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2016 DIGILAW 468 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Pravinsinh Dhirubha Jadena

2016-02-26

G.B.SHAH, K.S.JHAVERI

body2016
JUDGMENT: K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Both these appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated 28-4-2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge(Fast Track Court No. 4), Bhuj at Kachchh, in Sessions Case No. 51 of 2002 whereby the original accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo RI for two and half years and fine of Rs. 25,000/-, in default, to suffer further SI for 12 months for the offence punishable under section 304-II of IPC, and SI for four months for the offence punishable under section 309 of IPC. An amount of Rs. 20,000/- out of the amount of fine to be paid by the accused was ordered to be paid to father of the deceased Sonal as compensation. Criminal Appeal No. 1594 of 2005 has been filed by the State for acquittal of the accused for the offence punishable under sections 302 and 307 of IPC while Criminal Appeal No. 1595 of 2005 has also been filed by the State for enhancement of sentence imposed under section 304-II of IPC. 2. Short facts of the prosecution case are that on 25-6-2002 at 8.30 hours, the accused, who then just completed 19 years, keeping grudge of the complaint made to the Principal orally by the deceased Sonal as well as injured Munira Shabirbhai Vora and Hetalben Devji Umaraniya, who studied together in the same school, entered into Class-12B Commerce of R.D. High School, Mundra, armed with gupti and by closing the door from inside, caused fatal injuries to the deceased Sonal and injuries to P.W. No. 2-Munira Shabirbhai Vora and P.W. No. 3-Hetalben Devji Umaraniya. A complaint was therefore filed for the offence punishable under sections 307, 302 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short) against the accused. Upon filing of the complaint, police started investigation and at the end of investigation, charge sheet was filed before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. 2.1 As the offence was triable by Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions. The learned Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to the accused. The accused denied all the charges and pleaded to be tried. Hence, the prosecution was asked to prove the guilt against the accused. The learned Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to the accused. The accused denied all the charges and pleaded to be tried. Hence, the prosecution was asked to prove the guilt against the accused. 2.2 To prove the guilt against the accused, prosecution examined following witnesses: P.W.No. Name of Witness Exhibit No. 1 Complainant Chatursinh Tapubha Jadeja 4 2 Injured Munira Shabirbhai Vora 13 3 Injured Hetalben Devji Umarniya 15 4 Hina rajesh Soni 16 5 Alka Kirtikumar parekh 18 6 Devdas Rambhai Gadhvi 19 7 Kumdanben Harishbhai Dedhiya 20 8 Devdas Karshan Gadhvi 21 9 Rameshchandra Devraj Maheshwari 22 10 Mukeshkumar Lavjibhai Patel 23 11 Dipali Prakashchandra jani 25 12 Hardik Maheshbhai Sanghvi 26 13 Karshan damji Maheshwari 27 14 Vijay Devshi Malam 29 15 Vaishali Hareshbhai Sampat 36 16 Ashwinbhai Devchandbhai 37 17 Alimamad Adulla Khatri 39 18 Arvindbhai Nanalal Sanghvi 40 19 Pankaj vadilal Shah 41 20 Rajendra Hargovind Pataniya 43 21 Mahesh Mohanlal Desai 45 22 Parsottambhai Govindbhai Kharva 47 23 Amit Ramankant Shah 50 24 Manji Sumar Maheshwari 53 25 Gabha Jakhu Maheshwari 55 26 Prabhuram Hansaraj Soni 56 27 Dilip lalji Kandoi 59 28 Jethalal Mangal Maheshwari 64 29 Jagdish Jethalal Sharma 65 31 Kanji Jadavji Kharva 67 32 Hansaben Jagdish Dave 68 33 Bhagvandas Kanjibhai karthala 71 34 Pravin Narandas Chauhan 73 35 Devendra Ratilal Joshi 75 36 Jakhubhai Aachhubhai Dhuva 79 37 Ashokbhai Bhagiram Nigde 83 38 Kamlesh Punjabhai Garasiya 84 39 Rajesh Gulabray Gandhi 85 40 Subhashchandra Pitambardas 89 41 Prutvirajsinh Talubha Jadeja 92 42 Vikramsinh Karansinh Jadeja 94 43 Nirzamali Ramzanali khoja 95 44 Mahomad Jusab Khoja 97 45 Chanduji Becharji Ninama 99 46 Jusa Suleman Dhosa 102 47 Gyaneshwar Chakrapani Rav 104 48 Alimamad Husen Abda 106 49 Maheshwar Kishorsing Rana 114 2.3 The prosecution also relied on following documentary evidence: Sr.No. Description Exhibit No. 1 Education Certificate 10 2 Copy of 12 th Standard Attendant Register 11 3 Inquest panchnama 42 4 Panchnama of Scene of offence 44 5 Panchnama of seizure of muddamal cloth 46 6 Slip of muddamal Article No.13 48 7 Panchnama of seizure of muddamal cloth 49 8 Slip of muddaamal Article No.16 51 9 Panchnama of seizure of muddamal cloth 52 10 Panchnama of seizure of muddamal gupti 54 11 Panchnama of seizure of muddamal Hina 57 12 Slip of muddaamal Article No.32 58 13 Panchnama of seizure of chappal and spectacles 60 14 Slip of muddaamal Article No.32 and 34 61 15 Panchnama of seizure of cloth of Alkaben 63 16 Panchnama of the letter returning complaint 66 17 Medical certificate of Hetal 69 18 Medical certificate of Munira 70 19 Post mortem notes 72 20 DD of accused Pravinsinh 74 21 Police yadi 76 22 Dying declaration of injured Hetal Umaraniya 77 23 Dying declaration of injured Munira Vora 78 24 Medical certificate of injured Hetal Umaraniya 80 25 Medical certificate of injured Munira Vora 81 26 Medical certificate of accused Pravinsinh 82 27 Medical certificate of injured Hetal Umaraniya 86 28 Copy of notification Prohibiting arma 87 29 Medical certificate of injured Munira Vora 90 30 Panchnama of seizure of cloth of injured Hetal Umaraniya 93 31 Discovery panchnama 96 32 Panchnama of clothes, shoes and socks wore by the accused 98 33 Police yadi 100 34 Map of scene of offence 101 35 Panchnama of surname of accused 103 36 Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Gyaneshwar Rav 105 37 Janvajog Entry 108 38 Yadi written to FSL 109 39 Yadi written to FSL 110 40 Opinion of FSL 111 41 Report of physical matching 112 42 Original complaint 115 2.4 On submission of closing pursis by the prosecution, learned Sessions Judge recorded further statement of the accused under Sec. 