JUDGMENT : Both these miscellaneous petitions have been filed seeking condonation of delay of 529 and 516 days in filing the accompanying civil revision petitions, challenging the orders passed in I.A.No.17 of 2014 in O.S.No.182 of 2007 and the order passed in I.A.No.18 of 2014 in O.S.No.257 of 2007, respectively. The petitioner in both these miscellaneous petitions is the same individual, while the respondents are also common in the sense that in C.R.P.(SR)No.26676 of 2015 Smt. Lagula Parvatamma W/o late Nagaiah Goud, the first respondent is the plaintiff, while in C.R.P.(SR) No.26702 of 2015, Sri Lagula Krishnaiah Goud S/o late Nagaiah Goud is the first respondent plaintiff in the suit. Since the same question falls for consideration, both these petitions are heard together. I.A.No.17 of 2014 in O.S.No.182 of 2007 and I.A.No.18 of 2014 in O.S.No.257 of 2007 are both petitions which are moved in-turn seeking condonation of delay of 1169 days in filing applications to set-aside the exparte decree passed on 27.09.2010 in the suits concerned. Heard Sri H. Srinivasa Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Mrs. Pulipati Radhika, learned counsel for the respective petitioners and Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned senior counsel on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents. It is the contention of Sri H. Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners that it is not the length of delay what is of significance for consideration of the Court, but, the cause of justice must be promoted by condoning the delay adopting a liberal approach in that regard. Per contra, Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, would contend that, so long as there was no inaction on the part of a party, perhaps Court can consider condoning the delay but not otherwise. Section 5 of the Limitation Act which reads as under confers a discretion on the Court to condone the delay. “Section 5: Extension of prescribed period in certain cases: Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court comprising of Sir Arthur J.H. Collins (Kt)., Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Muttusami Ayyar in Krishnan (Plaintiff), Appellant vs. Chathappan (Defendant No2) respondent, has set the tone and tenor of the principle, which encompasses the expressions “sufficient cause”, when it observed as under: “……... We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafides is imputable to the appellant.” (emphasis is played by me) A three Judge bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Justice R.S. Bachawat has approvingly quoted the above ratio in paragraph 11 of the judgment rendered in Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari and others ( AIR 1969 SC 575 ), while concluding the issue as under: “……………. It is not a case where it is possible to impute to the appellant want of bonafides or such inaction or negligence as would deprive her of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act……” It is now a crystallized principle in our jurisprudence that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain or even a reasonable limit. Length of delay is, thus, not of significance, but what is most vital is the acceptability of the explanation and that was the only criteria by which the cause for condonation of delay should be judged. The main purpose for which Section 5 was enacted was to enable the Court to do substantial justice and that is the precise reason why very elastic expression ‘sufficient cause’ is employed therein, so as to sub-serve the ends of justice. It is well to remember that the very purpose sought to be achieved by the Courts is to sub-serve the ends of justice. It is well to remember that the very purpose sought to be achieved by the Courts is to sub-serve the ends of justice. Therefore, when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice had to be preferred to that of the technicalities, inasmuch as, no party can every claim a vested right when injustice is being done, all due to the delay in approaching the Court by the other party. In the instant case, the petitioner in both these cases is shown as a defendant to the suit. He participated in those proceedings initially and filed his written statement and after the issues are framed, setting them forth for trial, he stayed away from the rest of the proceedings. After the decree, exparte, was passed and when execution petition is taken out, he moved the Court for setting aside the exparte decree. In the process, a huge delay of 1169 days had occasioned. Therefore, he filed Interlocutory Application Nos.17 of 2014 and 18 of 2014 seeking condonation of such delay. Those, two applications were dismissed on 13.02.2014. Whereas he preferred the present revisions only on 14.10.2015 and hence, sought for condonation of delay of 529 and 516 days in preferring these revisions. Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned senior counsel, would point out that when once I.A No.17 of 2014 and I.A.No.18 of 2014 have been moved, the petitioner herein knew the importance and the necessity to have the exparte decree set aside and further he knew that he has not acted promptly and hence knew that there was delay in filing the necessary applications for setting-aside the exparte decree passed on 27.09.2010. He, therefore, sought for condonation of delay of 1169 days. When those applications are dismissed and in case, the petitioner is truly aggrieved by such an order, he ought to have moved this Court immediately. Therefore, there is no justification whatsoever for moving these present revision petitions once again with an enormous delay. Therefore, there are no bonafidees behind the present application for condonation of delay. When those applications are dismissed and in case, the petitioner is truly aggrieved by such an order, he ought to have moved this Court immediately. Therefore, there is no justification whatsoever for moving these present revision petitions once again with an enormous delay. Therefore, there are no bonafidees behind the present application for condonation of delay. Further, when the petitioner herein participated in the E.P. proceedings, he was cross-examined on 25.08.2015 and during the course of such examination, he has categorically stated as under: “It is true, I did not challenge the decree because I am no way concerned to that property.” This apart, when an earlier C.R.P.No.859 of 2014 was moved, arising out of the E.P., the petitioner has participated in the hearing of the said C.R.P No.859 of 2014, wherein, this Court directed the executing Court to dispose of E.P.No.10 of 2013 in O.S.No.182 of 2007 within two months from the date of receipt of the order. That order was passed by this Court on 21.11.2014. So, by that date, he should be aware of the consequences staring at him by virtue of the exparte decree. Hence, the petitioner owes an obligation to this Court as to what prevented him from not preferring the revision petitions till nearly one year thereafter. It is also pointed out that in the present applications, the original affidavit filed in support of seeking condonation of delay, the petitioner has not disclosed the said information relating to his participation in the hearing of C.R.P No.859 of 2014. When such information was brought to the notice of this Court by filing a counter affidavit, by the opposite party, then he has taken recourse to filing an additional affidavit and additional material papers, offering some feeble explanation. Therefore, there is attempted suppression of the material facts also by the petitioner. In view of the above narrated facts and circumstances, it is crystal clear that there was considerable inaction on the part of the petitioner herein and the bonafides in presentation of the present revisions become suspect, inasmuch as, he has participated in the proceedings in C.R.P No.859 of 2014 and this Court directed the E.P. to be decided within two months time by its order dated 21.11.2014. Thus, being aware that the execution proceedings taken out for execution of the exparte decree are directed to be disposed of within two months time by this Court on 21.11.2014, he could not have delayed any further in approaching this Court in instituting the present revisions, nearly one year thereafter on 14.10.2015. That would show that the order of this Court in C.R.P.No.859 of 2014 would get further delayed in implementation, if not frustrated altogether. Thus, looked at it from this perspective, the delay in preferring the revision cannot be condoned, as there is clearly attributable negligence, inaction and lack of bonafides on the part of the petitioner. Hence, both the applications stand dismissed. Consequently, the 2 revisions stand rejected. No costs.