JUDGMENT : Mr. Prashant Kumar Agarwal, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The accused-appellants have filed these three separate appeals under Section 374 Cr.P.C. against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.5.2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No.2, Jaipur District, Jaipur in Sessions Case No.01/2013 whereby the learned trial Court has found all the appellants guilty for the offences under Sections 149, 459, 323 and Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Accused-appellant-Shankar Lal has also been held guilty for offence under Section 325 IPC and the remaining four for offence under Section 325 read with Section 149 IPC. The appellants have variously been sentenced and it is also ordered that all the substantive sentences would run concurrently. The learned trial Court also awarded an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- as compensation to victim-Shri Nand Kishore. It is to be noted that in all ten persons were named as assailants in the FIR but charge-sheet was filed against seven persons only and two of them namely; Rajesh Kumar and Fatehlal have been ordered to be acquitted as they were found not involved in the incident in which one person died and four others sustained injuries. As all these appeals arise out of the same judgment and order, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, they were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 3. Brief relevant facts for the disposal of these appeal are that for an incident allegedly taken place on 12.6.2011 at 2:00 pm at the house of the complainant party, written report (Exhibit P/1) was submit by the complainant P.W.1-Shri Nand Kishore on 12.6.2011 itself at 8:30 pm at SMS Hospital, Jaipur to the effect that when they were sleeping inside of their house, their neighbours-Ramswaroop, Shankar Lal, Ram Dayal, Bhagirath, Anant Kumar, Chandra Prakash, Smt. Kamli and Smt. Shanti along with their relatives namely; Rajesh and Fatehlal (all ten in number) armed with various deadly weapons and in furtherance of their common object suddenly and forcibly entered into their house and assailed Nand Kishore, Ranjeet, Hari Narayan, Nanagram and Kumari Nisha as a result of which injuries were sustained by them. It was further alleged that injured-Nanagram was referred to SMS Hospital, Jaipur, but he died after some time during treatment as a result of injuries inflicted upon him by the aforesaid assailants. It was further alleged that injured-Nanagram was referred to SMS Hospital, Jaipur, but he died after some time during treatment as a result of injuries inflicted upon him by the aforesaid assailants. It was alleged that Gopal, Shrawan Lal and Ramdayal have witnessed the incident. It was also alleged that some other persons (not named) were also present at the time of the said incident. Prior dispute of the year 2010 between the parties was alleged motive of the incident. On the basis of written statement (Ex.P/1), FIR No.54/2011 came to be registered at Police Station Andhi (Jaipur) for the offences under Sections 143, 148, 149, 323, 452 & 302 IPC against all the ten persons named in the FIR, but after investigation charge-sheet was filed only against seven persons and both the women and Chandra Prakash were left out. Seven persons against whom charge-sheet was filed faced trial for the offences under Sections 148, 459, 323 325, 325/149, 302 & for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. In support of the charges, prosecution produced oral as well as documentary evidence whereas appellants in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution evidence and specifically pleaded that they have falsely been implicated in the incident due to enmity. DW.1-Tulsiram was produced by them as witness in defence and in the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses their police statements were got exhibited. 4. Learned trial Court after hearing both the parties passed the impugned judgment and order against which these separate appeals were filed. On the basis of evidence made available on record, trial Court came to a conclusion that appellants formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram and in prosecution of that common object they armed with various deadly weapons forcibly entered into the house of the complainant party and inflicted injuries to Shri Nanagram and injury caused to his head resulted into his death. It was further held that when injured witnesses intervened, injuries were also inflicted to them in furtherance of the common object. The grievous injury (fracture) found on the mandible of the Nand Kishore was found to have been caused by accused-appellant-Shri Shankar Lal. It is to be noted that none of the appellants was specifically found responsible for the death of Shri Nanagram and all of them have been convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The grievous injury (fracture) found on the mandible of the Nand Kishore was found to have been caused by accused-appellant-Shri Shankar Lal. It is to be noted that none of the appellants was specifically found responsible for the death of Shri Nanagram and all of them have been convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC. As already said, Shri Rajesh and Fateh Lal were found not involved in the incident and benefit of doubt was given to them. 5. In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the appellants jointly raised the following grounds : 6 (i) When on the same set of evidence, charge-sheet was not filed against three persons named in the FIR as person involved in the incident and two of the charge-sheeted accused have been acquitted by the trial Court, it was wrong on the part of the trial Court to hold appellants' guilty on the same set of evidence and they are also entitled to get benefit of doubt. (ii) From the medical evidence available on record, it is clear that single injury was found on the head of the deceased-Shri Nanagram which proved fatal, but learned trial Court without any expert's evidence at his own taken a view that more than one assault was laid on the head of the deceased resulting into more than one injury and this erroneous finding has seriously effected the final outcome of the case whereby all the appellants have been held guilty for the death of Shri Nanagram. It is well settled legal position that without any foundation