JUDGMENT : Indira Banerjee, J. 1. This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 23rd September, 2015 passed by the learned Single Bench dismissing an application filed by M/s Patel Timber Industries, being G.A. No. 1034 of 2011 inter-alia for intervention in the execution proceedings being E.C. No. 90 of 2011 for execution of the eviction decree dated 11th August, 2011 in APD No. 455 of 2005, along with three other similar applications being G.A. Nos. 1035, 1036 and 1038 of 2011. 2. Patel Timber Industries, a registered partnership firm, carrying on business at Premises No. 149/13, J.N. Mukherjee Road, PS – Malipanchghora, PO – Salkia, District Howrah – 711106 claims to be a ‘thika tenant’ in respect of 14 cottahs and 10 chittaks of land at the said premises. 3. The said premises were owned by a Trust, under the control of the members of the Bagla family. It transpires that the trustees, hereinafter referred to as the Baglas, had leased out 7 bighas of land to the Poddars. 4. Patel Timber Industries claims that the Poddars sub-leased 14 cottah and 10 chittaks of land out of the said 7 bighas, to Patel Timber Industries and received rent from Patel Timber Industries, showing Patel Timber Industries as a thika tenant. 5. According to Patel Timber Industries, it erected structures at the said premises with the knowledge and consent of the Poddars. Patel Timber Industries claims to be the owner of the structures at the said premises. 6. Patel Timber Industries has further claimed that the land held by Patel Timber Industries vested in the State of West Bengal in 1981, under the Thika Tenancy Laws enacted by the State. Patel Timber Industries claims to have been paying rent (Khazna) to the State of West Bengal. 7. The Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act, was enacted to regulate the law of landlord and tenant in respect of thika tenancies in Calcutta, and to make better provisions relating to the law. 8. The said 1949 Thika Tenancy Act was repealed by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981, hereinafter referred to as the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act. 8. The said 1949 Thika Tenancy Act was repealed by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981, hereinafter referred to as the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act. The said 1981 Thika Tenancy Act has been repealed and replaced by the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001, hereinafter referred to as the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act. 9. The 1949 Thika Tenancy Act defined ‘thika tenant’ to mean a person who held land, whether under a written lease or otherwise, under another person, and was, or but for a special contract, would be liable to pay rent at a monthly or at any other periodical rate, for that land to that other person, and had erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for residential, manufacturing or business purpose and included successors in interest of such person. 10. The definition of ‘thika tenant’ under the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act, expressly excluded a person who held land under another person in perpetuity or a person who held land under another person, under a registered lease, for a period of not less than 12 years, or a person who held land under another person and used or occupied such land as a khatal. 11. Section 2(1) of the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act defined ‘bharatia’ to mean any person by whom, or on whose behalf, rent was payable for any structure or part of a structure erected by a ‘thika’ tenant in his holding. 12. There could only be a ‘thika’ tenancy under the 1949 Act, when the land belonged to one person and the structures thereon to another person. In other words, there would be a superior landlord, who was the owner of the land and a subservient holder being the lessee and/or tenant under the superior landlord and the owner of the structures, that is, the ‘thika tenant’, with the right to use, occupy or let out the structures. The ‘bharatia’ was the person to whom a structure so constructed and/or acquired by a ‘thika tenant’ had been let out. A ‘bharatia’ paid rent to the ‘thika tenant’ only for the structure, of which he was ‘bharatia.’ 13. The expression ‘structure’ in the Thika Tenancy Act of 1949, had all along been judicially interpreted to mean a “kutcha” and/or temporary structure. A ‘bharatia’ paid rent to the ‘thika tenant’ only for the structure, of which he was ‘bharatia.’ 13. The expression ‘structure’ in the Thika Tenancy Act of 1949, had all along been judicially interpreted to mean a “kutcha” and/or temporary structure. However, a different view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its judgment and order dated 24th February, 2015, in Civil Appeal No. 2402 of 2015 arising out of SLP (C) 8297/2014, Nemai Chandra Kumar & Others vs. Mani Square Ltd. & Another, reported in (2015) 2 WBLR (SC) 321. 14. In Nemai Chandra Kumar & Others vs. Mani Square Ltd. & Others (supra) the Supreme Court held that the word ‘structure’ has a direct relationship with the purpose for which the structure was erected. It has no bearing with the nature of the structure. Any structure includes ‘kutcha’ as well as ‘pucca’ structure. 15. In Sri Satyanarayan & Others vs. S.C. Chunder, reported in 2001 (3) CHN 641 , a Division Bench of this Court held that there being no kutcha structure involved in the demised premises, the question of thika tenancy did not arise at all. However, the law laid down that the question of thika tenancy could not arise as long as there was no ‘kutcha’ structure is no longer good law in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nemai Chandra Kumar & Others vs. Mani Square Ltd. & Others (supra). 16. In Radha Raman Jew and Others vs. Shaligram Subha Karan Khemani and Another, reported in AIR 2001 Calcutta 78, the learned Single Bench of this Court held that to attract the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981, especially Sections 4, 5 and 19 thereof, it had to be seen whether any ‘thika’ tenancy was subsisting on the date of institution of the Act. As the Court found that there was no ‘thika’ tenancy in existence, an eviction decree having been passed in 1962, the Court rejected the contention of existence of a ‘thika’ tenancy. 17. In Smt. Amala Palit & Another vs. Smt. Ratna Bose & Others, reported in (2015) 1 WBLR (Cal) 255, a Division Bench of this Court considered whether the appellant was a ‘thika tenant’. The Division Bench held that the lease being executed in 1964 for 21 years, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 had no application. 17. In Smt. Amala Palit & Another vs. Smt. Ratna Bose & Others, reported in (2015) 1 WBLR (Cal) 255, a Division Bench of this Court considered whether the appellant was a ‘thika tenant’. The Division Bench held that the lease being executed in 1964 for 21 years, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 had no application. The subject tenancy was therefore not covered by the Thika Tenancy Act. 18. In Santilata De vs. Saraju Bala Devi and Others, reported in 60 CWN 642, a Division Bench of this Court held that thika tenant must be a person or the successor-in-interest of a person, who held bare land under another person. A holding of both land and structures situated thereon was not holding of bare land and therefore not a ‘thika’ tenancy. 19. In Gopal Chandra Shaw and Others vs. Smt. Uma Devi, reported in 1999 (II) CHN 607 , a Division Bench of this Court held that in order to establish thika tenancy right, it must be proved that a tenancy was created for land only and the tenant has either constructed structure thereon or has acquired such structure either by purchase or by gift, for manufacturing, residential or business purpose. In case of thika tenancy, land will be owned by the landlord while the structure by the tenant. If the land and structure are both let out to a tenant, such tenancy will be governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 20. In 1969 the Thika Tenancy Act of 1949 was amended to include the definition of ‘pucca structure’ which was defined to mean any structure constructed mainly of brick, stone or concrete or any combination of these materials. 21. By amendment in 1969, Section 10A was incorporated in the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act. Section 10A provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any contract, but subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) and (3), a ‘thika’ tenant using the land comprised in his holding for a residential purpose, might erect a pucca structure on such land, for such purpose, with the previous permission of the Controller. 22. 