JUDGMENT : S. Pujahari, J. - The legality and propriety of the order dated 25.02.2014 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Jeypore in G.R. Case No. 10 of 2010 (V) rejecting the petition filed by the present petitioner under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "Cr.P.C.") is called in question in this criminal revision. 2. It is alleged by the prosecution that the present petitioner while remaining in additional charge of ADMO (PH, Malaria & Leprosy), Koraput during the period from 01.08.2003 to 25.09.2006, in connivance with the then Senior Clerk-cum-Accountant (since deceased) committed criminal misconduct by misappropriating public money to the tune of Rs. 2,31,396/- meant for implementation of Leprosy Eradication Programme by forging and fraudulently using forged bills and vouchers. The aforesaid criminality was detected during a vigilance enquiry conducted by Sri Dasarathi Sethi, the then Inspector, Vigilance, Jeypore and pursuant to his report dated 15.03.2010, a case was registered at Koraput Vigilance Police Station and on completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner for his trial under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c)/7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420/409/468/471/477(A)/120-B of I.P.C. In the aftermath of the order of cognizance passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Jeypore, the petitioner filed an application under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. seeking an order of discharge on the ground of absence of the requisite sanction as contemplated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short "the Act") and Cr.P.C. and also for non-existence of a primafacie case to frame charge against him. The learned Court below having rejected the aforesaid application vide the impugned order, the petitioner has filed the present revision petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department. I have also perused the impugned order vis-a-vis the available papers on record. 4. The learned Court below having rejected the aforesaid application vide the impugned order, the petitioner has filed the present revision petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department. I have also perused the impugned order vis-a-vis the available papers on record. 4. In course of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted, inter-alia, that although the petitioner retired from service on superannuation on 30.09.2007, by the time of filing of charge-sheet and the order of cognizance he was in contractual appointment as Consultant Physician, C.H.C., Mathalpur vide Annexure-1 and since he continued to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act, no order of cognizance could have been passed by the trial court in absence of the requisite sanction under that Act. So far as the offences under the Indian Penal Code (for short "I.P.C.") are concerned, he further submitted that Section 197 of Cr.P.C. being applicable to both 'in-service' and retired public servant, in absence of sanction from the competent authority, no prosecution could have been launched for the alleged offences under the I.P.C. He is critical of the impugned order on the ground, inter-alia, that the learned Court below failed to deal with the question of sanction in right perspective. Having cited before a number of authoritative pronouncements, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged for setting aside the impugned order and discharging the petitioner from the prosecution. 5. Learned Standing counsel for the Vigilance Department, however, repudiated the contention of the petitioner on the ground that in view of the settled principle of law, no sanction is necessary to prosecute a public servant for the offences alleged in the present case both under the Act and I.P.C. He pointed out that the learned trial court has observed that it is premature at this stage to find any lacuna with the prosecution on account of absence of sanction. He further submitted that in view of the materials on record, there can be no denial of existence of a prima-facie case to frame charge against the petitioner. 6. He further submitted that in view of the materials on record, there can be no denial of existence of a prima-facie case to frame charge against the petitioner. 6. In the present case, the alleged offence under the Act is shown to have been committed by the petitioner while he was indisputably a public servant, and as it appears from Annexure-A, by the time the charge-sheet was filed, the petitioner on having already retired from regular service was holding a contractual post under the State Government. A reading of Section 2(c) of the Act, which defines "public servant" in extenso, leaves no room for doubt that a contractual employee is a public servant for the purpose of this Act, inasmuch as he is remunerated by the Government for performance of public duty within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 2(c) of the Act. The next question is; whether sanction was necessary in the present case for taking cognizance of offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Act against the accused-petitioner. The answer is certainly 'No' in view of the very words employed in the sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 19 of the Act. The principle has been stated by the Apex Court in the case of Balakrishnan Ravi Menon v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 45 in paragraph-7 as follows:- "7. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) specifically provide that in case of a person who is employed and is not removable from his office by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, sanction to prosecute is required to be obtained either from the Central Government or the State Government. The emphasis is on the words "who is employed" in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State Government. If he is not employed then Section 19 nowhere provides for obtaining such sanction. Further, under sub-section (2), the question of obtaining sanction is relatable to the time of holding the office when the offence was alleged to have been committed. In case where the person is not holding the said office as he might have retired, superannuated, be discharged or dismissed then the question of removing would not arise. Admittedly, when the alleged offence was committed, the petitioner was appointed by the Central Government. He demitted his office after completion of five years' tenure. In case where the person is not holding the said office as he might have retired, superannuated, be discharged or dismissed then the question of removing would not arise. Admittedly, when the alleged offence was committed, the petitioner was appointed by the Central Government. He demitted his office after completion of five years' tenure. Therefore, at the relevant time when the charge-sheet was filed, the petitioner was not holding the office of the Chairman of Goa Shipyard Ltd. Hence, there is no question of obtaining any previous sanction of the Central Government." Since in the present case, the question of obtaining sanction is relatable to the time of the petitioner's holding the regular post which was no more held by him by the time charge-sheet was filed and cognizance of offence was taken, the question of sanction under Section 19 of the Act did not arise. 7. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is with reference to Section 197 of Cr.P.C. inasmuch as the petitioner has also been indicted under several offences of I.P.C., and admittedly, no sanction as contemplated under Section 197 Cr.P.C. has been obtained. Needless to mention that Section 197 Cr.P.C. is applicable to the cases against both "in service public servants" and "retired public servants". The learned counsel has placed reliance on the following authorities of the Apex Court; (i) AIR 1955 SC 309 [Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu] (ii) AIR 1955 SC 287 [Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay] (iii) AIR 1996 SC 901 [R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala and another] (iv) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sheetla Sahai and others [III (2009) CCR 724 (SC)] 8. In the case of Amrik Singh (supra), upon a detailed discussion the Apex Court was of the view that if the discharge of official duty and the act of the accused complained of are inseparable, sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. would be necessary, but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. 9. In the case of Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph-18 of the judgment held as follows:- "18. 9. In the case of Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph-18 of the judgment held as follows:- "18. Now it is obvious that if Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The Section has content and its language must be given meaning. What is says is ? "when any public servant ?.. is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty?.." We have therefore first to concentrate on the word "offence"." 10. In the case of R. Balakrishna Pillai (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph-6 of the judgment held as follows:- "6. Xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx Our attention was next invited to a three-Judge decision in S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1841 ). The relevant observations relied upon are to be found in paragraph 17 of the judgment. It is pointed out that the words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed Section 197 (1) of the Code, are capable of both a narrow and a wide interpretation but their Lordships pointed out that if they were construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no part of an official duty to commit and offence, and never can be. At the same time, if they were too widely construed, they will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or is purported to be performed. The right approach, it was pointed out, was to see that the meaning of this expression lies between these two extremes. While on the hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection. The right approach, it was pointed out, was to see that the meaning of this expression lies between these two extremes. While on the hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection. Only an act constituting an offence directly or reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution. To put it briefly, it is the quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope of the afore-quoted words, the protection of Section 197 will have to be extended to the concerned public servant. This decision, therefore, points out what approach the Court should adopt while construing Section 197(1) of the Code and its application to the facts of the case on hand." 11. In the case of Sheetla Sahai (supra), the principles laid down or reiterated in some previous decisions were referred to, and in the facts and situation of that case on the point of sanction, it was held that when fresh decision was taken by the accused persons collectively keeping in view the exigencies of situation, and no material having been brought on record to show that they did the purported act for causing any wrongful gain to themselves or to third party or for causing wrongful loss to the State, sanction in terms of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was required for prosecution of the accused persons. 12. The Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala v. V. Padmanabhan Nair, AIR 1999 SC 2405 , in paragraphs-7 and 8 held as follows:- "7. That apart, the contention of the respondent that for offence that for offences under Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 120-B of the IPC sanction under Section 197 of the Code is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution is equally fallacious. This Court has stated the correct legal position in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munnipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 : (1955 Cri L.J. 857) and also Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 : (1955 Cri LJ 865) that it is not every offence committed by a public servant which requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Code, nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. Following the above legal position it was held in Harihar Prasad (1972 Cri LJ 707) (supra) as follows: "As far as the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B, read with Section 409, IPC is concerned and also Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are concerned they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no far." 8. Learned single Judge of the High Court declined to follow the aforesaid legal position in the present case on the sole premise that the offence under Section 406 of the IPC has also been fastened against the accused besides Section 409 of the IPC. We are unable to discern the rationale in the distinguishment. Sections 406 and 409 of the IPC are cognate offences in which the common component is criminal breach of trust. When the offender in the offence under Section 406 is a public servant (or holding any one of the positions listed in the Section) the offence would escalate to Section 409 of the Penal Code. When this Court held that in regard to the offence under Section 409 of the IPC read with Section 120-B it is no part of the duty of the public servant to enter into a criminal conspiracy for committing breach of trust, we find no sense in stating that if the offence is under Section 406 read with Section 120-B, IPC it would make all the difference vis-a-vis Section 197 of the Code." 13. Further, the Apex Court in the case of State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta, (2004) 2 SCC 349 held that it is no part of the duty of a public servant while discharging his official duty to commit forgery of the type covered by the offences under Sections 467/468/471 of I.P.C. Ultimately, it was held that want of sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is no bar for prosecution of the accused for the aforesaid offences. 14. 14. The latest view of the Apex Court in the case of Inspector of Police and another v. Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and another, 2015 (61) OCR (SC) 350, is that "indulgence of the officers in cheating, fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be in discharge of their official duty. Their official duty is not to fabricate records or permit evasion of payment of duty and cause loss to the Revenue". 15. In view of the settled principles of law, as referred to above, I am of the view that absence of sanction either under Section 19 of the Act or under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is not a bar in taking cognizance of the offences against the petitioner and the same also cannot afford him a ground to seek discharge under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Further, a perusal of the available materials on record does not support the contention of the petitioner that there is no prima-facie case against him to frame charge. 16. In the result, this criminal revision being devoid of merit stands dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed