ORDER : Veerender Singh Siradhana, J. 1. On an intra-court appeal involving the same recruitment process while setting aside the judgment and order made by the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench, directed the respondents to offer letter of appointment to the petitioner-appellant (Prahlad Rai Regar). The petitioner, having learnt about the opinion of the Division Bench aforesaid, has again instituted the present writ proceedings before this Court praying for the following reliefs:- "(a) That by appropriate writ, order, direction, and instructions it be declared that petitioner is more meritorious than Sh. Prahlad Ray and he be given appointment on the post of Stenographer (Hindi) in pursuance of the advertisement w.e.f. the date Sh. Prahlad Ray has been given appointment with all consequential benefits. (b) That any other appropriate writ, order or direction which may be considered just and proper in the circumstances of the case may kindly be issued in favour of the petitioner. (c) Cost of writ petition be allowed to the humble petitioner." 2. Shorn off unnecessary details, the skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised herein are that the petitioner submitted his application for consideration of his candidature for appointment to the post of Stenographer (Hindi), in response to the advertisement issued by the respondent number 2 (Jaipur Development Authority), in the year 1996. As a consequence of the recruitment process, a composite list of 21 successful candidates was prepared and published. However, no information was disclosed with reference to the waiting list. It is pleaded case of the petitioner that in response to an application under Right to Information Act, 2005, the petitioner was informed on 20th September, 2007, that out of 21 selected candidates, 5 candidates did not join, and therefore, the posts remained vacant. On institution of Civil Writ Petition Number 1330 of 2008 by the petitioner, the matter was disposed off at the motion stage on 14th February, 2008. The intra-court appeal preferred was also dismissed on 16th July, 2008. It is only in the backdrop of the judgment and order made by the Division Bench in the case of Prahlad Rai Regar (supra), the petitioner learnt about the factual aspect of the posts remained vacant, and therefore, has instituted the instant writ proceedings again. 3. The intra-court appeal preferred was also dismissed on 16th July, 2008. It is only in the backdrop of the judgment and order made by the Division Bench in the case of Prahlad Rai Regar (supra), the petitioner learnt about the factual aspect of the posts remained vacant, and therefore, has instituted the instant writ proceedings again. 3. In response to the notice of the writ application, respondent number 2 (Jaipur Development Authority), has filed its counter affidavit raising preliminary objections as to the very maintainability of the writ application for the controversy raised is between the same parties and substantially on the same subject matter, which has attained the finality in the backdrop of the orders dated 14th February, 2008 and 16th July, 2008, on the proceedings instituted by the petitioner. The respondent has also pleaded the fact of delay and laches for the earlier writ application was instituted in the year 2008 and the present writ application, on the same set of facts has been instituted in the year 2011. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. C.P. Sharma, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, has vehemently argued that the claim of the petitioner cannot be defeated on the ground of delay and laches so also on the ground of res-judicata. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Another v. M/s. National Construction Company, Bombay & Another, AIR 1996 SC 2367 (1); Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal (dead) L.Rs. Viz. Smt. Jaiwanti & Others, AIR 1989 SC 1764 ; Hoshank Singh v. Union of India & Others, AIR 1979 SC 1328 and B. Prabhakar Rao & Others v. State of A.P. & Others, AIR 1986 SC 210 (1). 5. According to the learned counsel, if the writ application is disposed of in limine without any speaking order, such an issue will not be barred by the principle of res-judicata. Learned counsel would further submit that dismissal in limine and dismissal on the ground of delay and laches or for availability of alternative remedy would also not operate as res-judicata. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 7. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 7. Indisputably, the petitioner did agitate the matter involving the same recruitment process of the year 1996-97 by institution of Civil Writ Petition Number 1330 of 2008 (Mahesh Shukla v. Jaipur Development Authority & Others), which was disposed off on 14th February, 2008. At this juncture, it will be relevant to consider the text of the order dated 14th February, 2008, which reads thus:- "The petitioner had appeared in the interview as back as in the year 1997 and, thereafter, he was not given any appointment order. In para 5 of the writ petition, the petitioner has averred that he had asked the respondents to publish the waiting list so prepared which was not published. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had appeared in the interview way back in the year 1997 and, now, he has approached this Court in the year 2008. Even otherwise, a person who is in the waiting list has no right to get the appointment and the same cannot be a ground for challenge. Otherwise also, the claim of the petitioner is too stale to be considered. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that after applying for the information under the Right to Information Act, the petitioner came to know that the waiting list is kept in sealed cover. Even if that is so, the fact remains that after 1997 the petitioner did not move in the matter for so long time, therefore, such a stale claim can never be considered by this Court. In the future, however, if advertisement is given for the post the petitioner may apply for the same and may represent his claim before the respondents. Subject to what is stated above, the writ petition is disposed of." 8. Aggrieved of the order passed by the Coordinate Bench on 14th February, 2008, the petitioner instituted an intra-court appeal (Civil Special (Writ) Number 1166 of 2008). The Division Bench while declining the intra-court appeal, held thus:- "Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the order impugned. Subject to what is stated above, the writ petition is disposed of." 8. Aggrieved of the order passed by the Coordinate Bench on 14th February, 2008, the petitioner instituted an intra-court appeal (Civil Special (Writ) Number 1166 of 2008). The Division Bench while declining the intra-court appeal, held thus:- "Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the order impugned. By filing the writ application by the appellant, a prayer was made to direct the authorities of the JDA to issue appointment letter to the writ petitioner as his name was included in the waiting-list and the same was kept under sealed cover. The learned Single Judge of this Court, on appreciation of the pleadings of the petitioner, held that the writ application firstly was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches inasmuch as the writ application was filed in the year 2008 where the cause of action had arisen in the year 1997. Secondly, it was held that the life of the waiting-list could not remain alive for ten years and the posts, in case, are advertised the writ petitioner may apply for the same. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioner had applied and was interviewed as far back as in the year 1997 and he approached this Court for necessary relief in the year 2008. It is submitted by the learned counsel that since the waiting list was kept under sealed cover, the petitioner has a right for asking for the appointment out of the waiting list. Ordinarily, life of a waiting list remains for one year and in no manner the same can be kept alive for years together. The waiting list which was prepared in the year 1997, by now, has became stale and inoperative. The learned Single Judge of this Court in this background of the case was fully justified in not granting the relief to the writ petitioner. For the reasons aforementioned, we find no merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed." 9. In the case of B. Prabhakar Rao & Others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue of res-judicata in the backdrop of the factual context wherein the Government of Andhra Pradesh decided to reduce the age of superannuation of its employees from 58' to 55' years. The same is accordingly dismissed." 9. In the case of B. Prabhakar Rao & Others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue of res-judicata in the backdrop of the factual context wherein the Government of Andhra Pradesh decided to reduce the age of superannuation of its employees from 58' to 55' years. The Government also issued directives to local authorities and public corporations under its control to do likewise. While making an amendment in the relevant Rules, the figure 55' was substituted for figure 58' for those who had already attained the age of 55 years and were continuing in service beyond that age on 8.2.1983 shall retire from service on the afternoon of 28.2.1983. Immediately after notification reducing the age of superannuation, large number of government employees, employees of public sector, corporations and teachers working under various local authorities instituted writ petitions before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the vires of the provisions reducing the age of superannuation. The judgment on the writ applications was reserved on 27th July, 1983, and was pronounced on 18th January, 1985, dismissing the writ petitions. However, in the meantime, there were amendments to the legislation; once more raising the age of superannuation. Though the subsequent events were brought to the notice of the Court with a prayer to raise additional grounds, however, the Court declined to take note of the subsequent events and pronounced the judgment with reference to the situation, which obtained at the relevant time. Thus, it was in those singular facts and factual matrix, the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land observed that the writ petitions similar in nature, which were filed earlier, had been dismissed in limine, would not constitute a bar by virtue of principle of res-judicata, which is not the case at hand. 10. In the case of State of Maharashtra & Another (supra), while dealing with the dismissal of the suit and subsequent appeal on technical grounds, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "6. We may first dispose of the plea based on Section 11, Explanation IV, of the Code. That section deals with the doctrine of res judicata and provides that any matter which might or ought to have been made a ground for defence or attack in the former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. That section deals with the doctrine of res judicata and provides that any matter which might or ought to have been made a ground for defence or attack in the former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Since the plea of res judicata can be disposed of on a narrow ground, it is not necessary to examine the ambit of Explanation IV. The main text of Section 11 reads thus: Section. 11 Res Judicata - No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The important words are "has been heard and finally decided". The bar applies only if the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit has been heard and finally decided by a Court competent to try such suit. That clearly means that on the matter or issue in question there has been an application of the judicial mind and a final adjudication made. If the former suit is dismissed without any adjudication on the matter in issue merely on a technical ground of non-joinder, that cannot operate as res judicata. 