22. Sub-section (2) of Section 10A provided that the Controller might grant permission to erect a pucca structure, if the Controller was satisfied that the ‘thika’ tenant had been using the structure on the land comprised in his holding for residential purpose, intended to use the pucca structure to be erected on such land for a similar purpose and had obtained sanction of a building plan to erect the pucca structure from the municipal authorities of the area. 23. Section 10A incorporated in 1969 makes it patently clear that a ‘thika’ tenant using a structure for residential purpose, might erect a ‘pucca’ structure in place of the existing “kutcha” structure, with permission of the Controller and for similar purpose, that is, residential purpose, subject to sanction of the municipal authorities. Thus, under the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act, no ‘pucca’ structure for business or manufacturing purpose would come within the purview of thika tenancy. 24. The 1949 Thika Tenancy Act was repealed and replaced by the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act, under which the interests of landlords in lands comprised in thika tenancies, and certain other lands in Calcutta and Howrah, vested in the State. 25. Section 3(8) of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act defined ‘thika tenant’ to mean any person who occupied, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and was, or but for a special contract, would be liable to pay rent at a monthly or at any other periodical rate, for that land to that another person, and had erected or acquired by purchase or gift, any structure on such land for residential, manufacturing or business purpose and included successors in interest of such person. 26. The definition of ‘thika tenant’ in the 1981 Act was almost identical to the definition of ‘thika tenant’ in the 1949 Act, except that, persons holding land in perpetuity, persons holding land under registered lease for a period of not less than 12 years and persons using land for the purpose of khatals were no longer excluded from the definition of ‘thika tenant’. 27. Section 5 as it stood at the time of enactment of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act provided as follows:- "5. Lands comprised in thika tenancies and other lands, etc. 27. Section 5 as it stood at the time of enactment of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act provided as follows:- "5. Lands comprised in thika tenancies and other lands, etc. and right, title and interest of landlords in such lands to vest in the State.- With effect from the date of commencement of this Act, lands comprised in thika tenancies and other lands held under any person in perpetuity or under registered lease for a period of not less than twelve years or held in monthly and periodical tenancies for being used or occupied as khatals along with easements, customary rights, common facilities and such other things in such thika tenancies and khatals attached to or used in connection with such thika tenancies, and khatals and the right, title and interest of landlords in such lands shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances: Provided that the easements, rights, common facilities or benefits enjoyed by a thika tenant or an occupier of any land under any person in perpetuity or any land under any person under registered lease for a period of not less than twelve years or a khatal in khas lands of the landlords shall not be affected in any way by such vesting." 28. Under Section 5 of the 1981 Act, lands comprised in ‘thika’ tenancies and other lands held under any person in perpetuity, or under registered lease for a period of not less than 12 years or held in monthly and periodical tenancies for being used and occupied as khatals, along with easements, customary rights, common facilities and such other things in such ‘thika’ tenancies and khatals, attached to or used in connection with such ‘thika’ tenancies and khatals, and the right, title and interest of landlords in such lands were to vest in the State free from all encumbrances, with effect from the date of commencement of the 1981 Act. 29. The proviso to Section 5 of the 1981 Act clearly provided that easements, rights, common facilities or benefits enjoyed by a ‘thika tenant’ or an occupier of any land under any person in perpetuity or any land under any person under a registered lease for a period of not less than 12 years or a khatal in khas lands of the landlords, were not to be affected in any way by such vesting. 30. 30. After the enactment of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act, every ‘thika’ tenant and other tenant occupying land directly under the State, became liable to pay to the State an amount of revenue determined in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979 and for this purpose, such tenant was to be deemed to be a ‘raiyat’ under that Act. 31. Sub-section 3 of Section 6 of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act provided that the rights of a thika tenant and other tenants occupying land directly under the State, subject to the provisions of the said Act, would be heritable but not transferrable. The 1981 Act and particularly Sub-section 3 of Section 6 thereof clearly provided that no tenant was to construct a pucca structure without submitting a comprehensive development plan or improvement scheme for the holding. Any such scheme was to provide for alternative accommodation for bharatias in accordance with Sub-section 2 of Section 11. An exception was made by the proviso to Section 6, enabling a ‘thika’ tenant, or a tenant of lands which vested under Section 5, to construct a pucca structure for essential common facilities like common pathway, common bath, toilet, water supply, drainage, sewerage, lighting and other similar purposes. 32. Only thika tenancies as defined by the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act, vested in the State under the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act, apart from Khatals. In Lakshmimoni Das and Others vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in AIR 1987 Calcutta 326, where the vires of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act was under challenge, a Full Bench of this Court held:- “56. For the reasons aforesaid we hold as follows:- (b) Within the scope and ambit of S.5 of the impugned Act only lands comprised in thika tenancies within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 comprising a kutcha structure and/or a pucca structure constructed for residential purpose with the permission of the Controller under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 and khatal lands held under a lease shall vest and save as aforesaid no other land and structure vests under the impugned Act.” 33. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Full Bench in Lakshmimoni Das and Others vs. State of West Bengal and Others (supra), the State of West Bengal filed a Special Leave Petition in the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Full Bench in Lakshmimoni Das and Others vs. State of West Bengal and Others (supra), the State of West Bengal filed a Special Leave Petition in the Hon’ble Supreme Court. While the Special Leave Petition was pending, the legislature passed the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Amendment Act, making certain amendments in the Thika Tenancy Act of 1981. 34. The definitions of ‘Bharatia’, ‘bustee’, ‘holding’, ‘hut’, ‘khatal’, ‘landlord’, ‘other lands’, ‘pucca structure’, ‘slum area’, ‘tenant of other lands’ and ‘thika tenant’ as amended and/or incorporated in Section 3 of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act by the 1993 Amendment Act, are set out herein-below for convenience: “(1) “Bharatia” means any person by whom, or on whose account, rent is payable for any structure or part thereof, owned by a thika tenant or tenant of other lands in his holding or by a landlord in a bustee on his khas land; (1A) “bustee” means an area containing land with a collection of huts used or intended to be used for human habitation or for any business purpose, and includes any tank in or appurtenant to and in common use of the occupiers of such bustee, whether or not the same person is the owner or the landlord in respect of such tank; (3) “holding” means a parcel or parcel of land occupied by a thika tenant or tenant of other lands under one set of conditions, and includes a bustee owned by a landlord on his khas land along with any tank included in such bustee; (3A) “hut” means any building or structure, the roof or the floor of which, excluding the floor at the plinth level, is not constructed of masonry or reinforced concrete; (3B) “khatal” means a place where cattle are kept or maintained for the purpose of trade or business including business in milk derived from such cattle; (7) “pucca structure” means any structure constructed mainly of brick, stone or concrete or any combination of these materials, or any other material of a durable nature; (7A) “slum area” means the area declared as such by the State Government under Section 3 of the West Bengal Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1972 (West Ben. Act X of 1972), or Section 4 of the Calcutta Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation of Slum-dwellers Act, 1958 (West Ben. Act XX of 1958); (7B) “tenant of other lands” means any person who occupies other lands under another person, whether under a written lease or otherwise, and is or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent at a monthly or periodical rate for occupation of such other lands, and includes the successors-in-interest of such person; (8) “thika tenant” means any person who occupies, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and is or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent, at a monthly or at any other periodical rate, for that land to that another person and has erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for residential, manufacturing or business purpose, and includes successors-in-interest of such person.” 