ORDER : Let the affidavit of service filed in Court today be kept on record. 2. This winding up application has been taken out by a finance company against a borrower, being a company registered under the Companies Act in the State of West Bengal. From the averments made in the winding up application and the submissions advanced by the parties it appears that the company entered into several loan-cum-hypothecation agreements with the petitioning creditor for purchase of several earth moving equipments (Mercedes Benz Actros 4841K). Admittedly, the company defaulted in making payments. This gave rise to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, since each of the agreements contained an arbitration clause. The petitioning creditor instituted section 9 applications before the Bombay High Court and several orders were passed by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench of that Court. In respect of the same transaction, the finance company has now filed the instant winding up application on the basis of a statutory notice dated 24th September, 2015, wherein the petitioning creditor’s total claim appears to be a sum of Rs.2,95,29,966.96p (Rupees two crores ninety five lakhs twenty nine thousand nine hundred sixty six and paise ninety six). The statutory notice dated 24th September, 2015 was replied to by the advocate of the borrower company in terms of a letter dated 12th October, 2015. In the said letter it has been stated, inter alia, that the subject loan agreements are currently subjudiced before the Bombay High Court and as such no liquidated amount stands due as on date from his client, namely, the borrower company. 3. At the time of hearing of the matter, the learned advocate representing the finance company, being the petitioning creditor, submits that notwithstanding the fact of existence of the proceedings before the Bombay High Court under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the instant winding up proceeding, being essentially a discretionary proceeding, is maintainable before this Court. In this context, he refers to a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Maheshwari Ispat Ltd. V. Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. reported in [2013] 179 Company Cases 15 (Cal). 4. Even a bare perusal of the judgment, especially paragraph 14 thereof, does not reveal anything further to what is clearly an established and settled principle of law. 4. Even a bare perusal of the judgment, especially paragraph 14 thereof, does not reveal anything further to what is clearly an established and settled principle of law. A winding up proceeding, indeed, is essentially a discretionary remedy. The Court has a wide discretion. Even if a claim is an admitted one, an order of admission is not a matter of course. The Court would retain its discretion under section 443 of the Companies Act that would empower it to pass an appropriate order which would be just in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, what appears to have not been discussed specifically or in detail by the Division Bench in the said judgment – other than a passing observation that the Court should use its discretion judiciously – is whether merely because a discretionary remedy is available under the Companies Act, the Court is ipso facto and mandatorily bound (emphasis supplied) to entertain (emphasis supplied) an application for winding up in such a fact situation, as sought to be presented in the instant case. In the facts of the instant case it appears that it is in respect of a set of claims arising out of several loan-cum-hypothecation agreements, which have given rise to proceedings under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Bombay High Court and orders have been passed thereon – both by the Single Bench as well as the Division Bench of that Court. However, before the Division Bench of this Court, the facts of Maheshwari Ispat Ltd.’s case were totally different, which is evident from a plain reading of the opening paragraph of the said judgment. What is, therefore, required to be answered by this Court is whether in such a fact situation – as sought to be presented in the instant case – the finance company, approaching the Company Court as a petitioning creditor – in essence and in effect – has taken advantage of and misused the process of this Court by invoking its discretionary jurisdiction. The answer is clear and unequivocal, yes. Merely because parallel statutory remedies are available, a litigant cannot be allowed to take its advantage and launch a two pronged attack against its other side solely for the purpose of hastening the process of making the latter somehow come to its terms. The answer is clear and unequivocal, yes. Merely because parallel statutory remedies are available, a litigant cannot be allowed to take its advantage and launch a two pronged attack against its other side solely for the purpose of hastening the process of making the latter somehow come to its terms. The deliberate attempt of taking undue advantage of the available process of law as well as the judicial system being taken for granted without even giving a passing thought or considering how it would tantamount to wasting valuable and precious time of at least one of the two heavily overburdened Courts, cannot be lost sight of. Even if a Court has discretionary jurisdiction to entertain a winding up application – in such a factual scenario as presented in the instant case – it should be loathed to exercise such jurisdiction and not entertain (emphasis supplied) such application, applying judicious principles for not exercising its discretion. The finance company, in the facts of the instant case, has merely taken advantage of being allowed by statute to invoke the Company Court’s discretionary jurisdiction to move a winding up application and has done so notwithstanding the fact that in respect of the same loan-cum-hypothecation agreements, proceedings have been initiated before the Bombay High Court under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and several orders have been obtained from that Court. Ideally, in such a fact situation, the finance company should have approached this Court praying, at the outset, for entertaining the winding up application with the assurance of having its proceedings pending before the Bombay High Court, withdrawn. That would have been a fair stand, but the finance company essentially decided to press on with the instant winding up application simply by referring to the Division Bench judgment (supra), which, for reasons stated above, is clearly distinguishable. 5. The application is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.