JUDGMENT : This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Aska (as it was then) in Title Suit No. 32 of 1977. The original respondent no.1 as the plaintiff had filed the suit for recovery of possession of the property described under Item Nos. A and B of the schedule appended to the plaint by evicting the defendant nos. 1 to 5 who are the appellants in the present appeal followed by grant of mesne profit. The suit having been decreed, granting the reliefs as mentioned hereunder to the plaintiff who was the original respondent no.1 in this appeal, the defendant nos. 1 to 5 as the appellants being aggrieved by it have filed this appeal. It is pertinent to state here that during the pendency of this appeal, the original plaintiff having died, his legal representatives have been substituted and they are now contesting the appeal. The order of the trial court runs as under :- (a) Plaintiff along with defendant nos. 6 and 7 are entitled to recover of possession of the suit properties described in schedule A and B of the plaint. The defendant nos. 1 to 5 are directed to give vacant possession of the land and house described in schedule A and B of the plaint to the plaintiff and defendant nos. 6 and 7 within two months from the date of decree failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to take delivery of possession of the same through court. (b) Plaintiff and defendant nos. 6 and 7 are also entitled to mense profits from the date of institution of the suit till the date of recovery of possession which has to be determined at the time of execution by appointing a Commissioner. 2. For the sake of convenience, in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the trial court. 3. The plaintiff’s case is that one Pindika had two sons namely Tarini and Raghunath. Ganesh and the plaintiff are the two sons of Raghunath. The branch of Ganesh is represented by the defendant nos. 6 and 7 who are now the respondent nos. 2 and 3. 3. The plaintiff’s case is that one Pindika had two sons namely Tarini and Raghunath. Ganesh and the plaintiff are the two sons of Raghunath. The branch of Ganesh is represented by the defendant nos. 6 and 7 who are now the respondent nos. 2 and 3. Tarini, the other son of Raghunath is said to have gone after marriage to the village of his father-in-law as his wife, namely, Khalli got the suit property from her mother, Chinamali. Said Chinamali had also executed one deed of gift in favour of Khalli on 19.11.1916. Thus, Khalli and Tarini possessed the land in question. They had one son namely, Trilochana who is said to have been adopted by Chinamali. Khalli died in the year 1954 and the death of Tarini took place in the year 1967. It is stated that in the year 1954, defendant no.2 came to pose himself as the adopted son of Tarini and accordingly attempted to alienate some properties. So, the Suit bearing No. 67 of 1958 was instituted. In that suit Tarini claimed to have adopted Seshadev, the defendant no.1 who is the son of Trilochan and asserted his status that as that of his son. The suit however did not succeed and finding was recorded that Seshadev was not adopted by Tarini. The appeal being filed by Tarini went in vain. Upon death of Tarini, the plaintiff tried to get back the property as the successor of Tarini along with defendant nos. 6 and 7. But he did not succeed in his attempt. As these defendants 1 to 5 were in forcibly possession of the property, the present suit has been filed for the reliefs of recovery of possession claiming that the plaintiff along with defendant nos. 6 and 7 are entitled to possess the suit land. 4. Defendant nos. 1, 3 and 4 contested the suit by filing their joint written statement whereas the defendant no.2 filed his separate written statement. However, they remained together so far as their defence is concerned. It is placed by them that Seshadev was adopted by Tarini who was not in possession of the suit property. It is stated that after the death of Khalli in the year 1954, the suit land was in possession of Trilochan and thereafter defendant no. However, they remained together so far as their defence is concerned. It is placed by them that Seshadev was adopted by Tarini who was not in possession of the suit property. It is stated that after the death of Khalli in the year 1954, the suit land was in possession of Trilochan and thereafter defendant no. 2 possessed the same through the power of attorney holder namely, Ananta Bisoi for some time and then he took over the possession of the suit property and thereafter with his mother, the defendant no.1, he has been in possession as such. It is stated that most of the land of Khalli had been sold to several persons and they have thus acquired the title over respective purchased properties. It is said that Khalli was having the limited interest over the suit property covered under the gift deed, Ext.E, and after his death it would be by her son’s son since it has not been indicated in the deed of gift that after the death of Khalli the property would flow to the hands of Tarini. Defendant nos. 4 to 7 have not filed their written statement. 5. Faced with above rival pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is the reversioner of Tarini Panda and has he any manner of right, title and interest over the suit lands? 2. Whether Tarini Panda had any right on possession over the suit lands at any time ? 3. Whether the plaintiff’s claim if any is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the judgment in T.S. No. 57 of 1958 is binding on the defendants 1 and 3 to 5? 