JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan J. OMP No. 399 of 2015 Applicants have sought rejection of the plaint by moving this application under order 7 Rule 11 of CPC on the ground that the same is under valued. It is alleged that though plaintiff in paragraph 13 of the plaint has alleged the value of the suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at Rs.70,00,000/- (Rs.Seventy lacs only) and affixed a court fee of Rs.72,560/-, but this valuation is contrary to the pleadings set out in paras 6 and 10 of the plaint, wherein it is specifically averred that the real market value of the suit property is more than Rs.6,00,00,000/- (Rs.Six crores only) and, therefore, the plaintiff is bound to affix the court fee on the market value assessed by the plaintiff at Rs.6,00,00,000/- . 2. In reply to the application non applicant/ plaintiff has raised preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the application on the ground of concealment and concoction of material facts and on merits it is averred that since price mentioned in the sale deed is of Rs.70,00,000/-, therefore, the plaintiff was only required to affix the court fee on the said amount even though the market value has been averred to be Rs.6,00,00,000/-. It is further contended that since the suit seeks setting aside of the sale deed in question, therefore, it is the valuation affixed on the instrument i.e. sale deed which would determine the valuation of the suit, which in turn would form the basis of affixing the court fees. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 3. At the outset, I may observe that deficiency of court fee, even if proved, cannot be a ground for rejecting the plaint unless the person by whom such fee is payable in whole or part, as the case may be, is allowed an opportunity to make good the deficiency. This is so prescribed in Section 149 of Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus:- “149. This is so prescribed in Section 149 of Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus:- “149. Power to make up deficiency of court fees.- Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court fees has not been paid, the court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. 4. Learned counsel for the applicants Mr. J.C. Katoch and Ms. Anjali Soni Verma, Advocates, have vehemently argued that since subject matter of the plaint is a land and building, then the court fee shall have to be affixed on the market value, comprising of land and building, which as per the plaintiff himself is worth Rs.6,00,00,000/-. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the judgments of this court; in Devta Satya Narain & anr Vs. Land Chand & ors 2006 (3) Shim.LC 92 ; Rachna Sharma Vs. Meena Kumari Sharma, 2013 (1) Him L.R. 318 and Khawaja Khallilullah Vs.Mrs. Shamem Butt & ors (CMPMO No. 20 of 2012, decided on 1.4.2013). 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff/non applicant has relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of learned Punjab and Haryana High Court in Niranjan Kaur Vs. Nirbigan Kaur, AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 368. 6. In Devta Satya Narain’s case (supra), suit was filed for declaration that that 8 heads of property categorized (A) to (H) were owned and possessed by the plaintiff, and, therefore, the Pata Dwan (perpetual lease), executed by respondent No.1 therein be declared illegal, null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The defendants in the suit raised preliminary objection about improper valuation of the suit which led to the framing of issue No.8, which reads thus: “Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of Curt fee and jurisdiction? OPD”. 7. The defendants in the suit raised preliminary objection about improper valuation of the suit which led to the framing of issue No.8, which reads thus: “Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of Curt fee and jurisdiction? OPD”. 7. Trial court, by referring to the provisions of H.P. Court fees Act, 1968, held that the suit ought to have been valued in accordance with the market value of the property and since it was not done, petitioner/plaintiff was directed to correct the valuation of the suit and pay the deficient court fee within 30 days from the date of passing of the order. It was this order which was challenged by way of Revision petition and this court held as under: “6.Clause (c) of sub section (iv) of Section 7 of 1968 H.P. Act reads thus: “for a declaratory decree and consequential relief; to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed;” Sub – Section (iv) (supra) also provides that in all suits falling under clause (c) (supra), plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. Second proviso to sub section (iv) reads thus: “Provided further that in suit coming under sub clause (c), in case where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by paragraph (v) of this section;” Sub section (v) of Section 7 of 1968 H.P. Act reads as under: “for possession of land, houses and gardens; In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens- according to the value of the subject matter and such value shall be deemed to be – where the subject matter is land, and– (a) to (d)………………………. (e) for houses and gardens; Where the subject matter is house