JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. SARANGI, J. - The petitioner has filed W.P.(C) No. 8943/2014 to quash the order dated 26.02.2014 under Annexure-5 directing to recover the gratuity amount of Rs. 3,82,650/- to be appropriate towards the loss of Rs. 10,05,03,788/- caused to the Bank and the letter dated 09.06.2014 under Annexure-2/A passed by opposite party no. 3 rejecting his request for release of compassionate allowance. He seeks for a direction to the opposite parties to pay the gratuity as per the Wage Settlement dated 01.1.2007 and also compassionate allowance not more than 2/3rd of his pension. The petitioner has filed W.P. (C) No. 20270/2012 to quash the order of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority vide Annexure-16 dated 19.11.2008 and confirmation made thereof by the appellate authority by order dated 07.05.2009 under Annexure-17 and reconfirmation by the reviewing authority vide order dated 29.09.2012 under Annexure-23. He has prayed for a direction to the opposite parties to treat him in service and grant all consequential service and financial benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law. 2.The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner following a process of selection by the Banking Recruitment Board was selected as a Probationary Officer in Bank of India and pursuant to appointment order dated 13.10.1981 issued to his permanent home address at Bhubaneswar, he joined on 30.12.1981 at Bank’s Zonal Office at Patna in the State of Bihar. After completion of probation period of two years, he was confirmed as an Officer in the said Bank in the Jr. Management Grade Scale-I. He was promoted to Middle Manager, Grade Scale-II w.e.f. 01.04.1991 and then Middle Managing Grade Scale-III w.e.f. 28-12-1996. Thereafter, he was promoted to Sr. Management Grade Scale-IV w.e.f. 01.04.2002. As his date of birth according to the official record is 16.10.1952, his due date of retirement from service on attaining the age of superannuation is 31.10.2012. The petitioner had opted for ‘pension scheme’ from bank service as per option exercised by him. The petitioner has discharged his duty as a Branch Manager in different branches of the bank and also has been issued merit certificate dated 30.12.2006 by the Bank Management in honour of his completion of 25 years of unblemished track record together with award of a “Medallion” in recognition of his contribution to the growth of the Bank. The petitioner has discharged his duty as a Branch Manager in different branches of the bank and also has been issued merit certificate dated 30.12.2006 by the Bank Management in honour of his completion of 25 years of unblemished track record together with award of a “Medallion” in recognition of his contribution to the growth of the Bank. He has discharged his duty as Branch Manager in four States and five administrative Zones of the said Bank within the period of 25 years. While he was continuing in service, he was placed on suspension on 26.04.2007 on the allegation of misconduct and misappropriation of funds by middleman amounting to Rs. 10.15 Crores in deposit accounts of three State Government Organizations, namely Andhra Pradesh State Disaster Mitigation Society, Andhra Pradesh Vulnerable Reduction Fund Trust, both under Planning Department Andhra Pradesh State Secretariat and the Public University, Acharya NG Ranga Agricultural University constituted under Andhra Pradesh State Agricultural University Act, 1963. After suspension, the Zonal Manager, Bank of India, Hyderabad Zone called upon the petitioner to submit his explanation vide memo dated 07.08.2007 which was served on him on 08.08.2007 and accordingly, he submitted his written explanation on 27.08.2007. having not satisfied with the explanation, major penalty proceeding was initiated against him with issuance of articles of charge dated 01.03.2008 by the General Manager, HR, Head Office, the Disciplinary Authority and the same was served on the petitioner in person on 01.04.2008 through Zonal Office, Hyderabad. The petitioner submitted his written statement dated 10.04.2008 addressing to the Zonal Manager, HR, the Disciplinary Authority through Zonal Office, Hyderabad and denied the charges leveled against him. The Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 29.04.2008 ordered for initiation of departmental enquiry against him and appointed Mr. G. Chandra Sekaran, retired Asst. General Manager, Bank of India, Hyderabad, Zonal Office as the Enquiring Authority for conducting the departmental enquiry pursuant to which he commenced the hearing on 27.05.2008 and concluded the same on 31.05.2008. On conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the petitioner’s defence assistance Mr. S. Swaminathan, an Officer of the Bank of India, Hyderabad Zone submitted his written brief dated 14.06.2008 to the Enquiring Authority through e-mail followed by dispatch of the hard copies through Speed Post/Courier Service at the home address of the Enquiring Authority in Tamilnadu. On conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the petitioner’s defence assistance Mr. S. Swaminathan, an Officer of the Bank of India, Hyderabad Zone submitted his written brief dated 14.06.2008 to the Enquiring Authority through e-mail followed by dispatch of the hard copies through Speed Post/Courier Service at the home address of the Enquiring Authority in Tamilnadu. The enquiry report was forwarded to the petitioner under the cover of the Disciplinary Authority’s letter dated 07.08.2008 which he received on 25.08.2008 through Zonal Office, Hyderabad. Thereafter he submitted his representation dated 29.08.2008 to the Disciplinary Authority through Speed Post in response to the findings of the enquiry report. For the self-same allegation, CBI also commenced investigation and lodged the FIR dated 31.07.2007 in the Special Court of CBI, Hyderabad on 01.08.2007 showing the petitioner as accused no.1. No incriminating documents or assets of disproportionate nature found during search of his residence and locker on 02.08.2007. He was interrogated by the CBI Team during the period from August, 2007 to January, 2008. The petitioner was also summoned to BSFC, Bangalore but he has not been paid his traveling bill for such interrogation. CBI arrested him on 23.10.2008 and he was enlarged on bail on 15.11.2008. Thereafter, he was served with the dismissal order on 27.11.2008 at the Zonal Office, Hyderabad Zone which is at page 175 of the brief. Against the said order of imposition of major penalty by the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority and the appellate authority confirmed the said order of punishment which was served on the petitioner at Hyderabad at page 183 of the brief. Against the said order, he preferred review and the reviewing authority also rejected the same vide order dated 29.09.2012 which was served on the petitioner at his permanent address at Plot No. 2084, Sabara Sahi Lane, Budheswari Colony, Bhubaneswar. It also reveals from the document annexed to the writ petition that the mercy petition under Annexure-18 dated 12.09.2009 and representation for reduction of punishment under Annexure-20 dated 27.01.2012 and reminder dated 20.08.2012 under Annexure-21 and subsequent reminder for non-communication of the result of the review petition dated 11.10.2012 issued by the petitioner to the opposite parties that correspondences have been made from his local address from Plot No. 2084, Sabara Sahi Lane, Budheswari Colony, Bhubaneswar. The petitioner after discharge from his service is staying at his own residence at Bhubaneswar and has made correspondences from his home address. The petitioner has not been paid allowance and gratuity as per the Wage Settlement dated 01.11.2007. He has filed W.P.