ORDER : Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J. 1. This petition is filed seeking the direction for the protection and preservation of the gomal land at Sy. No. 315/1 of Ajri Village, Virajpet Thaluk, Kodagu District. 2. Sri R. Subramanya, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 has raised the threshold objection to the entertaining of this petition on merits. He submits that the petitioner is guilty of suppressing the material facts. He submits that in O.S. No. 84/2006, the petitioner's I.A. No. 4 for temporary injunction was dismissed and the fifth respondent's I.A. No. 6 for temporary injunction was granted restraining the petitioner or anybody claiming under him from interfering with the possession of the respondent No. 5 in respect of the suit schedule property as also from obstructing the disposal of solid waste by the respondent No. 5 in the schedule property subject to the respondent No. 5 following the State Pollution Control Board's norms. He submits that a copy of the order passed by the Court of the Additional Civil Judge in this regard is at Annexure-R8. He submits that the petitioner filed M.A.3/2006 aggrieved by the temporary injunction order granted in favour of the respondent No. 5. The said appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court [Court of Civil Judge, (Senior Division) and JMFC, Virajpet) for default on 19.9.2009. He submits that O.S. No. 84/2006 itself is also dismissed for non-prosecution on 28.6.2012. He submits that none of these things are ever whispered in the memorandum of this writ petition. 3. He submits that this petition is liable to be dismissed with costs, as the petitioner has withheld all the material information from this Court. In support of his submission, he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and Others v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and Others reported in 2013 AIR SCW 34, wherein it is held that a party coming to the Court is required to make full disclosure of the material facts. It is not for the party, but it is for the Court to determine whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. Paragraph No. 46 read out by him is as follows: "46. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is not for the party, but it is for the Court to determine whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. Paragraph No. 46 read out by him is as follows: "46. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision making to the Court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2nd May, 2003 in the order dated 24th July, 2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order dated 2nd May, 2003 was passed or that it has attained finality." 4. Nextly, he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 . Paragraph Nos. 7 and 10 of the said decision read out by him are as follows: "7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.... 10. In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayshree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel." 5. Sri A.S. Ponnanna, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the land in question measuring 89 acres standing at Sy. No. 315/1 of Arji Village has never been a gomal land; it has always been a paisari land. He reads out the definition of paisari land' as contained in definition 2.96 of the Karnataka Revenue Survey Manual. It is as follows: "All waste and forest lands which are declared to be property of the Government and which have not been notified as protected portions or as forest reserve.". 6. He submits that the petitioner has been proceeding on the premise that the lands are gomal lands. 7. The second preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General is that the petition is to be thrown out on the ground of delay and laches. The land grants are made between 1969-2014. The petitioner, who claims to be living in the vicinity of the land cannot feign ignorance of the land-grant and the use of the land by the grantees for the given purpose. Without ever challenging the grants by way of appeal, the petitioner is not justified in seeking the restoration of status quo ante. 8. The third preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General is that the prayers made in the writ petition are not grantable in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The prayers sought by the petitioner can only be made in the civil suit. Without prejudice to the aforesaid contention, he submits that this petition involves the disputed question of whether or not it is a gomal land. If the petitioner wants to seek the relief of declaration that it is a gomala land, he has to approach the competent civil court. He submits that the prayer in b, c, and d are virtually in the nature of declaratory reliefs. He submits that this petition is in the nature of public interest litigation and that therefore no relief can be given to the petitioner. He submits that on the ground of equity also, this petition is liable to be dismissed. He submits that the prayer in b, c, and d are virtually in the nature of declaratory reliefs. He submits that this petition is in the nature of public interest litigation and that therefore no relief can be given to the petitioner. He submits that on the ground of equity also, this petition is liable to be dismissed. The grantees have occupied the land, developed the land and have been using it for the specified purpose. 9. Sri H. Pavana Chandra Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had filed O.S. No. 84/2006 in his capacity as the President of the Gomal Samrakshana Samithi whereas this petition is filed in his individual capacity. He submits that the prayer of the suit and of this petition are entirely different. He submits that in the suit, his prayer was for the order of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dumping the waste in the schedule property. 10. He submits that the land in question is shown in the records as paisari lands, which means an uncultivable land left free for the pasturage of cattle of the village. 11. He asserts that even in the absence of the challenge to the grant-orders this Court is required to protect the gomal land. 12. He submits that this Court has already granted an interim order in these proceedings on 14.01.2016 not to make any further grant in respect of the land at Sy. No. 315/1. He further brings to my notice this Court's order, dated 28.03.2016 wherein it is directed that no further construction be made on the land in question. He submits that on 04.04.2016 this Court passed the order restraining all the respondents from putting up any further construction on the schedule property. 13. He submits that the gomal land in question caters to 2,428 cattle. He submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1132/2011 @ SLP(C)3109/2011 is seized of the matter of protecting the gomal land. He submits that in the said proceedings the Apex Court is monitoring to ensure that the gomal land is not diverted to any other purpose. He has also relied on this Court's decision in the case of S.SIDDAPPA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in ILR 1998 KAR 2757. He read out the following portions from the said decision: "5. .... He has also relied on this Court's decision in the case of S.SIDDAPPA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in ILR 1998 KAR 2757. He read out the following portions from the said decision: "5. .... Devarakadu, Urduve, Gunduthope, Tankbed, Phut Kareb Kharab Haiia, date reserve, burial grounds can only be found in the revenue records. In fact, one finds it difficult even to locate a Gunduthope or a Tankbed in the villages. The gomal lands and the gunduthope is a gift to the villagers. They have been tampered with successfully from time to time by the special orders of the Deputy Commissioners unmindful of the strength of the cattle, the need of the people and the purpose for which the lands have been reserved. Though, relevant provisions are very much found in the statute book, the authorities empowered to enforce these provisions under the Land Revenue Act and Rules have failed to take special care to preserve these lands for the purpose they have been specifically assigned. The quality of the rural life can only be maintained by providing free pasturage to cattle, preserving Gokatte for providing drinking water to the cattle, protecting and preserving Gunduthope where the villagers find some shade for the people and the livestock. It is true that civilisation has entered the life of the rural people by way of roads, electricity, water, rural health and education. These are absolutely necessary for improving the quality of life of the rural people. But, the very essence of village life consists in preserving the lands reserved under Section 71 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, Rule 108-I of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules, 1966. We hardly find a plot, consisting of a few well grown trees in the villages. Those are the realms of the past. It, therefore, becomes an urgent necessity for this Court to remind all those concerned who are empowered to enforce these statutory provisions of Land Revenue Act and Rules made thereunder to act and to give effect to every word and letter of statute. The Deputy Commissioners of the districts who are directly incharge of these lands have to be reminded of their duty to protect and preserve these lands specially reserved by the Government. The newly constituted panchayats in the Panchayath Raj Act are duty bound to protect and preserve and to raise Gunduthope and to maintain Sarkari gomals. The Deputy Commissioners of the districts who are directly incharge of these lands have to be reminded of their duty to protect and preserve these lands specially reserved by the Government. The newly constituted panchayats in the Panchayath Raj Act are duty bound to protect and preserve and to raise Gunduthope and to maintain Sarkari gomals. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioners are now directed to give effect to the provisions of the Revenue Act and to preserve and reserve all these lands specified in the Act for the very purpose specified therein. The Deputy Commissioners shall direct the respective panchayats to protect and raise these Gunduthopes situated in the respective villages and to further direct the Tahsildar of the Taluk to preserve the gomals for free pasturage...." 14. The learned counsel takes serious exception to the Government making the statement that there are only 747 cattle in Ajri Village, whereas their number is 2,428. 15. Nextly, he relies on this Court's decision in the case of Mahesh v. The Principal Secretary and Others passed in W.P. No. 35299/2014 disposed of on 23.3.2015. Relying on the said decision, he would contend that the Government is duty bound to cancel the grant and restore the land to its original purpose - free pasturage. He submits that Jamabandi (Annexure-J) is reflective of over-writing. He submits that entry in column No. 7 is Tamarekadupaisari, which means the grass land. 16. Sri T.L. Kiran Kumar, the learned Additional Government Advocate submits that number of cattle in Ajri Village is correctly mentioned in the counter as 747. He submits that the same is disclosed by the documents produced by the petitioner himself as Annexure-D. 17. Sri A.S. Ponnanna, the learned Additional Advocate General, without prejudice to the preliminary objections raised by him, submits that the land at Survey No. 315/1 has never been a gomala land; it was a paisari land meaning a sarakari land. He submits that the Government has the power to reserve its land for any public purpose. 18. He submits that 5 acres of land allotted to Town Municipal Council, Virajpet is being used for the solid waste management purpose, which is in public interest. He submits that the land-grants amongst the 28 private parties are all small extents of few guntas. Majority of the grantees are the land-less people belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, namely 'Erava'. 18. He submits that 5 acres of land allotted to Town Municipal Council, Virajpet is being used for the solid waste management purpose, which is in public interest. He submits that the land-grants amongst the 28 private parties are all small extents of few guntas. Majority of the grantees are the land-less people belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, namely 'Erava'. 8 acres is given to M.S. Uttappa, an ex-serviceman. 19. On being asked as to what is the extent of the remaining land after being allotted to the different parties for different purposes, he submits that it is 47 acres 47 cents. 20. The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. The first question that falls for my consideration is whether the petitioner has disclosed all the material facts. The consequential question is whether the petition has to be thrown out, if all the material facts have not been disclosed in the memorandum of the writ petition. 