7. In its impugned order, the High Court of Bombay has taken note of the fact that the Short Cause Suit was dismissed on the technical ground of non-joinder of a necessary party i.e. the contractor. It has, however, stressed the fact that in the appeal against the Order of the lower Court, the appellants had made the contractor a party and yet the appeal was dismissed. The High Court has relied on this fact to come to the conclusion that the second suit was barred by res judicata. However, the High Court did not take note of the fact that in rejecting the appeal, the appellate Court had held that the suit was bad since there was no adjudication or legal determination of the plaintiffs dues and, for this reason, the suit was not maintainable against the 2nd Defendant only. However, the High Court did not take note of the fact that in rejecting the appeal, the appellate Court had held that the suit was bad since there was no adjudication or legal determination of the plaintiffs dues and, for this reason, the suit was not maintainable against the 2nd Defendant only. The High Court, therefore, failed to take note of the fact that the appellate Court did not consider the merits of the case, but confirmed the dismissal of the suit by the lower court on a technical ground. 8. This statement of the law by the High Court is, with respect, incorrect in view of the decision of this Court in Sheodhan Singh v. Daryao Kuanwar, (1966) 3 SCR 300 where, while considering the meaning of the words "heard and finally decided", used in Section 11 of the Code, it was held: "correct emphasis supplied (according to source) of jurisdiction...or on the ground of non-joinder of parties...and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision, not being on the merits, would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit." (Emphasis supplied) This Court in its recent decision, Ignacio Martins vs. Narayan Hari Naik, (1993) 3 SCC has reiterated this proposition. It is, therefore, clear that the dismissal of the Short Cause Suit and the subsequent appeal could not have operated as a bar to Spl. Civil Suit No. 27/83. The plea based on the principle of res judicata fails." 11. A glance of the factual matrix of the case aforesaid would reveal that the issue was with reference to the first suit that was filed to enforce bank guarantee and the second suit was claiming damages for breach of contract relating to which bank guarantee was given. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the relief in the first suit was based on different cause of action from that upon which relief in subsequent suit was founded while considering the mandate of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, the opinion is clearly distinguishable and is of no help to the petitioner. 12. In the case of Smt. Pujari Bai etc. Thus, the opinion is clearly distinguishable and is of no help to the petitioner. 12. In the case of Smt. Pujari Bai etc. (supra), while explaining the scope of dismissal in limine or dismissal on the ground of delay or laches or availability of alternative remedy, the observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the backdrop of factual matrix wherein the appellant (Smt. Pujari Bai), who migrated from Pakistan in 1947 after the partition of the country leaving a larger area of agricultural land in Pakistan, was allotted certain lands in Village Urdan under Rule 68 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. However, the defendant-respondent therein, who too migrated from Pakistan like Smt. Pujari Bai, was also allotted some land, but no entry could be made in the revenue record. Even in the objection filed by the defendant-respondent therein, Smt. Pujari Bai was not impleaded as a party. So also, to the writ proceedings, Smt. Pujari Bai was not a party. Thus, it was in those factual matrix, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the observations under paragraph 23 and 24, which reads thus:- "23. This takes us to the question of res judicata. The question is whether the suit of the appellant was barred by res judicata in view of the summary dismissal of her writ petition earlier. It is not disputed that the writ petition filed by the appellant against the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer was dismissed in limine. This order dated 14-4-1969 was passed by the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court. It was a one word order. The question of res judicata apparently arises when a controversy or an issue between the parties has been heard and decided. This Court in Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust, (1978) II LLJ 161 SC considered this principle and observed (at p. 977) (of SCR) : (at p. 1287-1288 of AIR): "But the technical rule of res judicata although a wholesome rule based upon public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. It is not safe to extend the principle of res judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guess work. It is not safe to extend the principle of res judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guess work. To illustrate our view point, we may lake an example. Suppose a writ petition is filed in a High Court for grant of a writ of certiorari to challenge some order or decision on several grounds. If the writ petition is dismissed after contest by a speaking order obviously it will operate as res judicata in any other proceeding, such as, of suit, Article 32 or Article 136 directed from the same order or decision. If the writ petition is dismissed by a speaking order either at the threshold or after contest, say, only on the ground of laches or the availability of an alternative remedy, then another remedy open in law either by way of suit or any other proceeding obviously will not be barred on the principle of res judicata." 24. It thus becomes clear that when a writ petition after contest is disposed of on merits by a speaking order, the question decided in that petition would operate as res judicata, but not a dismissal in limine or dismissal on the ground of laches or availability of alternative remedy. The High Court and the courts below, therefore, were not right in throwing out the suit of the appellant on the ground of res judicata." 