JUDGMENT : G.R. Udhwani, J. 1. The order dated 06.10.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 2015 by the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot has been impugned in this Criminal Revision Application. 2. The impugned order has been passed in the proceedings lodged under provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (herein after referred to as 'the Act'). By the said order, the appeal came to be allowed and the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajkot in Criminal Misc. Application No. 735 of 2015 below Exh. 3 on 22.05.2015 was quashed and set aside with a further direction to the applicant not to indulge into domestic violence against Respondent No. 2. The Protection Officer and Women Police Station, Rajkot were also ordered to provide protection to Respondent No. 2 by the impugned order. By the impugned order, the applicants were further restrained from removing the second respondent from possession of the residential accommodation. The applicants were also restrained from depriving the second respondent of the essential services/facilities. By the impugned order, the proceedings of Criminal Misc. Application No. 735 of 2014 were expedited. 3. This Court had heard the matter at ex-parte admission stage on 06.11.2015 and reserved it for orders. Since, the applicants showed their willingness to settle the matter, the notice was issued, on depositing Rs. 15,000/-, which amount was ordered to be paid to the second respondent on her appearance. The second respondent appeared and ultimately the reference of the matter was made to the mediation by order dated 22.12.2015 with the consent of applicants and second respondent. Today, the report has been placed on record reporting failure of the mediation. 4. Since the order was reserved only for the aforesaid limited purpose, learned Counsel for the applicants has no objection if the order is pronounced today. 5. The second respondent is the wife of applicant No. 1 and other applicants are her in-laws. The second respondent lodged the complaint under the Act with the Protection Officer complaining about mental and physical torture; especially by her in-laws; deprivation of custody of one of her daughters; her desertion and her being driven away frequently from the house etc. She contended that right from the inception her marrying to applicant No. 1, she has been staying with joint family of her husband and has given birth to two children there. 6. She contended that right from the inception her marrying to applicant No. 1, she has been staying with joint family of her husband and has given birth to two children there. 6. The second respondent, inter alia, prayed for the protection order and order of restraining the applicants depriving her of the residential accommodation. During the pendency of the proceeding, the application at Exh. 33 praying for interim orders particularly a protection order as well as interim injunction against deprivation of her residential accommodation was preferred. During the pendency of the proceeding, ad-interim protection orders from time to time on the application by the second respondent came to be passed. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, the case under the Act was registered and upon service of summons on the applicants, they appeared and opposed the case and filed their replies. 8. During the course of hearing of this application at Exh. 33, it was contended by second respondent that right from the inception of her marriage, she was staying in the house in question and therefore, it was a shared house and she was entitled to reside therein. It was stated that she was being mentally and physically harassed and therefore, she has prayed for protection order. The maintenance allowed to her in other proceedings was also sought to be enhanced by the aforesaid application. The reliance was placed on certain authorities. 9. As against that, it was argued by the applicants that the Respondent No. 2 resorted to other proceedings against them under different laws praying for the similar reliefs and that no maintenance be granted to her as she had already got an order of maintenance. The reliance was placed on several authorities in support of above contention. 10. In rejoinder, the second respondent drew the attention of the Trial court to Section20 of the Act contending that the maintenance to be awarded under Section 20 of the Act, is in addition to maintenance under other laws and thus, she reiterated her claim as to maintenance under Section 20 of the Act. 11. 10. In rejoinder, the second respondent drew the attention of the Trial court to Section20 of the Act contending that the maintenance to be awarded under Section 20 of the Act, is in addition to maintenance under other laws and thus, she reiterated her claim as to maintenance under Section 20 of the Act. 11. It may be noticed from the above arguments advanced before the Trial Court that neither the second respondent nor did the applicants herein make any application or submissions to award rentals in lieu of residential accommodation to second respondent nor was there any prayer by the applicants against opponent No. 2 for vacating the residential accommodation. 12. The Trial Court while proceeding on the premise that it was not feasible for the parties to reside together in the same house and while relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (AIR 2007 SC 1118), on which learned Counsel for the applicants has placed heavy reliance before this Court as well, that the house of the father-in-law was not a shared house and therefore, the alternative arrangement in the form of advance rentals to the second respondent was warranted. 13. As to maintenance, the Trial Court declined it for the reason that in absence of change of circumstances or additional circumstances, other than those under which the Family Court had granted maintenance earlier, the jurisdiction was not exercisable. Other reason for denial of maintenance was lack of evidence as to income. 14. The Trial Court was also of the opinion that in view of decision of Supreme Court in Dhaval Rajendra Soni v. Bhavini Dhaval Soni (2011 Law Suit 1064), the only rights available to the second respondent was visitation rights between 10.00 a.m. and 12.00 a.m. on Sundays. 15. The Trial Court in its order also noted that the Court cannot pass such order of maintenance as would amount to allowing the main application. The Trial Court, thus, in the above circumstances, ordered the applicants to pay the sum of Rs. 30,000/- as advanced rentals at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per month and also order the second respondent to vacate the house on receipt of the above stated amount. 16. The Trial Court, thus, in the above circumstances, ordered the applicants to pay the sum of Rs. 30,000/- as advanced rentals at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per month and also order the second respondent to vacate the house on receipt of the above stated amount. 16. The matter was taken in appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 2015 in the Court of learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot, wherein the Appellate Court has examined the details of the case. After referring to the definition of domestic violence and the decision of the Supreme Court of S.R. Batra (Supra) and after noting arguments advanced before it, the Appellate Court after noting that several applications for protection made by the second respondent were allowed from time to time and such orders were never recalled, found that the Trial Court without assigning the reasons and on mere arguments made by the applicants, had refused to pass the protection order. It however, did not disturb the findings with regard to denial of maintenance under Section20 of the Act and after referring to the definition of shared house and while relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Priti Jiteshbhai Upadhyay v. Virendrabhai Upadhyay ( 2011 (3) GLR 2607 ), reversed the findings of the Trial Court granting rentals in lieu of right to residence to the second respondent. The appellate Court noted that the second respondent was staying in the shared house since her inception of marriage and had given birth to two children there and that suit seeking vacation of the said house against the second respondent was unconditionally withdrawn and thus, the right to secure possession from her was given up by the applicants. It was also noticed by the Appellate Court that in the proceedings at the interim stage, when there was no evidence regarding ownership of the house and in absence of prayer of the second respondent for rental, the order of the trial court was not in consonance with law. It was also noted that no application for possession of the house was made by the applicants herein and thus, the reliefs not prayed for, were granted by the Trial Court. 17. The Appellate Court however, did not pass any order with regard to custody of the minor daughter in absence of the opportunity to the parties to lead the evidence. 17. The Appellate Court however, did not pass any order with regard to custody of the minor daughter in absence of the opportunity to the parties to lead the evidence. Thus, the Appellate Court mainly granted the relief as regards the right to residence and order of protection in favour of the second respondent. 18. Learned Counsel for the applicants submitted that the Trial Court had passed a well reasoned order after considering the facts and circumstances and evidence on the record and that applicant No. 1 had not deserted the second respondent and prayer sought by the second respondent before the Trial Court were in contravention of the provision of the Act; that the Appellate Court ought not to have interfered in a mere interim order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot and that appropriate reasons were assigned by the Trial Court for refusal of protection order; that no error was committed by the Trial Court in interpreting the definition of 'shared house' as defined under sub section 2(s) of Section 22 of the Act as also in placing reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in S.R. Batra (Supra). It was contended that the applicant No. 2 was owner of the house in question and the applicant No. 1, who is husband of the second respondent had no right, title or interest in the said house and therefore, second respondent had no right to residence in the said house. It was argued that she having forcefully entered into the house had no right to claim such reliefs. 