JUDGMENT : ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. 2. By way of the present application preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 22.11.2011 passed in connection with Complaint Case No. C-1405 of 2011 by which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 3. According to the complainant, the petitioner had issued a cheque amounting to Rs. 27,98,425/- in the name of the petitioner and on being presented before the Bank, the cheque got dishonoured due to insufficiency of fund. A notice in this regard was issued by the complainant to the petitioner which was duly received by him and in his reply the petitioner tried to shift his burden by concocting and fabricating a false story. 4. The allegation made in the complaint has been supported by the complainant in his solemn affirmation and the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant in course of inquiry conducted under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have also corroborated the prosecution case as narrated in the complaint. 5. Taking into consideration the materials available on record, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya took cognizance of the offence vide impugned order dated 22.11.2011. 6. The said order dated 22.11.2011 has been challenged by the petitioner after about four years by filing the present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 9th October, 2015. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the cheque presented before the bank did not bear the signature 3 of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the cheque was stolen away by the complainant and by misusing the same a false claim has been raised. 8. No plausible explanation has been given by the learned counsel for the petitioner for filing the present application after undue delay of about four years since the date on which the order impugned has been passed. Even otherwise, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. 9.
8. No plausible explanation has been given by the learned counsel for the petitioner for filing the present application after undue delay of about four years since the date on which the order impugned has been passed. Even otherwise, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. 9. In my view, the ground on which the quashing application is being pressed is in the nature of defence, which has to be considered at the stage of trial. No other illegality in the impugned order passed by the court below has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. Accordingly, the application, being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed. Application dismissed.