35. Section 5 of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act as amended by the 1993 Amendment Act provided as follows: “5. Lands comprised in thika tenancies, khas lands, etc. to vest in the State. – With effect from the date of commencement of this Act, the following lands along with the interest of landlords therein shall vest in the State, free from all incumbrances, namely:- (a) lands comprised in and appurtenant to tenancies of thika tenants including open areas, roads, passages, tanks, pools and drains; (b) lands comprised in and appurtenant to bustees on khas lands of landlords and lands in slum areas including open areas, roads, passages, tanks, pools and drains; (c) other lands not covered by clauses (a) and (b) held under a written lease or otherwise, including open areas, roads, passages, tanks, pools and drains; (d) lands held in monthly or other periodical tenancies, whether under a written lease or otherwise, for being used or occupied as khatal: Provided that such vesting shall not affect in any way the easements, customary rights or other facilities enjoyed by thika tenants, Bharatias and occupiers of land coming within the purview of clauses (c) and (d). 36. The 1981 Thika Tenancy Act has been repealed and replaced by the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act. 36. The 1981 Thika Tenancy Act has been repealed and replaced by the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act. Some of the provisions of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act were amended with effect from 5th October, 2010, by the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 2010. 37. Some of the relevant provisions of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act, prior to its amendment by the Amendment Act of 2010 are set out herein-below: “2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:- (1) “Bharatia” means any person by whom or on whose account, rent is payable “for any structure or part thereof,” owned by a thika tenant, but excludes any person paying rent to a Bharatia and any “resident of a structure” forfeited by the State Government under sub-section (2) of section 6, irrespective of the status, the said person may have enjoyed earlier; (2) ………. (3) “holding” means a parcel or parcels of land occupied by a thika tenant under one set of conditions along with any tank included in such land. (4) “hut” means any building or structure, the roof or the floor of which, excluding the floor at the plinth level, is not constructed of masonry or reinforced concrete. (5) ……….. (6) “land appurtenant” includes any easement, right, or any common benefits or facilities, or access, passage, drains, tanks and pools which were owned by the landlord and were enjoyed by the thika tenant and the Bharatia, if any, before the date of vesting. (7) “landlord” means any corporation, charitable or religious institution or person who, for the time being, is entitled to receive or, but for a special contract, would be entitled to receive the rent for any land comprised in the tenancy of a thika tenant or in a khatal, tank or hut owned by him, and includes any corporation, institution or person having superior interest in such thika tenancy……………. (13) “pucca structure” means any structure constructed mainly of brick, stone or concrete or any combination of these materials, or any other material of a durable nature. (13) “pucca structure” means any structure constructed mainly of brick, stone or concrete or any combination of these materials, or any other material of a durable nature. (14) “thika tenant” means any person who occupies, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and is, or but for a special contract, would be, liable to pay rent at a monthly or any other periodical rate for that land to that another person, and has erected of acquired “by purchase or gift any structure on such land” for residential, manufacturing or business purpose, and includes the successors-in-interest of such persons but excludes any resident of a structure forfeited to the State under sub-section (2) of section 6 of this Act irrespective of the status, he may have enjoyed earlier. 3. Act to override other laws.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or in any custom, usage or agreement or in any decree or order of a court, tribunal or other authority. 4. Lands comprised in thika tenancies and other lands, etc. to vest in the State. - With effect from the 18th day of January, 1982, the following lands along with the interest of landlords therein shall be deemed to have vested in the State, free from all encumbrances:- (a) Lands comprised in and appurtenant to tenancies of thika tenants including open areas, road. (b) Lands held in monthly or other periodical tenancies, whether under a written lease or otherwise, for being used or occupied as khatal: Provided that any land comprised in, and appurtenant to, tenancies of thika tenants created after the 18th day of January, 1982, shall also be deemed to be vested in the State, free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of creation of tenancies of thika tenants: Provided further that such vesting shall not be deemed to have affected in any way the easements, customary rights or other facilities enjoyed by thika tenants, Bharatias or occupiers of land coming within the purview of this section: Provided also that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the State Government or the local authority from taking up any development work on the land appurtenant to tenancies of thika tenants for public purpose. 5(1) ………………. 5(2) ………………. 5(1) ………………. 5(2) ………………. 5(3) If any question arises as to whether a person is a thika tenant or not, the matter shall be decided by the controller. 5(5) The thika tenants holding directly under the State under sub-section (1) shall be entitled to construct pucca structures in accordance with the building plans sanctioned under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, (West Ben. Act LIX of 1980), and the rules made thereunder, or the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980) and the rules made thereunder, according as the land may be situated within Kolkata as defined in clause (9) of section 2 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LIX of 1980), or Howrah as defined in clause (15) of section 2 of the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980), for – (a) residential and business purposes for themselves and the Bharatias under them; and (b) essential common facilities like common pathway, common bath, toilet, water supply, drainage, sewerage, lighting and similar other purposes: Provided that the thika tenants holding directly under the State under sub-section (1), shall obtain a no objection certificate from the Controller before making any pucca construction or changing the nature, character and dimension of an existing structure on the land, irrespective of the area of the land. 16. Restriction or exclusion of the Act by agreement. – Nothing in any contract between a thika tenant and a Bharatia made after the commencement of this Act shall take away, or limit, the rights of such tenant or Bharatia as provided for in this Act, and any contract which is made in contravention of, or which is inconsistent with, any of the provisions of this Act shall be void and without effect to the extent of such contravention or inconsistency, as the case may be. 38. 