(C) No. 8943/2014 which is pending for consideration. Hence the petitioner approached this Court to quash the order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority as confirmed by the appellate authority and reconfirmed by the reviewing authority and consequentially direct for release of compassionate allowance and gratuity, as mentioned above. 3.The matter was listed on Board on 07.01.2016 under the heading “Fresh Admission”. It is urged that since the pleadings are complete, the matter should be placed for final disposal. At this point of time, Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 3 raises preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petition and submits that the question of maintainability of the writ petition be decided first. Though he was called upon to address the Court both on maintainability and merit, he submitted that unless the question of maintainability of the writ petition is decided, he will not address this Court with regard to the merit of the case. Therefore, this Court is constrained to proceed to decide the maintainability of the writ petitions as a preliminary issue. 4.Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 3 raises preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition and submits that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the writ petitions are not maintainable before this Court. To substantiate his contention he has relied upon the case of K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and others, AIR 1954 SC 207 , Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and others v. Kalyan Banerjee, (2008) 1 SCC (L& S) 782 and State of Rajasthan and others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and another, AIR 1985 SC 1289 . 5.Per contra, Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a part of the cause of action having arisen in State of Orissa, the writ petition is maintainable. 5.Per contra, Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a part of the cause of action having arisen in State of Orissa, the writ petition is maintainable. It is stated that though the copies of the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority under Annexure-16 as well as the appellate authority under Annexure-17 have been served on the petitioner in Secunderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the order passed by the reviewing authority under Annexure-23 on the review preferred by the petitioner against the order of appellate authority has been served on the petitioner in his home town Bhubaneswar which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Thus a part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and as such this Court has jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions. To substantiate his contentions he has relied upon the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India and others. 2014(9) SCALE page 244. 6.On the basis of the facts pleaded above, it appears that while the petitioner was serving as a Bank Officer at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradehs he was subjected to disciplinary proceeding and was placed under suspension. Thereafter by following disciplinary proceeding, a major penalty of dismissal from service has been imposed by the Disciplinary Authority which has been confirmed by the appellate authority vide Annexures-16 and 17 respectively. The copies of both the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority were served on the petitioner at Hyderabad in his Zonal Office address. Against the order of appellate authority, the petitioner preferred review and the reviewing authority vide Annexure-23 communicated the order in his home address at Bhubaneswar which is at page 239 of the brief which has been duly acknowledged by the petitioner. 7. The contention raised by Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 3 that no part of cause of action having arisen in the home State of Odisha, the writ petition is not maintainable is absolutely a misconceived statement. 8.On perusal of the record, it appears that the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate authority vide Annexures-16 and 17 at page 175 and 183 of the brief respectively indicated that the same had been served on the petitioner at Hyderabad. 8.On perusal of the record, it appears that the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate authority vide Annexures-16 and 17 at page 175 and 183 of the brief respectively indicated that the same had been served on the petitioner at Hyderabad. So far as the order passed by the reviewing authority in Annexure-23 at page 239 of the brief is concerned, the same has been served in the home address of the petitioner. The contention raised by Mr. G.A.R. Doara, learned Senior Counsel that the reviewing authority has called upon the petitioner to receive the review order at Hyderabad is not borne out on the record. Rather the record speaks that the same has been served on the petitioner at his home address at Bhubaneswar. 9.Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure states as follows: “20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises- Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally words for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises” 10.Section 141 of Civil Procedure Code states as follows: “141. Miscellaneous Proceedings Xxx xxx xxx Explanation – In this Section, the expression “proceeding” under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution”. Section 141 of the CPC though deals with Micellaneous proceedings, the explanation clearly indicates the expression “proceeding” under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11.Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 3 strenuously urged that the procedure envisaged under Section 20 of the CPC is not applicable to the writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11.Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 3 strenuously urged that the procedure envisaged under Section 20 of the CPC is not applicable to the writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12.The object of Article 226 of the Constitution of India being to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties, it was pointed out that if the procedure of a suit had to be adhered to in the case of writ petitions, the entire purpose of having a quick remedy would be defeated. In Babubhai v. Nandalal, AIR 1974 SC 2105 the apex Court observed that a writ petition being essentially different from suit, it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into writ proceeding. Section 141 of the CPC was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 by which an Explanation was inserted to the Section which after the amendment reads as mentioned above. The reason for amendment was stated thus in the Statement of Objects and Reasons: “The question of whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a ‘Proceeding in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Section 141 has been the subject matter of controversy. While the Andhra Pradesh High Court holds that Section 141 applies to such proceedings. The Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras and Punjab High Courts have held that Section 141 does not apply to such proceedings and in the circumstances, it is being clarified that Section 141 does not apply to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution”. Therefore, taking into consideration, the above mentioned prospects, it was held by the apex Court that even if the procedure of a Civil Procedure Code is not applicable strictosenso the principle embodied therein is applicable to a writ proceeding. 