JUDGMENT & ORDER : R.R. Prasad, J. This application has been filed for quashing of the order dated 23.06.2015 passed by the District Magistrate, Imphal West, respondent no.2, whereby and whereunder respondent no.2 in exercise of the power conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 passed the order of detention against the petitioner after being satisfied that in order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and to maintain public order it has become necessary to do so. 2. The grounds on which the order of detention was passed that the detenu who having been enrolled in the Village Defence Force (in short ‘VDF’) had been posted under different Police stations, came into contact with one Md. Atao Rahaman @ Atabur @ Md. Ataur Rahaman, an important member of the co-ordination committee of underground outfits (conglomerate of six valley-based underground outfits) in short known as ‘CORCOM’ which had been declared as an unlawful organisation by the Government of India, instigated the detenu to carry out activities which is prejudicial to the security of the State for the underground outfits. The detenu having agreed to do so exploded hand grenade at the side of NH-102 on 11.01.2015 for which an FIR bearing No. 05(01)2015 LIL-PS was registered under sections 307/427/34 of the IPC, 3 Expl.Subs. Act and 16(1) (a)/20 UA(P) Act. Subsequently, the detenu planted IED bomb at the 40 AR Lilong Post for which another FIR bearing No.6(1)2015 LIL-PS under sections 307/511/34 of the IPC, 16(1)(b) UA (P) Act & 5 Expl. Sub. Act was registered. The detenu was paid money to the extent of Rs.10,000/- and that on 19.5.2015 at 4.30 PM, the detenu was arrested by the Imphal West Police in connection with a case registered as City P.S. Case No.68(05)2015 registered under section 121/121-A of the IPC, 20/16(1)(b) UA (P) Act, 25(1)(a)(1-B)A. Act and 4/5 Expl. Subs. Act and was subsequently remanded in the aforesaid cases. On such ground, the respondent no.2 after recording that, the detenu after availing bail facilities would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, passed the order of detention on 23.06.2015. 3. Subs. Act and was subsequently remanded in the aforesaid cases. On such ground, the respondent no.2 after recording that, the detenu after availing bail facilities would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, passed the order of detention on 23.06.2015. 3. A copy of the said detention order was served along with grounds of detention upon the detenu while he was lodged in Manipur Central Jail. The order of detention was approved by the State Government on 4.7.2015. Having receipt of the detention order, the detenu submitted his representation on 8.7.2015, which was rejected by the District Magistrate vide his order as contained in letter dated 6.7.2015. Subsequently, representation was rejected by the State Government as well as by the Central Government. Subsequently order of detention was confirmed by the State Government vide its order dated 31.7.2015. The aforesaid orders of detention, its approval as well as confirmation had been challenged on several grounds. 4. Mr.Ph. Sanajaoba, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner did confine his argument with respect to only one ground, which is with respect to non-recording of the satisfaction by the Detaining Authority of possibility being there of the accused of releasing on bail. In this regard, learned counsel submitted that the order of detention was passed while the detenu was in custody but the Detaining Authority while passing the order of detention never recorded its satisfaction that the detenu, an accused of a case in which bail application had been filed, is likely to be released on bail; rather, the Detaining Authority has only recorded that the detenu has filed bail application and wherever such satisfaction of the Detaining Authority of the detenu being likely to be released on bail, is not there that order of detention, in view of the decision rendered in the case of Union of India - Vrs - Paul Manickam & Anr, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342 and also in a case of Kamarunissa - Vrs - Union of India & Anr: (1991) 1 SCC 128 and therefore order of detention is fit to be set aside on this ground alone. 5. 5. As against it Mr.Y. Ashang, learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that from the order of detention it would appear that the Detaining Authority after having taken notice of the facts that the detenu, an accused in the case, has filed an application, has recorded in the grounds of detention that the detenu having availed bail facilities would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and only after recording such satisfaction the order of detention has been passed which never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. Learned counsel went on submitting that even if satisfaction as is required under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 is not reflected in the detention order but if the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents justifies the order of detention, the order of detention can never be taken to be bad. In this regard, learned counsel has referred to a decision rendered in a case of G. Reddeiah - Vrs Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr; (2012) 2 SCC 389 . Learned counsel in that context drew our attention to the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.2 wherein in para-9 it has been stated that the order of detention was passed after due consideration of the fact that possibility is there of the detenu being released on bail and that he would go on indulging himself continue involvement in the activities prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order after being released on bail. Thus, it was submitted that order of detention never warrants to be quashed. 6. It goes without saying that in a case of preventive detention no offence is proved and justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability. There is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence; whereas Article 21 of the Constitution of India declares that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by a law. In such situation a machinery was definitely needed to examine the question of lawful detention with utmost promptitude. The applicant must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention. In such situation a machinery was definitely needed to examine the question of lawful detention with utmost promptitude. The applicant must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention. Once, however, he shows such a cause and the return is not good and sufficient, he is entitled to be released by the High Court and Supreme Court upon issuance of writ of habeas corpus. 7. It be stated that the Detaining Authority passes the order detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clause (1) & clause (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer and the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this deterent law, the law of preventive detention is to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is mandatory and vital. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Rattan Singh -v- State of Punjab reported in (1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC(Cri) 853, wherein Their Lordships has observed: “4... ... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.” In this context, we may refer to another decision rendered in the case of Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh-Vrs - B.K. Jha, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 22 : 1987 SCC(Cri) 244 wherein it has been held: “5.. . The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard.” 8. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard.” 8. Keeping in view of the said principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently in the case of Union of India -Vs- Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 : 2004 SCC(Cri) 239 recorded requirements to be made by the Detaining Authority passing order of detention when the detenu is in custody, which reads as follows: “14... ..Where detention orders are passed in to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. Ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated..... The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cri) 88. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated..... The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cri) 88. The principles were set out as follows: even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail.” 9. Thus, at the cost of repetition, we may record that Detaining Authority in a case of detenu being in custody, needs to observe following safeguards meticulously: (i) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (ii) If there is reason to believe on the basis of available materials placed before him (a) that there is every possibility of being released; and (b) that on being so released he would be in all probability to indulge in prejudicial activities; (iii) If it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. 10. Thus, in the context of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we have to examine as to whether aforesaid safeguards have been observed meticulously by the Detaining Authority who passes the order of detention when the detenu was in custody. 11. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed on 23.6.2015 by the District Magistrate, Imphal West after being satisfied that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980. 11. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed on 23.6.2015 by the District Magistrate, Imphal West after being satisfied that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980. Such order was passed while the detenu was in custody which the Detaining Authority was aware which would be evident from the extract of the order which reads as follows: * * * * Whereas Md. Nasir Hussain in the court of the Hon’ble CJM, Imphal West with FIR No.68(05)2015 City P.S.u/s 121/121-A IPC, 20/16(1)(b) UA(P) Act, 25(1)(a)(1B)A. Act & 4/5 Expl. Subs. Act has moved bail application on 12.06.2015 and whereas I am satisfied from the police report that Md. Nasir Hussain (27 years) S/o Md. Alauddin of Lilong Ushoipokpi Chingkham Mamang Leikai, P.S. Lilong, District - Thoubal, Manipur who is now in judicial custody, should be prevented from commission of prejudicial activities through an alternative preventive measure.” 14. Satisfaction of the Detaining Authority of detenue committing the same activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order is also there in para-4 of the grounds of detention, which reads as follows: “4. That, in view of your tendencies and inclinations reflected in the offences committed by you in the proximate past by being a sympathizer of underground organisation and giving threats and intimidation to Government Officials, which are prejudicial to the security of the state and maintenance of public order, I am satisfied that after having availed of bail facilities and becoming a free person you would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Hence, the application of normal criminal law against you will not at all be effective to prevent you from the commission of further prejudicial activities. An alternative preventive measure is, therefore, immediately called for.” 15. From the aforesaid paragraph extracted from the order of detention and also from the grounds of detention, it would appear that the Detaining Authority while passing the order of detention did satisfy himself with respect to the fact that the detenu on being availing facilities of bail would continue to indulge in the same activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, but the Detaining Authority has never recorded on being satisfied that there is every possibility of being released. Thus, the safeguards as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as indicated above have not been observed meticulously by the Detaining Authority as there appears to be observance of the safeguards as stipulated under clause 2(b) whereas the Detaining Authority is absolutely silent over clause 2(a) which relates to possibility of the accused being released. 16. However, learned counsel by referring to a decision rendered in the case of G. Reddeiah -Vs - Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh (Supra) submits that even if satisfaction is not reflected from the detention order that would not render the detention order bad provided statements made in the affidavit justifies the order of detention. In the instant case, it has been specifically pleaded in the affidavit-in-opposition that the order of detention order was passed after due consideration of the fact that possibility is there of detenu being released on bail. Thereby the order of detention being quite legal never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. If we taking into account the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India - Vs - Paul Manickam & Anr. (Supra), the learned counsel appearing for the State can be said to have construed the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G. Reddeiah -Vs - Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh (Supra). In the said decision the observation which have been made upon which much emphasis have been given is there in para-22. Relevant portion of which reads as follows: “22. In a matter of detention, the law is clear that as far as subjective satisfaction is concerned, it should either be reflected in the detention order or in the affidavit justifying the detention order. Once the detaining authority is subjectively satisfied about the various offences labelled against the detenu, habituality in continuing the same, difficult to control him under the normal circumstances, he is free to pass an appropriate order under Section 3 of the 1986 Act by fulfilling the conditions stated therein......” 17. From such observation, one would never get that the safeguards laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India - Vs - Paul Manickam & Anr. (Supra), need not be observed by the Detaining Authority. Rather it has to be observed meticulously. From such observation, one would never get that the safeguards laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India - Vs - Paul Manickam & Anr. (Supra), need not be observed by the Detaining Authority. Rather it has to be observed meticulously. Upon observance of such safeguards, if it requires justification that can be justified by way of affidavit. In this respect we would like to refer a case of Elangbam Mangijao Singh - Vs - State of Manipur & Anr. decided by this Court in W.P.No.10 of 2013 wherein Their Lordships did observed as follows: “17. When in this case, the basic requirement in so far as subjective satisfaction of the first limb itself was missing, then it cannot be substituted by mere production of the record in the form of affidavit before the court on the basis of law laid down in G. Reddeiah’s case. In our view, this is a case where we can hold that detaining authority failed to record its subjective satisfaction on the first limb of the issue, namely that detenue was likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with the offense in which he was arrested, because as is clear, the detention order is silent on this issue.” 18. That apart, it be stated that in case of Reddeiah -Vs - Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh (Supra), detenu on the day of passing of the detention order was never in custody rather, he has already been released on bail and therefore, the issue with respect to observance by the Detaining Authority of the safeguards enunciated in case of Paul Manickam & Anr. (Supra), regarding possibility being there of detenu being released was never there. And as such whatever observation is there by Their Lordships in para-22 of the case of Reddeiah -Vs - Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh (Supra) can never be taken in respect to the issue involved in this case. 19. Thus, we find that the Detaining Authority failed to record subjective satisfaction on the first link of the issue, namely that detenu was likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with the offence in which he was arrested and thereby order of detention being banned and therefore is hereby quashed. Consequently the detenu is directed to be released forthwith if he is not wanted in another cases. 20. Consequently the detenu is directed to be released forthwith if he is not wanted in another cases. 20. Writ petition stands allowed.