Court cannot at its own make out a new case in favour of prosecution. It is to be noted that none of the appellants has specifically been held responsible for the fatal injury found on the head of the deceased. (iii) It is a case of false as well as over implication due to previous enmity. When five of the persons named in the FIR have not been found involved in the incident, the remaining also cannot be held guilty. Real assailants were left out and ten innocent persons were involved due to enmity. (iii) It is a case of false as well as over implication due to previous enmity. When five of the persons named in the FIR have not been found involved in the incident, the remaining also cannot be held guilty. Real assailants were left out and ten innocent persons were involved due to enmity. (iv) During the course of trial, a new ground of enmity was developed by the prosecution witnesses to the effect that appellants were having grudge with the deceased-Shri Nanagram as he was selected in police service few days before the incident whereas in the FIR, motive for incident was mentioned some dispute between the parties of the year 2010. During the course of trial, complainant PW.1-Shri Nand Kishore resiled from his statement that the dispute of year 2010 between them was cause of enmity. (v) Appellants have wrongly been held guilty for the offence under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 IPC as there is no iota of evidence available on record showing that appellants formed an unlawful assembly with common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram and in furtherance thereof injuries were inflicted to him. In absence of common object and a clear finding about author of the fatal injury, no one can be held liable for the death of Shri Nanagram, but learned trial Court failed to consider that aspect of the matter in a correct perspective and has held appellants guilty with the aid of Section 149 IPC in a mechanical manner. Merely because appellants armed with various weapons came together from their house and entered into the house of the complainant and caused injuries, it cannot be inferred that they were members of unlawful assembly having a common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram. (vi) Subscriber of report (Ex.P/1) Shri Bhagwan Sahai was not produced as witness and in absence of the same, true version of the incident has not come before the Court. PW.1-Shri Nand Kishore author of the report has disowned many material facts averred in the FIR. In absence of statement of Shri Bhagwan Sahay, it has not been clarified by the prosecution that how these facts were mentioned in the written report. PW.1-Shri Nand Kishore author of the report has disowned many material facts averred in the FIR. In absence of statement of Shri Bhagwan Sahay, it has not been clarified by the prosecution that how these facts were mentioned in the written report. (vii) It is a case in which true and false facts are so inextricably mixed that it was not possible for the Court to separate the truth from falsehood and convict respondents only. When out of ten persons named in the FIR, three were not charge-sheeted and after trial two have been acquitted by the trial Court giving benefit of doubt, how the appellants only can be convicted on the basis of same set of evidence. (viii) There are several material improvements, omissions, contradictions and discrepancies in the court statements of the injured and eye-witnesses in comparison to the FIR and their respective police statements. All of them have disowned most parts of their respective police statements. Even during trial some of the injuries have been attributed to Chandra Prakash and two ladies, the left out accused. No application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was filed to take cognizance against the left out persons. (ix) PW.1-Kumari Nisha, a child of eight years, is a tutored witness. She admits that she was not knowing the assailants before the incident but even then she has named them in her statement. (x) Investigation Officer has admitted that statements of several other persons were also recorded during investigation, but neither their statements were produced along with charge-sheet nor they were cited as witness and, therefore, adverse inference is to be drawn against prosecution for withholding material evidence from the Court. (xi) In the facts and circumstances of the case unreasonable delay was made in lodging the FIR, as the same was lodged neither at the place of incident when police arrived there nor at the local hospital where the injured were taken immediately after the incident. The report was submit at SMS Hospital, Jaipur after Shri Nanagram died giving chance for manipulation and false and over implication of the accused, which further finds support from the fact that charge-sheet was not filed against three and two were acquitted by the trial Court. (xii) Offence under Section 459 IPC is not made out even prima facie from the evidence made available on record. (xii) Offence under Section 459 IPC is not made out even prima facie from the evidence made available on record. It is not the case of prosecution itself that accused entered into the house of the complainant having taken precautions to conceal their entry into it from complainant and his family members. It is also not the case of prosecution that the accused effected their entry into the house in any of the six ways described in Section 445 IPC. (xiii) From the evidence available on record more particularly the number of injuries caused to the deceased and the nature of sticks used to inflict the injuries, it cannot be said that accused were having intention to cause death or they were having knowledge that death is likely to be caused. If the accused were having that intention, they would have caused more injuries to deceased for which they were having sufficient opportunity and time. Merely because as a result of head injury Shri Nanagram died, it cannot be inferred that the accused were having aforesaid intention or knowledge. As actual author of the head injury could not be found, none can be held liable for the death of Shri Nanagram. As common intention has also not been proved, none can be convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 IPC. At the most each of the appellants can be held guilty for his individual act, but no evidence is available to show individual act of any of the respondents. 