5. Whether defendant no.2 is the adopted son of Tarini Panda? 6. Has proper court fee been paid ? 7. To what relief or reliefs is the plaintiff entitled? Having taken up issue no.1 first for decision, answer has been recorded that Tarini had the right, title and interest over the suit property till his death. Next going to decide the issue no.2, it has been found that the suit property was in possession of Tarini although during his life time. Having taken up issue no.1 first for decision, answer has been recorded that Tarini had the right, title and interest over the suit property till his death. Next going to decide the issue no.2, it has been found that the suit property was in possession of Tarini although during his life time. So far as issue no.4 is concerned, answer has been that the defendant no.2 is estopped from saying that he was the adopted son of Tarini as it has already been held in the negative in the earlier suit i.e. T.S. No. 57 of 1958 which stood further confirmed in the appeal, the issue is no more open to be re-agitated. The issue no.5 concerning the claim of defendant no.2 as the adopted son of Tarini, upon examination of evidence, the decision has been given that there was no such adoption. The technical objection regarding payment of proper court fees has been overruled and then lastly going to find out the reliefs that the plaintiff is entitled to get, those as stated above have been allowed. 6. In this appeal finding of the trial court as above noted have been challenged mainly on the following grounds:- (i) That the plaintiff has failed to prove that Raghunath Panda is the brother of Tarini Panda and consequently he failed to prove his status as a reversioner of Tarini, and as such he is not entitled to the suit properties; (ii) That learned lower court acted under a misconception of Law and failed, in this case to apply the principles of Hindu Law, as referred to in para 401 at pages 472 and 473 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (1978 Edition). The correct position of law is that “If a gift is made to a female who is the mother, daughter etc., the same passes a limited estate, and later the property passes to the donor’s heirs in the absence of any son or sons’ son of the donee. The correct position of law is that “If a gift is made to a female who is the mother, daughter etc., the same passes a limited estate, and later the property passes to the donor’s heirs in the absence of any son or sons’ son of the donee. Accordingly, the property in the case has to revert back to the donor Chinamali’s adopted son Trilochan and then Sasadeva in the absence of any son or son’s son of Khalli, the donee, i.e., in case of failure of adoption; (iii) That the lower court ought to have held that Sasadeva is the adopted son of Tarini Panda on the basis of overwhelming evidence on record; (iv) That the plaintiff-respondent has failed to disprove the adoption of Sasadeva and consequently failed to discharge the burden which is heavily lie upon him; (v) That the appellant Sasadeva Panda is treated as an adopted son since 1952 and so the burden rests heavily upon the plaintiff to disprove the same and the lower court ought to have applied the principles enunciated in AIR 1969 S.C.1359 and AIR 1976 Orissa 43, so as to uphold his adoption; (vi) That the lower court failed to construe the gift correctly and ought to have declared that Sasadeva is entitled to the suit properties according to the terms of the gift Ext.E by Chinamali to Khalli and its effect; (vii) That the learned lower court ought to have held that Chinamali made the gift with a stipulation that Khalli would have life interest and that would with vest in favour of her sons and Tarini is totally excluded. Trilochan being given in adoption to Chinamali, the gift fails. Trilochan being given in adoption to Chinamali, the gift fails. So the property will revert back to the donor’s heirs; (viii) That the appellant Sasadeva admittedly possessed and enjoyed the suit properties for over the statutory period and acquired full ownership even if his adoption fails; (ix) That the lower court ought to have held that the suit is barred by time as plaintiff has failed to claim immediately on the death of Khalli when reversion opened; (x) That the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove possession of suit properties by Tarini from 1954 till his death in 1967 or at any time and the finding of the lower court that Tarini was in possession is wrong and based upon improper appreciation of evidence and law; (xi) That the suit ought to have been dismissed in any view of the matter as the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief; and (xii) That in any event, Trilochan as heir of Khalli or as heir of Chinamali has been in rightful possession of the suit properties and after his death, his son Sasadeva and other appellants are entitled to the suit properties and the plaintiff is not entitled to the suit properties in any capacity; 7. Learned counsel for the appellant at the time of hearing of the appeal however confines his submission centering round the finding on issue nos. 4 and 5 attacking the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on the sole point that accepting the case of the plaintiff in its entirety, under no circumstance, the plaintiff could have been held entitled to the relief of recovery the suit property as prayed for and would have been so granted since he as also defendant nos. 6 and 7 are not having any right, title and interest over the same. It is his contention that the deed of gift executed by Chinamali in favour of Khalli, the donee has to be held to be a limited one clothing the donee with limited interest over the gifted property to Khalli to hold the property till her death as such and upon her death the property has to revert back to the heirs of the last male owner i.e. Khalli’s father. It is contended that said Khalli had only the limited interest over the property; so the gift of the property by the holder of limited right does not have the sanction of law. Thus when the plaintiff and defendant nos. 6 and 7 are not coming as reversioners they have nothing to do with the suit property. Therefore, he contends that the suit as laid is liable to be dismissed on this ground and reason. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents submits all in favour of the findings recorded by the trial court. According to him, each of the issues have been answered by the trial court upon just and proper analysis of evidence in the back drop of the pleadings keeping the settled position of law in mind. It is contended that the trial court has rightly held that after the death of Khalli, the property came to the hands of Tarini, who possessed the same and therefore, there stands no legal obstacle or impediment for grant of the relief to the plaintiff. 9. Being faced with the above rival submissions when from the side of the appellants and also the respondents, the findings on all other issues save and except the question of subsistence of the right of Tarini over the suit land which was the land gifted to his wife Khalli by her mother after Khalli’s death and consequently the locustandie of the plaintiff to file the suit, are not challenged, only the following point stands for determination. (i) Whether the gift of the suit land made by the mother of Khalli in her favour had created an absolute interest in favour of Khalli or it was a limited interest that had been created thereby. In other words, whether, upon the death of Khalli, the property would pass on to her successor or it would revert back to the heirs of the mother of Khalli since Khalli left no children. In that situation whether Tarini, the husband of Khalli can come to stand as her heir as claimed. The above point was raised before the Trial Court and it has been practically dealt with under Issue No.1 at para-8 of judgment. It had been argued by the appellant that the deed of gift Ext.E is required to be strictly construed. In that situation whether Tarini, the husband of Khalli can come to stand as her heir as claimed. The above point was raised before the Trial Court and it has been practically dealt with under Issue No.1 at para-8 of judgment. It had been argued by the appellant that the deed of gift Ext.E is required to be strictly construed. It had been contended that specific term in the deed being that Khalli would enjoy the property without having any right to alienate or to pass it over by way of gift or Will and that thereafter it would be enjoyed by her sons and other heirs, it ought to be held that by such gift, merely limited right and interest stood conferred upon Khalli in respect of the gifted property by such gift executed by Khali's mother as the donor in favour of daughter standing as the donee. 10. In course of hearing of this appeal, also the point has been urged in that line by the learned counsel for the appellants, but in an elaborated manner referring to the relevant paras/provisions of the text of Hindu Law as it stood at the time the gift was made and also when Khali died. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent submits in counter that the deed of gift is indicative of the fact that Khalli's sons and other heirs would come to enjoy the property upon the death of Khalli, after clearly giving our a case of conferment of absolute right and interest over the gifted property in favour of Khalli. 12. In the instant case, a peculiar situation stands that Khalli died issueless and per-deceased her husband Tarini. A plain and simple reading being given to the relevant recitals of the deed of gift Ext.E, as those find mention, it is seen that the donor had intended that upon death of Kalli, the property would go to her sons and other heirs. This leads me to take a view that by such gift, Khalli was not conferred with the absolute right and interest over the property covered under the gift deed. The donor's intention being expressed as to who would come to own the gifted property on the death of Khalli, the right of Khalli to alienate is also seen to have been foreclosed. The donor's intention being expressed as to who would come to own the gifted property on the death of Khalli, the right of Khalli to alienate is also seen to have been foreclosed. Had it been the intention of the donor to confer absolute right or interest over the gifted property upon Khalli, first of all there was not at all the necessity or requirement to further indicate as to who would come to get it after Khalli's death which ordinarily would have come into play on their own and decided in accordance with law. The ordinary inference in that event would have been that that the succession to the property would be by Khalli's heirs as they would stand at the time of death, would come to succeed. But when it is indicated in the deed of gift as to what would happen to the property and on whom it would devolve after death of Khalli, there is no escape but to hold that Khalli was conferred with limited interest in respect of the gifted property and not the absolute. 