JUDGMENT : SANKAR ACHARYYA, J. This appeal has been preferred by convict appellant Najrul Islam challenging the judgment of conviction dated 04.02.2009 and order dated 05.02.2009 of sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three years with fine of Rs.1000/- in default of payment to suffer simple imprisonment for three months of the charge under Section 498 A of the Indian Penal code (in short I.P.C.) and of rigorous imprisonment of 8 years with fine of Rs.3000/- in default of payment to suffer simple imprisonment for one year of the charge under Section 304 B, I.P.C. passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, 6th Fast Track Court, Alipore in Sessions Trial No. 01 (06) 07 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 52 (06) 06. The appellant is detained in correctional home. Inter alia, the appellant has contended that the impugned judgment is bad in law and against the weight of evidence on records. He has claimed that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside and he deserves acquittal. The case in the trial Court in brief was that on 03.05.2005 at 12:05 p.m. Sk. Alauddin (PW 1) lodged a written information at Nodakhali Police Station which was registered as Nodakhali P,S. Case No. 49 dated 03.05.2005 under Sections 498 A/304 B/34, I.P.C. against the appellant and six others as accused. Said case was investigated by S.I. – Mriganka Prasad Bera as investigating police officer (in short I.O.) (PW 15) and on completion of investigation he submitted charge-sheet under Section 498 A/304 B/34, I.P.C. against all the seven accused persons. Charges under Sections 498 A/304 B/34, I.P.C. were framed against all the seven accused persons. After trial, excepting the appellant other six accused persons were acquitted. In the written information PW 1 alleged that on 25.04.2004 his daughter Eyasmina was given in marriage with the appellant. Acquitted accused persons are inmates of the house of appellant. Since after 2/3 months of marriage all accused persons subjected to mental and physical cruelty on Eyasmina in her matrimonial house demanding money as additional dowry. Being informed by Eyasmina the PW 1 went to the house of appellant on 2/3 occasions and discussed with all accused persons and settled the dispute. On 24.04.2005 all accused persons unitedly assaulted Eyasmina demanding Rs.40,000/- and they sent her to the house of PW 1. Being informed by Eyasmina the PW 1 went to the house of appellant on 2/3 occasions and discussed with all accused persons and settled the dispute. On 24.04.2005 all accused persons unitedly assaulted Eyasmina demanding Rs.40,000/- and they sent her to the house of PW 1. PW 1 consoled his daughter and sent her back to her matrimonial house again. On 29.04.2005 all accused persons assaulted Eyasmina and put her in starvation since morning. In the night of 01.05.2005 at about 12:30 a.m. all accused persons beat Eyasmina and killed her and they hanged up her body with one scarf (orna) binding around her neck. After the death of Eyasmina the PW 1 went to the house of accused persons and came to know the facts. Defence of the accused persons as transpired during trial is outright denial of the allegations of demand of money or dowry, torture on Eyasmina in her matrimonial home and her homicidal death. During trial prosecution examined fifteen witnesses namely, Sk. Alauddin (PW 1), Rafiq Mallick (PW 2), Sk. Imtiaj Mirza (PW 3), Ansura Bibi (PW 4), Sk. Raisuddin (PW 5), Sk. Mahim (PW 6), Sk. Amiruddin (PW 7), Saina Bibi (PW 8), Tuktuki BIbi (PW 9), Sk. Hasem Ali (PW 10), Zakir Mallick (PW 11), Dr. T.K. Roy (PW12), Sk. Rafiqul Hasan (PW 13), Sk. Abbasuddin (PW 14) and Mriganka Prasad Bera (PW 15). In addition to oral evidence of fifteen witnesses prosecution adduced some documentary evidence also. Undisputed facts of the case are marriage between appellant and Eyasmina on 25.04.2004 and unnatural death of Eyasmina on 02.05.2005 at about 12:30 a.m. in her matrimonial home. In the impugned judgment learned Additional Sessions Judge disbelieved homicidal death of Eyasmina and complicity of six accused persons who were acquitted. Said findings have not been challenged by filing any appeal on behalf of the prosecution. Learned trial Judge held in the impugned judgment that there was persistent demand of dowry and Eyasmina was being persistently ill-treated by accused Najrul Islam (appellant herein) for not bringing money and that soon before the death of Eyasmina she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband Najrul Islam in connection with demand of dowry and that accused Najrul Islam caused the dowry death of Eyasmina. At the time of hearing this appeal learned counsel for the appellant took us to the evidence adduced by prosecution and urged that admittedly Eyasmina died at the beginning of 02.05.2005 at 12:30 a.m. but PW 1 lodged the written information at police station on 03.05.2005 at 12:30 p.m. without any explanation of delay which is fatal. His further arguments is that the witnesses made same allegations against all the accused persons but learned Judge did not acquit the