JUDGMENT B.K. NAYAK, J. - This application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 09.12.2015 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Puri in G.R. Case No. 1099 of 2014, arising out of Puri Seabech P.S. Case No. 90 of 2014, whereby the learned S.D.J.M. allowed the prayer of the Investigating Officer (I.O) to take the petitioner on police remand for three days for the purpose of interrogation. 2.The G.R. case, as aforesaid has been registered under Sections 302/120-B/34 of the I.P.C. read with Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act for murder of one Purna Chandra Sahu. It is stated by the petitioner that in the written F.I.R. lodged by the father of the deceased, the petitioner has not been named, though it was alleged that one Papu Baral and his associates were suspectedly involved. It is further stated by the petitioner that on investigation the police submitted preliminary charge-sheet on 17.10.2014 against nine accused persons keeping the investigation open but the petitioner had not been charge-sheeted, as because the police had not been able to collect materials regarding the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged crime. It is also stated by the petitioner that by virtue of the order passed by this Court in CRLMC No. 5074 of 2015, the petitioner surrendered before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No. 82/19 of 2013-11 (another case) and though the Additional Sessions Judge granted bail to the petitioner in the said Session Trial Case, for non-submission of bail bond, the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody on the date of his surrender. On 05.12.2015, the petitioner submitted bail bonds and release order was passed by the additional sessions Judge, but before the petitioner was released from the jail, the Investigating officer of Puri Seabeach P.S. Case No. 90 of 2014 (instant case) made a prayer before the learned S.D.J.M., Puri on the same day for taking the petitioner on police remand for three days in connection with that case and by the impugned order dated 09.12.2015, the learned S.D.J.M. allowed the prayer of the investigator for police remand of the petitioner. It is also stated that on the preliminary charge-sheet filed by the police in the instant case against other nine accused persons, cognizance was taken against them and the case was committed to the Court of Session and that even during further investigation, the petitioner having not been arrested not produced before the S.D.J.M., the S.D.J.M. could not have remanded the petitioner to police custody by the impugned order within the scope of Section 167, Cr. P.C. and, therefore, the order is bad and illegal. 3.The only ground urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner having neither been arrested nor produced before the learned S.D.J.M. in the instant case, the learned S.D.J.M has gone wrong in allowing the prayer of the Investigating Officer for remand of the petitioner to police custody, which is not permissible as per the provisions of Section 167, Cr.P.C. 4.It is not known whether the petitioner has been formally arrested at any time by the Investigating Officer in the instant G.R. Case No. 1099 of 2014 and produced before him. Even when he surrendered before the Additional Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No. 82/19 of 2013-11 as per order of this Court and was remanded to custody, before seeking police remand the I.O. should have formally arrested him, though it was not necessary to bring him physically from the jail and produce before the learned S.D.J.M., Puri. 5.Sub-Section (1) & (2) of Section 167, Cr.P.C. which are relevant for our purpose and deal with the question of remand run as under : “ 167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. –(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this Section may, whether he has or has no jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it fir trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that- [(a) 1 the Magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days; if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding, (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and , on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this Sub-Section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purpose of that Chapter;]” [(b) no Magistrate shall authorize detention of the accused in custody of the police under this Section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage. (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorize detention in the custody of the police. [Explanation I. –For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail;]. [Explanation II. [Explanation I. –For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail;]. [Explanation II. – If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorizing detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be:] [Provided further that in case of woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorized to be in the custody of a remand home or recognized social institution.]” 6.The scope of remand under Section 167 (2), Cr.P.C. has been very succinctly articulated by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni : AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1768 in the following terms: “11. A question may then arise whether a person arrested in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him during an occurrence can be detained again in police custody in respect of another offence committed by him in the same case and which fact comes to light after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days of his arrest. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that as a result of the investigation carried on and the evidence collected by the police the arrested accused may be found to be involved in more serious offences than the one for which he was originally arrested and that in such a case there is no reason as to why the accused who is in magisterial custody should not be turned over to police custody at a subsequent stage of investigation when the information discloses his complicity in more serious offence, we are unable to agree. In one occurrence it may so happen that the accused might have committed several offences and the police may arrest him in connection with one or two offences on the basis of the available information and obtain police custody. In one occurrence it may so happen that the accused might have committed several offences and the police may arrest him in connection with one or two offences on the basis of the available information and obtain police custody. If during the investigation his complicity in more serious offences during the same occurrence is disclosed that does not authorize the police to