or garden-according to the market value of the house or garden;” 7. Almost the entire section 7 of 1968 H.P. Act is in peri materia to the Central Court Fee Act, 1870, except that the second proviso to sub section (iv) is absent in the Central Act. The Central Act, therefore, does not have any provision identical or similar to the second proviso obtaining in 1968 H.P. Act. 8. Almost the entire section 7 of 1968 H.P. Act is in peri materia to the Central Court Fee Act, 1870, except that the second proviso to sub section (iv) is absent in the Central Act. The Central Act, therefore, does not have any provision identical or similar to the second proviso obtaining in 1968 H.P. Act. 8. The point for consideration by this Court in the present petition, therefore, boils down to this: 'In view of the second proviso to sub section (iv) of section 7 of 1968 H.P. Act (which is absent in the Central Act) in suits falling under clause (c) (supra), is it open to a plaintiff to value the suit if the relief sought is with reference to any property, in a manner other than provided in clause (v) of Section 7? In other words, is it open to a plaintiff in such a suit to fix the valuation of the suit other than based on the market value of the house or houses which are the subject matter of the suit?”. 9. Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that I should not look at the frame of the suit only, but should go deeper into the substance of the plaint and by adopting this approach, I would find that the petitioners ' relief is restricted to only the challenge to a lease deed and there is nothing in the plaint relating to the property as such and the challenge being confined to a lease deed, the suit was properly valued based upon the annual rental of the property, i.e. Rs.1200/- per annum. In support of this contention, Mr. Kuldip Singh has relied upon two Single Bench judgments of Punjab High Court andDelhi High Court. His main reliance of course is upon the Single Bench judgment of Punjab High Courtin the case of Ram Kanwar Kidarmal and others v.Naurang Rai Kundan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1956 Punjab 251. The Single Bench Delhi High Court judgment in the case of Union of India through Chief Commissioner Delhi State Vs. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons (P) Ltd., reported in ILR (1969) Delhi 120 merely, in turn, relies upon the ratio in the aforesaid Punjab High Court judgment. The Single Bench Delhi High Court judgment in the case of Union of India through Chief Commissioner Delhi State Vs. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons (P) Ltd., reported in ILR (1969) Delhi 120 merely, in turn, relies upon the ratio in the aforesaid Punjab High Court judgment. Punjab High Court judgment in the case of Ram Kanwar Kidarmal and others v. Naurang Rai Kundan Lal and others (supra), has construed the phrase “with reference to any property” occurring in an identical proviso in the Central Court Fees Act brought about by the Punjab Court Fees (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1953 as indicating and describing an interest which a person has in the property. By adopting this construction to the said proviso, the learned Single Judge of Punjab High Court in the aforesaid judgment was of the opinion that the word 'property’ as occurring in the proviso should be construed to have been used in the sense of a right in the property and because the rights were in the nature of lease hold rights, court fee should be paid on the lease hold rights and not on the market value of the immovable property which might be the subject matter of the lease itself. 10. To quote the learned Judge himself, I reproduce here-in-below the following observation in the aforesaid judgment which reads thus : “It appears to me difficult to hold that this was the intention of the legislature. The legislature could not be imputed with the intention that court fee should be paid on full market value of the immovable property irrespective of the nature of the right involved in the litigation. The word “property” is not a term of art and strictly speaking means only the right which a person has in relation to something. The word “property” ordinarily indicates and describes an interest which a person has in something. It is also frequently used to denote the thing in relation to which the right of property exists. The only proper way to construe the phrase “with reference to any property” in the proviso is to construe it as indicating and describing an interest which a person has in the thing. Moreover, Cl. (v) of S. 7 does not deal with value of movable property but a suit relating to movable property can also be governed by S. 7 (iv) (c), Court Fees act. Moreover, Cl. (v) of S. 7 does not deal with value of movable property but a suit relating to movable property can also be governed by S. 7 (iv) (c), Court Fees act. In such a case then the proviso does not lay down any test for computation of the value of the property. To hold that the word “property” in the Punjab Amendment relates only to immovable property and not to rights in movable or immovable property will be not only unjust but also inconvenient. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the word “property” in this amendment is used in the sense of a right in the property involved in the case. In the present case lease rights are involved which admittedly are property and therefore court fee must be paid on these rights and not on the market value of the immovable property which is the subject of the lease.” 11. With utmost deference and highest respect, I do not agree with the aforesaid proposition of law, because I have failed to persuade myself to subscribe to the aforesaid view in the face of unambiguous and plain language employed in the second proviso (supra), as well as in clause (e) of sub section (v) of Section 7 (supra). By providing in the second proviso that if a plaintiff files a suit falling under clause (c) and if in such a suit the relief sought is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided in subsection (v). Whereas the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid Punjab judgment did give, assign and apply some meaning to the expression “with reference to any property”, he did not at all consider clause (e) of sub section (v) which was of utmost importance by placing a combined interpretation upon the second proviso and clause (e) together, because any isolated reading of second proviso, without referring to clause (e) would not have reflected the true legislative intent. 12. Clause (e) clearly states that where the subject matter of a suit is a house or a garden, the value of the suit shall be the market value of the house and plot. 12. Clause (e) clearly states that where the subject matter of a suit is a house or a garden, the value of the suit shall be the market value of the house and plot. The expression “market value of the house and garden” is unambiguous, because on its plain reading the legislative intent clearly becomes immediately discernible and that is, that in any suit filed or falling under clause (c) (supra), where the relief sought is with reference to any property, the suit has to be valued on the basis of the market value of the property. Howsoever one wishes, one cannot get out of this binding effect of the expression “market value of the house or garden” used in clause (e) (supra). I am, therefore, of the clear opinion that on a plain but combined reading of the second proviso and clause (e) (supra), whenever a suit is filed which falls under clause (c) (supra), and if the relief sought is with reference to any property, the suit has to be valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at the market value of the property and not otherwise. It is not open to any plaintiff in any such suit to value the suit differently. 13. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, Mr. Kuldip Singh’s contention cannot be accepted, because a bare look at the cause title of the plaint, as well as its prayer part leaves no manner of any doubt that the petitioners- plaintiffs were not only seeking a declaratory relief qua the lease hold rights or qua the execution of a lease, but they were also seeking declaratory reliefs qua their own rights in the property concerned. The petitioners- plaintiffs were seeking the declaratory reliefs about their ownership as well as possession to the extent of their ½ share in the property and also the relief that the mutations entered with respect to the property based upon the lease deed be declared as null and void, illegal etc. etc. The frame of the suit of course has to be in conformity with the substance of the plaint. There cannot be any quarrel to this proposition of law. etc. The frame of the suit of course has to be in conformity with the substance of the plaint. There cannot be any quarrel to this proposition of law. If the frame of the suit as well as the substance of the plaint are read together, the inescapable conclusion which emerges in the present case is that the suit filed by the petitioners- plaintiffs was with reference to the property and the plaintiffs had no option but to value the suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction in accordance with the market value of the property.” 8. In Rachna Sharma’s case (supra), respondent had filed a suit for declaration against the petitioner therein that he was the sole successor of one of the deceased co-owners and thus entitled to the suit land to the extent of 1/3rd share and, therefore, the mutation showing the petitioner as absolute owner of the share claimed by him was illegal, null and void and not binding upon him. Petitioner moved an application under order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC and Section 7 of the HP Court Fees Act seeking direction to the respondent to make good the deficiency in the Court fees within a time frame, failing which the plaint be rejected. It was alleged that the plaint was required to be properly valued and stamped on ad valorem basis on the market value of the suit property, which include urban built up property. This court held 22. In the impugned order the learned Civil Judge has observed that the suit land comprised in khata/ khatauni No. 54/103 is assessed to land revenue which is Rs.4.84 and in khata/ khatauni No.60/12 to Rs.0.31 paise and after noticing Section 7 (v) (a) of the Act has held that respondent is not required to pay ad valorem court fee on the suit land. The learned Civil Judge has not considered Section 7 (v) (e) of the Act. The Section 7 (v) (e) of the Act provides where the subject matter is house or garden then according to the market value of the house or garden. 