appellant like other six accused persons illegally. Drawing our attention to the depositions of witnesses he argued that the evidence in connection with allegations of demand of money and subjecting cruelty is uncorroborated hearsay statements. According to him, the impugned judgment suffers from serious infirmity and has caused gross miscarriage of justice. He relied on the principles of law relating to presumption under Section 113 B, Evidence Act discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M. Srinivasulu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 2007 SC 3146 . He relied upon another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Bittu and Another reported in AIR 2016 SC 146 in support of his arguments that when medical evidence rules out the case made out in FIR the accused deserves the benefit of doubt. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State advanced her arguments in support of the findings made in the impugned judgment. She urged that undisputedly Eyasmina died in her matrimonial house within seven years of her marriage and prosecution adduced sufficient reliable evidence to prove that Eyasmina was persistently tortured physically and mentally on demand of money in her matrimonial home by the appellant during her life time and she was tortured on demand of dowry soon before her death also. Further arguments of learned counsel for the State is that the learned trial Judge rightly has drawn presumption under Section 113 B, Evidence Act about dowry death of Eyasmina. Further arguments of learned counsel for the State is that the learned trial Judge rightly has drawn presumption under Section 113 B, Evidence Act about dowry death of Eyasmina. On perusal of the evidence adduced by prosecution during trial it appears to us that PW 1 is the father, PW 4 is the mother, PW 5 is brother, PW 6 is cousin brother, PW 8 is sister in law (wife of brother, and according to PW 1 the PW 9 is his daughter in law and PW 9 stated that PW 1 is her ‘Kakasasur’ (brother of father in law) by village courtesy. PW 2 and PW 7 were declared hostile witnesses at the instance of prosecution. PW 10 is next-door neighbour of PW 1. PW 11 and PW 14 are neighbours of the appellant. PW 12 held post mortem examination over the dead body of Eyasmina on 04.05.2005. PW 13 conducted the marriage between appellant and victim and he proved the marriage certificate as exhibit- 4. PW 15 is the I.O. PW 2, PW 7, PW 10 and PW 11 stated nothing in support of the allegations against the appellant. PW 12 ruled out possibility of post mortem hanging of Eyasmina which was pleaded in written information lodged by PW 1 at police station on 03.05.2005. PW 1, PW 4, PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8 stated that Eyasmina was murdered and then hanged. PW 12 ruled out that possibility. As such, evidence of victim’s parents, brother, cousin brother and sister in law to that effect is established untrue. This is a strong circumstance in favour of the appellant relating to his claim of false allegations brought against him. We get support in arriving such decision in view of the discussions made in the case reported in AIR 2016 SC 146 (Supra). PW 1 stated that his daughter was subjected to torture at her matrimonial house by the accused persons. PW 4 stated that during the stay of Eyasmina at her matrimonial house she was subjected to torture by her husband Najrul Islam and her mother in law, “nanad’ (husband’s sister) and ‘ja’ (wife of husband’s brother). PW 5 stated that his sister was subjected to torture by her husband and in laws. PW 6 stated that accused persons used to torture and assault upon Eyasmina at her matrimonial house. PW 5 stated that his sister was subjected to torture by her husband and in laws. PW 6 stated that accused persons used to torture and assault upon Eyasmina at her matrimonial house. According to PW 8, Eyasmina was assaulted and tortured by her mother in law, ‘ja’ (husband’s brother’s wife), ‘nanad’ (husband’s sister) and father in law. PW 9 stated that Eyasmina was treated with cruelty by her father in law, mother in law, ‘ja, ‘nanad’ and husband. All the said witnesses claimed their knowledge about torture on Eyasmina from Eyasmina and not from any other source. None of the said witnesses claimed witnessing any incident of torture on Eyasmina by any accused. As such, there is substance in the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that if on the basis of such evidence other accused persons can be acquitted of the charge of subjecting cruelty on Eyasmina then the appellant also deserves acquittal. We cannot brush aside the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that said witnesses deposed like parrots in the matters of torture on Eyasmina and her homicidal death. Learned counsel for the state submitted that PW 9 is a member of Ganatantrik Mahila Samity and she is not a member of the family of PW 1. During life time Eyasmina was treated with cruelty in her matrimonial home. We do not find even a chit of paper to establish that during life time Eyasmina ever complained before Ganatantrik Mahila Samity