13. The facts of the case at hand are entirely different and distinguishable from the case referred to and relied upon. 14. In the case of Hoshnak Singh (supra), which was a case of displaced person from West Pakistan, who was allotted land measuring 32 1/2 standard acres in Village Daultpur, Tehsil Pathankot, District Gurdaspur and the land was acquired for construction of railway line. Further, for setting up a housing colony for rehabilitating some refugees from Mirpur (Kashmir), the land comprising 7.88 acres was acquired, which included a part of land that was allotted to the appellant (Hoshnak Singh). The claim for the compensation was declined on the ground of reference made from Evacuee Property Department accepted and the permanent settlement rights conferred in favour of the appellant therein, were cancelled and the land was described as ghair mumkin abadi and was not allotted on permanent settlement as agricultural land against the verified claim of the appellant. The claim for the compensation was declined on the ground of reference made from Evacuee Property Department accepted and the permanent settlement rights conferred in favour of the appellant therein, were cancelled and the land was described as ghair mumkin abadi and was not allotted on permanent settlement as agricultural land against the verified claim of the appellant. The question of correctness was dismissed in limine on 22nd March, 1961, by the High Court in Writ Petition Number 559 of 61. The subsequent writ proceedings instituted were resisted on the ground of principle analogous to res-judicata and thus, the matter travelled upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the backdrop of the factual matrix aforesaid. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "8. If after preferring an appeal or revision under the statute under which the right is claimed by the Petitioner a petition under Article 226 is filed irrespective of the fact that the revision or appeal was dismissed and the original order which was challenged in the first petition had merged into the appellate or revisional order, nonetheless the second petition in the circumstances would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata because the cause of action is entirely different and the merger of the order cannot stand in the way of the Petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. 9. In the leading case of Daryao v. State of U.P. (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457 this Court in terms said that if the petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to the subsequent petition under Article 32 except in cases where the facts found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Article 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would be a bar; if the order says that the dismissal was for the reason that the Petitioner was guilty of laches or that he had an alternative remedy it would not be a bar except in cases indicated in the judgment. Then comes an observation which may better be quoted (at p. 1466 of AIR): If the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all, but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and that makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Article 32. 10. In Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. The Government of Madras, (1968) 2 SCR 740 : AIR 1968 SC 1196 , rejecting the contention that if the petition under Article 226 is dismissed without issuing a notice to the other side though by a speaking order such a dismissal would not bar the subsequent petition for same cause of action or for the same relief, it was observed that this Court in Daryao's case did not mean to lay down that if the petition is dismissed in limine without notice to the opposite side it would not bar a subsequent petition this Court only ruled that if the petition is dismissed in limine but with a speaking order which order itself indicates that the petition was dismissed on merits, the absence of notice to other side by itself would not be sufficient to negative the plea of res judicata in a subsequent petition in respect of the same cause of action. However, while negativing the contention on the facts of the case this Court re-affirmed that if the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such a dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. Similarly, in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2 SCR 824 : AIR 1970 SC 898 a majority of the Judges affirmed the ratio in Daryao's case that if a petition under Article 226 is dismissed not on merits but because an alternative remedy was available to the Petitioner or that the petition was dismissed in limine without a speaking order such dismissal is not a bar to the subsequent petition under Article 32. It must follow as a necessary corollary that a subsequent petition under Article 226 would not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata. Re-affirming the view taken on this point in Daryao's case, in P.D. Sharma v. State Bank of India, (1968) 3 SCR 91 : AIR 1968 SC 985 , the preliminary objection about the bar of res judicata was negatived. It is, therefore, incontrovertible that where a petition under Article 226 is dismissed in limine without a speaking order such a dismissal would not constitute a bar of res judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action, more so, when on the facts in this case it appears that the petition was dismissed presumably because the Petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of a revision petition under Section 33 of the 1954 Act which remedy he availed of and after failure to get the relief he moved the High Court again for the relief. It would be incorrect in such a situation to dismiss the petition on the ground that the order made by the revisional authority dismissing the revision petition had the effect of merging the original order against which the revision was preferred with the order made by the revisional authority and, therefore, the challenge on the fresh cause of action to the order made by the revisional authority would of necessity be a challenge to the original order also and the petition would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata as the first order had become final. The High Court was clearly in error in dismissing the petition on this short ground." 