38. The definition of “Thika tenant” as amended by the 2010 Amendment Act is as follows:- “2 (14) “Thika tenant” means any person who occupies, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and is, or but for a special contract, would be, liable to pay rent at a monthly or any other periodical rate for that land to that another person, and has erected or acquired [by purchase or gift any structure including pucca structure, if any, on such land] for residential, manufacturing or business purpose, and includes the successors-in-interest of such persons but excludes any resident of a structure forfeited to the State under sub-section (2) of section 6 of this Act irrespective of the status, he may have enjoyed earlier.” 39. The 2010 Amendment Act has incorporated sub-section (15) of Section 2 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act, which defines “thika land” as follows:- “2(15) “thika land” means any land comprised in and appurtenant to, tenancies of thika tenant irrespective of the fact whether there is any claim of such tenancy or not an includes open areas and roads on such land.” 40. Section 5(3) and 5(5) of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act as amended by the 2010 Amendment Act are set out herein-below for convenience:- “5(3) If any question arises as to whether a person is a thika tenant or not or whether the land in question is thika land or not, the Controller, either on his own motion or upon receiving any information, may, after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after examining all such documents and particulars as may be considered necessary, enquire upon and decide such question………….. 5(5) The thika tenants holding directly under the State under sub-section (1) shall be entitled [to construct pucca structures or to change the nature, character and dimension of an existing structure on the land] in accordance with the building plans sanctioned under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, (West Ben. Act LIX of 1980), and the rules made thereunder, or the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980), and the rules made thereunder, according as the land may be situated within Kolkata as defined in clause (9) of section 2 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LIX of 1980), and the rules made thereunder, or the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980), and the rules made thereunder, according as the land may be situated within Kolkata as defined in clause (9) of section 2 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LIX of 1980), or Howrah as defined in clause (15) of section 2 of the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980), for – (a) residential and business purposes for themselves and the Bharatias under them; and (b) essential common facilities like common pathway, common bath, toilet, water supply, drainage, sewerage, lighting and similar other purposes: Provided that the thika tenants holding directly under the State under sub-section (1), shall obtain a no objection certificate from the Controller before making any pucca construction or changing the nature, character and dimension of an existing structure on the land, irrespective of the area of the land.” 41. Section 21 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act provides as follows:- “Bar to jurisdiction - No civil court shall have jurisdiction to decide, or to deal with, any question, or to determine any matter, which, by or under this Act, is required to be, or has been, decided or dealt with, or which is to be, or has been, determined, by the Controller or the appellate or other authority specified in the provisions of this Act, and no order or judgment passed, or proceedings including execution proceedings commenced, under the provisions of this Act shall be called in question in any civil Court.” 42. On perusal of the definition of ‘thika tenant’ in the 2001 Act, as amended, it is patently clear that there is no difference between the definition of ‘thika tenant’ in the Thika Tenancy Act of 2001, and the definition of ‘thika tenant’ in the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act as amended in 1993 and the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act, except that persons residing in a structure forfeited to the State under Sub-section 2 of Section 6, irrespective of the status that they might have enjoyed earlier, have been excluded from the definition of ‘thika tenant’. The definition of ‘thika land’ incorporated with effect from 1st November, 2010 defines ‘thika land’ to mean any land comprised in and appurtenant to tenancies of thika tenants, irrespective of whether there is any claim of such tenancy or not and includes open areas and roads on such land. 43. The essential ingredient of a ‘thika’ tenancy is that the land should be owned by the superior landlord, but the structure thereon should be owned by another person in occupation of land, ordinarily on payment of rent, who may have erected the structure on the land held by him as occupier and/or holder of the land, or acquired the structure by gift or purchase. 44. After 1st November, 2010, the definition of “thika tenant” includes the owner of a pucca structure, whether the pucca structure has been acquired by gift or purchase, or erected by him from his own funds. The thika tenant must, however, be the owner of the structure, but not the land on which the structure is erected. 45. In Nemai Chandra Kumar & Others vs. Mani Square Ltd. & Another (supra) which is perhaps the latest judgment of the Supreme Court relating to the Thika Tenancy laws in the State, the Supreme Court held:- “22. ……………..To claim rights of a ‘Thika Tenant’ a person should be a ‘Thika Tenant’ under Section 2(5) of the 1949 Act for which he should satisfy the following conditions: “(i) The person shall be holding land under another person; (ii) he shall be liable to pay rent, at a monthly or any other periodical rate, for that land to that another person; and (iii) he should have erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for a residential, manufacturing or business purpose. It includes the successors in interest of such person.” The said definition does not include a person - (a) who holds such land under that another person in perpetuity; or (b) under a registered lease, in which the duration of the lease is expressly stated to be for a period of not less than twelve years; or (c) uses or occupies such land as Khatal. 23. The word ‘any structure’ relates to structure erected or acquired by purchase or gift on such land for a residential, manufacturing or business purpose…….” 46. 23. The word ‘any structure’ relates to structure erected or acquired by purchase or gift on such land for a residential, manufacturing or business purpose…….” 46. In Lakshmimoni Das and Others vs. State of West Bengal and Others (supra) the Full Bench of this Court held:- “43. Looking into the history of the legislation and purpose of the legislation, it appears to us that the impugned legislation is plainly to abolish the rights of the landlord over the lands held by thika tenants which were so long governed by the provisions of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. ………………. Applying these legal maxims, it appears to us that 'other land' appearing in S.5 of the impugned Act must mean land falling under the category of thika tenancy land. This general word following a specific word must apply not to different objects of a widely differing character, but something which can be called a class or kind of objects. In this case, from the title, preamble of the Act, the intention of the legislature as also on consideration of the mischief sought to be remedied by the impugned Act it must be held that 'other land' must be land coming within the category of thika tenancy land. If however appears that besides the lands comprising thika tenancies lands used as khatals and the right, title and interest of landlord in such khatals are intended to be vested under S.5…….” 47. The judgment of the Full Bench is binding on the Division Bench and the Single Bench. The learned Judge rightly held that land not falling with in the category of ‘thika’ tenancy land under the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act would not vest in the state under the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act. 48. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmimoni Das and Others vs. State of West Bengal and Others (supra) was considered by the Supreme Court in Nemai Chandra Kumar vs. Mani Square Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court approved the view of the Full Bench that only land held by thika tenants within the meaning of the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act vested. The issue is no longer open, at least not before this Court. 49. The Supreme Court approved the view of the Full Bench that only land held by thika tenants within the meaning of the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act vested. The issue is no longer open, at least not before this Court. 