7. In support of their submissions, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the cases of Ram Lal v. Delhi Administration reported in (1973) 3 SCC 466 , Shiva Shankar Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (2002) 7 SCC 299, Shaikh Karimullah @ Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2009) 11 SCC 371 , Deoka & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1993 Supp (1) SCC 447, Daulat Trimbak Shewale & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2004) 10 SCC 715 , Ninaji Raoji Boudha & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1976) 2 SCC 117 , Daya Kishan v. State of Haryana reported in (2010) 5 SCC 81 , Sardul Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2002) 8 SCC 372 , Roy Fernades v. State of Goa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1976) 2 SCC 117 , Daya Kishan v. State of Haryana reported in (2010) 5 SCC 81 , Sardul Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2002) 8 SCC 372 , Roy Fernades v. State of Goa & Ors. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 221 , Jamuna Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (1974) 3 SCC 774 , Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (2004) 13 SCC 189 and Shambhu Nath Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1960 SC 725 . 8. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor assisted by the counsel for the complainant submit as below : (i) Injured and eye-witnesses have essentially supported the basic prosecution story and there are no material and major contradictions, improvements, omissions and discrepancies in their respective court statements and even if there are some, the same are of minor and immaterial nature not adversely effecting the involvement and role of the appellants. The incident took place in a very short span of time, therefore, any parrot like version of the incident cannot be expected from the eye-witnesses. (ii) The entire evidence of the prosecution witnesses cannot be discarded merely because charge-sheet was not filed against three persons and two of the accused have been acquitted by the trial Court. It is well settled legal position that conviction can be based even on the basis of a statement of a partly disbelieved witness if his statement is otherwise found truthful and reliable by the trial Court to the extent of the accused, who has been held guilty by it. Whole of the statement of a witness cannot be discarded by the Court by the reason that some part of the statement has been disbelieved. It is for the Court after analysing his statement to separate truth from the falsehood and record conviction. In the present case, reasons have been recorded by the trial Court how the prosecution evidence is convincing to the extent of appellants. (iii) FIR was promptly lodged without any delay and it contains all the essential details of the incident. FIR is not an encyclopedia and each and every minute detail of the crime is not required to be averred in it. (iii) FIR was promptly lodged without any delay and it contains all the essential details of the incident. FIR is not an encyclopedia and each and every minute detail of the crime is not required to be averred in it. In the present case, deceased-Nanagram was seriously injured and first task before the complainant party and police was to provide him proper medical aid immediately and not to lodge report and if the same was submit at SMS Hospital, Jaipur where Shri Nanagram died during treatment, it cannot be said that it was lodged deliberately late to falsely implicate the accused. (iv) Although, it could not be found which of the respondents caused fatal injury to the deceased, but from the evidence available on record it is clear that respondents constituted unlawful assembly with a common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram and in furtherance and in preparation thereof they armed with various deadly weapons entered together into the house of the complainant and one or more of the appellants caused injuries to the head of the deceased resulting into his death. Appellants have rightly been convicted for the death of Shri Nanagram with the aid of Section 149 IPC. It is very difficult to collect direct evidence to prove constitution of unlawful assembly and its object and the same can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. In the present case, all the appellants gathered at their house, armed themselves with various deadly weapons, came and entered together in the house of the complainant with weapons in their hands and caused injuries on the head of Shri Nanagram and inflicted injuries to other family members also when they tried to intervene and after causing injuries fled away together. All these facts clearly show that their common object was to cause death of Nanagram or they knew that death of someone is likely to be caused by their act. (v) It is not the case of single injury on the head of the deceased, but case of several injuries caused as a result of several blows laid on the head, which has been described in the postmortem report as Injury No.1. All the injuries found on the head of the deceased have collectively been described by the Doctor in the postmortem report as Injury No.1, but that does not mean that only one injury was found on the head. All the injuries found on the head of the deceased have collectively been described by the Doctor in the postmortem report as Injury No.1, but that does not mean that only one injury was found on the head. The nature of injury found on the head clearly shows that it was as a result of more than one blow and not of a single one. (vi) Merely because the actual author of the fatal injury could not be found and even assuming that single injury was caused on the head of Shri Nanagram even then each and every appellant is liable for his death as the fatal injury was caused by one of the members of the unlawful assembly. It is well settled legal position that every member of the assembly is guilty of the offence where that offence was committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of common object of that assembly or such members of assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. (vii) As per ocular evidence, as relied upon by the trial Court, all the appellants participated in the incident and over act was also attributed to each and every of them. It is well settled legal position that ocular evidence will prevail over the medical evidence. It is not required to show who caused the fatal injury. (viii) In a case of direct evidence, motive is not required to be shown. In the present case, even if prosecution has failed to prove motive or a false ground of motive has been taken even then direct evidence cannot be rejected only on that account. (ix) No reason has been shown by the appellants for their false implication. No suggestion in cross-examination to the material prosecution witnesses in this regard. No would one leave real culprits and falsely implicate their neighbours without any reason. (x) It was not necessary for the prosecution to produce subscriber of the report as he wrote it as per narration made by the complainant. Complainant PW.1-Shri Nand Kishore is the author of FIR and not Shri Bhagwan Sahay. No reason has been disclosed by the appellants for their false implication at the hands of Shri Bhagwan Sahay. 9. In support of the submissions, learned counsel for the complainant relied upon the cases of Krishnappa & Ors. Complainant PW.1-Shri Nand Kishore is the author of FIR and not Shri Bhagwan Sahay. No reason has been disclosed by the appellants for their false implication at the hands of Shri Bhagwan Sahay. 9. In support of the submissions, learned counsel for the complainant relied upon the cases of Krishnappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka reported in 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Cr. 397, Susanta Das & Ors. v. State of Orissa reported in 2016 SAR (Cr.) 240, Laxman v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (1) WLC 227, Hari Yadav v. State of Bihar reported in 2008 SC 867, Surendra & Ors. v. State of U.P. Reported in 2012 (1) WLC SC (Cr.) 652, Suresh Ram & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan 2014 (1) WLC (SC) Cr. 368, Ram Swaroop v. State of Rajasthan 2008 reported in Cri. Law Journal 2259, State of Maharashtra v. Tulsiram reported in WLC (SC) Cri 2007 (2) 705, Amit v. State of U.P. reported in 2012 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 634 and Gajoo v. State of Uttrakhand reported in 2013 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 93. 10. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the material made available on record as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law. 11. The basic prosecution case in essence is that on 12.6.2011 at about 2:00 pm, the accused ten in number as named in the FIR gathered at the house of one of the appellants and formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram and armed themselves with various deadly weapons and to achieve their common object they came together and forcibly entered into the house of complainant and caused injuries to Shri Nanagram and when other family members tried to intervene, injuries were also inflicted to them. As per the prosecution case, Nanagram died in the hospital while undergoing treatment as a result of injuries received by him in the incident. In the report, four family members of the deceased were named, who got injured and three persons were named as eye-witnesses. During the course of trial, all injured and eye-witnesses as named in the FIR were examine on behalf of the prosecution. In the report, four family members of the deceased were named, who got injured and three persons were named as eye-witnesses. During the course of trial, all injured and eye-witnesses as named in the FIR were examine on behalf of the prosecution. Some other witnesses were also produced by the prosecution to support the charges framed against the accused, but their evidence need not be considered as they were not named in the FIR and during investigation they were examine late. 12. In his statement complainant-PW.1-Nand Kishore, father of the deceased, claiming to be eye-witness and injured, during the course of trial has fully supported the basic prosecution case. According to him, on the date and time of the incident all the ten persons as named in the FIR assembled together and armed with various weapons came and forcibly entered into his house and caused injuries to Shri Nanagram with intention to cause his death and injuries were also inflicted on him and three other family members when they tried to intervene and save Shri Nanagram. He has also stated that three persons as named in the FIR witnessed incident. In his statement before the Court the witness has also described the particular role played by some of the accused involved in the incident like weapon with which he was armed, which accused inflicted which injury to which of the victim and also the part of the body, where the injury was caused and to that extent there are some improvements, contradictions, omissions and discrepancies in his statement in comparison to FIR and his police statement but so far as the basic prosecution case is concerned, there are no major and material improvements etc. in his statement. Apart from that, he has resiled from the cause of enmity as mentioned in the FIR and a new reason was developed by him during trial. Looking to the date, time and place of occurrence, he is a natural witness and his presence cannot be doubted more particularly in view of the fact that he also got injured in the incident. He has withstood the lengthy cross-examination without deviating from the basic prosecution story and as per his statement appellants were also member of the assembly and they actively participated in the incident. He has withstood the lengthy cross-examination without deviating from the basic prosecution story and as per his statement appellants were also member of the assembly and they actively participated in the incident. PW.2-Ram Dayal claiming to be an eye-witness has also supported the basic prosecution case and there is no reason to suspect his presence at the time of incident and false implication of appellants. As already stated he was named as a person, who witnessed the incident in the FIR. In his statement, he has named eight persons as assailants included the three against whom charge-sheet was not filed but he has not named both the acquitted accused. In his statement before the Court he has also described the role played by each of the assailants like weapon used by each of the accused, and which assailants inflicted what injury to