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure qua incriminating evidence. Upon affording opportunity of hearing to the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the impugned judgment and order as aforesaid was delivered in the earlier part of this judgment giving rise to prefer the present appeals. 3. Heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Ms. C.M. Shah for the State, learned advocate, Mr. J.M. Thakkar for Mr. Y.S. Lakhani, learned Senior Advocate, for the original complainant and learned advocate, Mr. Krunal Shahid for Mr. K.B. Anandjiwala, learned Senior Advocate, for the accused in both the appeals. 4. Learned APP, Ms. C.M. Shah taking us through the medical evidence and evidence of injured witnesses namely, P.W. No. 2-Munira Shabirbhai Vora and P.W. No. 3-Hetalben Devji Umaraniya and other witnesses as also towards dying declaration at Exh. 74, contended that happening of the incident as well as presence of the accused at the place of incident cannot be disputed. She further took us through the medical evidence and contended that injuries sustained by the deceased as well as the injured witnesses were possible with the muddamal gupti alleged to have been used by the accused in the commission of offence. She further contended that although almost all the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated their evidence and therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges of 302 and 307 of IPC against the accused by leading legal, reliable and impeachable evidence is contrary to the evidence available on record. She also further contended that the learned trial Judge has not appreciated the seriousness of the offence wherein one school girl has lost her life. She also contended that since the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the accused through oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial court has committed error in not convicting the accused under sections 302 and 307 of IPC but convicting the accused under section 304-II of IPC only. She also contended that since the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the accused through oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial court has committed error in not convicting the accused under sections 302 and 307 of IPC but convicting the accused under section 304-II of IPC only. She therefore requested that Criminal Appeal No. 1594 of 2005 filed against acquittal of the accused requires to be allowed. 4.1 As regards enhancement of sentence is concerned, Ms. Shah contended that even if the findings arrived at by the trial court are confirmed, it is a case where maximum punishment is required to be imposed on the accused under Section 304 Part-II of IPC and therefore, she urged that accused requires to be punished appropriately by allowing Criminal Appeal No. 1595 of 2005. 5. Learned advocate, Mr. J.M. Thakkar, adopted the submissions made by learned APP. 6. Learned advocate, Mr. Krunal Shahid for the original accused contended that although prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the present accused beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as there are serious contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, the trial court has not believed the evidence of those witnesses and convicted the accused for the offence under section 304-Part-II of IPC. He also contended that even if it is believed that the accused had committed the offence, it may be noted that the accused had no intention to kill the deceased and cause injuries to other witnesses, however, due to excitement and sudden provocation, the incident took place and therefore, considering the tender age of the accused, he was rightly convicted for the offence punishable under section 304-II of IPC and was acquitted for the offence punishable under sections 302 and 307 of IPC. In view of the above, he contended that it is not a case where enhancement of sentence is required to be made. In view of the above, he contended that it is not a case where enhancement of sentence is required to be made. He also contended that incident is of the year 2002 and therefore, instead of enhancing the sentence imposed on the accused, some reasonable compensation be ordered to be paid to the injured witnesses and compensation ordered to be paid to the father of the deceased may be enhanced by giving benefit of section 357 of Cr.P.C. to the accused He, therefore, requested that considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, remaining sentence to be undergone by the accused may be substituted by payment of appropriate compensation which may be fixed by this Court in view of a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2013)6 SCC page 770. 7. We have gone through oral as well as documentary evidence on record together with the impugned judgment and order as well as the suggestion made by learned advocate for the accused for substituting remaining period of sentence to be undergone by the accused by payment of appropriate compensation. 8. Regarding acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under sections 302 and 307 of IPC, principles governing and regulating the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very clearly explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in number of decisions. 8.1 In the case of Dilawar Singh and Others v. State of Haryana reported in (2015)1 SCC 737 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph 36 and 37 as under: "36. The court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach is vitiated by manifest illegality. In an appeal against acquittal, this Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because on the evaluation of the evidence, a different plausible view may arise and views taken by the courts below is not correct. In other words, this Court must come to the conclusion that the views taken by the learned courts below, while acquitting, cannot be the views of a reasonable person on the material on record. 37. In Chandrappa and Ors. In other words, this Court must come to the conclusion that the views taken by the learned courts below, while acquitting, cannot be the views of a reasonable person on the material on record. 37. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the scope of power of appellate court dealing with an appeal against acquittal has been considered and this Court held as under: "42.....(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." Unless there are substantial and compelling reasons, the order of acquittal is not required to be reversed in appeal. It has been so stated in State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram (2012) 1 SCC 602 ." 8.2 In the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. reported in (2007)3 SCC 75, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court In para 16 as under: "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 8.3 In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors, reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his anke was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 8.4 Even in the case of Mookkiah and Anr. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellant very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 8.5 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein it is held as under:"... "This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 8.6 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Shivasharanappa and Ors v. State of Karnataka, reported in JT 2013(7) SC 66. 8.7 Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then elaborate discussion of evidence or assigning fresh reasons are not necessary. 9. We have considered the above referred rival submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties in light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions. 10. As regards acquittal of the accused for the offence punishable under sections 302 and 307 of IPC is concerned, it is to be noted that nothing is forthcoming on record describing about the cause of death of the deceased and short period of hospitalization of the injured. However, considering the extra-judicial confession made by the accused at Exh. 74 and also considering the tender age of the accused and the time gap of almost 14 years after happening of the incident, the trial court has acquitted the accused under sections 302 and 307 of IPC and instead convicted the accused for the offence punishable under sections 304-II of IPC and 309 of IPC. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of those charges. Therefore, the findings recorded by the trial court in that regard are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it in the said findings. 11. As regards enhancement of sentence is concerned, considering the fact that a single blow has been given to the deceased, the trial court, on a complete appreciation of the entire evidence in proper perspective and considering the fact that the incident has happened in a heat of moment and in view of young age of the accused, convicted the accused under section 304-II of IPC and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for only two and half years and therefore, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the same at this stage. However, in order to have a deterrent effect in the society, principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment should have been considered while imposing sentence. We would be failing in our duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded in appropriate case. 12. It has been recently held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Bala v. State of Haryana & Ors. Etc. Etc. in Criminal Appeal Nos. We would be failing in our duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded in appropriate case. 12. It has been recently held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Bala v. State of Haryana & Ors. Etc. Etc. in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1049 to 1050 of 2015 decided on 18-8-2015 more particularly in paragraph Nos. 1 and 2 as under: "1. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, while focusing on the gravity of the crime and the concept of proportionality as regards the punishment, the Court had observed:-- "Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. A punishment should not be disproportionately excessive. The concept of proportionality allows a significant discretion to the Judge but the same has to be guided by certain principles. In certain cases, the nature of culpability, the antecedents of the accused, the factum of age, the potentiality of the convict to become a criminal in future, capability of his reformation and to lead an acceptable life in the prevalent milieu, the effect - propensity to become a social threat or nuisance, and sometimes lapse of time in the commission of the crime and his conduct in the interregnum bearing in mind the nature of the offence, the relationship between the parties and attractability of the doctrine of bringing the convict to the value-based social mainstream may be the guiding factors. Needless to emphasise, these are certain illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed manner. We may hasten to add that there can neither be a straitjacket formula nor a solvable theory in mathematical exactitude. It would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors which we have indicated hereinbefore and also have been stated in a number of pronouncements by this Court. On such touchstone, the sentences are to be imposed. The discretion should not be in the realm of fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just punishment." [Emphasis added]" 2. Seven years prior to that, in Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, it has been held that:-- "7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: "State of criminal law continues to be-as it should be-a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society." Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. 8. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. 8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N." [Emphasis supplied] And again:-- "The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and the victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal"." 13. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision, it needs to be mentioned that in the present case, the trial court, though convicted the accused for the offence punishable under section 304-II of IPC, has imposed sentenced of only two and half years by showing leniency. In view of our consistent practice of imposing sentence of five years for the offence under section 304-II of IPC, we are of the view that it would be appropriate and in the interest of justice if the sentence imposed on the accused is enhanced from two and half years to five years. In view of our consistent practice of imposing sentence of five years for the offence under section 304-II of IPC, we are of the view that it would be appropriate and in the interest of justice if the sentence imposed on the accused is enhanced from two and half years to five years. However, considering the fact that a period of almost 14 years have passed and the families of both the sides must have settled in their lives by this time, in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to invoke the principle rendered in Ankush Gaikwad's case (supra) in favour of the accused in the larger public interest by ordering the accused to pay appropriate amount of compensation to the father of the deceased and injured in lieu of the remaining period of sentence to be undergone by the accused, which has been accepted by the parties. Therefore, we believe it appropriate to direct the accused to pay an additional amount of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) to father of the deceased Sonal and Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twentyfive Thousand only) each to P.W. No. 2-Sunira Shabirbhai Vora and P.W. No. 3-Hetalben Devji Umaraniya. 14. While confirming the conviction, the sentence imposed on the original accused for the offence punishable under section 304 Part II of IPC is enhanced from RI for 30 months to RI for five years. However, in view of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (6) SCALE 778, the remaining period of sentence to be undergone by the original accused shall be substituted by giving benefit of provisions of section 357 of Cr.P.C. by payment of additional compensation of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) to father of the deceased Sonal and Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twentyfive Thousand only) each to P.W. No. 2-Munira Shabirbhai Vora and P.W. No. 3-Hetalben Devji Umaraniya to be deposited by the accused within a period of 12 weeks before the Registry of the concerned Sessions Court, which, in turn, shall be paid on proper verification and identification by account payee cheque. If the original accused fails to deposit the said amount within the stipulated period, he shall have to undergo the remaining period of sentence and in that event, the investigating agency shall take necessary steps for sending the accused forthwith to jail custody. If the original accused fails to deposit the said amount within the stipulated period, he shall have to undergo the remaining period of sentence and in that event, the investigating agency shall take necessary steps for sending the accused forthwith to jail custody. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. The impugned judgment and order dated 28-4-2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge(Fast Track Court No. 4), Bhuj at Kachchh, in Sessions Case No. 51 of 2002 is accordingly modified to the aforesaid extent. Remaining part of the impugned judgment is unaltered. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 1595 of 2005 stands partly allowed. However, Criminal Appeal No. 1594 of 2005 stands dismissed. Record and proceedings shall be sent back forthwith to the trial court.