49. In Ramdas Bansal vs. Kharag Singh Baid & Others, reported in (2007) 3 CHN 851 a Division Bench of this Court held that a person who did not acquire title to the structure but only had a right of enjoyment of the structure was not a thika tenant. 50. In Ramdas Bansal vs. Kharag Singh Baid & Others, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 548 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court referred to above and held that where structures had been raised prior to coming into force of the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act, and/or subsequent Thika Tenancy Acts of 1981 or 2001, the premises would not be covered by the definition of thika tenancy. 51. The Controller has power under Section 5(3) of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act to decide whether any particular land is ‘thika land’ and whether any person claiming ‘thika tenancy’ is a ‘thika tenant’ or not. However, before the Controller can commence an enquiry under Section 5(3), the Controller would have to be prima facie satisfied of the existence of a thika tenancy on preliminary examination of the documents including the return/ application of a person claiming the existence of a thika tenancy. 52. It appears that the Thika Controller, Howrah initiated proceedings being MP-3/83-84 in respect of the said premises some time in 1984, provisionally recorded the status of Patel Timber Industries as ‘thika tenant’ and received provisional rent from Patel Timber Industries in respect of the said premises. 53. On or about 29th September 2010, the Thika Controller in exercise of power under Section 5(3) of the Thika Tenancy Act of 2001 passed a final order in MP – 3/83-84 holding on verification of the documents filed by Shri Bhimji Patel on behalf of Patel Timber Industries, that Patel Timber Industries was a thika tenant under Section 5(3) of the Thika Tenancy Act of 2001. 54. Section 12 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act provides:- 12. Appeal. 54. Section 12 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act provides:- 12. Appeal. – (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of a Controller may, within 30 days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal in writing before the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal established under the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (West Ben. Act XXV of 1997). (2) Subject to provisions of this Act and rules made thereunder, any order passed by the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal may, in the manner prescribed, be reviewed by the said Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient cause of like nature. 55. The West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal has been established under the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Tribunal Act to exercise jurisdiction, power and authority conferred by Section 6 and Section 7 of the Tenancy Tribunal Act. 56. Section 6 of the Tenancy Tribunal Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal inter-alia in relation to an order made by an authority under a specified Act; inaction or culpable negligence of an authority under a specified Act, applications relating to matters under any provision of a specified Act, matters relating to constitutional validity of any action under the provisions of a specified Act and adjudication of matters, proceedings, cases and appeals which stand transferred from the High Court and other authorities to the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Tribunal Act. The 1981 Act was a specified Act mentioned in the Tenancy Tribunal Act. After the repeal of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act, by the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act, the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act is a specified Act, within the meaning of the Tenancy Tribunal Act. 57. Sections 7 and 8 of the Tenancy Tribunal Act provide as follows:- “7. The 1981 Act was a specified Act mentioned in the Tenancy Tribunal Act. After the repeal of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act, by the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act, the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act is a specified Act, within the meaning of the Tenancy Tribunal Act. 57. Sections 7 and 8 of the Tenancy Tribunal Act provide as follows:- “7. Exercise by Tribunal of jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable by court.— Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall, with effect from the date appointed by the State Government under section 6, exercise all the jurisdiction power and authority exercisable immediately before that day by any court including the High Court, except the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution exercised by a Division Bench of the High Court, but excluding the Supreme Court, for adjudication or trial of disputes and applications relating to land reforms and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and other matters arising out of any provisions of a specified Act. 8. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts.—On and from the date from which jurisdiction, power and authority become exercisable under this Act by the Tribunal, the High Court, except where that Court exercises writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by a Division Bench, or any civil court, except the Supreme Court, shall not entertain any proceeding or application or exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to adjudication or trial of disputes or applications relating to land reforms or any matter connected therewith or incidental thereto or any other matter under any provision of a specified Act.” 58. Under Section 7 of the Tenancy Tribunal Act, the Tenancy Tribunal is empowered to exercise jurisdiction that was exercisable by all Courts including the High Court, at the time the Tenancy Tribunal started to function, but except the Supreme Court and except the High Court in exercise of its extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, when such jurisdiction was exercised by a Division Bench of the High Court, inter-alia relating to matters arising out of any provision of a specified Act. 59. 59. Section 8 of the Tenancy Tribunal Act excludes the jurisdiction of all Civil Courts, except the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of the High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, from entertaining any proceeding or application or from exercising jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to adjudication or trial of disputes or applications relating to land reforms or any matter connected therewith or incidental thereto or any other matter under any provision of a specified Act. 60. On the basis of the order of the Thika Controller, Howrah, the municipal authorities revised the assessment records by deleting the name of the superior landlord namely, Baglas and incorporating the name of the State of West Bengal as owner of the said property. Since November 30, 2010 the Howrah Municipality Corporation has been raising property tax bills in respect of the land held by Patel Industries Ltd., recording Government of West Bengal as its owner. The applicant as an occupier has deposited taxes with the Municipal authorities. 61. Sometime in 1987, Smt. Sarada Devi Poddar, one of the heirs of the original lessee filed Title Suit No. 133 of 1987 in the Court of the th Munsif, Howrah for eviction of Patel Timber Industries from the said premises. 62. Patel Timber Industries filed a written statement in the said suit, claiming protection against eviction, by recourse to the provisions of the Thika Tenancy Act of 1981. By a judgment dated 20th May, 1992 the learned 5th Civil Judge held that Patel Timber Industries was a ‘thika tenant’ and dismissed the suit as not maintainable. 63. Smt. Sarada Devi Poddar filed an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 150 of 1992 against the aforesaid judgment and Order dated 20th May, 1992 in the Court of the learned District Judge, Howrah. The said appeal was allowed by the District Judge, Howrah by a judgment and Order dated 5th April, 1992. 64. Patel Timber Industries filed a Civil Revisional Application being C.O. No. 1912 of 1999 in this Court against the order of the District Court. By a judgment and Order dated 18th September 2001, this Court set aside the judgment and order of the District Judge, Howrah on the ground that no appeal lay from the judgment and Order dated 20th May, 1992, declaring Patel Timber Industries as a ‘thika tenant’. By a judgment and Order dated 18th September 2001, this Court set aside the judgment and order of the District Judge, Howrah on the ground that no appeal lay from the judgment and Order dated 20th May, 1992, declaring Patel Timber Industries as a ‘thika tenant’. Liberty was however given to the Poddars to file a Civil Revisional Application, challenging the judgment and Order dated 20th May, 1992 of the learned Civil Judge. 