13. Article-400 of the Old Hindu Law as it finds place in Mulla's Hindu Law (12th Edition) contains the heading-Gift and bequest to widows, daughters and other females with the sub-heading the absolute gift or limited gift. It reads that - "When a property is given to female by a deed of gift or Will, the question frequently arises whether the gift passes the estate of inheritance i.e. an absolute estate or merely a limited estate. If a gift made to a female that is mother, daughter, brother's daughter, sister etc. passes estate of inheritance, she could dispose of it at her pleasure but not if it passes for limited estate. In the former case the property passes on her death intestate to her Stridhan heirs. In the latter case, it passes to the donor's heir. If the gift passes an absolute estate, she can dispose of the property at her pleasure by act of inter vivos or by Will but not if it passes a limited estate. In the former case, the property passes on her death to her Stridhan heirs and in the latter case to her husband's heirs." 14. Whether a gift passes an absolute or limited estate depends on the terms of the grant in each case. In the former case, the property passes on her death to her Stridhan heirs and in the latter case to her husband's heirs." 14. Whether a gift passes an absolute or limited estate depends on the terms of the grant in each case. The Judicial Committee in an earlier case laid down that in construing the deed of gift or a Will made by a Hindu in favour of female relation, the Court was entitled to assume that a donor intended the donee to take a limited estate only, unless the contrary appeared from the deed or Will. The very basis of this rule was that the female in accordance with the rule as prevailing took a limited estate only in the property inherited by them from the males's relation and the donor must be presumed to have made the gift with that fact in mind. The Privy Council in Mahamed Shamsul V. Shewukaram; 14 Bom L R 226 held that -"In construing the Will of a Hindu, it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to the ordinary notion and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that Hindus know that, a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estate of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate. This was applied alike to all females who took a limited estate in the property inherited by them. However, a distinction was drawn taking into account the spirit of text cited in Article-141 that where a gift or device of immovable property was made by a husband to his wife, the presumption stands at first against a gift being absolute followed by consequential presumption that it passes a limited estate, unless by express words or necessary implication an absolute estate was expressed to be conveyed. In the latter case i.e. where a gift is made to other female relation i.e. mother, they did not in all cases start with that presumption. However, there was nothing in Mahamed Shamsul's case (supra) to justify this discussion. The rule there laid down purported to apply to all females who took a limited interest in the property inherited by them. In fact, the Judicial Committee in the case of Radha Prasad V. Ranee Mani (1908) 35 Cal. However, there was nothing in Mahamed Shamsul's case (supra) to justify this discussion. The rule there laid down purported to apply to all females who took a limited interest in the property inherited by them. In fact, the Judicial Committee in the case of Radha Prasad V. Ranee Mani (1908) 35 Cal. 896 applied the above whether the bequest was made to a daughter saying that they took limited estate only. In the given case one more question comes to mind that when gift was made, Khalli had no son and that state of affair continued till her death. So the donor's intention was that Khalli would enjoy the gifted property having limited right and interest during her life time and thereafter, her sons and others would get the same. Here the word 'others' has to be read in conjunction with the word 'sons' but not in disjunction and not bereft of the fact that by ‘others’ those are as meant only the son’s son’s son down the line of sons but no others having any status except only through sons of Khalli. So here is a case where after death of Khalli, none of the persons as intended by the donor came to enjoy the absolute right. Therefore, upon death of Khalli, the gifted property that she was enjoying would revert back to the heirs of the donor i.e. mother of Khalli so as to be accordingly succeeded. Thus, in that way these plaintiffs are not shown to be having any right over the suit property and the suit at their instance is not maintainable having no locus. Consequentially, it is held that they are having no nexus with the property, when also admittedly the property also does not remain in their possession. Thus, the finding of the trial Court on that score cannot be countenanced to and found to be unsustainable. Accordingly, it is held that the suit is not maintainable as laid and as such, is liable to be dismissed. The aforesaid discussion and reasons provide necessary answer to the point for determination as aforementioned which runs in favour of the appellants and against the respondents that they are liable to be non-suited. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are hereby set aside and the suit is accordingly dismissed. 15. In the result, the appeal stands allowed as above. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are hereby set aside and the suit is accordingly dismissed. 15. In the result, the appeal stands allowed as above. However, in the facts and circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout.