JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioner is an employee of National Insurance Company Limited (herein after referred to as “the NIC”) and in the year 2000 he was working in Dehri-on-Sone Branch under Gaya Divisional office as Development Officer, Grade-II. He was departmentally proceeded for certain acts of omission and commission committed during his posting at Dehri-On-Sone. Charges were framed on 11.01.2001 and were as follows: “On 03.04.2000 at about 2.00-2.30P.M. in the office premises of Dehri-on-Sone Branch, National Insurance Company Ltd. following a dispute arising out of a controversy over the premium rate of Mediclaim Policy, Shri P. Kumar, Dev. Officer, Grade II, Dehri-on-Sone Branch, National Insurance Co. Ltd., tried to forcibly use the office telephone in the Chamber of Sri G. B. Singh, Branch Manager, Dehri-on-Sone Branch and physically assaulted, misbehaved and manhandled Sri Singh in the office premises. Therefore, the act of Sri Kumar in spoiling the decorum of the office, disturbing office work and engaging himself in the indecent, disorderly and riotous behaviour in the office premises is tantamount to misconduct under General Insurance, CDA Rule 1975, Shri Kumar thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a public servant. Thus, Shri Kumar violated Rule 3(i) of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1975 and committed misconduct under Rules 4(5), 4(12) and 4(20) of the said General Insurance (CDA) Rules, 1975.” 3. The petitioner duly replied to the article of charges vide Annexure-4. The enquiry officer submitted his report exonerating him from part of the charge as far as it related to use of office telephone of Shri G.B. Singh, Branch Manager. However, he was found guilty of misbehaviour and entering into a scuffle with the Branch Manager. The disciplinary authority sought show-cause from the petitioner while forwarding a copy of the enquiry report. The petitioner submitted his explanation, which did not find favour with the disciplinary authority. 4. The disciplinary authority in terms of Rule 26 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to “Rules, 1975”) imposed penalty of reduction of basic pay by two stages in the cadre of Development Officer Grade-I with immediate effect as provided under Rule 23(e) of Rules, 1975. 4. The disciplinary authority in terms of Rule 26 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to “Rules, 1975”) imposed penalty of reduction of basic pay by two stages in the cadre of Development Officer Grade-I with immediate effect as provided under Rule 23(e) of Rules, 1975. The petitioner preferred an appeal and Memorial, which too were rejected vide order dated 30.03.2006 of Deputy General Manager, NIC and the order dated 21.12.2006 of Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the NIC. 5. The petitioner has challenged the impugned orders primarily on the ground that the order of the appellate authority and the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the NIC are not reasoned orders and is in violation of Rule 37 of General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1975 He submits that punishment is harsh and excessive. 6. Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel for the NIC submits that the order passed by the appellate authority as well as the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the NIC in Memorial have been passed in accordance with Rule 37(2)(b) of the 1975 Rules. He submits that if the order of the appellate authority is in agreement with the disciplinary authority, it may not be a speaking one, if the order shows proper application of mind as regard the compliance of the requirement of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules, 1975. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. I find that the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted in accordance with law and sufficient opportunity has been given to the petitioner to place his case before the enquiry officer as well as disciplinary authority. 8. The main issue for consideration before this Court is whether the order passed by the appellate authority and the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the NIC complies with the requirements of Rule 37(2)(b) of Rules, 1975, which is quoted herein below: 37. Consideration of Appeals.- (1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate-authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 20 and having regard to the circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. Consideration of Appeals.- (1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate-authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 20 and having regard to the circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 23, the appellate-authority shall consider: (a) whether the procedure prescribed in these Rules has been complied with, and if not, whether such noncompliance has resulted in failure of justice; (b) whether the findings are justified; and (c) whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and pass orders: (i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. 9. Explaining the ambit and scope of the Rule and the consideration required by the appellate authority, a learned Single Bench of this Court in case of Jeevan Kumar Jayaswal vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2000 (3) BLJR 1943 observed that appellate authority is not required to give a detailed reasons, if it agrees with the findings of the disciplinary authority. Nonetheless, the order passed by the disciplinary authority must reflect that it has applied its mind and disclose some reasons for its finding. 10. Again in case of Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in AIR 2006 SC 1748 have reiterated the same view. Para 33 of the judgment, which is relevant in this context is quoted herein below: “33. An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regard the compliance of the requirement of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules.” 11. Therefore in the light of the above decisions, if the appellate authority affirms the order of the original authority, it may not give the detailed reasons but nonetheless it must satisfy the requirement of the provisions of Rule 37(2)(a)(b) & (c) of 1975 Rules. 12. Therefore in the light of the above decisions, if the appellate authority affirms the order of the original authority, it may not give the detailed reasons but nonetheless it must satisfy the requirement of the provisions of Rule 37(2)(a)(b) & (c) of 1975 Rules. 12. Rule 37(2)(b) requires that the appellate authority has to form an opinion as to whether the findings are justified, though it would be not required to give a detailed reasonings, but nonetheless, there is to be some reasons for coming to the conclusion that the findings are justified. It would not be sufficient to arrive in a line that the findings are justified as that would not fulfill the requirement of Rule 37(2) of 1975 Rules in its letter and spirit. Furthermore, there would be nothing for the superior court to consider if the matter is taken to the Courts under the provisions of judicial review. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of the Manager, Govt. Branch Press & Anr. Vs. D. B. Belliawpa, reported in AIR 1979 SC 429 observed that it would be only fair that if the quasi judicial functionary assigns a reason while disposing of a matter, so that the Administration and Tribunal exercising quasi judicial functions will justify the existence and carry credibility with the people by expiring confidence with the adjudicatory process. Para 24 of the judgment is quoted herein below: “24…“The giving of reasons”, as Lord Denning put it in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [(1971)1 All ER 114], “is one of the fundamentals of good administration”, and, to recall the words of this Court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal [ (1975)2 SCC 81 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 435: (1975)2 SCR 832 , 845], in a Government of laws “there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability”. The executive, no less than the judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomized in Articles 14 and 16(1).” 13. In the light of law laid down by this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court and also in the light of Rule 37(2) of Rules 1975, we would now examine whether the grievance of the petitioner that the order of the appellate authority does not confirm to the requirement of Rule 37(2) of 1975 Rules has merit. 14. In the light of law laid down by this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court and also in the light of Rule 37(2) of Rules 1975, we would now examine whether the grievance of the petitioner that the order of the appellate authority does not confirm to the requirement of Rule 37(2) of 1975 Rules has merit. 14. I find that the appellate authority has narrated the background of the case and has not assigned any cogent reason for rejecting the appeal of the petitioner. As noticed in the foregoing paragraphs, the order of the appellate authority affirming the order of disciplinary authority should reflect that it has applied its mind to the facts and the issues, though there may not be detailed reasons for the same. 15. In the result, the writ application is partially allowed and the matter is remitted to the appellate authority for fresh consideration in accordance with law.