which victim and by which weapon and he has improved the version of the incident only with regard to the details of the incident, but so far as the basic prosecution case is concerned, there are no material and major contradictions, improvements, omissions and discrepancies in his court statement in comparison to his police statement. There is no deviation in his statement about the date, time and place of incident, person involved as assailants, name of the deceased, injured and the eye-witnesses. Similarly other injured witnesses PW.3-Ranjeet, PW.6-Hari Narayan and eye-witness PW.4-Gopal and PW.16 Shravan Lal have also supported the basic prosecution story, but there is difference in their statements about number of assailants involved in the incident. In their respective statements there are improvements only with regard to the details of the incident like role played by each of the assailants, weapon used by each of them and injury caused, but so far as basic prosecution case is concerned, there are no material and major improvements etc. in their statements. Presence of PW.3-Ranjeet and PW.6-Hari Narain cannot be doubted as they are family members of the deceased and they also received injuries which finds support from their injury reports proved by PW.13-Dr. Bhupendra Kumar. Nothing has come in the cross-examination of the eye-witnesses doubting their presence at the time of the incident more particularly in view of the fact that they were named in the FIR as witness. Bhupendra Kumar. Nothing has come in the cross-examination of the eye-witnesses doubting their presence at the time of the incident more particularly in view of the fact that they were named in the FIR as witness. So far as PW.15-Kumari Nisha is concerned, she is a child of eight years, who also received injuries when she tried to save her brother deceased-Nanagram. Being family member her presence at the spot cannot be doubted and she was also examined by the doctor and found injured. She has supported the basic prosecution story and improvements are in her statement only with regard to the details of the incident. It is to be noted that she has named seven persons as assailants included the two ladies, left out by the police, and five other being the appellants. She has not named Chandra Prakash, Rajesh Kumar and Fatehlal as a person involved in the incident. She has also withstood the lengthy cross-examination made on behalf of the appellants and nothing have come in her statement showing that real culprits have been left and appellants were falsely implicated. 13. Having regard to the evidence made available on record in the form of statements of the aforesaid witnesses there can be no room for doubt about the presence of all the five appellants at the place of occurrence and their active participation in the incident. 14. The first question to be determined is that whether the statements of these witnesses are to be discarded entirely as two of the accused, who faced trial, have been acquitted by the trial Court and they have made some improvements in their statements about details of the incident. As per the observation made by the trial Court, benefit of doubt has been given to the acquitted accused by the reason that they have been named as person involved in the incident only by PW.1-complainant-Shri Nand Kishore and not by any other witness. The reason recorded by the trial Court for their acquittal is not that the injured and eye-witnesses are not trustworthy and reliable. Although, the reason recorded for acquittal of these two accused does not appear to be sound in the light of overall evidence made available on record, but in absence of appeal against acquittal, no further comment by this Court is necessary. Although, the reason recorded for acquittal of these two accused does not appear to be sound in the light of overall evidence made available on record, but in absence of appeal against acquittal, no further comment by this Court is necessary. Similarly, there are no material and major improvements, contradictions, omissions and discrepancies in their statements so far as the basic prosecution case is concerned and the same are there, at the most about details of the incident as particular role played by each of the assailants, weapon with which each of them was armed, injury caused by each of the accused and the victim to whom it was caused and also the part of the body where it was caused. It is true that these witnesses have improved their statements to this extent, but that improvement or exaggerated version can safely be separated from the main case of the prosecution. So far as the main prosecution case is concerned, all the witnesses are consistent and all of them have named respondents as person involved in the incident. This is not a case where truth and falsehood are inextricably mixed up. Witnesses tend to exaggerate the prosecution story. If the exaggeration does not change the prosecution story or convert it into an altogether new story, allowance can be made for it. If the evidence of a witness is to be disbelieved merely because he has made some improvement in his evidence, there would hardly be any witness on whom reliance can be placed by the courts. It is trite that the maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' has no application in India. It is merely a role of caution. It does have the status of rule of law. In the case of Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 1975 (4) SCC 511 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because the grain and the chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation, an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and background against which they are made, the Court cannot make an attempt to separate truth from falsehood. But the present is not the case where the grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up. But the present is not the case where the grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up. The evidence of the aforesaid witnesses is not discrepant on the material aspect of the prosecution case. Reliance can, therefore, be placed on them. 15. In the case of Rizan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2003 (2) SCC 661 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that : "Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in ominbus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such case testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. 16. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Tulsiram Bhanudas reported in 2007 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is well known that in India the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' does not apply. The court can partly reject and partly accept the evidence of a witness, and it is not correct to say that merely because some part of the evidence is found to be false the entire evidence has to be rejected. If the Court finds that out of several co-accused, one or more are falsely implicated, that does not necessarily mean that everyone was falsely implicated. 17. If the Court finds that out of several co-accused, one or more are falsely implicated, that does not necessarily mean that everyone was falsely implicated. 17. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Major Singh reported in 1999 Criminal Law Reporter (SC) 163, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in an incident in which several assailants are involved having different type of weapons and there are number of victims, who received injuries by their hands, it would be practically impossible for any injured witness or eye-witness to exactly notice and memorise which accused was armed with what weapon and which accused assaulted by blunt weapon and which accused was causing injuries by sharp edged weapon. Even if such statement is made, it may amount an exaggeration because when number of assailants are there injuries are not inflicted in a manner which could be exactly noted by the witness. 18. In the case of Seeman @ Veeraman v. State, (2005) 11 SCC 142 , Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it cannot be expected from the witnesses to narrate the exact location of the injuries caused to the person of the injured. Generalised statement as regards the injuries would be more credible than particularize statement of location of injuries on the body when the injuries were caused in quick succession and in a short time. 19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Harayan v. Tek Singh reported in (1999) 4 SCC 682 has held that if in a case the accused persons came all of a sudden armed with deadly weapons and attacked the victims and assault was over within few minutes, it would be difficult for any witness to state exactly which accused inflicted how many blows to the deceased as well as the injured. In these set of circumstances, if there is some exaggeration in the evidence of the witnesses, those exaggeration are to be separated by taking into consideration the overall facts on record. Some contradictions as to who assaulted whom, with what weapon and whether it was by the sharp edged or blunt side of the weapon was used are bound to be there, particularly when the blows are given in quick succession, it would be against the ground reality to expect the witnesses to depose exactly on which part of the body the blow landed. In these circumstances, even if there is some exaggeration with regard to the infliction of blows, it would hardly be a ground for rejecting their testimony. It may be futile to expect an exact description of the details of the attack on the victims by each accused from the near relatives of the deceased who witnessed the dastardly act or from eye-witnesses. 20. In the present case also as several assailants were involved, all of them were armed with various deadly weapons and all of a sudden they came and entered into the house of the complainant and inflicted injuries to several persons included Shri Nanagram in quick succession in a time span of few minutes, it cannot be expected even from the injured and eye-witnesses to describe details of the incident and even if they have attempted to do so in the course of trial and in that process some improvements, contradictions, omissions and discrepancies have surfaced in that statements, the same cannot be a valid ground to reject their entire evidence. Live and pictorial description of such an incident cannot be expected from any of the witness and, therefore, ground raised on behalf of the respondents on that account being not tenable, and, is rejected. 21. Next question to be seen by us is whether respondents have wrongly been held guilty for the offence under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 IPC. From the evidence established by the injured and eye-witnesses following clear facts have emerged out : (i) All the respondents neighbour of the complainant gathered at one place near the house of complainant. (ii) All were armed with various deadly weapons. (iii) All of them arrived and forcibly entered together into the house of the complainant with weapons in their hands. (iv) They assaulted and caused injury on the head and other body parts of the deceased-Shri Nanagram. (v) They also inflicted injuries to other family members when they tried to intervene and save the deceased and; (vi) Fled away together from the scene of the incident. 22. All these facts clearly proves that the respondents formed an unlawful assembly with common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram and in furtherance of the common object injuries were inflicted to deceased and other family members. 22. All these facts clearly proves that the respondents formed an unlawful assembly with common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram and in furtherance of the common object injuries were inflicted to deceased and other family members. The legal position is well established that inference of common object has to be drawn from various factors such as the weapons with which the members of the assembly were armed, their movements, the acts of violence committed by them and the result. In the present case, we are satisfied that the prosecution, from the entirety of the evidence, has been able to establish that all the members of the unlawful assembly acted in furtherance of the common object to cause death of Shri Nanagram. Even if for the sake of arguments it is assumed that it is a case of single blow and single injury on the head of Shri Nanagram resulting in his death and none of the respondents has individually been found author of the fatal injury even then looking to the well settled legal position, all the appellants are equally liable for his death and they have rightly been held guilty by the trial Court with the aid of Section 149 IPC. 23. In the case of Krishnappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka reported in 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Cri 397, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Section 149 IPC will be attracted whenever any offence committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or when the members of that assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, so that every person, who, at the time of committing of that offence is a member, will also be vicariously held liable and guilty of that offence. Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. This principle ropes in every member of the assembly to be guilty of an offence where that offence is committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of common object of that assembly, or such members or assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. This principle ropes in every member of the assembly to be guilty of an offence where that offence is committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of common object of that assembly, or such members or assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. The factum of causing injury or not causing injury would not be relevant, where accused is sought to be roped in with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The relevant question to be examined by the Court is whether the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took active part in the crime or not. 24. In the case of Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (2004) 13 SCC 189 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that : "By virtue of Section 149 IPC every member of an unlawful assembly at the time of the commission of the offence is guilty of an offence committed by any member of the unlawful assembly. The Section creates constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. The basis of constructive guilt under Section 149 is mere membership of an unlawful assembly. In a case under Section 149 the accused if is a member of the unlawful assembly, the common object of which is to commit a certain crime and if that crime is committed by one or more members of that assembly every person who happened to be a member of that assembly would be liable for that criminal act by virtue of his being a member of it, irrespective of the fact whether he actually committed the act or not. To attract Section 149 of the IPC the prosecution must prove that the commission of the offence was by any member of an unlawful assembly and such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or must be such that the members of the assembly knew that it was likely to be committed. Unless these three elements are satisfied by the prosecution the accused cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 149." 25. Unless these three elements are satisfied by the prosecution the accused cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 149." 25. In the case of Daya Kishan v. State of Haryana reported in (2010) 5 SCC 81 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that : "Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability on the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. The basis of the constructive guilt under Section 149 IPC is mere membership of the unlawful assembly, with the requisite common object or knowledge. This Section makes a member of the unlawful assembly responsible as a member for the acts of each and all, merely because he is a member of an unlawful assembly. While overt act and active participation may indicate common intention of the person perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten vicariously criminal liability under Section 149. There are two essential ingredients of Section 149, viz., (1) commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly and (2) such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or must be such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Once the court finds that these two ingredients are fulfilled, every person, who at the time of committing that offence was a member of the assembly has to be held guilty of that offence. After such a finding, it would not be open to the court to see as to who actually did the offensive act nor it would be open to the Court to require the prosecution to prove which of the members did which of the offensive acts. Whenever a court convicts any person of an offence with the aid of Section 149, a clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly must be given and the evidence discussed must show not only the nature of the common object but that in pursuance of such common object the offence was committed. There is no manner of doubt that before recording the conviction under Section 149 IPC, the essential ingredients of Section 149 IPC must be established." 26. Now, it is to be seen whether non-production of Shri Bhagwan Sahay as witness during trial can adversely effect the prosecution case. There is no manner of doubt that before recording the conviction under Section 149 IPC, the essential ingredients of Section 149 IPC must be established." 26. Now, it is to be seen whether non-production of Shri Bhagwan Sahay as witness during trial can adversely effect the prosecution case. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case no adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution by the reason that subscriber of the report Shri Bhagwan Sahay was not produced as witness during trial. Merely because complainant-PW.1-Nand Kishore, at whose instance report was written by Shri Bhagwan Sahay, has disowned some of the facts mentioned in the report during trial, it cannot be inferred that those facts were averred in the report by Bhagwan Sahay at his own. PW.1-Nand Kishore in his cross-examination has clarified that report was written by Bhagwan Sahay at his instance as narrated by him. Although, he admits that the report was not read over to him before he put his signatures on it, but he has reaffirmed that it was written at his instance. It is to be noted that part of the report disowned by the witness is immaterial not going to the root of the case. 27. Now, it is to be seen whether FIR was lodged deliberately late so as to manipulate it and if yes what is its effect on the basic prosecution case. The well settled legal position is that no duration of time can be fixed as