, stating that the same has been done, failing which this Court may be compelled to direct his personal appearance. No further adjournment or extension of time shall be granted on that score. Be it added, the High Court shall not entertain any kind of petition with regard to the controversy that is covered in the decision rendered in Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited (supra) or even linked with it. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to send a copy of this order to the Registrar General of the High Court of Allahabad, to be placed before the learned Chief Justice so that he can do the needful in the matter. List the matters on 15th September, 2015.” 6. Feeling aggrieved by the continuance of the party respondents, the petitioners approached the Chief Secretary. 7. List the matters on 15th September, 2015.” 6. Feeling aggrieved by the continuance of the party respondents, the petitioners approached the Chief Secretary. 7. Pleadings have been settled. We heard Mr. M.C. Pant, Mr. Vinay Kumar holding brief of Mr. Niranjan Bhatt and Mr. Bhagwat Mehra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. We also heard Mr. B.P. Nautiyal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 8 to 12 & 14 to 18; Mr. Pradeep Joshi, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand; and Mr. D.S. Patni, learned counsel appearing for the Nigam. 8. It is contended that the party respondents have been accorded accelerated promotions by virtue of their being members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. This is done based on Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act. Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act has been declared unconstitutional by the Apex Court. The interim order passed in contempt petition, which we have referred to, is also emphasised. It is submitted that, despite demand being made to the Government, no direction has been given to revert the party respondents from the promoted posts, which they attained on the strength of the law, which was declared unconstitutional by the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court and affirmed by the Apex Court. Reference is also made to judgment dated 10th July, 2012 passed by this Court in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 45 of 2011, Sri Vinod Prakash Nautiyal & others vs. State of Uttarakhand & others (Annexure No. 5). Since much may turn on the said judgment, we extract the same as under: “In this writ petition, vires of Section 3 (7) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 has been challenged. Section 3(7) was inserted in the said Act at the time of enactment of the original Act. The original Act was enacted on 22nd March, 1994. At that time, the State of Uttarakhand was not born. After creation of the State of Uttarakhand by the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, the State of Uttarakhand, as entitled to by the 2000 Act, adopted the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994, without speaking a word as to Section 3(7) of the said Act. After creation of the State of Uttarakhand by the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, the State of Uttarakhand, as entitled to by the 2000 Act, adopted the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994, without speaking a word as to Section 3(7) of the said Act. The vires of Section 3(7) of the said Act was challenged in a group of writ petitions filed before the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. The challenge, thus, thrown ultimately reached the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Appeal No. 2608 of 2011 and connected appeals held that Section 3(7) of the said Act runs contrary to the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of M. Nagaraja and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 212 and, accordingly, not sustainable. The reason appears to be that, while inserting Section 3(7) of the Act, no effort was made, as was the requirement of law and pronounced in M. Nagaraja, for making reservations in the promotional posts. From the records of this case, it does not appear to be the contention of the State of Uttarakhand that at the time of enactment of Section 3(7), any such effort was made. 2. In the circumstances, we also declare that Section 3(7) of the Act, as applicable to the State of Uttarakhand, also suffers from the same vires as pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and, accordingly, on the strength thereof, no further promotion can be granted. We make it clear that the pronouncement, as above, shall be deemed to be prospective, but with effect from the date the first interim order was passed on this writ petition and connected writ petitions, namely, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 389 of 2011, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 66 of 2011, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 179 of 2011 and Writ Petition (S/B) No. 116 of 2012, which are confirmed, inasmuch as, people who have been promoted prior thereto are not before us and, accordingly, we have refrained from interfering with the status accorded to them, which status they have enjoyed for a long period of time. It is, however, made clear that henceforth, no promotion can be given by the State of Uttarakhand by taking recourse to Section 3(7) of the Act. It shall be deemed to be non-existent from today. 3. It is, however, made clear that henceforth, no promotion can be given by the State of Uttarakhand by taking recourse to Section 3(7) of the Act. It shall be deemed to be non-existent from today. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand wanted an adjournment for the purpose of brining on record a new enactment commensurate with the provisions of the Constitution of India and the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of M. Nagaraja. In the event, the same is done that would not be an answer to the issues raised in the instant writ petition. Accordingly, we have refused to grant an adjournment. We, however, make it clear that this judgment and order will not be treated to be a hurdle on the part of the State to bring out a valid piece of new legislation in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution of India read with the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in M. Nagaraja. 4. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of.” 9. There is a case for the petitioners that directions were issued by the Chief Secretary of the State of Uttar Pradesh to all subordinate authorities to comply with the directions of the Apex Court contained in its judgment dated 27th April, 2012. There is reference to a communication from the Managing Director of the U.P. Jal Nigam to show that the persons, who obtained benefit of reservation, were reverted. Annexure No. 11 is the representation addressed to the Chief Secretary complaining of non compliance of the judgment dated 27th April, 2012 passed by the Apex Court. Annexure No. 12 purports to be communication dated 4th September, 2015 issued by the Managing Director of the U.P. Jal Nigam to the Nigam regarding compliance of the judgment of the Apex Court. It was indicated that the State of Uttar Pradesh has decided to comply with the decision of the Apex Court and the orders, which are passed, are also mentioned therein. It is the case of the petitioners that nothing remained except to effect compliance with the judgment of the Apex Court and there is no reason to justify the inaction. 10. Mr. It is the case of the petitioners that nothing remained except to effect compliance with the judgment of the Apex Court and there is no reason to justify the inaction. 10. Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the petitioners, would seek to enlist in his support the provisions contained in Sections 67 and 74 of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Reorganisation Act”). He also seeks to buttress his arguments with reference to Section 88 of the Reorganisation Act. Besides the same, he also sought support from Articles 31C, 39, 41 and 51A(j) of the Constitution of India. This is apart from contending that Article 144 of the Constitution would come to the rescue of the petitioners, as every authority, be it civil or judicial, is bound under the Constitution to act in assistance of the orders passed by the Supreme Court and, therefore, there is duty on the part of the State and the Nigam to cause reversion of those employees, who obtained accelerated promotions in compliance with the unconstitutional provision. 11. Per contra, Mr. B.P. Nautiyal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the party respondents, would submit that it is after the judgment of the Apex Court that the Division Bench of this Court came to deal with the challenge to Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act and the matter was disposed of by the judgment, which we have already adverted to. He would point out that this Court had, in the said judgment, resorted to the doctrine of prospective overruling; the promotions made on the basis of Section 3(7) were interdicted; but, as far as the promotions which had already been effected, the Court had protected the same. He poses the question, if the judgment of the Apex Court was to hold the field, what was the need for approaching the court for obtaining the declaration subject to the terms, which are found reflected in the judgment of this Court? He would submit that the party respondents have been promoted prior to the date of the interim order, which was passed by this Court in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra) and, therefore, their promotions cannot be disturbed in terms of the said judgment. 12. Next, he would refer us to the subsequent order dated 13th October, 2015 passed by the Apex Court in contempt jurisdiction. 12. Next, he would refer us to the subsequent order dated 13th October, 2015 passed by the Apex Court in contempt jurisdiction. The said order reads as follows: “In pursuance of our earlier order dated 15th September, 2015, the Chief Secretary of the State of U.P., has filed an affidavit dated 8th October, 2015, stating that there has been full compliance of the judgment dated 27th April, 2014, passed in Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2011 and other connected appeals. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, learned counsel appearing for the State of U.P., has drawn our attention to paragraph 4, 5 and 6 of the said affidavit. They read as follows” “4. That, following the said order dated 15.9.2015, passed by this Hon’ble Court in the present case, Government Orders dated 16.9.2015 and 22.9.2015 were issued by the Principal Secretary (Karmik) & the Chief Secretary respective, directing all concerned government functionaries in the State to ensure that all reversions are completed in the State within the stipulated time frame, in terms of Government Order dated 21.8.2015, which has already been placed on record in this Hon’ble Court in the affidavit filed by the deponent on 14.9.2015. 