23. In the present case the respondent has challenged the Will of Rajinder Prakash Sharma and claimed herself to be his daughter. The suit property consists of land and built up structure. The Section 7 (v) (e) of the Act provides where the subject matter is house or garden then according to the market value of the house or garden. 23. In the present case the respondent has challenged the Will of Rajinder Prakash Sharma and claimed herself to be his daughter. The suit property consists of land and built up structure. In the plaint, it has not been pleaded what is the land revenue of the landed property and what is the market value of the built up structure. In Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh (supra) while considering section 7 (iv) (c ) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as amended in Punjab, which in substance is similar to the Act, the Supreme Court has held that where the relief is in regard to house, court fee shall be on the market value of the house, under clause (e) thereof. The respondent in the relief has prayed “co-owner in possession”. The second proviso to section 7 (iv) of the Act provides, in suits coming in sub-clause (c), in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the matter provided for by clause (v) of this section. Sub-clause (e) of section 7 (v) provides where the subject matter is house or garden- according to the market value of the house or garden. 24. In view of pleaded case of the respondent and relief claimed the suit for the purpose of court fee so far as built up structure is concerned, is required to be valued in accordance with section 7 (iv) (c) (v) (e) of the Act on the market value of the built up structure. The respondent has not valued the suit for the purpose of court fee in accordance with section 7 (iv) (c) (v) (e). The learned Civil Judge has erred in observing that respondent has affixed the requisite fee on the plaint. The impugned order is not sustainable.” 9. In Khawaja Khalliullah’s case (supra), respondent therein had filed suit for declaration that she is legal and rightful owner of building No.70/1, The Mall, Shimla and the revenue entries got effected by the petitioner and respondent No.4 qua property in their favour be declared null and void. The impugned order is not sustainable.” 9. In Khawaja Khalliullah’s case (supra), respondent therein had filed suit for declaration that she is legal and rightful owner of building No.70/1, The Mall, Shimla and the revenue entries got effected by the petitioner and respondent No.4 qua property in their favour be declared null and void. The question of court fee again came up for consideration as the petitioner alleged that the property against which declaration of title was being sought was a five storeyed building situated on Mall Road, the market value of which was not less than Rs.2,00,00,000/-, and therefore, respondent No.1 was required to value the suit under Section 7 (iv) (c ) of the Act, whereas respondent claimed that her claim was with respect to her pre-existing right of ownership in the suit property and thus, the same had been correctly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. In this background, the court held as under: “26. The respondent No.1 in prayer (ii) of the plaint has used cleverly 'and/or’. The reading of the plaint reveals that consequential relief of injunction has been prayed in the plaint. In any case, the prayer of injunction during the pendency of the suit in the facts and circumstances of the case will also attract Section 7 (iv) (c) (v) (e) of the Act. The suit for mere declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is otherwise not maintainable. In view of the pleaded case of respondent No.1 and relief claimed the plaint for purpose of court fee and jurisdiction is required to be valued in accordance with Section 7 (iv) (c) (v) (e) of the Act on the market value of the suit property. The respondent No.1 has not valued the suit for the purpose of court fee in accordance with Section 7 (iv) (c) (v) (e) of the Act. The learned court below has exercised jurisdiction wrongly, illegally in dismissing the application in its entirety.” 10. On the other hand, Mr. Adarsh Vashisht, learned counsel for the plaintiff/non applicant has vehemently argued that since the suit seeks cancellation of document and possession of land, the court fee payable is on the value of the instrument and not the market value of the property and has placed reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of the Learned Punjab & Haryana High Court in Niranjan Kaur Vs. Nirbigan Kaur, AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 368, wherein it was held: 7. It is well settled that the Court in deciding the question of Court-fee should look into the allegation made in the plaint to find out what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. Thus, in each case the court has to find out the real relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit, where the main relief is that of the cancellation of the deed, and the declaration if any is only a surplusage, the case would not be covered under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act, because in a suit