15. The High Court was clearly in error in dismissing the petition on this short ground." 15. A glance of the factual matrix of the case at hand would reveal that the Coordinate Bench of this Court on institution of the earlier writ proceedings did take note of the fact that the petitioner participated in the recruitment process, which dates back to the year 1996-97 and instituted the writ proceedings in the year 2008. While taking into consideration of the issue of waiting list and a stale claim, specific reasoning on the merits of the case was recorded for the recruitment process, which stood concluded in the year 1997, was not complained of until institution of the writ application in the year 2008. The adjudication made by the learned Single Judge was confirmed by the Division Bench in the intra-court appeal on 16th July, 2008, which has attained finality as the same was not subjected to any further challenge. 16. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent-JDA also informed this Court that the petitioner having learnt about the opinion of the Division Bench in the case of Prahlad Rai Regar (supra), did institute Civil Review Petition Number 05111 of 2010, which was dismissed on 22nd February, 2011, holding thus: "For stated reasons, application for condonation of delay in filing review petition is allowed. Delay in filing review petition is condoned. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. This review petition is wholly misconceived. It has been filed on the ground that in identical matter a coordinate Division Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 14.12.2009, allowed Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1095/2006 - Prahlad Rai Regar v. State of Rajasthan and Another, filed by writ petitioner therein. Division Bench in present matter has dismissed the appeal concurring with view taken by learned Single Judge that writ petition was filed in the year 2008 whereas cause of action arose to petitioner in 1997. It was only alternatively observed that life of waiting list could not remain alive for ten years. The parity cannot be claimed on the ground that writ petition of Prahlad Rai Regar has been allowed. Prahlad Rai Rear filed writ petition in the year 1997 whereas admittedly present petitioner filed writ petition in the year 2008. Petition thus was liable to be dismissed for reason of delay and laches. The parity cannot be claimed on the ground that writ petition of Prahlad Rai Regar has been allowed. Prahlad Rai Rear filed writ petition in the year 1997 whereas admittedly present petitioner filed writ petition in the year 2008. Petition thus was liable to be dismissed for reason of delay and laches. In any case, we do not find any merit in review petition. It is dismissed." 17. In the case of Technical Teachers Training Institute v. C. Balasubramaniam, (2007) 15 SCC 722, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the issue of delay and laches so also with the principle that final adjudication binds the parties held thus: "11. The facts that are not in dispute are that the respondent was removed from service on 25-2-1982. The civil suit filed by him was dismissed. The respondent challenged the order of his removal from service in Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982, which was also dismissed on 15-12-1986. Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987 filed against the said order of the learned Single Judge was also dismissed on 16-2-1987. The order passed in the writ appeal, aforementioned, was not challenged further. 12. The respondent raised industrial dispute almost after a period of twelve years from the date of his removal from service and seven years after the Division Bench of the High Court passed the order dismissing the writ appeal in which challenge to his removal from service was involved. The said order passed by the Division Bench has attained finality, that having not been challenged any further. 13. The amendment to Section 2-A of the Act by Tamil Nadu Act 5 of 1988 came into force on 1-11-1988. The removal from service of the respondent was in the year 1982. In the light of these admitted facts, we are of the view that the High Court was not right and justified in saying that the Labour Court should proceed with the adjudication of the dispute and the appellant should urge all the contentions, that were sought to be urged before the Division Bench of the High Court, before the Labour Court. The respondent chose to approach the High Court challenging the order of his removal from service and he also took up the matter further in writ appeal unsuccessfully. It is not a case where the respondent withdrew the writ appeal with a view to approach the Labour Court. The respondent chose to approach the High Court challenging the order of his removal from service and he also took up the matter further in writ appeal unsuccessfully. It is not a case where the respondent withdrew the writ appeal with a view to approach the Labour Court. He, having allowed the order passed by the Division Bench in writ appeal to become final, cannot be allowed to re- agitate the matter and question the very validity of his removal from service. 14. It is well settled that the decision inter parties which has become final binds the parties. Apart from all other questions, the respondent having suffered the order, which has become final, cannot be permitted to reopen the case again questioning the very validity of his removal from service of for that matter question the quantum of punishment. 15. One more factor to be kept in view is that although limitation may not be pleaded as a bar but his conduct of approaching the Labour Court after twelve years after his removal from service and seven years after the Division Bench passed the order cannot be ignored. Merely because the Tamil Nadu amendment to Section 2-A of the Act came into force on 1-11-1988, it was not open to the respondent to approach the Labour Court for raising an industrial dispute. If the plea of the respondent is allowed, it may give rise to a situation where the Labour Court even may have to examine the validity of the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court which has become final. We are of the view that it cannot be permitted to happen. 