5. That, pursuant to the exercise aforestated, and in full compliance of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 27.4.2012 in U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar & others ( 2012 7 SCC 1 , and following the order passed in the instant Contempt Petition by this Hon’ble Court from time to time, a total of 15226 (111514+3712) employees in Groups A, B and C in various departments and organizations of the State Government, have been reverted. A copy of the Chart containing the numbers of the reverted employees in various departments and organizations, along with summary thereof, is filed herewith as Annexure A-1). 6. That, it is thus manifest from the details of all reversions effected in the State, as contained in the said chart, that the directions contained the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. case (supra), have been fully complied with. The entire exercise in this regard by the State Government has been completed in terms of the said Government Order dated 21.8.2015. The entire exercise in this regard by the State Government has been completed in terms of the said Government Order dated 21.8.2015. It is further stated that in the event any employee is aggrieved by an issue relating to his reversion, or in case of any grievance that a particular employee ought to have been revered, following the judgment by this Hon’ble Court, such representations/complaints are proposed to be decided on top priority by the State Government.” On a perusal of the Chart, we find that the State Government has identified 20,807 persons, who were required to be reverted, but in actuality 15,226 persons have been reverted. The other 5581 persons have not been reverted because some of them have died or retired or have resigned or dismissed from the service or allocated to the State of Uttarakhand. As far as the death, retirement, dismissal and resignation are concerned, we do not take that into account. However, in respect of the persons allocated to the State of Uttarakhand, we do not express any opinion on the same in this proceeding. Be it noted, it has been stated in the affidavit that if anyone is grieved by the order of reversion or in case of any grievance that a person ought to have been reverted, if raised, shall be decided on top priority by the State Government. We inquired from Mr. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the State that who would be the competent authority who will decide it, learned counsel has submitted that he has instructions to state that Principal Secretary, Department of Personnel, State of U.P., shall decide the same. If anyone is grieved by the decision taken by the said authority, the said person is entitled to file an interlocutory application before this Court in the disposed of Civil Appeal no. 2608 of 2011 and connected appeals, so that suitable order can be passed. The purpose of stating so is that no other court shall entertain the challenge to the grievance of any person. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take another aspect before we close these contempt petitions. A number of writ petitions have been filed which have been listed today and they pertain to reversion. They call in question the validity of the order of reversion. They shall be dealt with independently when we address the writ petitions. At this juncture, Mr. A number of writ petitions have been filed which have been listed today and they pertain to reversion. They call in question the validity of the order of reversion. They shall be dealt with independently when we address the writ petitions. At this juncture, Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, learned counsel for the State, has drawn our attention to paragraph 6(f) of the affidavit dated 12th September, 2015. The said paragraph reads as follows : “On the vacancies which will be available as a result of the aforesaid reversions, proceedings of promotion shall be conducted as per the amended seniority list.” The State Government is at liberty to proceed accordingly. Needless to emphasize, our above said observation for granting liberty to the State will not be an impediment in adjudication of the writ petitions which have been filed before this Court. The contemnors in the contempt petitions are discharged. The contempt petitions are, accordingly, disposed of. All the applications filed n the contempt petitions stand disposed of.” 13. There is also a case for the party respondents that, actually, they had been accorded promotions as they belonged to the Hill Sub-Cadre in terms of the Rules, just as much the petitioners were also accorded promotions under the said Rules. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that, as far as the judgment in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra) is concerned, the matter was tested before the Apex Court by an interventionist and the SLP came to be rejected. Therefore, he seeks to persuade us to hold that it has achieved approval at the hands of the Apex Court. 14. Mr. D.S. Patni, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Nigam and the Managing Director, would submit that the promotions, which have been accorded to the party respondents, have not been impugned. Next, he would point out that no demand has been made to the Chairman seeking implementation of the judgment passed by the Apex Court. In this regard, he drew our attention to Sections 8 and 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the “1975 Act”). They read as follows: “8. Appointment of employees. In this regard, he drew our attention to Sections 8 and 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the “1975 Act”). They read as follows: “8. Appointment of employees. – (1) Subject to the provision of sub-section (2), the Nigam may appoint such employees as it considers necessary on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit for the efficient performance of its functions: Provided that the appointment of such employees as the State Government may, by general or special order, specify shall be made and their terms and conditions shall be determined with the approval of the State Government. (2) The Nigam may, with the previous approval of the State Government, appoint a servant of the Central Government or the State Government as an employee of the Nigam on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. 9. Supervision and control over employees. – Subject to the superintendence of the Nigam, the Chairman shall have the general control and direction over, and subject thereto, the Managing Director shall have control over, all other employees of the Nigam.” 15. Reliance is also placed on the Uttarakhand Government Servants Seniority (First Amendment) Rules, which have been framed in the year 2009. Under the said Rules, it is contended that persons, who have been promoted prior to 09.11.2000, would not be reverted. 16. Mr. Bhagwat Mehra, learned counsel for the fourth petitioner, would submit that the Additional Chief Secretary, to whom a copy of the representation was also sent, was holding the post of Chairman. In the Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975) Adaptation and Modification Order, 2002, it is provided as follows: “4(1) The Nigam shall consist of a Chairman, who shall be Secretary of Pey Jal Vibhag Ex officio, besides the members specified in sub-section (2).” 17. As far as respondent No. 8 is concerned, the employee has climbed the ladder and became the Managing Director and the State, alone, has the authority to revert him. 18. To the same, Mr. B.P. Nautiyal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the party respondents, would point out that the representation was, actually, addressed to the Chief Secretary and a copy of the same was sent to Secretary (Finance) and other Secretaries also. 19. Mr. 18. To the same, Mr. B.P. Nautiyal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the party respondents, would point out that the representation was, actually, addressed to the Chief Secretary and a copy of the same was sent to Secretary (Finance) and other Secretaries also. 19. Mr. Pradeep Joshi, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of Uttarakhand, would, in response to the arguments of the petitioners, submit that the State of Uttarakhand was not a party in the case before the Apex Court. He would also draw out support from the judgment in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra) and also the order passed in contempt by the Apex Court. Findings: 20. What is the nature of the Nigam? The Nigam was set up under the 1975 Act. State of Uttarakhand was born on 09.11.2000 under the Reorganisation Act. Section 3 of the 1975 Act, which is an Act passed by the undivided State of Uttar Pradesh, became law apparently within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Reorganisation Act. Apparently acting in terms thereof, on 7th November, 2002, an Order was passed called the Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975) Adaptation and Modification Order, 2002. We have already noticed the substitution of Section 4. The Reorganisation Act, in fact, provided for such an adaptation. In this regard, Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act provided for the power to adapt laws. It reads as follows: “87. Power to adapt laws. – For the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the State of Uttar Pradesh or Uttaranchal of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.” 21. It is necessary to notice at once, therefore, that it is on the basis of the Act that the Nigam was born as an independent entity for the new State of Uttarakhand. It is necessary to notice Section 3 of the 1975 Act. It reads as follows: “3. It is necessary to notice at once, therefore, that it is on the basis of the Act that the Nigam was born as an independent entity for the new State of Uttarakhand. It is necessary to notice Section 3 of the 1975 Act. It reads as follows: “3. Establishment of the Nigam.-(1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Gazette and with effect from a date to be specified therein, constitute a corporation by the name of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam. (2) The Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam shall be a body corporate by the said name, having perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall sue and be sued by the said name and have the power to acquire, hold or dispose of property. (3) The Nigam shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local authority and not a company or a corporation owned by the State Government having shares and share-holders. (4) The Nigam shall have its head office at Lucknow and may have offices at such other places as it may consider necessary.” 