reasonable for giving information of crime to the police, the question of reasonable time being a matter of determination by Court in each case. The effect of delay in the light of eligibility of the explanation falls for consideration in the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, evidence available on record shows that on being informed about the incident police came at the place of incident and all the injured included Shri Nanagram were initially taken to local hospital at Aandhi and finding condition of Shri Nanagram serious he was referred for further treatment to SMS Hospital, Jaipur. He was admitted in Neuro-Surgery Ward of the Hospital and he died at 6:00 pm on the same day. He was admitted in Neuro-Surgery Ward of the Hospital and he died at 6:00 pm on the same day. Looking to the serious condition of Nanagram priority for the complainant party and police was to provide him immediate medical aid and not to lodge report and if in these circumstances it was submit after Nanagram died, it cannot be said that it was lodged deliberately late with an object to falsely implicate or to over-implicate the accused, more particularly in view of the fact that all the male members of the family were also injured in the incident and SHO concerned accompanied Shri Nanagram to hospital at Jaipur and report was submit before him thereafter Shri Nanagram died. Therefore, it cannot be said that report in this case was deliberately lodged with delay with an object to manipulate it. 28. Now, it is to be considered effect of development of a new ground of enmity on prosecution case. Although a new ground of enmity to show reason for the incident was developed by the prosecution witnesses during trial, but in the facts and circumstances of the case and looking to the fact that ocular evidence is available on record, entire prosecution case cannot be discarded only on that account. It is well settled legal position that in case of direct evidence, motive for commission of crime is not required to be shown. Motive is not an element essential to prove guilt in a criminal trial and it is a factor to be taken along with other circumstances. Proof of motive is not necessary in every case. The evidence of eye-witness, who is otherwise reliable, is not rendered untrustworthy merely because motive is absent. Thus, in the present case, even if the prosecution has failed to show motive or new ground of motive for commission of the incident has been taken during trial, it cannot be a ground to reject the basic prosecution case. 29. In the present case, apart from injured and eye-witnesses named in the FIR, several other person were examined by the Investigation Officer during investigation as eye-witness and their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were also recorded and some of them produced during trial also. 29. In the present case, apart from injured and eye-witnesses named in the FIR, several other person were examined by the Investigation Officer during investigation as eye-witness and their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were also recorded and some of them produced during trial also. There is no admission on the part of Investigation Officer in his cross-examination that statements of several other persons were also recorded during investigation and, therefore, it is futile contention by the appellants that adverse inference is to be raised against prosecution on the ground that neither their statements were filed along with charge-sheet nor they were cited as witness. 30. It is also to be considered whether offence under Section 459 IPC, for which also appellants have been held guilty by the trial Court, is made out or not in the light of evidence available on record. As per this provision whoever, whilst committing lurking house-trespass or house-breaking, causes grievous hurt to any person or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Thus, for an offence to be made out under this section lurking house-tress or house-breaking is one of the essential ingredient required to be shown. According to Section 443 when any person commits house-trespass having taken precautions to conceal such house trespass from some person who has a right to exclude or eject the trespasser from the building, tent or vessel which is the subject of the trespass, is said to commit "lurking house-trespass". In the present case, it is not the case of prosecution itself that appellants entered into the house of the complainant after taking precaution to conceal their entry into it. According to Section 445 IPC, a person is said to commit "house-breaking" who commits house-trespass if he effects his entrance into the house or any part of it in any of the six ways described, or if, being in the house or any part of it for the purpose of committing an offence or, having committed an offence therein, he quits the house or any part of it in any of these six ways. The entry into or departure of appellants from the house of the complainant is not covered under any of the six ways described in Section 445 of IPC and, therefore, it cannot be said that offence under Section 459 IPC was committed by appellants or by any of them but offence under Section 449 IPC is clearly made out against all of them. As per Section 449 whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence punishable with death shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and shall also be liable to fine. In the present case, the appellants entered into the house of complainant for the purpose of or with intention to cause death of Shri Nanagram for which death is also one of the sentence. 31. As a result of all the above discussions and for the reasons recorded by us, these appeals have no merit except that appellants are liable for conviction under Section 449 IPC instead of for offence under Section 459 IPC and to that extent impugned judgment is required to be modified. So far as sentence awarded by the trial Court for the offences under Sections 148, 323, 325 325/149 and Section 302/149 IPC is concerned, the same cannot be said to be unreasonable and excessive and it is affirmed, but for offence under Section 449 IPC, they are awarded rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. The amount of compensation awarded to victim-Nand Kishore is also confirmed. 32. With the aforesaid modification, all these appeals are dismissed.