16. Thus, viewed from any angle, these appeals are entitled to succeed. Hence, the impugned judgment is set aside and Writ Petition No. 9152 of 1995 filed by the appellant is allowed and the writ of prohibition, as sought for, is granted. No costs." 18. We are of the view that it cannot be permitted to happen. 16. Thus, viewed from any angle, these appeals are entitled to succeed. Hence, the impugned judgment is set aside and Writ Petition No. 9152 of 1995 filed by the appellant is allowed and the writ of prohibition, as sought for, is granted. No costs." 18. In the case of Shankara Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. M. Prabhakar & Others, (2011) 5 SCC 607 ; the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the scope of maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the backdrop of the principle of res-judicata and finality of orders taking into consideration the fact that the delay and laches is one of the factor for refusal to exercise discretionary powers under Article 226, held thus: "46. Re: Delay and Laches: Delay and laches is one of the factors that requires to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances." 54. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the Petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the Petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the Petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the Petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay." 19. It is evident that in the earlier round of litigation, the Coordinate Bench of this Court while declining to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India observed that even if, the information made available to the petitioner under the Right to Information Act, 2005, the fact remains that after 1997 the petitioner did not move in the matter for so long time, therefore, such a stale claim can never be considered by this Court. The view of the learned Single Judge was confirmed by the Division Bench in the intra-court appeal, which was dismissed on 16th July, 2008. Furthermore, even the Review Petition that was instituted in the backdrop of the opinion of the Division Bench in the case of Prahlad Rai Regar (supra), was also declined on 22nd February, 2011, which has attained finality without challenge any further. 20. In the case of Raj Rishi Mehra & Others v. State of Punjab & Another, (2013) 12 SCC 243 , on a survey of earlier opinions while explaining the scope of waiting list and the right of the candidates whose names are included therein; the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "16. The question whether the candidates whose names are included in the waiting list are entitled to be appointed against the unfilled posts as of right is no longer res integra and must be answered in negative in view of the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 84, Gujarat State Dy. The question whether the candidates whose names are included in the waiting list are entitled to be appointed against the unfilled posts as of right is no longer res integra and must be answered in negative in view of the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 84, Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat and Others, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591, State of Bihar v. Secretariat Assistant Successful Examinees Union 1986 and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 126 , Prem Singh and Others v. Haryana SEB and Others, (1996) 4 SCC 319 , Ashok Kumar and Others v. Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment Board and Others, (1996) 1 SCC 283 , Surinder Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another, (1997) 8 SCC 488 , Madan Lal and Others v. State of J and K and Others, (1995) 3 SCC 486 , Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta and Others, (1998) 3 SCC 45 , State of J and K and Others v. Sanjeev Kumar and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 148 , State of U.P. and Others v. Rajkumar Sharma and Others, (2006) 3 SCC 330 , Ram Avtar Patwari and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, (2007) 10 SCC 94 and Rakhi Ray and Others v. High Court of Delhi and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 637 . 17. In Surinder Singh's case, this Court observed as under: A waiting list prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the person from the waiting list may be pushed up and be appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice, may result in depriving those candidates who become eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice, may result in depriving those candidates who become eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as an infinite stock for appointments, there is a danger that the State Government may resort to the device of not holding an examination for years together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The constitutional discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and perpetrate waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from service. 19. In Rakhi Ray's case, this Court referred to a number of judicial precedents and held: It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as "the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16 (1) of the Constitution" of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to "improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated from and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rationale", otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, is not permissible in law." 21. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ petition is devoid of any substance and lacks in merit, and therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 22. Ordered accordingly. 23. In view of the final adjudication on the writ application, the stay application stands closed. 24. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.