22. The Nigam, therefore, is a body corporate having, obviously, a legal existence and it is separate from the Government. We will proceed on this basis. 23. We must notice that what is sought by the petitioners is a writ of mandamus. It is trite law that an indispensable requirement for issuance of a writ of mandamus is existence of a legal right with the petitioners and a corresponding public duty on the part of the answering respondents. We would like to refer to some of the decisions of the Apex Court, which have expounded its true scope. We would start by referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Comptroller and Auditor-General of India & another vs. K.S. Jagannathan & another, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 679 . Therein, the Apex Court has held as follows: 18. The first contention urged by learned Counsel for the Appellants was that the Division Bench of the High Court could not issue a writ of mandamus to direct a public authority to exercise its discretion in a particular manner. There is a basic fallacy underlying this submission both with respect to the order of the Division Bench and the purpose and scope of the writ of mandamus. The High Court had not issued a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus. There is a basic fallacy underlying this submission both with respect to the order of the Division Bench and the purpose and scope of the writ of mandamus. The High Court had not issued a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus. Was the relief prayed for by the Respondents in their writ petition. What the Division Bench did was to issue directions to the Appellants in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, every High Court has the power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, directions, orders, or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose. In Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur, and another, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 536, 540 this Court pointed out that Article 226 is designedly couched in a wide language in order not to confine the power conferred by it only to the power to issue prerogative writs as understood in England, such wide language being used to enable the High Courts "to reach injustice wherever it is found" and "to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country." In Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa & Ors., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 667, 676 this Court held that the powers of the courts in England as regards the control which the Judiciary has over the Executive indicate the minimum limit to which the courts in this country would be prepared to go in considering the validity of orders passed by the Government or its officers. 19. Even had the Division Bench issued a writ of mandamus giving the directions which it did, if circumstances of the case justified such directions, the High Court would have been entitled in law to do so for even the courts in England could have issued a writ of mandamus giving such directions. 19. Even had the Division Bench issued a writ of mandamus giving the directions which it did, if circumstances of the case justified such directions, the High Court would have been entitled in law to do so for even the courts in England could have issued a writ of mandamus giving such directions. Almost a hundred and thirty years ago Martin, B., in Mayor of Rochester v. Regina, [1858] E.B. & E. 1024,1032,1034 said: But, were there no authority upon the subject, we should be prepared upon principle to affirm the judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench. That Court has power, by the prerogative writ of mandamus, to amend all errors which tend to the oppression of the subject or other misgovernment, and ought to be used when the law has provided no specific remedy, and justice and good government require that there ought to be one for the execution of the common law or the provisions of a statute : Comyn’s Digest, Mandamus (A) . . . . . .Instead of being astute to discover reasons for not applying this great constitutional remedy for error and misgovernment, we think it our duty to be vigilant to apply it in every case to which, by any reasonable construction, it can be made applicable. The principle enunciated in the above case was approved and followed in The king v. The Revising Barrister for the Borough of Hanley, [1912] 3 K.B. 518, 528-9, 531. In Hochtief Gammon’s Case this Court pointed out (at page 675) that the powers of the Courts in relation to the orders of the Government or an officer of the Government who has been conferred any power under any statute, which apparently confer on them absolute discretionary powers, are not confined to cases where such power is exercised or refused to be exercised on irrelevant considerations or on erroneous ground or mala fide, and in such a case a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. In Padfield and Others v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Others, [1968] A.C. 997 the House of Lords held that where Parliament had conferred a discretion on the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, to appoint a committee of investigation so that it could be used to promote the policy and objects of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1958, which were to be determined by the construction of the Act which was a matter of law for the court and though there might be reasons which would justify the Minister in refusing to refer a complaint to a committee of investigation, the Minister’s discretion was not unlimited and if it appeared that the effect of his refusal to appoint a committee of investigation was to frustrate the policy of the Act, the court was entitled to interfere by an order of mandamus. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume I, Paragraph 89, it is stated that the purpose of an order of mandamus "is to remedy defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual. 20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion.” 24. Next, we may refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & others vs. V.R. Rudani and others, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691 . Therein, the Apex Court has referred to the spectacular advancement made in regard to the law relating to mandamus and held as follows: “20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. 22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. 22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract." We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.” 25. Next, we would straightaway come to a recent decision of the Apex Court in State of Kerala and others vs. Kandath Distilleries, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 573 . The said case related to the right of a person to secure licence to vend liquor. The court, inter alia, held as follows: “29. Section 14 uses the expression “Commissioner may”, “with the approval of the Government” so also Rule 4 uses the expressions “Commissioner may”, “if he is satisfied” after making such enquiries as he may consider necessary “licence may be issued”. All those expressions used in Section 14 and Rule 4 confer discretionary powers on the Commissioner as well as the State Government, not a discretionary power coupled with duty. The powers, conferred on the Commissioner as well as the Government, have to be understood in the light of the Constitutional scheme bearing in mind the fact that the trade or business which is inherently harmful can always be restricted, curtailed or prohibited by the State, since it is the exclusive privilege of the State. No duty is, therefore, cast on the Commissioner to grant a licence for establishing a distillery unit and no right is conferred on any citizen to claim it as a matter of right. No duty is, therefore, cast on the Commissioner to grant a licence for establishing a distillery unit and no right is conferred on any citizen to claim it as a matter of right. State can always adopt a “restrictive policy”, e.g., reducing the number of licences in a particular district or a particular area, or not to grant any licence at all in a particular district, even in cases where the applicants have satisfied all the conditions stipulated in the rules and the policy permits granting of licences. In other words, the satisfaction of the conditions laid down in 1975 Rules would not entitle an applicant as a matter of right to claim a distillery licence which is within the exclusive privilege of the State. MANDAMUS – TO ISSUE LICENCE 30. Legislature when confers a discretionary power on an authority, it has to be exercised by it in its discretion, the decision ought to be that of the authority concerned and not that of the Court. Court would not interfere with or probe into the merits of the decision made by an authority in exercise of its discretion. Court cannot impede the exercise of discretion of an authority acting under the Statute by issuance of a Writ of Mandamus. A Writ of Mandamus can be issued in favour of an applicant who establishes a legal right in himself and is issued against an authority which has a legal duty to perform, but has failed and/or neglected to do so, but such a legal duty should emanate either in discharge of the public duty or operation of law. We have found that there is no legal duty cast on the Commissioner or the State Government exercising powers under Section 14 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the 1975 Rules to grant the licence applied for. The High Court, in our view, cannot direct the State Government to part with its exclusive privilege. At best, it can direct consideration of an application for licence. If the High Court feels, in spite of its direction, the application has not been properly considered or arbitrarily rejected, the High Court is not powerless to deal with such a situation that does not mean that the High Court can bend or break the law. At best, it can direct consideration of an application for licence. If the High Court feels, in spite of its direction, the application has not been properly considered or arbitrarily rejected, the High Court is not powerless to deal with such a situation that does not mean that the High Court can bend or break the law. Granting liquor licence is not like granting licence to drive a cab or parking a vehicle or issuing a municipal licence to set up a grocery or a fruit shop. Before issuing a writ of mandamus, the High Court should have, at the back of its mind, the legislative scheme, its object and purpose, the subject matter, the evil sought to be remedied, State’s exclusive privilege etc. and not to be carried away by the idiosyncrasies or the ipse dixit of an officer who authored the order challenged. Majesty of law is to be upheld not by bending or breaking the law but by strengthening the law.” 26. We would also refer to another decision of the Apex Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and another vs. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and another, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 470 . Therein, we may notice the following paragraphs: “21. It is evident from the above, that generally the court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction to enforce the contractual obligation. The primary purpose of a writ of mandamus, is to protect and establish rights and to impose a corresponding imperative duty existing in law. It is designed to promote justice (ex debito justiceiae). The grant or refusal of the writ is at the discretion of the court. The writ cannot be granted unless it is established that there is an existing legal right of the applicant, or an existing duty of the respondent. Thus, the writ does not lie to create or to establish a legal right, but to enforce one that is already established. While dealing with a writ petition, the court must exercise discretion, taking into consideration a wide variety of circumstances, inter-alia, the facts of the case, the exigency that warrants such exercise of discretion, the consequences of grant or refusal of the writ, and the nature and extent of injury that is likely to ensue by such grant or refusal. 22. While dealing with a writ petition, the court must exercise discretion, taking into consideration a wide variety of circumstances, inter-alia, the facts of the case, the exigency that warrants such exercise of discretion, the consequences of grant or refusal of the writ, and the nature and extent of injury that is likely to ensue by such grant or refusal. 22. Hence, discretion must be exercised by the court on grounds of public policy, public interest and public good. The writ is equitable in nature and thus, its issuance is governed by equitable principles. Refusal of relief must be for reasons which would lead to injustice. The prime consideration for the issuance of the said writ is, whether or not substantial justice will be promoted. Furthermore, while granting such a writ, the court must make every effort to ensure from the averments of the writ petition, whether there exist proper pleadings. In order to maintain the writ of mandamus, the first and foremost requirement is that the petition must not be frivolous, and must be filed in good faith. Additionally, the applicant must make a demand which is clear, plain and unambiguous. It must be made to an officer having the requisite authority to perform the act demanded. Furthermore, the authority against whom mandamus is issued, should have rejected the demand earlier. Therefore, a demand and its subsequent refusal, either by words, or by conduct, are necessary to satisfy the court that the opposite party is determined to ignore the demand of the applicant with respect to the enforcement of his legal right. However, a demand may not be necessary when the same is manifest from the facts of the case, that is, when it is an empty formality, or when it is obvious that the opposite party would not consider the demand.” 27. We may, therefore, cull-out some of the features, which would be self-evident from a perusal of the dicta, which we have adverted to. On the one hand, mandamus is a writ, which has witnessed a phenomenal expansion; the writ courts in India are not shackled by the procedural and technical requirements as must be obtained in England; courts are more free to issue the writ to cause the removal of injustice by directing performance of duties, which are public in nature, and to exercise discretion where discretion remains unexercised. Mandamus may be issued, where, for instance, a statutory authority, which has to exercise its discretion independently, acts under dictation, does not take into consideration the relevant considerations, or is guided by irrelevant considerations and the courts may direct performance of a discretion in a proper and lawful manner. However, the courts may not direct the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, unless it is covered by the dictum in Jagannathan’s case (supra), where the court may direct passing of the order, which the authority should have passed. 28. The further requirement is that the person seeking a writ of mandamus must make a demand. As noticed in (2013) 5 SCC 470 , the demand must be clear, plain and unambiguous. More importantly, it must be made to an officer having the requisite authority to perform the act demanded. Either there must be actual rejection of the demand, be it in words or by conduct, or there may be delay in performing the duty, which may entitle a party to approach the court. It is also true that the requirement of demand may be dispensed with in circumstances, where the demand would be an exercise in futility, as, for instance, where demand is made to an authority, which is bound or seemingly bound by the enunciation of policy by a superior body, which precludes it from taking a different stand and comply with the law. The demand may be dispensed with when it is an empty formality, as when it is obvious that the respondent would ignore the demand. In all other circumstances, the requirement of previous demand before coming to the court is indispensable to seek a writ of mandamus. In the case of a discretion, as already noticed, if discretion is not being exercised in a proper manner as understood in law, a mandamus may lie. It may be that, in a case of a power, it may be coupled with a duty. The existence of a duty, even though it may appear that it is a power, cannot and will not disable the court from exercising its discretion to meet the ends of justice. The court must also not be oblivious to the impact of the judgment on the rights of the parties and whether it promotes justice or produces a miscarriage of justice. The court must also not be oblivious to the impact of the judgment on the rights of the parties and whether it promotes justice or produces a miscarriage of justice. In other words, to say that, when there is a right and a legal duty, mandamus must issue is an over-simplification of a complex issue, as it, without considering that the true scope of writ jurisdiction, is one geared to produce justice. 29. With these prefatory observations, we may pass on to consider the merits of the petitioners’ case. 30. The first question we must decide is whether a demand has been made and, if so, to whom. The demand has been made to the Chief Secretary of the State of Uttarakhand. The prayer in the writ petition is also partly directed against the State of Uttarakhand to cause reversion of those employees, who got accelerated promotions. Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to examine whether the demand, which appears to have fallen on deaf ears as no action has ensued pursuant thereto, was laid at the right doorstep. The Nigam, whose employees are sought to be visited with orders of reversion, is a body corporate. It is constituted under the 1975 Act, as adapted by the State of Uttarakhand by order passed under Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act. We questioned the learned counsel as to what is the source of authority with the State to cause or direct reversion of the party respondents. Actually, no forthright answer could be secured. We scanned the provisions of the 1975 Act. What we could find was Section 89 of the 1975 Act. The said provision reads as follows: “89. Directions to the Nigam on questions of policy. – (1) In the discharge of its functions, the Nigam shall be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government. (2) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the State Government may issue a direction under sub-section (1), the decision of the State Government shall be final.” 31. In fact, Mr. Pradeep Joshi, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of Uttarakhand, would also point out another Act, namely, the Uttar Pradesh State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975. Section 2 of this Act reads as follows: “2. Power to issue directions to statutory bodies. In fact, Mr. Pradeep Joshi, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of Uttarakhand, would also point out another Act, namely, the Uttar Pradesh State Control Over Public Corporation Act, 1975. Section 2 of this Act reads as follows: “2. Power to issue directions to statutory bodies. – (1) Every statutory body (by whatever name called), established or constituted under any Uttar Pradesh Act, excepting Universities governed by the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973, as reenacted and amended by the Uttar Pradesh Universities (Reenactment and Amendment) Act, 1974, shall, in the discharge of its functions, be guided by such directions on questions of policies, as may be given to it by the State Government, notwithstanding that no such power has expressly been conferred on the State Government under the law establishing or constituting such statutory body. (2) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the State Government may issue a direction under sub-section (1), the decision of the State Government shall be final.” 32. But, in view of Section 89 of the 1975 Act, we need not be detained by this Act. Section 89 of the 1975 Act comes under Chapter X, which provides for ‘External Control’. The Nigam is, undoubtedly, to be guided by the directions to be given to it by the State Government. It is not any sort of directions, which can be issued by the State Government. The directions can only be on questions of policy. The State Government is declared the final authority to decide as to what are the matters, which fall within its domain under Section 89. Bereft of this power, we have not been shown any other power with the State. Section 93(3) of the 1975 Act, which is referred to by Mr. M.C. Pant, refers to the power of the State Government to give directions to the local body for enabling the Nigam or Jal Sansthan to perform its duties under the Act. We find the argument totally untenable, as we do not see how it will enable the Government to issue a direction to the Nigam. It is to be noticed that, under Section 3(3) of the 1975 Act, by substitution done by the U.P. Legislature in the year 2007 w.e.f. 01.01.2003, the Nigam is to be treated as a local body and not a company or corporation. It is to be noticed that, under Section 3(3) of the 1975 Act, by substitution done by the U.P. Legislature in the year 2007 w.e.f. 01.01.2003, the Nigam is to be treated as a local body and not a company or corporation. The said provision will certainly not apply to the State of Uttarakhand, as Uttarakhand became a new State with its own Legislature following its formation on 09.11.2000. Therefore, in view of Section 89 of the 1975 Act, which is, in fact, not even referred to in the pleadings as the basis for requesting the Government to interfere, but nonetheless proceeding on the basis that such a provision exists, we must pose the question whether it would suffice for us to issue a writ of mandamus to the State on the strength of the said provision. 