JUDGMENT : B.V. Nagarathna, J. 1. The legal representatives of the deceased original defendant has preferred these appeals, assailing judgment and decree of the Court of the ; Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Ramanagaram, dated 17-1-2009 in R.A. No. 60 of 2005, by which, the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First Class at Channapatna in O.S. No. 182 of 1990, dated 16-4-2005 has been confirmed. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties shall be referred to, in terms of their status before the Trial Court. 3. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit against the defendant seeking declaration of her title in respect of the suit items no. 1 and 2; for possession of suit item for mesne profits from last three years at Rs. 360/- p.m.; consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents or anybody claiming under them from in any way interfering with the plaintiff's right and possession of the suit item no.2 and altering or meddling with suit item no. 1. 4. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit schedule property was originally belonged to one Malgal Kempamma, who is stated to be the grandmother of the plaintiff. She had executed a registered deed of settlement dated 13-8-1962 settling the suit schedule properties on the plaintiff. Malgal Kempamma had also fostered first defendant and had settled certain other properties on him. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of first defendant. The plaintiff is in possession of the suit properties. Suit item had been let out to the first defendant in the year 1982 as he assured that he would construct a fresh house on his site and vacate item no.1. Later on defendants repudiated the title of the plaintiff in suit item no.1 by their reply dated 26-5-1986 to the notice issued on behalf of the plaintiff. Thereafter, attempts were made for settlement of the dispute but they failed. The Municipality has issued an endorsement and assessment list extracts to showed the title of the plaintiff to the suit schedule properties. Thereafter, attempts were made for settlement of the dispute but they failed. The Municipality has issued an endorsement and assessment list extracts to showed the title of the plaintiff to the suit schedule properties. Therefore, defendants have no right or title to the suit schedule properties except that defendants are in possession of suit item After defendants have repudiated the title of the plaintiff as illegal, they are liable to vacate suit item no.2 is a site and it has a Tamarind tree at its southern end. Defendants are now claiming the Tamarind tree and item no.2 since 1987, but their attempts have been resisted by the plaintiff. Along with the plaint, a sketch has been filed showing the properties that were settled on defendant and the properties that were settled on the plaintiff under the settlement deed 'ABCD' is No. 1685/1 i.e., item no.1 of the suit schedule in which defendants are in illegal possession. 'ACEF' is the portion of the house of the plaintiff in No. 1685. BDGH is the vacant site of the defendants in No. 1686 and GHIJKL is the suit item no.2 in No. 1686/1. Though the defendants have no right or title in respect of the suit item no.2, they are interfering with the plaintiff's possession and they have repudiated plaintiff's title in suit item no.1 but asserting their title on the same. The cause of action for the suit arose in May 1986 and 1987 when the defendants repudiated plaintiff's title to suit item no.1 and were trying to meddle with suit item no.2. Hence, the suit was filed seeking the above said reliefs by the plaintiff. 5. In response to the suit summons and Court notices, defendants appeared and filed their written statement contending that the description of the first and third defendants in the cause title was not correct. Defendants are residing at Khaneshumari No. 1685 of Mangalwarpet for the last 65 years and the first defendant was the absolute owner of the property in its entirety shown as 'ABCD' in the sketch produced by the defendants. Defendants are also in possession and enjoyment of the property bearing Site No. 1686 in its entirety shown as 'CDEFGHIJHG' in the rough sketch to the written statement. Defendants are also in possession and enjoyment of the property bearing Site No. 1686 in its entirety shown as 'CDEFGHIJHG' in the rough sketch to the written statement. The first defendant is also the absolute owner of the house property measuring about east to west 41 feet and north to south 36 feet described as 'ABCD' in the rough sketch. The defendants have been enjoying the entire area 'CDEFGHIJHG' by putting up a cattle shed, bathroom, manure pits, hay stocks, raising several trees etc. That the first defendant has inherited all the properties as the adopted son of Chowdegowda and Malgal Kempamma who are the adopted parents. According to the defendants, Malgal Kempamma had not executed any settlement deed on 13-8-1962 in favour of the plaintiff and the said document is fraudulent and concocted. The plaintiff has not derived any right or interest in respect of the suit schedule property. Under that settlement the first defendant was adopted to the family of the Malgal Kempamma, when he was a boy of 10 years and since then he has been brought up and residing with his family. As such Kempamma has no right or title to execute any settlement in favour of the plaintiff. That the husband of the plaintiff is a distant relative of the first defendant and that the plaintiff was residing with her husband in Matadabeedi in Fort, Channapatna Town in the house of her husband. Thereafter, the said house being in a dilapidated condition was demolished in the year 1965 and the plaintiff and her husband were residing at D. No. 1614/1 in Bajanemane Beedhi at Mangalwarpet, Channapatna Town, Thereafter, plaintiff and her husband requested the first defendant during the end of the year 1971 for accommodation for residence. The first defendant has reconstructed his house in No. 1685 measuring 41 x 36 feet and he made it into two portions shown as 'ABMN' and MNCD in the rough sketch. The plaintiff and her husband were residing in D. No. 1614/1 and on their request to the first defendant a portion of 'ABMN' was given for their residence as they stated that they wanted to reconstruct their dilapidated house as they could not reside in the house of the parents of the plaintiff on account of some misunderstanding in the family. For the aforesaid reasons in the end of the tear 1971 the first defendant permitted the plaintiff and her husband to occupy