that she was subjected with cruelty by appellant or his relations on demand of dowry. Although the aforesaid witnesses stated about physical and mental torture on Eyasmina in her matrimonial home but there is no iota of evidence on record to show that during her life time she or HER any relative informed police about alleged torture due to non-fulfilment of demand of dowry laid by accused persons. There is also no evidence of medical treatment of Eyasmina due to any physical torture on her during her life time. During post mortem examination also PW 12 did not find mark of injury on persons of Eyasmina to substantiate any physical torture on her during life time. We like to mention another circumstance which transpires from the evidence of PW 1 and FIR. During post mortem examination also PW 12 did not find mark of injury on persons of Eyasmina to substantiate any physical torture on her during life time. We like to mention another circumstance which transpires from the evidence of PW 1 and FIR. During cross-examination PW 1 stated, “It is true that on receiving the information of death of my daughter Eyasmina I along with my brother, other villagers and near relatives went to Noda Khali P/S on 02.05.2005 at about 11:00 a.m.”. The FIR was lodged at P.S. on 03.05.2005 at t 12:05 p.m. Had there been knowledge of PW 1 and his relatives about demand of Rs.40,000/- by appellant and his relations and torture on Eyasmina for non-fulfilment of such demand in her matrimonial house certainly there would be no reason of not lodging FIR by PW 1 at P.S. on 02.05.2005 and for waiting more than 24 hours after his visit at P.S. to lodge FIR relating to death of his daughter Eyasmina. The case of prosecution is mainly based on circumstantial evidence. The cumulative effect of aforesaid circumstances leans to the appellant’s claim of innocence. In the case of Srinivasulu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (Surpa) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held, “A conjoint reading of Section 113 B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B, I.P.C. shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances’. The expression ‘soon before’ is very relevant which Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B, I.P.C. are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. ‘Soon before’ is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period soon before the occurrence. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. ‘Soon before’ is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression ‘soon before her death’ used in the substantive Section 304-B, I.P.C. and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression ‘soon before’ is not defined. As reference to expression ‘soon after’ used in Section 114 (illustration (a)) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term ‘soon before’ is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression ‘soon before’ would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence”. We have discussed in foregoing paragraphs about the prevailing circumstances against allegations of prosecution relating to the torture on Eyasmina during her life time in her matrimonial home demanding money. In addition, it will not be out of place to mention that in FIR the PW 1 stated that on 24.04.2005 all the accused persons unitedly beat up his daughter severely and demanding rupees forty thousand they sent his daughter to his house. None of the witnesses deposed to prove any incident of 24.04.2005. It is significant to note that the date of death of Eyasmina is 02.05.2005. None of the witnesses deposed to prove any incident of 24.04.2005. It is significant to note that the date of death of Eyasmina is 02.05.2005. PW 1 and his relative witnesses tried to establish that before 15 days of Eyasmina’s death she was subjected to cruelty in her matrimonial home and PW 1 went there after getting such information and settled the matter. However, from the totality of circumstances, said matter cannot be said as proved beyond reasonable doubt. The I.O. as PW 15 could not improve the prosecution case. In our view, it would have been proper for the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the trial Court to extend the benefit of doubt in favour of the appellant also like other accused persons. We hold that the appellant may also be given the benefit of doubt and may be acquitted of the charges under Sections 498 A/304 B of the Indian Penal Code. As a result, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment in respect of conviction and sentence of the appellant Sk. Najrul Islam only is set aside. The appellant Sk. Najrul Islam is hereby acquitted of the charges under Sections 498 A/304 B of the Indian Penal Code. He is set at liberty and let him be released from custody forthwith if his detention in custody is not required in connection with any other case. A copy of this judgment along with L.C.R. be sent to the trial Court promptly from the department. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties or their advocates on record in compliance with usual formalities.