under that clause, the main relief quintal relief is just ancillary. In this respect, reference may again be made to Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa's case (AIR 1941 Lah 97) (FB) (supra), where in it has been observed as follows: "It seems obvious that the consequential relief referred to in section 7 (iv) (c) could not mean a substantive relief, the valuation of which is separately provided for in the Court-fees Act. If it were so held, a plaintiff could easily evade payment of the necessary court-fee on the substantive relief by prefacing it with a declaration as to his rights. Every suit involves the establishment of certain rights of the plaintiff as a necessary preliminary to the grant of the relief claimed by him. But the addition of a prayer for a declaration as to such rights cannot convert a suit for a substantive relief into one for a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed for within the meaning of Section 7 (iv) (c) Court-fee Act. It is significant that the valuation of the relief in cases falling within the scope of Section 7 (iv) (c) is left to the plaintiff. This is presumably because the consequential relief contemplated by the section is some ancillary relief to which the plaintiff becomes entitled as a necessary result of the declaration but for which no separate provision is made in the Act. The essence of the relief in such cases lies in the declaratory part and the consequential relief being merely an auxiliary equitable relief, its valuation seems to have been left to the plaintiff. The essence of the relief in such cases lies in the declaratory part and the consequential relief being merely an auxiliary equitable relief, its valuation seems to have been left to the plaintiff. The meaning of the expression; consequential relief' as used in section 7 (iv) (c) Court-fees Act, was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (consisting of five Judges) in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, ILR 54 All 812 : ( AIR 1932 All 485 ) and it was held that the expression 'consequential' relief means some relief, which would follow directly from the declaration given the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act and cannot be clamed independently of the declaration as a 'substantial relief'. It follows, therefore, that if the relief claimed in any case is found in reality to be tantamount to a substantial relief and not a mere ''on sequential relief'' in the above sense the plaintiff must pay Court-fee on the substantial relief'." 8. It is the common case of the parties that in case the main relief in the suit is held to be that of cancellation of the sale deed, then the case is not covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) and the only provision applicable is Article 1, Schedule 1 of the Act. In order to bring the case under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the act, the main and substantive relief son sequential relief should be ancillary thereto. Moreover, if no consequential relief is claimed or could be claimed in the suit then Section 7 (iv) (c) will not be attracted, Action 7 (iv) (c) clearly contemplated suits to obtain the declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed. It further provides that in all such suits, the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. A further proviso has been added thereto by the Punjab Act No. 31 of 1953, which reads as follows: "Provided further that in suits coming under sub-clause (c) in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by Clause (v) of this Section." 9. In a Suit to obtain declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed, sub-clause (iii) of Article 17 of Schedule II of the Act, will be applicable but the suit filed by the plaintiff-petitioner was virtually to all intents and purposes, for the cancellation of the sale deed, executed by her, in favour of the defendant-respondent. She cannot claim possession unless the said deed is cancelled by a decree of the declared that the sale deed, got executed from her as a result of the fraud, was void and not binding on her, does not convert the suit into one for a declaration with the consequential relief of possession so as to fall within the provision of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. To such a suit, the only article applicable is Article 1. Schedule 1 of the Act, and for that proposition, further support can be had from a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kalu Ram's case ( AIR 1932 All 485 ) (supra) also wherein as regards the valuation of the relief as to the cancellation of the alienation it has been held that such a relief falls neither under Section 7 (iv) (c) nor under Schedule II Article 17 (iii), but under the residuary Article 1, Schedule 1 of the Act. 10. In Jagat Singh's case (1970 Cur LJ 80) (supra) relied upon by he learned counsel for the respondent, it has been rightly held that the plaintiff has to get the alleged gift deed, to which he himself was a party, cancelled before he could seek possession of the land. The case was therefore, held to be covered by Article 1 Schedule 1 of the Act, and the plaintiff was required to pay ad valorem Court-fee on the value of the property involved. The said case is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 11. Similarly, in Amer Kaur's case (1974 Cur LJ 71) (supra), the learned Judge rightly distinguished the decision of their Lordships of the supreme court in Shamsher Singh' case ( AIR 1973 SC 2384 ) (supra) and correctly held that when a suit is for the cancellation of an instrument with a consequential relief for injunction, it will not fall within the ambit of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. 