19. The undisputed facts on record are that application at Exh. 33 was merely an interim application not seeking final determination of the rights of the parties. It is settle legal position and that no relief, by an interim order, resulting into final reliefs that too in favour of any applicants can be granted by the Trial Court. Such legal position was noted by the Trial Court as discussed above. Still however, the interim order came to be passed and that too in absence of the prayer by the applicants, virtually allowing the application finally. The Trial Court ignored altogether that the suit by the applicant No. 2 for possession of the property from the Respondent No. 2 was unconditionally withdrawn. Still however, the interim order came to be passed and that too in absence of the prayer by the applicants, virtually allowing the application finally. The Trial Court ignored altogether that the suit by the applicant No. 2 for possession of the property from the Respondent No. 2 was unconditionally withdrawn. Even in absence of withdrawal of the suit, the Trial court could not have granted the relief to the applicants in absence of the prayer by them and that too at interim stage. Further, it could not have passed any order against applicant to vacate the house without her prayer for such an alternative relief. Not only that, the plain reading of provisions of the Act would indicate that an aggrieved person is the wife and it is she, who can make an application seeking orders of varied nature provided under the Act. The Court can either grant the reliefs or refuse them. So far as the interim applications are concerned, the Court cannot determine the issues so as to finally dispose them off. The relief of right to residence prayed by the second respondent was virtually rendered infructuous and that too without getting appropriate evidence on record on the issue as to whether the house was exclusively owned by the applicant No. 2 or whether it was the house of joint family or whether it was a shared house, wherein the second respondent was residing from the date of her marriage and had given birth to two daughters. In the opinion of this Court, the Trial Court has totally misconstrued S.R. Batra (Supra), wherein the issue was whether the house wherein the husband and wife reside from time to time, irrespective of the ownership of the husband, of that house can be said to be a shared house. In the very judgment, the Supreme Court took the note of the fact that the shared house would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by husband or house which belongs to joint family. Clearly, in the instant case, the Trial Court misconstrued the factual situation inasmuch as the fact as to whether the house was shared house was yet to be determined by the evidence and it was not justified for the Trial Court to jump to particular conclusion on the oral statements and submissions and that too in an interim application. 20. Clearly, in the instant case, the Trial Court misconstrued the factual situation inasmuch as the fact as to whether the house was shared house was yet to be determined by the evidence and it was not justified for the Trial Court to jump to particular conclusion on the oral statements and submissions and that too in an interim application. 20. As to the protection order, there does not appear to be any infirmity in the observations of the Appellate Court that during the pendency of the proceedings, on several occasions, the orders for protection were passed in favour of the second respondent. Those orders were not disturbed nor challenged by the applicants. Thus, they subsisted and the learned Trial Judge as if he was deciding the proceedings finally, unjustifiably recorded that the orders of protection can be passed only in the event of occurrence circumstances adverse to the second respondent after she occupies the rented premises. 21. In the opinion of this Court, the Appellate Court was justified in interfering with the interim order passed below application at Exh. 33 by the Court below. 22. One more aspect which is required to be born in mind is that arrangement ordered by the Appellate Court is merely in the nature of interim arrangement and it does not determine the rights and liability of the parties finally and therefore, also, considering the settled legal position that in revision application, the Revisional Court will be slow in interfering with the interim orders, the Revision Application is not required to be entertained. 23. In the above circumstances, present Criminal Revision Application fails and is accordingly rejected. 24. It goes without saying that the observations made herein are only qua the interim application at Exh. 33 presented in the Trial Court and has nothing to do with the merits of the case and it will be open for the Trial Court to decide the main matter in accordance with law after following due legal procedure and after affording the necessary opportunities to al l concerned. 25. Considering the nature of dispute between the parties and also the scheme of the Act (Section 12), it is directed that Criminal Misc. 25. Considering the nature of dispute between the parties and also the scheme of the Act (Section 12), it is directed that Criminal Misc. Application No. 735 of 2013 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajkot shall be decided as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of THREE MONTHS from the date of receipt of writ of this order.