33. We are of the view that Section 89 of the 1975 Act cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of mandamus, as sought for by the petitioners. Section 89 contains the provision, which enables the Government to give directions in relation to questions of policy. Section 89 embodies a discretion and a power with the State. The power is circumscribed by the nature of the direction it can issue, namely, it can issue directions only in relation to questions of policy. As is very clear, it does not provide for a duty. It only gives a power with the State, if it is so advised, to give directions in relation to questions of policy. We cannot treat this as a case of a power, which is coupled with a duty. At this juncture, we must also bear in mind the provisions contained in Sections 8 and 9 of the 1975 Act. The Nigam is given the power to appoint its employees. Sub-Section (2) of Section 8, no doubt, provides for appointment of a servant of the Central Government or the State Government as an employee of the Nigam with the previous approval of the State Government. Subject to the superintendence of the Nigam, Section 9 declares the Chairman to be the person, who will have general control and direction over the employees of the Nigam. The importance of body corporate constituted under an Act to perform various public functions has been a development of the 20th Century. Subject to the superintendence of the Nigam, Section 9 declares the Chairman to be the person, who will have general control and direction over the employees of the Nigam. The importance of body corporate constituted under an Act to perform various public functions has been a development of the 20th Century. The State, for reasons of efficiency, convenience and autonomy, has created various corporations and, through the said mechanism, while it does retain control in various ways including the constitution of the key personnel, who are to manage the corporations, it allows free play in its joints to the corporations so that the goals sought to be achieved are, in no way, impaired by undue red tapism and bureaucratic delays, which may hamper its smooth functioning. Key to success of a statutory corporation is autonomy and undue control from the Government is sought to be warded-off by providing that it is to be guided by directions from the Government only in matters of policy. Thus, even while, for the purpose of Article 12, the Nigam would be State in itself and fundamental rights can be availed against the Nigam, the distinction between it and the Government cannot be lost sight of. 34. We have indulged in this discussion only to bring out the cardinal fact that the demand, in this case, has been made before the State Government to do something (in this case, to revert the employees, who are not the employees of the Government). We would, therefore, think that, when there is a power lodged with the Chairman under Section 9 of the 1975 Act in the matter of superintendence of all employees, which would also include the Managing Director, approaching the State to direct the Nigam to act in a particular manner, that is to revert the employees of the Nigam, may not be justified. 35. Reference is also made to Section 97 of the 1975 Act by Mr. M.C. Pant. Section 97 provides for the power with the Nigam to make regulations, not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules, for the administration of the Nigam. 35. Reference is also made to Section 97 of the 1975 Act by Mr. M.C. Pant. Section 97 provides for the power with the Nigam to make regulations, not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules, for the administration of the Nigam. Sub-Section (3) of Section 97 provides as follows: “(3) Until any regulations are made by the Nigam or a Jal Sansthan, as the case may be, under sub-section (1), any regulations which may be so made by it may be made by the State Government, and any regulations so made may be altered or rescinded by the Nigam or a Jal Sansthan in exercise of its power under sub-section (1).” 36. Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the petitioners, would contend that there is no power for giving accelerated promotions under the regulations and, therefore, reversions are necessarily to be effected of persons, who were given illegal promotions. We will deal with this argument at the appropriate stage. 37. The demand, which has been made, is, as we have noted, to the Chief Secretary. Now, an argument is raised that, under the adaptation of the 1975 Act, the Chairman is to be the Secretary of Pey Jal Vibhag Ex officio. Admittedly, the representations are all addressed to the Chief Secretary of the State and the demand is made to the Government. There is no demand, actually, made to the Nigam. At the foot of the representation, it is seen that copies are given to various Secretaries, who would include the Secretary of the Department, who, in terms of the Adaptation and Modification Order, was acting as the Chairman. No representation has been addressed to the Chairman of the Nigam as such. The body of the representation and the request also would indicate that it is addressed to the Government Secretary and not to the Chairman. Therefore, we can safely proceed on the basis that there is no demand to the Chairman, who is the statutory authority mentioned in Section 9 of the 1975 Act, who could possibly, if it is otherwise found with merit, order reversion. 38. On this ground itself, the prayers sought in the writ petition cannot be granted; but, we will test the arguments of the petitioners also on the basis of the merits of the matter. 39. What is it that the petitioners seek from this Court? 38. On this ground itself, the prayers sought in the writ petition cannot be granted; but, we will test the arguments of the petitioners also on the basis of the merits of the matter. 39. What is it that the petitioners seek from this Court? It is a direction in the form of a writ of mandamus to direct the State and the Nigam to comply with the judgment dated 27th April, 2012 and the interim order dated 20th August, 2015 passed by the Apex Court. The judgment dated 27th April, 2012 passed by the Apex Court, as already noticed, arose from the judgments of the Allahabad High Court. Two Benches of the Allahabad High Court, namely, the Allahabad Bench and the Lucknow Bench struck discordant notes. The Lucknow Bench struck down Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act and also Rule 8-A. From the judgment of the Apex Court, we notice the reliefs, which were actually granted by the Lucknow Bench, as follows: “3. Two Benches of the Allahabad High Court, namely, the Allahabad Bench and the Lucknow Bench struck discordant notes. The Lucknow Bench struck down Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act and also Rule 8-A. From the judgment of the Apex Court, we notice the reliefs, which were actually granted by the Lucknow Bench, as follows: “3. Extraordinary and, in a way, perplexing though it may seem, yet as the factual scenario pronouncedly reveals, the assail in some of the appeals of this batch of appeals is to the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 63217 of 2010 (Mukund Kumar Srivastava vs. State of U.P. and Another) upholding the validity of the provisions contained in Rule 8-A of the U.P. Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991 (for brevity ‘the 1991 Rules’) that were inserted by the U.P. Government Servants Seniority (3rd Amendment) Rules, 2007 by the employees-appellants and in some of the appeals, the challenge by the State Government and the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. (for short ‘the Corporation’) is to the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, in Writ Petition No. 1389 (S/B) of 2007 (Prem Kumar Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others) and other connected writ petitions holding, inter alia, that the decision rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Mukund Kumar Srivastava (supra) at Allahabad is per incuriam and not a binding precedent and further Section 3(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Public Servants (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 (for short ‘the 1994 Act’) and Rule 8A of the 1991 Rules, as brought into force in 2007, are invalid, ultra vires and unconstitutional and, as a necessary corollary, the consequential orders relating to seniority passed by the State Government deserved to be quashed and, accordingly, quashed the same and further clarified that in case the State Government decides to provide reservation in promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State, it is free to do so after undertaking the exercise as required under the constitutional provisions keeping in mind the law laid down by this Court in M. Nagraj (supra). It has been directed that till it is done, no reservation in promotion on any post or classes of posts under the services of the State including the Corporation shall be made hence forth. However, the Division Bench observed that the promotions already made as per the provisions/Rules where the benefit of Rule 8A has not been given while making the promotion shall not be disturbed.” 40. It is the judgment of the Lucknow Bench, which has been affirmed. Next, we must notice interim order dated 20th August, 2015, which is sought to be made the basis for the writ of mandamus and which we have already extracted above. Therein, the Apex Court, in contempt, recorded the submission of the State of Uttar Pradesh that the judgment will be complied with in letter and spirit within three weeks hence and the officers, who are to be reverted, will be reverted and they will not be given any additional charge. The Chief Secretary of the State of Uttar Pradesh was directed to file an affidavit stating the same to be done by 15th September, 2015, failing which, his personal appearance may be compelled. It is also directed that the High Court was not to entertain any kind of petition with regard to the controversy covered by the said judgment or even linked with it. The case was directed to be listed on 15th September, 2015. 