ask for police custody for a further period after the expiry of the first fifteen days. If that is permitted than the police can go on adding some offence or the other of a serious nature at various stages and seek further detention in police custody repeatedly, this would defeat the very object underlying Section 167. However, we must clarify that this limitation shall not apply to a different occurrence in which complicity of the arrested accused is disclosed. That would be a different transaction and if an accused is in judicial custody in connection with one case and to enable the police to complete their investigation of the other case they can require his detention in police custody for the purpose of associating him with the investigation of the other case. In such a situation he must be formally arrested in connection with other case and then obtain the order of the magistrate for detention in police custody. The learned Additional Solicitor General however strongly relied on some of the observations made by Hardy, J. in Mehar Chand’s case extracted above in support of his contention namely that an arrested accused who is in judicial custody can be turned over to police custody even after the expiry of first fifteen days at a subsequent stage of the investigation in the same case if the information discloses his complicity in more serious offences. We are unable to agree that the mere fact that some more offences alleged to have been committed by the arrested accused in the same case are discovered in the same case would by itself render it to be a different case. All these offences including the so-called serious offences discovered at a later state arise out of the same transaction in connection with which the accused was arrested. Therefore there is a marked difference between the two situations. All these offences including the so-called serious offences discovered at a later state arise out of the same transaction in connection with which the accused was arrested. Therefore there is a marked difference between the two situations. The occurrences constituting two different transaction give rise to tow different cases and the exercise of power under Section 167 (1) and (2) should be in consonance with the object underlying the said provision in respect of each of those occurrences which constitute tow different cases. Investigation in one specific case cannot be the same as in the other. Arrest and detention in custody in the context of Sections 167 (1) and (2) of the Code has to be truly viewed with regard to the investigation of that specific case in which the accused person has nee taken into custody. In S. Harsimran Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984 Crl. L.J. 253 A Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court considered the question whether the limit of police custody exceeding fifteen days as prescribed by Section 167(2) is applicable only to single case or is attracted to a series of different cases requiring investigation against the same accused and held thus: “We see no inflexible bar against a person in custody with regard to investigation of a particular offence being either re-arrested for the purpose of the investigation of an altogether different offence. To put it in other words, there is no insurmountable hurdle in the conversion of judicial custody into police custody by an order of the Magistrate under S. 167 (2) of the Code for investigation another offence. Therefore, a re-arrest or second arrest in a different case is not necessarily beyond the ken of law”. This view of the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court appears to be practicable and also conforms to Section 167. We may, however, like to make it explicit that such re-arrest or second arrest and seeking police custody after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days should be with regard to the investigation of a different case other than the specific one in respect of which the accused is already in custody. We may, however, like to make it explicit that such re-arrest or second arrest and seeking police custody after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days should be with regard to the investigation of a different case other than the specific one in respect of which the accused is already in custody. A literal construction of Section 167(2) to the effect that a fresh remand for police custody of a person already in judicial custody during investigation of a specific case cannot under any circumstances be issued, would seriously hamper the very investigation of the other case the importance of which needs no special emphasis. The procedural law is meant to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. It is an accepted rule that an interpretation which furthers the ends of justice should be preferred. It is furthers the ends of justice should be preferred. It is true that the police custody is not the be-all and end-all of the whole investigation but yet it is one of its primary requisites particularly in the investigation of serious and heinous crime. The legislature also noticed this and permitted limited police custody. The period of first fifteen days should naturally apply in respect of the investigation of that specific case for which the accused is held in custody. Btu such custody cannot further held to be a bar for invoking a fresh remand to such custody like police custody in respect of an altogether different case involving the same accused.” It is thus apparent from the aforesaid pronouncement, particularly the portion underlined that the accused in judicial custody in one case must be formally arrested in connection with the other case and then the order of the Magistrate for detention in police custody in connection with the other case be obtained. 7.As has been said earlier, since the counsel for the parties have no adequate instruction, it is not known whether the petitioner was formally arrested and the arrest was reported to the learned S.D.J.M. before the impugned order of remand to police custody was passed. In case, there was no formal order of arrest, then the impugned order directing remand of the petitioner to police custody is illegal. In case, there was no formal order of arrest, then the impugned order directing remand of the petitioner to police custody is illegal. If there was formal arrest and reported to the S.D.J.M. and the remand order was passed subsequent to such arrest then the impugned remanded order is not illegal. In any view of the matter, since remand by the impugned order had been given for three days, i.e., from 10.12.2015 to 13.12.2015, which is over, physical remand of the petitioner to police custody in pursuance to the impugned order cannot be stopped at this stage. The CRLMC is thus disposed of. CRLMC disposed of.