13.Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 3 refers the Constitution Bench judgment of the apex Court in K.S. Rashid & Son (supra) which states as follows: “There are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; one is that the power is to be exercised “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”, that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs “must be within those territories” and this implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. It is with reference to these two conditions thus mentioned that the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is to be determined” 14. He has placed reliance on paragraph-9 of Eastern Coalfields Ltd and others (supra) which states as follows: “9. As regards the question as to whether situs of office of the appellant would be relevant, this Court noticed decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v. STAT and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P. to hold: (Kusum Ingots case, SCC p. 263, para-26-27)” 26. The view taken by this Court in U.P. Rastriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning of the expression ‘cases arising’ in Clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is not that extent the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not confined to statute enacted by Parliament or the legislature of a State, which would include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an executive order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory authority. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instruction issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. Situs of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a Court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a Court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority” 16.In State of Rajasthan and other (supra), the apex Court held that since the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court, therefore, the said Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such application filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17.Referring to the above judgments in the present case, it is made clear that if the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Court, then this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application in view of the proposition laid down by the apen Court as mentioned (supra). 18.Reliance has been placed in Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) by Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner wherein the short question that has been considered by the apex Court is that whether the Patna High Court was correct in taking the view that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. For answering the said question reference has made to Article 226 of the Constitution. “Article 226 –Power of High Courts to issue certain writs-(1) notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo qarranto and certiorari, or any of them or the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article-32". (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article-32". 19.While interpreting the aforesaid provision, the Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 , held that the writ Court would not run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or the authority affected by the writ must be amenable to Court’s jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insist on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which High Court exercises jurisdiction. 20. In K.S. Rashid and Son (supra) referred by Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for opposite party no. 3, the apex Court took similar view and held that the writ Court cannot exercise its power under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction. It is also held that the exercise of power conferred by Article 226 was subject to a two-fold limitation, firstly, the power is to be exercised in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and secondly, the person or authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue writ just be within those territories. Both Election Commission, India (supra) and K.S. Rashid and son (supra) have been considered by a larger Bench of seven judges of the apex Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India and another, AIR 1961 SC 532 . The vies taken by two Constitution Bench of the apex Court in both the cases have been confirmed by the larger Bench of the apex Court which stated that unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which cannot be denied, writ Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 21.The interpretation given by the two Constitution Benches in the aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. 21.The interpretation given by the two Constitution Benches in the aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. Clause-1 (A) was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution (42) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended Clause (2) of Article 226 reads as follows: “226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs- (1) xxxx (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercise by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories”. 22.On a plain reading of the amended provisions in Clause (2), it is clear that the High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meanings as envisaged under Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure as mentioned above. The expression “cause of action” has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. 23.In view of the wider meaning attached to Article 226(2) it is to be examined whether the cause of action wholly or partly arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court or not. In Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra), the apex Court considering the cause of action and various judgments on that score inparagraph-19 held as follows: “19. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction”. 24. Applying the provisions contained in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India after amendment to the facts of the present case since a part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court meaning thereby the copy of rejection of review application having been served on the petitioner is his home address which is within the territorial jurisdiction of his Court and subsequent correspondence has been made by the petitioner from his home address to the authority and vice-versa, prima facie it denotes that a part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 25.In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that since a part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court within the domain of Article 226(2) read with Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions. Therefore, the question is answered accordingly. 26.The writ petition may be placed for final hearing. Petition disposed of.