41. It is on the basis of the above judgment and the interim order passed that the petitioners have approached this Court. It is to be noted that Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act was, indeed, found to be unconstitutional and was declared so. The same was the fate of Rule 8-A, which was enacted in 2007. Rule 8-A was, in fact, inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991. These are the provisions, which have been frowned upon as being unconstitutional by the Apex Court. The Apex Court also, apparently, has countenanced the reversion of the employees, save those who have been promoted on the basis of the dictum in Indra Sawhney’s case (supra). As already noted, this judgment of the Apex Court arose from the High Court of Allahabad and one of its Benches had struck down the provision in the Act and the Rule. As already noted, this judgment of the Apex Court arose from the High Court of Allahabad and one of its Benches had struck down the provision in the Act and the Rule. The Lucknow Bench, in fact, has ordered reversion; however, saved promotions already made as per the provisions in the Rules, where the benefit of Rule 8-A had not been given while making the promotions. It was with reference to the parties in the said case that, apparently, a contempt petition was moved and interim order dated 20th August, 2015 was passed, which we have adverted to. After the judgment of the Apex Court, as admitted by the petitioners and in fact relied upon by them, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 45 of 2011 was filed in this Court separately challenging Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act. We have already noticed the judgment passed in the said case. It is a judgment delivered after the judgment of the Apex Court and, in fact, placing reliance on the said judgment. Therefore, despite the pronouncement of the Apex Court by judgment dated 27th April, 2012, the Division Bench of this Court was called upon to pronounce on the vires of Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act all over again. 42. It is, at this juncture, that we must notice a crucial feature. Under the Reorganisation Act, the 1994 Act became law within the meaning of Section 2(f). Therefore, for the State of Uttarakhand also, Section 3(7) became the law. So, it was applicable to the employees and it is following the same that accelerated promotions were given to the employees, including the employees who are party respondents in this case. At this juncture, it becomes necessary for us to notice the nature of a pronouncement by the Apex Court regarding the vires of a statute as to whether it is only a pronouncement qua the parties and, therefore, would have only precedential value as far as others are concerned, or is it a judgment in rem. This question is no longer res integra, as it fell for consideration by a Constitution Bench in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka vs. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1955 SC 123 . Therein, the Apex Court held as follows: “53. This question is no longer res integra, as it fell for consideration by a Constitution Bench in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka vs. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1955 SC 123 . Therein, the Apex Court held as follows: “53. The learned Attorney-General contended that the correct approach to the question was that there being a strong Presumption in favour of the constitutionality, of a statute, it is for those who assail it as unconstitutional to establish it, and therefore it was for the appellant to establish that the statute was. unconstitutional, and that unless he proved facts requisite for the constitutional invalidity of the conviction he could not succeed. We cannot agree that that is a correct way of judging criminal cases. The constitutional invalidity of a part of section 13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act having been declared by this Court, that part of the section ceased to have any legal effect in judging cases of citizens and had to be regarded as null and void in determining whether a citizen was guilty of an offence. Article 141 of the Constitution declares that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. In view of this clear enactment there is no scope in India for the application of the American doctrine enunciated by Willoughby ("The Constitution of the United States" Vol. I, P. 10), wherein the learned author states, "the declaration by a court of unconstitutionality of a statute which is in conflict with the Constitution affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute; that the opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute book; the parties to that suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound; a new litigant may bring a new suit, based on the very same statute, and the former decision cannot be pleaded as an estoppel, but can be relied on only as a precedent." Once a statute is declared void under article 13(1) or 13(2) by this Court, that declaration has the force of law, and the statute so declared void is no longer law qua persons whose fundamental rights are thus infringed. In America there is no similar statutory provision and that being so, the doctrine enunciated by the learned author can have no application here. In this country once a law has been struck down as unconstitutional law by a Court, no notice can be taken of that law by any Court, and in every case an accused person need not start proving that the law is unconstitutional. The Court is not empowered to look at that part of the law which has been declared as void, and therefore there is no onus resting on the accused person to prove that the law that has already been declared unconstitutional is unconstitutional in that particular case as well. The Court has to take notice only of what the law of the land is, and convict the accused only if he contravenes the law of the land.” 43. Thus, the judgment of the Apex Court declaring a law to be unconstitutional binds not only the parties, but, being a judgment in rem, binds as against all the subjects, which are within the jurisdiction of the said Legislation. In this regard, see the judgment of the Apex Court in K.N. Raghavan vs. Habeeb Moahmmed & others, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 180 . Therein, it is held as follows: “When any provision is held to be ultra vires, it covers the field as against all its subjects who are within the jurisdiction of the said legislation and the court. Thus this submission has no merit and is rejected.” 44. No doubt, the question as to the effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality leading to the law being void ab initio on the ground that a post-constitutional law cannot contravene the fundamental rights, except upon the peril of it being void ab initio, is subject to certain exceptions and, in this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in State of Gujarat & another vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., reported in AIR 1974 SC 1300 may be seen. A law may not be ab initio void as regards a person who is not a citizen under the said decision when the reason for it becoming ab initio void is contravention of a fundamental right, which may be available to a citizen, but may not be available to a person, who is not a citizen. A law may not be ab initio void as regards a person who is not a citizen under the said decision when the reason for it becoming ab initio void is contravention of a fundamental right, which may be available to a citizen, but may not be available to a person, who is not a citizen. A law is capable of being shielded by it being put in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. No doubt, this would be, now, subject to the law laid down in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 580 , wherein the Apex Court has held that any insertion of the law in the Ninth Schedule after the date of the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1973) 4 SCC 225 could be tested on the anvil of it being violative of the basic structure. Then, there is also doctrine of prospective overruling. In other words, in the judgment in L.C. Golak Nath & others vs. State of Punjab & another, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1643 , the Apex Court has evolved a doctrine by which, when it declares a law unconstitutional, it can declare it so limited to the future saving all past transactions by adopting the said device. But, as far as the case at hand is concerned, we have adverted to this aspect of the decision of the Apex Court, declaring a law to be unconstitutional being a judgment in rem, to deal with the argument of Mr. Pradeep Joshi, learned Standing Counsel, that the State of Uttarakhand is not a party to the decision of the Apex Court and, therefore, it can extricate itself from the said pronouncement. If the pronouncement is otherwise binding on a party as one falling within the field of the law and hence the declaration of unconstitutionality, it would certainly be no answer for him or it to say that it was not a party before the Apex Court. A person need not be a party to the proceedings in which the court declares a law to be unconstitutional. A person need not be a party to the proceedings in which the court declares a law to be unconstitutional. This difference in the law between the law obtaining in the United States and the law obtaining in India has been brought out in the 4th year of the Republic in 1954 by the Constitution Bench ruling and, therefore, it cannot lie in the mouth of anyone to say that, as it is not a party, it is not bound by the declaration. 