the house portion 'ABMN' temporarily which consists of a kitchen, lining hall, one room, thotte and cattle yard. Therefore, plaintiff and her husband are not the owners of the suit property but they are in permissive possession of the suit property. It is further alleged that the endorsement and assessment extracts produced by the plaintiff are concocted in collusion with the Municipality officials as the plaintiff who is an employee of TMC from more than 30 years with the influence of Thirumalegowda and others have produced the sketch which is incorrect and does not represent the real state of affairs. It was contended that the defendants are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the entire property bearing No. 1686 measuring east to west on the northern side, 46 feet and 80 feet on the southern side and north to south about 177½ feet and that they are absolute owner of the same. The plaintiff has no manner of right, title or interest over the said properties and Therefore the defendants sought dismissal of the suit. 6. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: (1) Does the plaintiff proves that she is the lawful owner of the items no.1 and 2 as on the date of the suit as per the plaint rough sketch? (2) Does she further proves that she is entitled for possession of the suit item no.1? (3) If so, she is entitled to mesne profits as sought? (4) Does she further prove that alleged obstructions caused by the defendants? (5) Does she further prove that the allegations made in para 4 of the plaint? (6) Do the defendants prove that they are the absolute owner of the entire property described as 'ADEFGHIJ and LB' as per the rough sketch furnished by the defendants? (7) Do the defendants further prove that the allegations made in para 8 of written statement? (8) If so, is the suit barred by limitation? (9) Do they further prove this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit as the value of the property exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court? (10) Does she entitled for permanent injunction as sought for? (11) What order or decree? (8) If so, is the suit barred by limitation? (9) Do they further prove this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit as the value of the property exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court? (10) Does she entitled for permanent injunction as sought for? (11) What order or decree? In order to substantiate her case, plaintiff examined one Lingegowda as P.W. 1 and two more witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 2 and 3. She produced forty-four documents and they were marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 44. Defendants examined three witnesses. They produced ninety-four documents which were marked as Exs. D. 1 to D. 94. On the basis of the said evidence, the Trial Court answered issues 1 to 5 and lOin the affirmative, 6 to 9 in the negative and decreed the suit of the plaintiff by declaring that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit items no.1 and 2 and defendants were directed to hand over possession of suit item no.1 to the plaintiff and a direction for separate enquiry for mesne profits was given. Defendants were also permanently restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule item no.2 and also restrained from altering or meddling with suit item No. 1. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 16-4-2005, defendants preferred R.A. No. 60 of 2005 before the First Appellate Court, which on hearing the learned Counsel for the parties framed the following points for its consideration: VERNACULAR MATTER The First Appellate Court answered Point Nos. 1 and 2 in the negative and dismissed the appeal by confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, defendants have preferred this second appeal. 8. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellants and learned Counsel for the respondent and perused the material on records well as the original records which have been summoned by this Court. 9. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the Courts below were not right in granting the decree of declaration of title as well as possession in respect of the suit items and consequently injuncting the defendants from interfering with the suit items no.1 and 2. She contended that the plaintiff relied upon Ex. 9. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the Courts below were not right in granting the decree of declaration of title as well as possession in respect of the suit items and consequently injuncting the defendants from interfering with the suit items no.1 and 2. She contended that the plaintiff relied upon Ex. P. 42, which is stated to be a settlement deed dated 13-8-1962. The said document was not proved in accordance with law. No person who had attested the said document was examined in the case. The Trial Court simply applied Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act ('the Act', for short) to hold that the document was more than 30 years old and therefore there was presumption with regard to execution as well as the contents of the document. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that, based on the evidence of Ex. P. 42, suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed. The judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, which has confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is also incorrect. 11. She, further, contended that the plaintiff had let-in her evidence through her power of attorney holder, her husband and that she had not stepped into the witness-box and therefore, the evidence of the power of attorney holder could not be relied upon in order to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had made out a case to get the reliefs sought by her. Learned Counsel for the appellants further contended that defendant No.1 was the adopted son of Malgal Kempamma and therefore, he had succeeded to the suit schedule properties on the demise of Malgal Kempamma and hence, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court ought to have dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. It is contended that this appeal gives rise to substantial questions of law and the same may be admitted for a detailed hearing. 12. Per contra, learned Counsel for the plaintiff supporting the judgment of the Courts below submitted that the original defendant claimed to be the adopted son of Malgal Kempamma. But there was no evidence let in support of the adoption. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the original defendant was not the son of Malgal Kempamma in the absence of there being any evidence in support of the said fact. He further contended that Exs. But there was no evidence let in support of the adoption. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the original defendant was not the son of Malgal Kempamma in the absence of there being any evidence in support of the said fact. He further contended that Exs. P. 42 is a registered settlement deed, under which Malgal Kempamma settled the suit schedule properties in favour of the plaintiff. The said document also settled some other properties among defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who are the children of original defendant. Therefore, the appellants cannot resile from Ex. P. 42-settlement deed as they are beneficiaries of certain properties. The suit schedule property was given to plaintiff by Malgal Kempamma in terms of Ex. P-42 and plaintiff acquired right, title and interest in respect of the property. The defendants were given only permissive possession of suit item no.1 and hence, plaintiff was entitled to get back her possession. He contended that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, which has been rightly confirmed by the First Appellate Court would not call for any interference by this Court as no substantial question of law would arise in this appeal and therefore, the appeal may be dismissed in limine. 13. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material on record as well as the original records, it is noted that both the plaintiffs as well as the defendants are claiming title through the same person namely, Malgal Kempamma, who is since deceased. Of course, the plaintiff has placed reliance on Ex. P. 42, which is a registered settlement deed dated 13-8-1962 under which the suit schedule properties have been settled on her. The defendants have not placed any reliance on the said document. Their contention is that the original defendant-Motaiah was the adopted son of Malgal Kempamma. Under the circumstances, he had inherited the suit schedule properties. 14. I have perused Ex. P. 42, which is the original settlement deed dated 13-8-1962. It is noted that under the said settlement deed, not only plaintiff has been settled with the suit schedule properties, defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are also beneficiaries under the said settlement deed. The same is presumed to be a genuine document under Section 90 of the Act, both with regard to the contents of the document as well as its execution. 2 and 3 are also beneficiaries under the said settlement deed. The same is presumed to be a genuine document under Section 90 of the Act, both with regard to the contents of the document as well as its execution. The Trial Court, by invoking Section 90 of the Act, has held that the document is over thirty years old and hence a presumption arises in regard to its genuinity, execution as well as its contents. Therefore, the presumption has been raised by the Trial Court on the settlement deed. In order to rebut the said presumption, defendants have not let-in any evidence. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence, the Trial Court was justified in holding that Ex. P. 42 is a genuine document, on the basis of which, the plaintiff is the beneficiary and the suit schedule properties, which had fallen to her under the said document. Under Ex. P. 42, defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are also beneficiaries having been conferred with ownership of certain other Properties by Malgal Kempamma. It may be that defendants may not be aware of that, but the defendants who are beneficiaries of some other properties cannot lay claim to the suit schedule properties on the premise that the original defendant was the adopted son of Malgal Kempamma. The adoption has not been proved by any requisite evidence. Therefore, the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have not accepted the theory of adoption which has been set up by the original defendant. The Trial Court while placing reliance on Ex. P. 42 decreed the suit of the plaintiff by holding that she is the owner of suit items no 1 and 2. The defendants have been directed to handover possession of suit item no.1 to the plaintiff and consequently, a decree of permanent injunction has been granted to the plaintiff as against defendants restraining them from interfering with suit items no.1 and 2. The judgment of the Trial Court, which is based on the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff and in the absence of any contra evidence produced by defendants, in my view it is just and proper. The First Appellate Court while reconsidering the matter has come to the conclusion that the defendants have not proved the adoption of original defendant-Motaiah as the adopted son of Malgal Kempamma. The First Appellate Court while reconsidering the matter has come to the conclusion that the defendants have not proved the adoption of original defendant-Motaiah as the adopted son of Malgal Kempamma. Therefore, they could not claim any right, title and interest in respect of the suit schedule property as successor to Malgal Kempamma. 15. It is also interesting to note that defendants had produced Ex. D. 72, which is stated to be the Will of Malgal Kempamma dated 25-4-1959. It is stated to be a registered testament, but the same was not proved in accordance with law. Therefore, even though there were certain documents produced by the defendant, there was no clinching evidence to prove the fact that Motaiah was the adopted son of Malgal Kempamma. In the circumstances, the First Appellate Court also concurred with the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of Ex. P. 42 and held that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court would not call for any interference. Consequently, it dismissed the appeal. 16. Having regard to the fact that the defendants did not let-in any documentary evidence to prove their title to the suit schedule property and coupled with the fact that defendants did not prove adoption of the original defendant-Motaiah to Malgal Kempamma, both the Courts below have decreed the suit of the plaintiff and granted consequential relief of permanent injunction. I do not find any infirmity in the judgment of First Appellate Court, which has confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court by granting the relief as sought by the plaintiff. In my view, no substantial question of law would arise in the appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. 17. Parties to bear their respective costs.