21. To answer this question the reference has to be made to some of the decisions of the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the case of S.B. Noronah (Smt.) v. Union of India and Others reported in (1994) 1 SCC 372 has held that if a person has not approached the Court with clean hands and honest conscience, his petition is to be dismissed in limine. 22. It is also helpful to refer to what the Apex Court has said in paragraph Nos. 34, 36 and 38 of its decision in the case of K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and Others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481: "34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. .... 36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. .... 36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done". The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. .... 38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the court knows law but not facts". 23. In the case of Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2008) 1 SCC 560 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has this to say in paragraph No. 16: "16. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching a superior court must come with a pair of clean hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching a superior court must come with a pair of clean hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law. In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries this Court was of the opinion that such a repeated filing of writ petitions amounts to criminal contempt." 24. In the case of Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India reported in (2007) 8 SCC 449 , the Apex Court has held that a party is required to candidly state all the facts to this Court. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into the merits of the matter. In the case of Vijay Syal and Another v. State of Punjab and Others reported in (2003) 9 SCC 401 , the Apex Court has held that a party should not conceal facts. 25. In the light of what the Apex Court has been consistently reiterating, let me examine the position in the factual matrix of this case Admittedly, the petitioner had filed O.S. No. 84/2006 in his capacity as the President of Gomal Samrakshana Samithi. He has also suffered an interlocutory order in the said suit proceedings. It was challenged in M.A. No. 3/2006 which was dismissed for default. Subsequently, the said suit was also dismissed for default. None of these are whispered in the memorandum of the writ petition. The petitioner cannot justify with any rate of success that the nondisclosure is on account of his thinking that it is necessary or relevant to mention the case. As held by the Apex Court in the series of cases to which the elaborate references are made hereinabove, a party has to give a frank, open and fair account of the antecedent background. 26. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the petitioner is at fault for not disclosing the filing of the suit, miscellaneous appeal, etc. in the memorandum of the writ petition. The first question is answered accordingly. 27. The consequential question is whether this petition is to be rejected on that ground. 26. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the petitioner is at fault for not disclosing the filing of the suit, miscellaneous appeal, etc. in the memorandum of the writ petition. The first question is answered accordingly. 27. The consequential question is whether this petition is to be rejected on that ground. Even when I find that the petitioner has committed an avoidable lapse of not disclosing the material facts, I am not inclined to dismiss this petition on that ground. The petitioner seems to be earning his livelihood atleast partly from the cattle. The ends of justice would be met by my considering this petition on merits but by (a) administering a stern warning to the petitioner not to repeat the mistake and (b) imposing a cost of Rs. 1,000/- on the petitioner. The cost shall be paid to the Bengaluru Bar Association within one week from the date of the issuance of the certified copy of today's order. 28. Nextly, I am concerned with what relief can be given to the petitioner. Admittedly, the grants are made to as many as 34 parties, including six Government parties between 1969 and 2014. Their grant-orders are not specifically challenged. The petitioner has not made any of them as parties to this petition. Only 3 of the 34 parties have got themselves impleaded in this petition. This petition therefore also suffers from the non-joinder of the necessary parties. 29. In any case, the challenge to the 34 grants cannot be entertained at this juncture. The grantees may have developed the lands by putting up construction thereon and occupied the buildings; some of the private grantees may have also died. Their legal representatives or the purchasers from them may have become the owners. Whatever has accrued to the 34 grantees cannot be erased at this juncture by putting the clock back. 30. The facts and circumstances of the case on hand and of W.P. No. 35299/2014 are different. The petitioner's reliance on S. Siddappa's case (supra) does not come to the rescue of the petitioner in any way. But the question that still remains to be considered is the land at Sy. No. 215/1 measures 89 acres 6 cents and as submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General, 47 acres 47 cents are still vacant; they are not allotted to anybody. But the question that still remains to be considered is the land at Sy. No. 215/1 measures 89 acres 6 cents and as submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General, 47 acres 47 cents are still vacant; they are not allotted to anybody. Therefore, I deem it necessary and just to direct the second respondent Deputy Commissioner to consider the petitioner's representation, dated 19.12.2014 but only in so far as it pertains to the remaining land of Sy. No. 315/1 measuring 47 acres 47 cents. 31. It is trite that the choice of location is the prerogative of the Government. Whether same land has to be used as gomal land or some other land has to be earmarked or set apart for being used as gomal land has to be considered by the Government. The Deputy Commissioner is directed to hold the cattle census, determine the extent of the land required for free pasturage and accordingly earmark and reserve the same. This exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and in any case within an outer limit of four months from the date of the issuance of the certified copy of today's order. 32. Now that the main matter itself is disposed of I.A. Nos. 3, 5 and 6 of 2016 are dismissed as having become unnecessary.