65. It is not in dispute that the Poddars neither challenged the order of this Court before any higher forum, nor filed any revisional application challenging the judgment and order of the learned Munsif as per the leave granted by this Court. The order of the learned Civil Judge passed on 20th May, 1992 has assumed finality. 66. In 1990 Poddars filed a suit against the Baglas being Title Suit No. 240 of 1990 praying inter-alia for Specific Performance of the contract between the Baglas and the Poddars, which provided for renewal of the lease. The suit was later transferred to this Court and numbered as Extraordinary Suit No. 4 of 2003. 67. On or about 20th August, 1991, the Baglas filed a suit being Title Suit No. 232 of 1991 in the Howrah Court against the Poddars for eviction on the ground of expiry of lease. Patel Timber Industries or other sub-tenants and/or lesser and/or persons inducted by the Poddars were not impleaded parties to the suit. The said suit was also transferred to this Court and re-numbered as Extraordinary Suit No. 3 of 2003. 68. On or about 30th June, 2005 the suit filed by the Baglas being E.O.S. No. 3 of 2003 against the Poddars for recovery of possession was dismissed. The suit filed by the Poddars being E.O.S. No. 4 of 2004 succeeded. 69. The Baglas filed two appeals before the Division Bench of this Court, which were disposed of in favour of the Baglas, by a judgment and Order dated 11th August, 2010. The Division Bench decreed the suit for eviction against the Poddars. 70. In Rup Chand Gupta vs. Raghuvanshi Private Limited & Another, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1889 , the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the sub-lessee were not impleaded in a suit for eviction or that the lessee did not actually contest the suit, did not render the decree passed in the suit collusive. 70. In Rup Chand Gupta vs. Raghuvanshi Private Limited & Another, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1889 , the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the sub-lessee were not impleaded in a suit for eviction or that the lessee did not actually contest the suit, did not render the decree passed in the suit collusive. The Supreme Court held that whether the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit, served on the lessee and does not implead the sub-lessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub-lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such object is quite legitimate. The decree in such a suit could bind the sub-lessee. This may act harshly on the sub-lessee but this was a position well understood when he took the sub-lease. The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act. 71. Citing Keshar Bai vs. Chhunulal, reported in AIR 2014 SC 1394 , where the Supreme Court held that in eviction proceedings questions of title to the properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally, Mr. Mitra argued that the finding of the Court in the eviction suit filed by the Poddars against Patel Timber Industries that the said premises had vested in the State could not be a conclusive finding that would bind later proceedings. 72. The Baglas filed an application being EC No. 90 of 2011 in this Court for execution of the eviction decree against the Poddars. By an Order dated 8th March 2011, the learned Single Bench of this Court appointed a Receiver over the said premises with a direction on the Receiver to take symbolical possession of the said premises. 73. Pursuant to the aforesaid Order dated 8th March, 2011 of this Court, the learned Receiver pasted a notice on the entrance gate of the said premises whereupon Patel Timber Industries moved the intervention application being G.A. No. 1034 of 2011 in the said intervention case, which has been dismissed by the judgment and Order dated 23rd September, 2015 under appeal. As observed above other sub-tenants and/or sub-lessees inducted by the Poddars similarly circumstanced as Patel Timber Industries, also filed intervention applications, which have been dismissed. 74. As observed above other sub-tenants and/or sub-lessees inducted by the Poddars similarly circumstanced as Patel Timber Industries, also filed intervention applications, which have been dismissed. 74. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Patel Timber Industries, the Learned Advocate General of West Bengal submitted and rightly, that when a decree-holder was resisted or obstructed from taking possession of immovable property, he could make an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the executing Court, complaining of such resistance and/or obstruction. 75. In support of his submissions, the learned Advocate General referred to Order 21 Rules 97, 98 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure which are set out herein-below: “97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property.-(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. 98. Orders after adjudication.-(1) Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the court shall, in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) — (a) make an Order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application. (b) pass such other Order as, in the circumstances of the case, ft may deem fit. (2) Where, upon such determination, the court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the court may also, at the instance of the applicant, Order the judgment debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. 99. 99. Dispossession by decree holder or purchaser.-(1) Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.” 76. Rule 21 of Order XXI provides that all questions including question relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rules 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. 77. The learned Advocate General submitted that Patel Timber Industries was a ‘thika tenant’ of the premises in question. The decree holders being the Baglas were disturbing and/or threatening the possession of Patel Timber Industries of land held by Patel Timber Industries as ‘thika’ tenant under the State of West Bengal. 78. The learned Advocate General argued that the judgment debtors are the Poddars who had been tenants under the Baglas under a long lease. The decree was passed for possession of the said premises consisting of land measuring more than 7 Bighas with structure standing thereon. Patel Timber Industries claims ‘thika’ tenancy only in respect of 14 Cottahs 10 Chittacks of land at the premises in question. 79. The learned Advocate General argued that Patel Timber Industries had obtained possession of vacant land at the said premises as “Math Bharatia.” Patel Timber Industries raised temporary structures thereon and has been carrying on business from the temporary structures at the said premises. Patel Timber Industries relied on rent receipts in support of its contention that what was leased out to Patel Timber Industries was vacant land measuring about 14 Cottahs and 1 Chittacks. 80. Patel Timber Industries claims to have constructed a temporary shed in 1968. Reliance has been placed on a health licence issued by the Municipal Authorities. Patel Timber Industries relied on rent receipts in support of its contention that what was leased out to Patel Timber Industries was vacant land measuring about 14 Cottahs and 1 Chittacks. 80. Patel Timber Industries claims to have constructed a temporary shed in 1968. Reliance has been placed on a health licence issued by the Municipal Authorities. Patel Timber Industries has also relied upon the proposed health licence plan of the saw mill at the said premises which was sanctioned by the Health Officer on 14th August, 1969. Patel Timber Industries have also relied on the site plan, and the mutation certificate. 81. The learned Advocate General argued that, being monthly tenants of the Poddars in respect of 14 Cottahs and 10 Chittaks of land, on which Patel Timber Industries constructed structures, for the purpose of carrying on businesses and also for the residence of its partners and the members of their respective families, Patel Timber Industries became ‘thika tenant’ under the State, under Section 5 of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act. The learned Advocate General argued that Patel Timber Industries had been depositing rent with the Thika Controller since 1981, as the land held by it had vested in the State of West Bengal and in terms of Section 6 of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act, Patel Timber Industries had been occupying the land directly under the State, under an independent title. 