12. 12. The contrary view taken in Chhota Singh's Case (AIR 1975 Punj & Har 316) (supra), has to be held to be erroneous because in that case, the plaintiff was a party to the gift deed, which was sought to be declared null and void on the ground of fraud etc. The learned Judge after noticing Shamsher Singh' case (supra), held therein that the said case was covered by Section 7 (iv), which, in our view, has not been correctly interpreted by the learned Judge. 13. Similarly, the view taken in Labh Singh' s case ( (1978) 80 Punj he LR 29 (supra) and in Mohan Singh’s case (1978) 80 Pun LR 622 (supra), has to be held to be erroneous because in both cases, the plaintiff was a party to the deed which was sought to be declared void and ineffective against the plaintiffs right, the same having been got executed by undue influence and fraud etc. However, in Mohan Singh's case (supra), in addition to the Supreme Court judgment in Shamsher Singh' case ( AIR 1973 SC 2348 ) (supra), further reliance was also placed on the decision of Parbhu's Case (AIR 1965 Punj & Har 1) (FB) (supra) and Vishwa Nath's case (AIR 1952 Punj 335) (supra). Parbhu's case (supra), related to the declaration that the previous decree for partition was null and void because the provision of order 1, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure, were not complied with whereas in wishwa Nath's case (supra), the plaintiff who was a minor had sought declaration, that the decree be declared null and void because the alienations upon which it was based, were without consideration and necessity. The plaintiff being the son was not bound to sue for setting aside the decree thus the same are distinguishable and are not applicable to the case in hand. 14. Reference to the other cases cited at the bar, is not necessary. Every suit involves the establishment of certain rights of the plaintiff as a necessary preliminary for the grant of the relief claimed by him, but the addition of a prayer for a declaration as to such right cannot convert such a suit for a substantive relief into one for a "declaratory decree where a consequential relief is prayed for" within the meaning of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. Therefore, it will have to be seen in each case as to what, in effect, is the substantive relief that has been claimed in the suit by the plaintiff and the determination thereof will decide the payment of the Court-fee. 15. As regards the present case, the plaintiff-petitioner claimed possession of the suit land after getting a declaration that the sale deed was null and void because of the alleged fraud etc. It significant to note that the plaintiff-petitioner herself being a party to the sale deed could not sue for a mere declaration that the sale deed was fraudulent and the vendees had not acquired any title thereunder. The sale deed had to be cancelled, otherwise, title in the land had already passed to the vendee under the deed. In the present case, the plaintiff-plaintiff had to get the sale deed, to which she was a possession of the land. Thus, the substantive relief being the cancellation of the sale deed, it is Article 1, Schedule I of the Act, which was applicable to the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner. 11. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has further relied upon the judgment of learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Manohar Lal Vs. Ram Avtar (1990) 1 Revenue Law Reporter 431, but the same need not be referred to as this judgment only followed what was laid down by the learned Full Bench in Niranjan Kaur’s case (supra). 12. In Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh Vs.Randhir Singh, AIR 2010 SC 2807 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the case under the Punjab Court Fee Act which is para materia with the H.P. Court Fee Act and it was held that in a suit seeking cancellation of sale deed of which the plaintiff was not the executant, the court fee need not be paid on the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed, whereas in case a suit for declaration that the sale deed is null and void or for any other reason is filed by the executant, which in turn means suit for cancellation of sale deed, then he has to pay valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. This court held as under: “5. Court fee in the State of Punjab is governed by the Court Fees Act, 1870 as amended in Punjab ('Act' for short). This court held as under: “5. Court fee in the State of Punjab is governed by the Court Fees Act, 1870 as amended in Punjab ('Act' for short). Section 6 requires that no document of the kind specified as chargeable in the First and Second Schedules to the Act shall be filed in any court, unless the fee indicated therein is paid. Entry 17 (iii) of Second Schedule requires payment of a court fee of Rs.19/50 on plaints in suits to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed for. But where the suit is for a declaration and consequential relief of possession and injunction, court fee thereon is governed by section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act which provides : "7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits : The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows : (iv) in suits - x x x x (c) for a declaratory decree and consequential relief.