45. We have noted that Section 3(7) was declared unconstitutional in the context of cases, which arose from the State of Uttar Pradesh. It so happened that the same law was adopted in the State of Uttarakhand by virtue of the provisions contained in the Reorganisation Act and the adaptation order was passed thereunder. It is perhaps because of the same that the need was felt to mount a separate challenge to the said law. The Division Bench of this Court entertained the challenge and, following the law laid down by the Supreme Court, thought it fit to declare the said provision as unconstitutional. Therefore, the law, which was applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh, was struck down by the Apex Court finally in proceedings, which arose from the said State and in regard to its operation qua the employees of that State. Since the same law was also in operation in the State of Uttarakhand, challenge being raised against the same, the Division Bench found merit in the challenge and declared the law as unconstitutional. But, when it declared the said law as unconstitutional, with the State on the party array, it saved the promotions, which had been made prior to the date it passed the interim order in that case, which, admittedly, is in 2010. It called in aid the doctrine of prospective overruling and proceeded to declare that the declaration would have prospective effect. We are not, in this proceeding, sitting in appeal over the said judgment. We may have our reservations about the authority of the High Court to resort to prospective overruling, as one of the conditions, subject to which the Apex Court declared the law in L.C. Golak Nath’s case (supra), about the existence of the extra-ordinary power was that only the Apex Court can resort to prospective overruling. We may have our reservations about the authority of the High Court to resort to prospective overruling, as one of the conditions, subject to which the Apex Court declared the law in L.C. Golak Nath’s case (supra), about the existence of the extra-ordinary power was that only the Apex Court can resort to prospective overruling. But, we have to take the judgment as it is in this proceeding. We cannot be called upon not to give effect to the same. Can we ask the State of Uttarakhand or the Nigam to disregard the judgment in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra)? 46. It is, in this context, that we must appreciate the case even proceeding on the basis that either the demand could be entertained even by the State by calling in aid the provision of Section 89 of the 1975 Act and taking this to be a matter of policy on which the State could issue a direction to the Nigam to cause reversion or proceeding on the basis that a representation addressed to the Secretary must be treated as representation addressed to the Chairman. We would think that, in the facts of this case, having regard to the judgment rendered by this Court, we cannot even find fault with the State and with the Nigam for refusing to revert the party respondents, who, incidentally, have all been promoted [accelerated promotions, be it under Section 3(7)] prior to the interim order passed in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra). This is an admitted fact. Therefore, by the declaration given by this Court subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court and purporting to follow the Apex Court, this Court’s directions would not be observed in its breach if the State or the Nigam refuses to revert the employees. 47. In this aspect, there is another circumstance, which is relied on by the respondents, which would, in our view, have crucial significance and that aspect is this. The subsequent order passed by the Apex Court in contempt jurisdiction makes it abundantly clear that the Apex Court did not think that the cases relating to the employees from Uttarakhand would fall within the sweep of its judgment. The subsequent order passed by the Apex Court in contempt jurisdiction makes it abundantly clear that the Apex Court did not think that the cases relating to the employees from Uttarakhand would fall within the sweep of its judgment. Thus, the Apex Court, itself, refused to pull in the employees of the State of Uttarakhand within the sweep of its contempt jurisdiction, which it ordinarily would have, had it intended that the declaration of law made by it was to hold sway for the employees in the State of Uttarakhand also. This fact fortifies us in the view we take that this is not a fit case for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding either the State or the Nigam to follow the judgment of the Apex Court, when it has, itself, expressly taken the employees of the State of Uttarakhand outside its scope. 48. The argument of Mr. M.C. Pant based on Article 144 of the Constitution must now be adverted to. It is, undoubtedly, true that Article 144 is a salutary provision in the Constitution intended to aid the rule of law, for the Supreme Court is not only an interpreter of law, but it produces law. The ratio decidendi in the cases decided by it has binding nature. Its directions must be complied with. It is intended to facilitate the decision of the Apex Court being given full effect and, thus, the cause of justice be advanced. But, we have noted the features present in this case and we would think that the petitioners would be unjustified in calling in aid Article 144 when we have found that the petitioners cannot be permitted to draw support from the judgment dated 27th April, 2012 or the interim order passed in contempt. 49. We may also notice that the only reliefs, which the petitioners have sought, are writs of mandamus. Admittedly, the party respondents have been given promotions, be it in terms of Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act. Those promotions are not called in question. No relief is sought against those promotions. In this regard, it may be noticed that the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court had quashed the orders relating to seniority passed by the State Government. Therefore, there was substantial relief relating to the promotions, which the petitioners have not sought for in this petition. No relief is sought against those promotions. In this regard, it may be noticed that the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court had quashed the orders relating to seniority passed by the State Government. Therefore, there was substantial relief relating to the promotions, which the petitioners have not sought for in this petition. Petitioners have approached this Court merely seeking a direction to cause the reversion. Was there a duty on the part of the State or on the part of the Nigam to order reversion? We would think that, in the facts of this case having regard to the Bench decision of this Court in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra), we cannot hold that there was such a duty or a right with the petitioners in this regard. 50. In fact, there is no detail given in the writ petition as to when the party respondents were given accelerated promotions. No doubt, according to the petitioners, the employees, who were given promotions prior to the time when the Nigam was created, are ordered to be reverted by the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam vide Annexure No. 12. In the List contained in Annexure No. 12, the promotions given to the party respondents on the basis of reservation and the dates are indicated. There is a case for the party respondents that the communications from the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam are not binding. The Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, after the creation of the Nigam in 2002, may not have the authority as such. Furthermore, at any rate, the party respondents, except respondent No. 7, have secured promotions on the basis of the earlier promotions after the creation of the Nigam. In this regard, we may notice the following pleadings in the writ petition: “22. That perusal of the list of the employees of the reserved category, who have been promoted on higher posts by getting the benefit of reservation in promotion, forwarded by the U.P. Jal Nigam along with the communication dated 4th September 2015 and are presently working in the Uttarakhand Peyjal Nigam shows that the present Managing Director, Uttarakhand Peyjal Nigam Mr. Bhajan Singh also got benefit of reservation in promotion and while working in U.P. Jal Nigam as Executive Engineer he was promoted on the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) on 4 July 2002. Bhajan Singh also got benefit of reservation in promotion and while working in U.P. Jal Nigam as Executive Engineer he was promoted on the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) on 4 July 2002. It is pertinent to mention here that Uttarakhand Peyjal Nigam was carved out of U.P. Jal Nigam on 7 November 2002. 23. That Sri Bhajan Singh was further promoted on the post of Chief Engineer, Level-II in Uttarakhand Peyjal Nigam giving the benefit of reservation in promotion. Sri Bhajan singh was promoted on the post of Chief Engineer, Level-II vide Office Memorandum dated 8th February 2005. Copy of the promotion order dated 8th February 2005 of Sri Bhajan Singh is being annexed as Annexure No.-16 to this writ petition. 24. That the private respondents were promoted on the higher posts in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3(7) of the Act of 1994 and they got accelerated promotion in service above the petitioners in spite of the private respondents being appointed in the concerned cadre of the service after the petitioners. 51. Therefore, even proceeding on the basis that promotions were given to the party respondents earlier to 09.11.2000 at a time when the State of Uttar Pradesh was undivided, we can proceed on the footing that, after the said date and after the creation of the Nigam, subsequent promotions have been given to the party respondents, except respondent No. 7 who has not been given subsequent promotion, on the strength of Section 3(7) as applicable in the State of Uttarakhand. There is a direction that the accelerated promotions cannot be undone in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case. More importantly, none of these promotions are under challenge before us. 52. The case of the petitioners based on Regulations made under Sub-Section (3) of Section 97 of the 1975 Act also does not appeal to us. The argument is that, under the Regulations, there is no provision for giving accelerated promotions; but, apparently, the accelerated promotions were given on the basis of Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act. The effect of its invalidation at least in respect of promotions, which were made after it was in force in the State of Uttarakhand, was the subject matter of the decision in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra). After 09.11.2000, whatever promotions are given, Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra) will govern the field. The effect of its invalidation at least in respect of promotions, which were made after it was in force in the State of Uttarakhand, was the subject matter of the decision in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra). After 09.11.2000, whatever promotions are given, Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra) will govern the field. We would, again, reiterate that their promotions have not been challenged even in regard to the earlier period. There is also a case for the party respondents that rules were framed by which promotions made prior to 09.11.2000 are protected. 53. Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the petitioners, relied on Article 31C of the Constitution and contended that Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) are only enabling provisions and there was no law for giving accelerated promotions. We would reject the argument based on Article 31C, as this is a matter, where we have already adverted to the judgment rendered by this Court in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra) and we have also noticed that there is no challenge to the promotions given to the party respondents. 54. Reference is also made to Article 51A(j) by Mr. M.C. Pant. Article 51A(j) comes under the Fundamental Duties. It reads as follows: “(j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement.” 55. The argument based on the same is only to be rejected and we do so. 56. Argument based on Articles 39 and 41 also does not require any consideration and is totally merit-less and it is rejected. 57. Reference made to Section 74 of the Reorganisation Act by Mr. M.C. Pant does not appeal to us. It, undoubtedly, speaks about conditions of service of the employees not being variable except after getting previous approval from the Central Government. Reference placed on Section 67 of the Reorganisation Act by Mr. M.C. Pant also does not appeal to us. Section 67 reads as follows: “67. General provision as to statutory Corporations. M.C. Pant does not appeal to us. It, undoubtedly, speaks about conditions of service of the employees not being variable except after getting previous approval from the Central Government. Reference placed on Section 67 of the Reorganisation Act by Mr. M.C. Pant also does not appeal to us. Section 67 reads as follows: “67. General provision as to statutory Corporations. – (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by the foregoing provisions of this Part, where any body corporate constituted under a Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act for the existing State of Uttar Pradesh or any part thereof has, by virtue of the provisions of Part II, become an inter-State body corporate, then, the body corporate shall, on and from the appointed day, continue to function and operate in those areas in respect of which it was functioning and operating immediately before that day, subject to such directions as may from time to time be issued by the Central Government, until other provision is made by law in respect of the said body corporate. (2) Any directions issued by the Central Government under sub-section (1) in respect of any such body corporate shall include a direction that any law by which the said body corporate is governed shall, in its application to that body corporate, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction.” 58. Therefore, it contemplates that, by virtue of provisions of Part II, a body corporate would become an inter-State body corporate and it would operate subject to such directions as may be issued by the Central Government in those areas in respect of which it was functioning and operating prior to the appointed day. Therefore, the argument, apparently, is that the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam continued to operate in the territories of the State of Uttarakhand till 08.11.2002. It may be true that the corporation continued to exist till 2002 when a new corporation was created, which is the third respondent (the Nigam). As already noticed, Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act, in its operation in regard to the State of Uttarakhand, has been declared unconstitutional separately by this Court and we have also noticed how the promotions, which have been given prior to the interim order passed in the said case, have been saved. As already noticed, Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act, in its operation in regard to the State of Uttarakhand, has been declared unconstitutional separately by this Court and we have also noticed how the promotions, which have been given prior to the interim order passed in the said case, have been saved. As far as Section 74 of the Reorganisation Act is concerned, in fact, there is a case for Mr. D.S. Patni, learned counsel appearing for the Nigam, that Section 73, read with Section 74, is intended for the employees of the State; meaning thereby, employees of the Government in its various departments. At any rate, we do not see on what basis the petitioners can rely on the proviso, which prohibits varying of conditions of service of a person allocated except with the previous approval of the Central Government. The argument, apparently, as we could understand, is that the Section having been struck down, there is no provision for their promotion. We have already noted that this is a question, which was the subject matter of the decision in Vinod Prakash Nautiyal’s case (supra). Secondly, here also, we must notice that the promotions of the party respondents have not been challenged by the petitioners. So, we cannot be called upon to decide the validity of their promotions in the absence of any challenge to their promotions or to render a ruling regarding their becoming liable to be reverted. 59. Reference is also made to Section 88 of the Reorganisation Act by Mr. M.C. Pant. It reads as follows: “88. Power to construe laws. – Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provision has been made under Section 87 for the adaptation of a law made before the appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority, required or empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to the State of Uttar Pradesh or Uttaranchal, construe the law in such manner, without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper in regard to the matter before the court, tribunal or authority. 60. 60. Undoubtedly, even in the absence of a law or even if the law is insufficient, the court, tribunal or authority, required to enforce such law, can, for facilitating its application to the State of Uttarakhand (in this case), construe the law in a manner without affecting the substance, as may be proper or necessary in regard to the matter before it. If the submission is with reference to Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act, there is nothing for us to construe, for it had already been the subject matter, firstly, of the decision of the Apex Court and, subsequently, of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court the effect of which we have already explained and there remains nothing for us to construe. Therefore, reference to Section 88 appears to us to be misplaced. 61. We notice that the second prayer is addressed, in fact, against the Chairman of the Nigam; but, we have already noticed that there is no demand made as such to the Chairman. We have also discussed that, even proceeding on the basis that the copy given to the Secretary must be treated as a representation addressed to the Chairman, petitioners may not have a case in law. 62. The argument of Mr. Bhagwat Mehra, learned counsel appearing for the fourth petitioner, about the power to revert the Managing Director being vested with the State Government also does not appeal to us in the facts of the case in view of the discussion we have made regarding merits of the matter. 63. Regarding the binding effect of rulings of the Apex Court, Mr. M.C. Pant also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in South Central Railway Employees Cooperative Credit Society Employees Union vs. B. Yashodabai & others, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 727 . Therein, the Apex Court had declared that there was no provision for giving benefit of reservation to the employees of the society; but, thereafter, ignoring the said judgment on the ground that certain points were not argued before the Apex Court, the High Court purported to take a different view. Therein, the Apex Court had declared that there was no provision for giving benefit of reservation to the employees of the society; but, thereafter, ignoring the said judgment on the ground that certain points were not argued before the Apex Court, the High Court purported to take a different view. It was, in the said context, that the Apex Court held as follows: “Once in pursuance of a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court orders had been issued by the Society concerned to its employees who had been wrongly promoted, the High Court could not have held that the orders were not valid because there were certain other factors which had made the promotions given to the employees concerned valid. The High Court should not have considered any other factor especially when the Supreme Court had come to a final conclusion that the policy with regard to reservation in the matter of promotion to the employees was not legal and proper. It was not open to the High Court to hold that the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society Employees’ Union case was per incuriam.” 64. We are of the view that, in view of the discussion that we have rendered, this judgment, in our humble view, would not assist the petitioners, as this is not a case, where we are purporting not to give effect to the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajesh Kumar’s case; but, we have only expounded the effect of the subsequent pronouncement by this Court, where there was a direct challenge raised to the provision and the effect of the same. It is, no doubt, brought to our notice that Special Leave Petitions are pending against it; but, we must proceed on the basis of the said judgment as things stand. 65. Mr. M.C. Pant also drew our attention to a judgment of the Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 690 of 2015 and connected cases. In the said case, the Apex Court, no doubt, has taken the view that Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) are enabling provisions only and a writ petition will not lie to take a step towards the framing of a rule or a regulation for the purpose of reservation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the matter of promotion. 66. In the said case, the Apex Court, no doubt, has taken the view that Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) are enabling provisions only and a writ petition will not lie to take a step towards the framing of a rule or a regulation for the purpose of reservation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the matter of promotion. 66. In the circumstances, we do not think that the petitioners have made out any case for issuance of any direction. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. 67. Even though Mr. M.C. Pant sought certificate for leave to appeal under Article 134A, we do not think that the learned counsel has made out a case for grant of such certificate. We, accordingly, decline the said request.