82. The learned Advocate General argued that the Controller had provisionally been accepting the rent in respect of ‘thika’ tenancy. Mr. Mitra argued that Patel Timber Industries has been holding the 14 odd Cottahs of land at 149/13, J.N. Mukherjee Road, Salkia under the State of West Bengal and the decree for possession which had been obtained by the Baglas against the Poddars was not binding on Patel Timber Industries. 83. The learned Advocate General submitted that Patel Timber Industries was threatened with physical dispossession from the said property. Being so threatened, it was entitled to approach the executing Court under Order 21 Rule 99 read with Order 21 Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 84. 83. The learned Advocate General submitted that Patel Timber Industries was threatened with physical dispossession from the said property. Being so threatened, it was entitled to approach the executing Court under Order 21 Rule 99 read with Order 21 Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 84. In Paspur Travels Pvt. Ltd. vs. Biswanath Poddar & Another, reported in 2000 (2) CLJ 204, cited by the learned Advocate General a Division Bench of this Court held that an application of a sub-tenant under Order 21 Rules 99, 100 and 101 challenging a decree of eviction against a tenant without impleading the sub-tenant, on the ground of fraud and collusion, could not be rejected on the sole ground of failure of the sub-tenant to give notice to the superior landlord under Section 16 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 85. The learned Advocate General argued that to invoke the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, actual physical dispossession from the property was not necessary. A person threatened with dispossession could also approach the executing Court. 86. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Baglas argued that the learned Single Bench rightly held that the Order dated 20th May, 1992 passed in Title Suit No. 133 of 1987 (Sarada Devi Poddar vs. Patel Timber Industries) was not binding on the Baglas being the decree-holders/ owners of the property who were not party to the decree in said suit. 87. Mr. Mitra argued that if the order of the Howrah Court can at all be construed as a declaration that Patel Timber Industries is a thika tenant of the portion of land in their possession, then in that case, the declaration would not bind any person other than the parties to the suit, that is, the Poddars and Patel Timber Industries. 88. Mr. Mitra argued that a decree for declaration is not a declaration in rem. Mr. Mitra argued that orders and/or judgments in eviction suits are not relevant in other proceedings where the same issue comes up for consideration. In support of his submission, Mr. Mitra cited Smt. Sunita Sharma vs. Smt. Ratna Das (Ghosal), reported in 1995 (2) CLT 147 . 89. Citing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Keshar Bai vs. Chhunulal, reported in AIR 2014 SC 1394 , Mr. In support of his submission, Mr. Mitra cited Smt. Sunita Sharma vs. Smt. Ratna Das (Ghosal), reported in 1995 (2) CLT 147 . 89. Citing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Keshar Bai vs. Chhunulal, reported in AIR 2014 SC 1394 , Mr. Mitra argued that a judgment and decree regarding title to property in an eviction suit would not be binding in a subsequent suit on the question of title to the property. 90. Mr. Mitra next argued that the judgment and decree in the eviction suit filed by the Poddars against Patel Timber Industries, was without jurisdiction, since a debuttar property was outside the purview of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act before its amendment in 1993. 91. May be, as argued by Mr. Mitra, the said premises was debuttar property. Whether such debuttar property would vest in the State or not may require adjudication. The fact remains that under Section 5(3) of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act, it is the Thika Controller, who is to decide whether a person is a ‘thika tenant’ or not or whether the land in question is ‘thika land’ or not. The Thika Controller may decide the aforesaid question either on his own motion, or upon receiving any information, after giving the person interested an opportunity of hearing and after examining all such documents as may be considered necessary. 92. There can be little doubt, that the Baglas, being the owner of the land, at least till the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act came into force, was a person interested and entitled to notice. However, the fact remains that the learned Thika Controller, Kolkata has rightly or wrongly passed a final order which is appealable before Tenancy Tribunal. In no circumstances could the validity of the said final order of the Thika Controller be adjudicated by a Civil Court, in view of the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 21 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act. 93. Mr. Mitra further argued that Section 27 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act pres-served pending legal proceedings as if the 2001 Act had not been passed. Therefore, the Thika Controller had no jurisdiction to adjudicate and declare Patel Timber Industries as a thika tenant. The order of the Thika Controller was an order without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity with no effective force. 94. Mr. Therefore, the Thika Controller had no jurisdiction to adjudicate and declare Patel Timber Industries as a thika tenant. The order of the Thika Controller was an order without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity with no effective force. 94. Mr. Mitra also argued that the Thika Controller was conferred jurisdiction under Section 5(3) to adjudicate thika tenancy rights with effect from 1st March, 2003. Before 1st March, 2003 the Thika Controller had no jurisdiction. In support of his argument, Mr. Mitra cited Sabitarani Majilya vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2011 (3) CHN 534 where a Division Bench of this Court held that the order of the learned Tribunal confirming the order of the learned Thika Controller was not legally sustainable since the Thika Controller had no jurisdiction under the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 to adjudicate the issue of whether the respondent No. 5 in the aforesaid case was a thika tenant or not. 95. The judgment in Sabitarani Majilya vs. State of West Bengal (supra) was rendered in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Until and unless the final order of the learned Thika Controller is set aside in appropriate proceedings, the Civil Court would have no option but to proceed on the basis that the order exists. 96. The judgment in Shayamal Atta & Others vs. State of West Bengal, The Ld. Thika Controller & Another, reported in 1999 (1) CLJ 250, where a Single Bench of this Court held that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Requisition) Act, 1981 does not give any power to the Thika Controller to adjudicate whether a person is a ‘thika’ tenant or not. The judgment was rendered before enactment of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act. 97. The judgment was rendered before enactment of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act. 97. In Shri Iswar Satyanarayanjee & Others vs. Administrator, Corporation of Calcutta & Others, reported in 1988 (2) CLJ 314, a Single Bench of this Court held that the right of a religious minority protected under Article 226 of the Constitution to own property and to administer such property or to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purpose could not be taken away by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 and further if the temples and/or the Seva puja of the deities could not be maintained because of acquisition of property without permanent annuity, the purpose of the trust was bound to be frustrated. 98. In Management of M/s. Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Ajit Singh, reported in AIR 2005 SC 1050 , the Supreme Court held that the principles of res judicata belonged to the domain of procedure. When the decision relates to the jurisdiction of a Court to try earlier proceedings, the principles of res judicata would come into play. A jurisdictional question if wrongly decided would not attract the principle of res judicata. Even though such an order remains unchallenged, the same does not attain finality. The same can be challenged before the Supreme Court in appeal. 99. Mr. Mitra cited Manujendra Dutt vs. Purendu Prosad Roy Chowdhury & Others, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1419 where the Supreme Court held that the deletion of Section 29 of the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act by the Amendment Act of 1953 would not deprive the Controller of his jurisdiction to try proceedings pending before him on the date when the Amendment Act came into force. 