- to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, x x x x x according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought: Provided that minimum court-fee in each shall be thirteen rupees. Provided further that in suits coming under sub-clause (c), in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of this section." The second proviso to section 7 (iv) of the Act will apply in this case and the valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of the said section. Clause (v) provides that where the relief is in regard to agricultural lands, court fee should be reckoned with reference to the revenue payable under clauses (a) to (d) thereof; and where the relief is in regard to the houses, court fee shall be on the market value of the houses, under clause (e) thereof. 6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. 6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to 'A' and 'B' -- two brothers. 'A' executes a sale deed in favour of 'C'. Subsequently 'A' wants to avoid the sale. 'A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if 'B', who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by 'A' is invalid/void and non- est/ illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If 'A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If 'B', who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17 (iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if 'B', a non- executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. Section 7 (iv) (c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7. 7. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7. 7. In this case, there is no prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds. The prayer is for a declaration that the deeds do not bind the "co-parcenery" and for joint possession. The plaintiff in the suit was not the executant of the sale deeds. Therefore, the court fee was computable under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. The trial court and the High Court were therefore not justified in holding that the effect of the prayer was to seek cancellation of the sale deeds or that therefore court fee had to be paid on the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deeds. 8. We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court directing payment of court fee on the sale consideration under the sale deeds dated 20.4.2001, 24.4.2001, 6.7.2001 and 27.9.2003 and direct the trial court to calculate the court fee in accordance with Section 7 (iv) (c) read with Section 7 (v) of the Act, as indicated above, with reference to the plaint averments.” 13. Evidently the following principles can be culled out from the aforesaid decision. (i) if the executant of a document wants the deed to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed and to pay advalorem Court fee on the consideration stated in the said sale deed; (ii) But if a non-executant seeks annulment of deed i.e. when he is not party to the document, he is to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, non-est, illegal or that it is not binding upon him. In that eventuality, he is to pay the fixed court fee as per Article 17 (iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act; (iii) But if the non-executant is not possession and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also a consequential relief of possession, he is to pay the ad valorem court fee as provided under Section 7 (iv) (c ) of the Act and such valuation in case of immovable property shall not be less than the value of the property as calculated in the manner provided for by Clause (v) of Section 7 of the Act. 14. The preposition of law involved in this case has, infact, not been dealt with by this Court in any of the three cases relied upon by the applicant and, therefore, the ratio laid down in these judgments is not at all applicable to the instant case. Whereas, identical issues has come up before the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Niranjan Kaur’s case (supra) and while dealing with identical provisions of the Court Fee Act, it was categorically held that where the plaintiff seeks cancellation of the instrument, of which he is the executant, before he can seek possession of the land, then the case would be covered under Article-1 Schedule-1 and, therefore, the plaintiff would be required to pay ad valorem court fee on the value mentioned in the instrument. 15. That apart, similar reiteration of law has thereafter been made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhrid Singh’s case (supra), wherein it has been held that if the executant of the deed seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed and not on the market value of the subject market. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this application. The same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.