100. Mr. Mitra also referred to Videocon International Limited vs. SEBI, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 33 where the Supreme Court discussed the provisions of Section 6(c) and (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held that change in forum does not affect pending actions unless contrary intention is shown in a statute. Citing Sabitarani Majilya vs. State of West Bengal (supra), Mr. Mitra argued that an order without jurisdiction was a nullity and can be declared as such in a collateral proceeding. In support of the aforesaid submission, Mr. Mitra cited Management of M/s. Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Ajit Singh, reported in AIR 2005 SC 1050 . Mr. Citing Sabitarani Majilya vs. State of West Bengal (supra), Mr. Mitra argued that an order without jurisdiction was a nullity and can be declared as such in a collateral proceeding. In support of the aforesaid submission, Mr. Mitra cited Management of M/s. Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Ajit Singh, reported in AIR 2005 SC 1050 . Mr. Mitra finally argued that a lessee who cannot acquire the status of a thika tenant under the owner of a property cannot create a thika tenancy. Mr. Mitra argued that the Act does not contemplate a sub-lessee being a thika tenant. 101. However, having regard to the definition of ‘thika tenant’ in 1949 Thika Tenancy Act, 1981 Thika Tenancy Act and 2001 Thika Tenancy Act discussed above, we see no reason why a sub-lessee cannot be a thika tenant. The conditions precedent for a thika tenancy are that land should be held under another. The thika tenant should have erected structures. The structures should be owned by the thika tenant, whether the structures be erected or acquired by gift or purchase. 102. The learned Single Bench has very rightly held that the definition of ‘Thika Tenancy’ excludes registered lease of over 12 years. However, in the instant case, there was a decree of a Civil Court holding that the land in question was thika tenancy land. It is true that Bagla was not party to the suit. However, in view of the finding of the Civil Court that the land had vested in the State by operation of law, Patel Timber Industries and other interveners are entitled to intervene in the execution proceedings and resist their dispossession. The factual contentions of Patel Timber Industries would have to be decided in proceedings under Order 21 Rule 99 of the Civil Procedure Code. 103. It would be necessary for the Court to look into the factual questions of whether land was held under registered lease exceeding 12 years at the material time when the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act came into force or whether the Patel Timber Industries had merely been holding the said premises as ordinary tenants and also the question of whether any structure had been erected or acquired and if so at which point of time would have to be considered. 104. 104. The question of the status of a tenant who initially held land under a registered lease, exceeding 12 years, constructed structures thereon or otherwise , became owners of the structures but held over after expiry of the lease and were still holding over the land when the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act came into force, might perhaps also have to be considered in appropriate proceedings, upon hearing interested persons including the Baglas, being the admitted owners of the land atleast till the date of enforcement of the 1981 Thika Tenancy Act. 105. Other questions raised by Mr. Mitra, including the question of the status of sub-lessees under a lessee who had raised their own structures on land sub-leased to them, and/or in other words, the question of whether a sub-lessee of land who had raised or acquired by purchase or gift structures thereon was a thika tenant or not would also require consideration. 106. May be, as held by the learned Single Bench, the lease between the Baglas and the Poddars, executed in 1965, when the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act was in operation, was a registered one, for a period exceeding 12 years and thus specifically excluded from the purview of the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act. The learned Single Bench rightly observed that where a registered lease executed during the operation of the 1949 Thika Tenancy Act was for a period exceeding 12 years, the mere deposit of rent with the Thika Controller would not create any ‘thika’ tenancy. 107. In Annapurna Seal vs. Tincowrie Dutt, reported at ILR 1961 (1) Cal 1, this Court held that if land was demised with even one structure, it would not be a thika land. The contention of the Bagals that the land was let out with structures and therefore not ‘thika’ land may have substance. 108. However as observed above, there is a final order passed by the learned Thika Controller holding that the appellant Patel Timber Industries is Thkia Tenant in respect of 14 Cottahs and 10 Chittaks of land held by Patel Timber Industries. 108. However as observed above, there is a final order passed by the learned Thika Controller holding that the appellant Patel Timber Industries is Thkia Tenant in respect of 14 Cottahs and 10 Chittaks of land held by Patel Timber Industries. In view of the provisions of the 2001 Thkia Tenancy Act, and in particular, Section 5(3) thereof, if any question arises as to whether a person is a Thika Tenant or not whether the land in question is Thika Land or not the Thika Controller may, either on his own motion or upon receiving information, after giving the person interested an opportunity of being heard and after examining all such documents and particulars as might be considered necessary, enquire upon and decide such question. 109. It is true that the Thika Controller was required to enquire upon the question of whether the 14 Cottahs and 10 Chittaks of land held by Patel Timber Industries or the land held by the other three intervenors was ‘Thika land’ or not should have been decided after being persons interested a hearing. The Baglas were entitled to a hearing. 110. However, it is not for this Court, deciding an appeal from an order in execution proceedings, to decide the question of the correctness and/or validity of an order of the Thika Controller. 111. Section 21 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or to deal with any question or to determine any matter which, by or under 2001 Act is required to be or has been decided or dealt with or is to be or has been determined by the Thika Controller or the Appellate Authority or other authorities specified under the provisions of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act. Section 21 makes it clear that no order or judgment passed or proceedings including execution proceedings commenced under the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act shall be called in question in any Civil Court. 112. Under Section 12 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act an order of the Thika Controller is appealable before the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal established under the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997. 112. Under Section 12 of the 2001 Thika Tenancy Act an order of the Thika Controller is appealable before the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal established under the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997. Under Section 7 of the Tenancy Tribunal Act quoted above the Tenancy Tribunal has been empowered to exercise all the jurisdiction power and authority exercisable by any Court including the High Court before the date except the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution exercised by a Division Bench of High Court. The order of the learned Controller can only be set aside by the Tenancy Tribunal or alternatively by a Division Bench of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 113. May be as argued by Mr. Mitra, an order without jurisdiction is a nullity and can ordinarily be challenged in collateral proceedings. However, in view of the specific bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 21 the Execution Court cannot under Order 21 Rule 97 to 99 decide the question of validity of an order passed by the Thika Controller under the 2001 Act, including the question of whether the order of the Thika Controller is without jurisdiction or not cannot be decided by the Civil Executing Court/ Civil Court. 114. The final Order of the learned Thika Controller dated 29th September, 2010 is subsisting. The appellants have the right to resist dispossession in execution of the decree obtained by the Baglas against the Poddars, claiming an independent right to remain in possession of the said premises. 115. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. Photostat certified copy, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all usual formalities. I agree – Sahidullah Munshi, J.